Integrating knowledge through communication: an analysis of expert-decision making interactions by Mengis, Jeanne & Eppler, Martin
Integrating Knowledge through 
Communication: 
An Analysis of Expert-Decision Maker 
Interactions 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation presented by 
Jeanne Mengis 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervised by 
Prof. Dr. Martin J. Eppler 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the 
Faculty of Communication Sciences 
University of Lugano 
 
 
 
for the degree of 
Ph.D. in Communication Sciences 
 
 
January 2007 
 
  
 
Integrating Knowledge through Communication 
An Analysis of Expert-Decision Maker Interactions 
 
 
Jeanne Mengis 
 
  
 
Board 
 
Advisor 
Prof. Dr. Martin J. Eppler 
 
 
Reviewer 
Prof. Dr. Andrea Back 
Prof. Dr. Ivan Snehota 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Officially submitted to the PhD committee of the Faculty of Communication 
Sciences, University of Lugano in January 2007 
 
© 2007 Jeanne Mengis, University of Lugano. All rights reserved. 
 
 Abstract 
This thesis sheds light on the communication processes through which experts and 
decision makers integrate their domain specific knowledge in decision making. 
Understanding knowledge integration as a communicative process, the study 
analyzes the communicative challenges that are present when communicating expert 
knowledge across its disciplinary boundaries and discusses practices to overcome 
them. We particularly focus on face-to-face conversations as this communicative 
form is central to decision making and knowledge processes and outline the role of 
visual boundary objects. On the basis of an interdisciplinary conceptual part – 
including literature on knowledge integration, sense-making, communication, and 
decision making – we develop a phase framework for the knowledge communication 
between experts and decision makers and a framework for the management of 
conversations from a knowledge perspective. The two frameworks are used to 
analyze the knowledge communication in three case studies: the knowledge 
communication between IT-analysts and managers, between facility management 
consultants and their clients, and between policy analysts and public policy makers. 
The major communicative challenges that we found recurrently in these cases were: 
lacking common ground, lacking big picture, and the non constructive handling of 
conflict. To deal with these challenges, experts and decision makers recurrently 
engage in the combined practices of boundary spanning (primarily: face-to-face 
conversations) and in the use of boundary objects (primarily: visualizations). In an 
integrative attempt, we present a model for knowledge integration and discuss a first 
empirical validation through the analysis of a classroom experiment that is based on 
a hidden profile situation. We show that the use of visual boundary objects has a 
moderating effect on the model. Next to discovering and describing many context-
rich problems and practices in knowledge communication, the thesis further 
develops the key notions of boundary objects and boundary spanning for the 
context of knowledge management. 
 
 
vi 
 Acknowledgements 
Martin J. Eppler, my adviser and professor, my most heartfelt thanks go to you. The 
very collaborative interactions with you were infinite sources of learning and 
continued to surprise me. Without your generous support and faith in me, this work 
wouldn’t have been possible.  
Many thanks to the Professors David Lazer and Jane Fountain for having invited me 
to Harvard University. You gave me the chance to live in an environment 
enormously rich in stimuli and challenges. 
I would like to express my gratitude to the members of the Foundation for Research 
and Development of the University of Lugano who financed my PhD. 
My recognition to the Swiss National Science Foundation for having sustained me as 
a prospective researcher and funded my 8-months-stay in the United States. 
Particular thanks go to Peter Schulz, Marco Borghi, Marco Baggiolini, Albino 
Zgraggen, and Ivan Snehota for having supported me in this undertaking. 
Thank you Professor David Brinberg. Your methodological insights, enthusiasm, 
and support were enormously precious. 
Thank you Laura. You always were an exquisite interlocutor and a dear friend. 
My gratitude also goes to Filippo Bortone, Marta Cola, Thomas Stehle, Laura Illia, 
Alessio Manzan for generously lending me your technical equipment. 
Thanks to Anna Linda Musacchio Adorisio, Cristina Broch, Giuseppe Pagani, 
Antonella La Rocca, Sabrina Rozalen, Stefano Vizzola, Alessandra Zamparini, 
Yvonne Zorzi, my colleagues. 
Thank you Ralph Lengler for your suggestions and feedback. 
Infinite thanks to my family and friends.  
A special thank you to Gisèle, so much of what I am is because of you. 
And finally, my most tender thank you goes to you Enrique, for cooking infinite late 
arrival dinners, relaxing my shoulder tensions, correcting my English, changing my 
mind with your unique spirit and joy, for believing in me when I doubted most 
strongly, and for giving me the most generous freedom while staying as close to my 
heart as you do.  
 vii 
  
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 1 
1 Introduction to the Object of Study………………………………………………………………… 3 
2 Motivation and Relevance…………………………………………………………………………… 7 
3 Research Questions…………………………………………………………………....................... 10 
4 Methods………………………………………………………………………………………………. 13 
5 Procedure and Structure …………………………………………………………………………… 16 
 
Chapter 2 - A Communicative Approach to the Study of Knowledge 
Integration in Decision Making – Background and Frameworks 19 
1 The Process of Knowledge Integration……………………………………………..................... 21 
2 The Expert – Decision Maker Situation…………………………………………………………… 28 
3 A Phase Framework of the Knowledge Communication of Experts and Decision Makers 
along the Decision Making Process………………………………………………….................. 33 
4 The Role of Conversations for Knowledge Integration and Approaches for their 
Management…………………………………………………………………….............................. 52 
5 Section Summary……………………………………………………………………....................... 77 
 
Chapter 3 – Three Theory Building Case Studies 79 
1 The Scope of Building Theory from Case Studies……………………………………………… 81 
2 Methods………………………………………………………………………………………………. 82 
3 Overview on the Three Contexts of Knowledge Communication……………………………. 87 
4 The Knowledge Communication Process between Experts and Decision Makers and its 
Main Challenges and Practices……………………………………………………………………. 92 
5 Phase Independent Challenges and Practices in the Knowledge Communication 
between Experts and Decision Makers……………………………………………………….… 118 
6 Section Summary……………………………………………………………………..................... 158 
 
Chapter 4 - A Communicative Model of Knowledge Integration in Decision 
Making and the Role of Knowledge Visualization 161 
1 A Communicative Model for Knowledge Integration in Decision Making………………… 163 
2 The Role of a Collaborative Visualization Tool within the Process of Knowledge 
Integration……………………………………………………………………...........................… 176 
 
Chapter 5 - A First Empirical Evaluation of the Model of Knowledge 
Integration Considering the Role of Collaborative Knowledge Visualization 187 
1 Methods……………………………………………………………………................................... 189 
2 Results……………………………………………………………………...................................... 200 
3 Section Discussion: Implications and Limitations…………………………………………….. 215 
 
viii 
  
 
Chapter 6: Concluding Discussion and Outlook 223 
1 Resuming Major Findings………………………………………………………………………… 225 
2 Contributions to Practice……………………………………………………………………......... 228 
3 Scientific Contributions, Limitations, and Suggestions for Future Research……………… 230 
 
References 239 
 
Appendix 1 
Appendix 1 – Case #1: The Knowledge Communication between the Scholars of the 
Brookings Institution and U.S. Policy Makers…………………………………… 3 
Appendix 2 – List of Interviewees for Brookings Case…………………………………………… 55 
Appendix 3 – Case #2: The Knowledge Communication between Facility Management 
Consultants and their Clients (pom+)……………………………………………. 56 
Appendix 4 – List of Interviewees for pom+ Case………………………………………………. 100 
Appendix 5 – Case #3: The Knowledge Communication between IT-specialists and Business 
Managers (InSure)…………………………………………………………………. 101 
Appendix 6 – List of Interviewees for the InSure Case…………………………………………. 163 
Appendix 7 – The Decision Maker Version of the Case Study Used for the Experiment….. 164 
Appendix 8 – The Expert Version of the Case Study Used for the Experiment…………….. 168 
Appendix 9 – The Information Cues of the Expert and Decision Maker Versions of the Case 
Study………………………………………………………………………………… 175 
Appendix 10 – Overview on the let’s focus Suite……………………………………………….. 178 
Appendix 11 – Functionalities of the let’s focus Positioner 2.1………………………………… 179 
Appendix 12 – Distribution of Items – Test of Normality……………………………………….. 185 
Appendix 13 – Original Scales with Factor Loadings and Cronbach Alphas Prior to Scale 
Adjustments………………………………………………………………………... 187 
Appendix 14 – Group Comparison of Means between Tool and Non-Tool Condition…….. 188 
Appendix 15 – Pearson’s Inter-Construct Correlations Controlling for the Tool/Non-Tool 
Condition……………………………………………………………………………. 189 
Appendix 16 – Multiple-Sample Analysis between Tool and Non-Tool Groups Showing 
Unstandardized Values……………………………………………………………. 190 
 
 
ix 
  
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Three Units of Analysis for Knowledge Integration Understood on a Social Level.……… 25 
Table 2: Prescriptive Labels and Definitions Attributed to Conversations in Organizations………. 56 
Table 3: Conversational Principals and Rules Regarding the Message………………………………. 68 
Table 4: Conversational Principles and Rules Regarding the Conversation Process……..……….. 69 
Table 5: Conversational Principles and Rules Regarding the Group Dynamics…………………….. 70 
Table 6: Conversational Principles and Rules Regarding the Mental Models……………………….. 71 
Table 7: Conversational Principles and Rules Regarding the Conversational Intent……………….. 73 
Table 8: Conversational Principles and Rules Regarding the Outer Context of Conversations....... 74 
Table 9: Contextual Similarities and Differences between the Case Studies (Sampling Choices) 84 
Table 10: Overview on the Three Organizations Studied………………………………….…………… 88 
Table 11: Functions of Co-located, Face-to-face Communication (e.g. Meetings, Events, 
Conversations) ………………………………………………………………….………………. 156 
Table 12: Factor Loadings, Percentages of Variance Explained, Cronbach Alphas, Mean Values, 
and Standard Deviations of First Order Latent Variables………………………………….. 202 
Table 13: Results of the Two Qualitative Questions: “What are the two major 
advantages/disadvantages of the use of the visual tool during the exercise?”………… 204 
Table 14: Pearson’s Inter-Construct Correlations……………………………………………………...... 207 
 
x 
 List of Figures 
Figure 1: Main Research Question, Sub-questions, and Two Focal Point Questions……………….. 11 
Figure 2: Triangulation of Methods in Addressing Research Questions……………………………… 14 
Figure 3: The Common Ground between Experts and Decision Makers – Two Situations………… 32 
Figure 4: The Knowledge Communication Process between Experts and Decision Makers………. 38 
Figure 5: Key Dimensions and Questions of Conversation Management…………………………….. 61 
Figure 6: A Framework for the Management of Conversations in Organizations from a Knowledge 
Perspective………………………………….………………………………….…………………… 75 
Figure 7: Major Challenges along the Phase Model of Knowledge Communication between 
Experts and Decision Makers……………………………….……………………………………. 93 
Figure 8: The Direct Links between the Brookings Institution and Companies, Universities, and 
Governmental Organizations at the Level of the Board of Directors……………………….. 95 
Figure 9: Instances of Feed-Forward and Feedback Loops (Refinement, Alignment, and 
Readjustment Loops) within the Interaction between the Consultants of pom+ and their 
Clients………………………………….………………………………….………………... 103 
Figure 10: Example of a Policy Brief of the Brookings Institution (With Outlined Standard 
Elements)………………………………………………………………………………………… 110 
Figure 11: Cross-Case Analysis: Impact of Push-/Pull Situation and of Existence of Organizational 
Ties on Knowledge Communication Process………………………………………………. 116 
Figure 12: Major Phase-independent Challenges and Practices in the Knowledge Communication 
between Experts and Decision Makers across the Three Case Studies………………… 119 
Figure 13: Excerpt of the Glossary of a Preparatory Study for an IT Application Project at InSure: 
The Verbal Definition Is Supported by a Visual Illustration……………………………….. 134 
Figure 14: Visualization is Used to Reduce the Complexity of the Content and to Expand the 
Existing Common Ground (Example of pom+, which Shows Pictograms that Refer to 
(Metaphoric) Language that is Understandable Across Knowledge Boundaries)……... 139 
Figure 15: Visualization Makes Planned Processes and Areas of Activity More Tangible (Example 
of pom+ Showing an Extended Organigram of the Organization)………………………..140 
Figure 16: Visualization is Used to Provide an Overview (Example of InSure Outlining the 
Summary of the Proposed IT Measures) ………………………………………………….... 142 
Figure 17: Visualization Used to Provide a Summary (Example of InSure, with which IT-specialists 
Aim to Give an Overview of the IT-Applications and of the Technical Process that is 
Needed for the Calculation of Interests) …………………………………………………….. 143 
Figure 18: Visualization Used to Outline Differences in Perspectives (Example Drawn from pom+ 
Showing the Commercial, Geographical (Physical), and the Maintenance Points of 
View on a Real Estate Object)…………………………………………………………………. 145 
Figure 19: A Reflective Model for Knowledge Integration in Decision Making……………………... 164 
Figure 20: Inverted U-Relationship of Task Conflict and Knowledge Integration…………………… 173 
Figure 21: Example of a Collaborative Visual Tool – Mindjet MindManager Pro 6 ………………… 176 
Figure22: Moderation Effect of the Use of Interactive Visual Tools (Hm1, Hm2, Hm3, Hm4) ……. 178 
 xi
 Figure 23: Tool Condition: Conversers, who Aim to Integrate Knowledge, Mainly Rely on the 
Construction of the Big Picture and of Common Ground………………………………… 185 
Figure 24: Non-Supported Condition: Conversers, who Aim to Integrate Knowledge, Mainly Rely 
on Balanced Participation and Conflict……………………………………….……………… 185 
Figure 25: Template (Based on a Compound Metaphor) and Exemplary Solution for the First Part 
of the Task: .Understanding Corporate Objectives, Problems, and Defining Evaluation 
Criteria……………………………………….……………………………………………………. 193 
Figure 26: Template and Exemplary Solution for the Second Part of the Task: Evaluating 
Proposals of Five Knowledge Management Projects……………………………………… 193 
Figure 27: Group Conversing with the Use of let’s focus Positioner…………………………………. 194 
Figure 28: Results of the Structural Equation Analysis for the Model of Knowledge Integration... 209 
Figure 29: Knowledge Integration for Groups Interacting with the Support of the Visual Tool….. 211 
Figure 30: Knowledge Integration for Groups Interacting without a Visual Support………………. 211 
Figure 31: Necessity for a Process View on (Visual) Boundary Objects ……………………..……… 235 
xii  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outline 
1 Introduction to the Object of Study......................................................................... 3 
2 Motivation and Relevance ........................................................................................ 7 
3 Research Questions................................................................................................. 10 
4 Methods.................................................................................................................... 13 
5 Procedure and Structure......................................................................................... 16 
 
 
3 Introduction to the Object of Study 
 
1  Introduction to the Object of Study 
In the last decades knowledge has become ever more specialized and distributed. The 
distribution of expertise has profound implications for the coordination and integration 
mechanisms across knowledge boundaries (Brusoni et al., 2001; Carlile, 2004; Grant, 
1996). One area, where the specialization of expertise and the concurrent need for knowl-
edge integration have progressed is decision making. Ever more often, decision makers find 
themselves in an ‘authority-expertise chasm’ (Eppler, 2004), a situation in which they have 
the functional power to take decisions, but lack the sufficient expertise to fully understand 
the issue of decision. Decision makers gather specialists from various domains pertinent to 
the decision to take in order to cope with the growing complexity (Sutcliffe, 2005) of (or-
ganizational) problems and solutions and to deal with the ambiguities and uncertainties 
(Callon et al., 2001; Weick, 1995) they perceive in fast changing market environments 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). This thesis focuses on how experts communicate their specialized 
knowledge to decision makers and how the latter integrate it in their decision making. 
These interactions can be direct such as co-located face-to-face conversations, events, or 
presentations and they can be indirect and take place in the form of reports, websites, and 
standard forms. We discuss crucial communication challenges that arise when aiming at 
integrating specialized knowledge in decision making and present practices to overcome 
them. Particular focus is directed towards face-to-face conversations and collaborative 
visual boundary objects.  
The growing role of expert advice in decision making can be observed in manifold 
contexts. In the political arena, for example, the Swiss public administration, which itself 
provides expertise to the public policy makers, assigned 6100 mandates to external experts 
in 2004 alone, for which it spent 490 million Swiss Francs (307 million Euro) 
(Geschäftsprüfungskommission der Schweiz, 2006). In the private sector, management 
consultancies, for example, steadily have become ever more important actors in supporting 
the strategic decisions of companies (Wright, 2002). In Switzerland, management consul-
tancies increased their total revenues in the last twenty years (from 1984 to 2005) by 340 
percent (with a total revenue of 1.1 billion Swiss Francs in 2005) (ASCO, 2006).  
The increased demand for expert knowledge can be explained by the variety of func-
tions and roles attributed to experts within decision making. In the first place, referring to 
experts allows decision makers to absorb the uncertainty of the environment. By trusting in 
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the (scientific) ‘truth’ of experts’ statements, decision makers can reduce the complexity of 
the decision to take (see also: Luhmann, 2000). The experts gain this trust because they are 
vested with a symbolic power (Bourdieu, 2001), for which their analysis becomes an offi-
cial opinion that is believed to transcend individual interests (Henry, 2002). The decision 
makers can refer to this objectivized truth to legitimize decisions (Evers & Menkhoff, 
2003) and to – in part - give away their own responsibility in case a decision leads to un-
predicted, negative consequences.  
Apart from these situations, where it can be doubted that decision makers actually 
aim to integrate the experts’ knowledge in their decision making, there are many instances 
in which decision makers call in experts because they have a primary interest in incorporat-
ing the experts’ specialized knowledge in their decision making. They aim to inquire into 
cause-and-effect relationships that underlie the issue of decision, they want to explore pos-
sible courses of action, to assess the risks associated with them, and to better understand 
the decisions’ implications (Haas, 1992). In other words, decision makers and experts aim 
to develop a shared understanding of the issue of decision, on the basis of which the for-
mer can take their decisions.  
However, the development of a shared understanding between experts and decision 
makers (and across knowledge boundaries in general) is a challenging undertaking and 
there are specific requirements for a communication apt to integrate knowledge in decision 
making. First, the communication is challenged by the fact that experts and decision mak-
ers have expertise in different fields, talk different languages (Bechky, 2003), interpret 
same events differently, have local meanings of the same goals (Dougherty, 1992), lack 
common ground (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002; Bechky, 2003), and are immersed in specific 
practices (Scarbrough et al., 2004; Wenger, 1998). These differences demarcate ‘knowledge 
boundaries’ (Carlile, 2002, 2004) that lie across areas of specialization and make the 
communication and integration of knowledge difficult.  
A second challenge is to find forms of communication in which the complexity of the 
issue can be adequately represented, which means that the communication is both rea-
sonably accurate and simple enough to be meaningful across knowledge boundaries. 
Knowledge integration requires the synthesis of individuals’ disparate specialized knowl-
edge into situation-specific systemic knowledge (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002: 1031). The aim is 
thereby not to level the existing knowledge gap between experts and decision makers. In 
fact, unlike a logic of knowledge ‘transfer’ (Szulanski, 2000), the aim of knowledge inte-
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gration is to maintain or even foster a functional degree of specialization, while being able 
to combine and apply this highly specialized knowledge into joint actions and decisions 
(Eisenhardt & Santos, 2000). As a consequence, knowledge integration requires synthetic 
modes of communication that yet can represent, in an adequate manner, the complexity of 
the issue of decision. For the integration of knowledge in decision making, the request to 
communicate this ‘in-between-complexity’ adds to the challenge of translating meaning 
across knowledge boundaries. 
Finally, challenges in the knowledge communication are bound also to the relational 
dimension. The experts’ knowledge can represent a threat to the authority (Black et al., 
2004) of decision makers such that the latter decide to discount the knowledge provided by 
the experts. Discarding knowledge is particularly probable when the consideration of a 
certain insight of an expert would imply changes in current power structures (e.g. the de-
partment of one decision maker would loose in importance) (Carlile, 2004). Micropolitics 
of knowledge – that is coalitions among subgroups (Lazega, 1992: 14) of decision makers 
– facilitate specific knowledge claims in certain situations, while inhibiting them in others. 
In this way, the implications of the integration of specific expertise signify changes in 
power structures, which often leads to resistances to these changes. 
One mode of communication, which is of particular importance in the study of the 
knowledge communication between experts and decision makers are co-located face-to-
face conversations and thus represent a first focal point of this thesis. Face-to-face conver-
sations not only represent the “prototypical case” of how people develop, share, and inte-
grate knowledge in social interaction (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 28). It is also the mode 
of communication by which experts and decision makers frequently interact and which is 
particularly apt to address the challenges present in the integration of knowledge in deci-
sion making. In the political context, for example, public policy makers invite domain ex-
perts to expose their views and arguments in ‘hearings’, where after a brief presentation by 
the experts, decision makers can ask specific questions and engage in a more interactive 
form of communication. In the private sector, managers that seek insights from experts 
such as engineers, IT-specialists, insurance underwriters, or financial risk analysts, do not 
limit their interactions to written requests, reports, and lengthy recommendations, but 
engage extensively in face-to-face conversations, for example by participating in meetings, 
workshops, and presentations and by leading informal talks during breaks or lunches.  
Co-located conversations are especially suited to meet the above mentioned chal-
lenges of knowledge integration as they allow for the co-construction of meaning and for a 
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collaborative sense-making (Weick, 1979). Because of the physical co-presence of inter-
locutors, conversation partners have the opportunity to flexibly adapt their language and 
the complexity of discourse to the characteristics of their vis-à-vis. They can continuously 
readjust their mode of communication while receiving verbal, para-verbal (e.g. tone of 
voice), non-verbal (body language) feedback by their communication partners (Krauss & 
Fussell, 1991). In addition, and as argued Clark and Brennan, the construction of common 
ground among interlocutors is particularly favored in face-to-face conversations (thanks to 
co-presence, visibility, contemporality, etc.) (Clark & Brennan, 1991). Finally, conversa-
tions are important for the integration of knowledge because, in conversations, experts and 
decision makers can nurture well-working interpersonal relations, an aspect which is cen-
tral to social knowledge processes (von Krogh, 1998). In conversations, people create a 
shared experience (Dixon, 1997) and gradually build trust among them (Harkins, 1999).  
Although conversations are the preferred mode of how experts and decision makers 
engage in collective sense-making and how knowledge is integrated in decision making, 
conversations are also problematic for the effective integration of knowledge. Conversa-
tions are ephemeral as contributions vanish the moment they are pronounced. For this 
reason, conversations lack persistence (they are neither traceable nor correctible) (Bregman 
& Haythornthwaite, 2001) and the process that led to reach a certain decision can be re-
traced only with difficulties. Conversations are essentially temporal, both in terms of the 
progression of the single speech acts and also in their wider context within a community or 
organization (Flores et al., 1988). This limits the combination, comparison, and evaluation 
of large amounts of information items, all activities central to decision making in complex 
environments. Finally, conversation partners do not benefit from the knowledge integra-
tion potential inherent in conversations as their conversations are often characterized by 
suboptimal communicative patterns, such as unequal turn-taking (Ellinor & Gerard, 
1998), inattentive listening (Isaacs, 1999; McCambridge, 2003; Ross, 1994; Topp, 2000), 
overhasty interpretations, defensive arguing (Argyris, 1996), and the like. 
In view of the centrality, but also limitations of conversations, the role of collabora-
tive visual boundary objects in supporting co-located face-to-face conversations is a par-
ticularly intriguing argument and a second focus of this thesis. Boundary objects are arte-
facts, which inhabit several intersecting social worlds and are meaningful across these vari-
ous contexts (Carlile, 2002: 452; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Although the people of each 
social context attribute different meanings to the artefact, it nevertheless provides a struc-
ture that is common to all these contexts. This common structure allows for a means of 
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translating and transforming knowledge so that common understandings can be developed 
across knowledge boundaries and different interests can be negotiated and aligned. In the 
literature, it has been discussed that visuals, such as Gantt charts, workflow matrices, 
computer simulations, or geographical maps, can take over the function of boundary ob-
jects (Carlile, 2002; Star & Griesemer, 1989), yet there are few investigations on their role 
in supporting collocated face-to-face conversations (for an example, see: Fischer, 2001). 
We will argue that visuals, which are used during face-to-face conversations, can take over 
the function of boundary objects and offer various advantages in overcoming knowledge 
boundaries. First, they provide a shared resource to which conversation partners can refer 
and thus more easily create common ground (Carlile, 2002). They can make abstract 
thought more tangible (it gains a visual reality) and by encouraging analogical reasoning 
(for example through visual metaphors) conversation partners can build on the already 
existing common ground among them and extend it to novel areas (Inns, 2002; Kraut et 
al., 2003). In addition, the semantics and syntax of visuals are looser defined than those of 
verbal language (i.e. conventions of visual signs in terms of their signified or meaning are 
less strict). By using these more flexible, rough, visual approximations it is possible to ex-
press something that is difficult to put in words (i.e. implicit knowledge). As the visual is 
used in combination with talk, the discussion about its meaning can surface potential mis-
understanding or ambiguities. This clarification process leads to a gradual development of 
common ground. Finally, we will also argue that images have an integrative capacity, as 
the various elements of which they are composed are visually related to one another. In 
this way, visuals help to maintain the big picture of a complex issue (Dimond & Beau-
mont, 1974; Kosslyn, 1978; Maruyama, 1986).  
With these two main focuses – co-located face-to-face conversations and collabora-
tive visual boundary objects - we aim to outline in the following thesis how the integration 
of knowledge takes place between experts and decision makers within their communica-
tions. 
2  Motivation and Relevance 
There are multiple reasons why we believe it is relevant to study the communication 
and integration of knowledge between experts and decision makers. On a substantial level, 
we have already argued that the role of experts is steadily increasing within decision mak-
ing since decisions have to be taken on ever more complex issues and in ever more uncer-
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tain, ambiguous, and fast moving environments. With the progressing specialization of 
expertise and the concurrent need for knowledge integration also in decision making, we 
have to understand how these coordination and integration mechanisms unfold, what the 
challenges to the integration are and what practices are used to address this task effec-
tively.  
Other motivations for the investigation are more conceptual in nature. First, with the 
present thesis, we aim to contribute to a communication perspective (Baecker, 1999; Ep-
pler, 2004; Heaton & Taylor, 2002; Reinhardt & Eppler, 2004; Reinmann & Mandl, 
2004) on issues of knowledge management. Such a perspective is important if we conceive 
knowledge not as a static object or unit, but rather as a dynamic, context dependent proc-
ess and action (Cook & Brown, 1999). A dynamic view of knowledge emphasizes that 
knowledge is created, shared, and integrated in social interactions (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995). In such a perspective, the study of co-located face-to-face conversations is a central 
concern as they represent a proto-typical form of the interactions within which social 
knowledge processes take place (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). In the knowledge manage-
ment literature, knowledge is often viewed as an object (for an overview, see: Alavi & 
Leidner, 2001) that can be embedded and stored, for example, in individual members, in 
roles, and organizational structures (Walsh & Ungson, 1991). Knowledge as an object can 
be possessed and transferred to new potential owners by moving the ‘knowledge reservoirs’ 
from one context to another, and it can be finally applied in action (Argote & Ingram, 
2000). Opposite and complementary to this view (but not excluding it) is the idea of 
knowledge as a part of action, as an activity of knowing1. Knowing as action is understood 
as a situated interaction of the knower(s) with the world “using knowledge as a tool” 
(Cook & Brown, 1999: 388). Focusing on this situated dimension of knowledge and 
knowing, the question for social knowledge processes, such as knowledge integration, is 
not so much how knowledge or knowing can be transferred, distributed, or disseminated, 
but more how it can be “generated in” other contexts, groups, or organizations (Cook & 
Brown, 1999: 398). The communication, and in particular, the face-to-face conversations 
represent the direct context of these “generations” and are a major means of how people 
engage in knowing, sense-making, and knowledge integration (Alavi & Leidner, 2001; 
Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). A conversations is not “limited to a merely additive back and 
forth exchange of information” or of knowledge. “It can also afford the generation of new 
 
1 To express this distinction and to stress the emphasis on an activity (see: Weick, 1979 on the distinction 
between organization and organizing), the title of this thesis is ‘integrating knowledge’ and not ‘knowl-
edge integration’.  
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knowledge, since each remark can yield new meaning as it is resituated in the evolving 
context of the conversation” (Cook & Brown, 1999: 393). In this way, we understand 
knowledge processes to be processes of communication. As a consequence, by studying 
patterns of communications in the forms of communicational practices and challenges, we 
sharpen the understanding of the way people create and integrate knowledge. The expert-
decision maker interaction represents a rich context, in which we can conduct investiga-
tions towards this more conceptual aim. 
The study of the processes of communication through which decision makers aim to 
integrate expert knowledge in decision making is further relevant because it aims to con-
tribute to a better understanding why it is difficult to manage even explicit knowledge 
(Carlile, 2002; Heaton & Taylor, 2002). It has been argued that a major inhibitor of 
knowledge sharing is the lacking motivation of the people knowing (Bock & Young-Gul, 
2002; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Osterloh & Frey, 2000). In view of formal and in-
formal organizational structures (e.g. functional divisions, retribution systems, career 
paths), processes (e.g. evaluation processes of individual employees and not teams; time 
management in projects), and cultures (e.g. competitive vs. collaborative spirit), employees 
are often poorly motivated to share knowledge with their colleagues. Yet, in the expert-
decision maker situation, both experts and decision makers are motivated to share and 
communicate their knowledge with each other. Decision makers deliberately refer to ex-
perts and pay them for their services. At the same time, experts’ primary role is to advise 
and provide their expertise to decision makers. However, the knowledge integration proc-
ess remains challenging. Previous research has shown that this is true, first, for the qualities 
of the knowledge – e.g. its tacit dimension (Nonaka, 1994; Polanyi, 1966; von Krogh et 
al., 2000) – second, for the characteristics of the person to whom the knowledge aims to be 
conveyed – e.g. the person’s absorptive capacity (Szulanski, 1996) – and, third, for a spe-
cific organizational context in which knowledge integration takes place– e.g. inflexibility of 
organizational ties (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002). We add to these argumentations that knowl-
edge integration is inherently difficult also for the process of communication within which 
it takes place. Thus, with this thesis, we aim to provide empirical support for the claim that 
the integration of knowledge is a difficult endeavor because of the characteristics of the 
communication process in which the knowledge integration unfolds.  
A final minor conceptual motivation for the proposed object of study is that we aim 
to contribute to the body of research on communication in decision making (DeSanctis, 
1987; Hirokawa & Salazar, 1999; Hollingshead, 2001; Poole & Hirokawa, 1996; Stasser 
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& Stewart, 1992). In the decision making literature, the effectiveness with which informa-
tion is handled has been questioned very prominently on a cognitive level (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Simon, 1955, 1960) for that a decision maker uses specific heuristics and 
biases (e.g. framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), availability heuristic (Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1973)) to choose and elaborate the limited information he/she receives from the 
environment. While the primary focus of such studies was on the individual decision maker 
and on choice, in more recent years, it has been shown that the effective use of information 
in decision making is also challenged because of the communication process that takes 
place between various decision makers (Dennis, 1996; Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Wit-
tenbaum et al., 2004). Stasser et al. could show, for example, that there is a tendency to 
address mostly information items that are already shared among communication partners 
whereas those information items, which are uniquely held by single interlocutors, are not 
shared even if this information would be central for the decision to take (Stasser & Stew-
art, 1992; Stasser et al., 2000). With this thesis, we would like to add to this literature by 
studying the expert-decision maker interaction. We will focus on how knowledge is co-
constructed in communication (not the mere exchange of information items) and how the 
challenges related to this communication obstruct the effective integration of domain spe-
cific expertise in decision making.  
3  Research Questions 
In view of the outlined object of study and the motivations that stand behind it, we 
organize the present investigations around a few key questions that are represented in syn-
thesis in Figure 1. 
The main research question we would like to answer with this thesis is: Which com-
municative challenges have to be overcome when experts and decision makers attempt to 
integrate their knowledge in decision making and what practices do they have in place to 
address these challenges? In order to answer this question, we deem it necessary to qualify 
it in two sub-questions. One question aims to approach the communicative challenges and 
practices of the knowledge integration between experts and decision makers from a process 
view, the other is more structural and aims to identify challenges and practices that are not 
specific to a single phase in the overall communication process between experts and deci-
sion makers, but that manifest themselves throughout the process within the single interac-
tions between experts and decision makers.  
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Which communicative challenges have to be overcome when experts and decision makers attempt 
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communication process and that impact the 
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Based on the premise that experts do not convey their insights and expertise in a one-
time contact, but rather interact repeatedly with decision makers along their decision mak-
ing process, we ask: Which communicative challenges and practices are of particular sig-
nificance at which moment of the overall knowledge communication process? The overall 
communication process between experts and decision makers can take place over several 
weeks or months, starts with the identification of the experts on behalf of the decision 
makers and ends with the actual integration and application of the expert knowledge in the 
decision making. We aim to find out whether there are challenges in the communication 
that are specific to the various phases of this overall communication process. The chal-
lenges are likely to differ already for the fact that the knowledge asymmetry varies accord-
ing to the subject under discussion (Bromme et al. 2004) and to the phase of the interac-
tion. In the moment, for instance, when the decision makers brief the experts upon the 
decision that has to be taken, they know much more about the context of the decision than 
the experts, but might have difficulties in framing the demand in such a way that the ex-
perts then can work on it. Later on, when the experts have conducted their analysis and 
convey their insights to decision makers, the knowledge asymmetry is inversed. We believe 
that applying a process perspective permits more precision in the analysis of the challenges 
and practices in communication and thus constitutes one lens of our analysis of the knowl-
edge communication between experts and decision makers.  
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With the second sub-question – Which communicative challenges and practices gen-
erally characterize the expert – decision maker communication that are not specific to one 
phase of the overall communication process and that impact the single interactions?  - we 
aim to analyze whether there are challenges and practices in the communication that can 
be observed throughout the single phases of the overall communication process and that 
more generally characterize the expert-decision maker interaction. Such challenges are 
more basically related to the situation of the knowledge and power asymmetry that exists 
between experts and decision makers and to the activity of integrating expert knowledge in 
decision making. These general challenges manifest themselves (explicitly or less visibly) in 
the single interactions between experts and decision makers. For example, for the fact that 
the expert has in-depth knowledge on a rather narrow area of expertise, he is likely to give 
recommendations on a level of detail, which is inadequate to the requirements of the deci-
sion makers as well as to their level of expertise. This aspect might be challenging across 
the single phases of the macro communication process between experts and decision mak-
ers and can be observed within their single interactions.  
The division of the main research question into these two sub-questions reflects the 
idea that the management of a process, of an activity or of an objective involves the man-
agement of such on a macro level (how should the activity/objective be coordinated among 
other activities/objectives?) as well as on a micro level (how could the activity/objective be 
structured into sub-activities and organized and coordinated in time?) (Pettigrew et al., 
2006; Zan et al., 1993). In an analogue manner, if we aim to understand which communi-
cational challenges and practices characterize the experts - decision maker interaction (not 
at least also to give some prescriptive indications of how experts and decision makers 
could manage their communication), we have to take into account both the overall com-
munication process that unfolds over a period of several weeks or months (overall-process) 
and the single interaction (micro-process), which takes place, for example in the case a co-
located face-to-face conversation, in a time period of 30 minutes. We ask, on the one hand, 
how does the overall communication process between experts and decision makers unfold 
in time and how is the single interaction characterized (micro-interaction patterns)? 
Finally, as exposed in the introduction to the object of study, we aim to analyze the 
knowledge communication between experts and decision makers with two specific focuses: 
co-located face-to-face conversations, and collaborative, visual boundary objects. In par-
ticular, we ask: What roles do face-to-face conversations have for the integration of 
knowledge in decision making and, second, how do visual boundary objects support inte-
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gration efforts? The two questions are interlinked in so far as we believe that while the 
characteristics of both forms of communication are of particular value for the expert – 
decision maker situation, they also mutually complement each other. On a more general 
level, Wenger argued that for the co-construction of meaning, the duality of ‘participation’ 
and ‘reification’ is central (Wenger, 1998). While conversations can be viewed as an in-
stance of participation, visual boundary objects represent a type of reification. Reification 
is a process in which we give a referable form (e.g. through objects, designations) to the 
fluidness of our experience. Around these reifications we can organize our co-constructions 
of meanings. Participation, on the other hand, designates the involvement as a person and 
gives the possibility of mutual recognition and of elaborating coordinated meanings. It 
stresses the importance of the relational, the informal, and accounts for the tacit dimension 
of knowledge. According to Wenger “reification always rests on participation: what is 
said, represented, or otherwise brought into focus always assumes a history of participa-
tion as a context for its interpretation. In turn, participation always organizes itself around 
reification because it always involves artefacts, words, and concepts that allow it to pro-
ceed” (Wenger, 1998: 67). In this way, the two focal questions we propose aim to investi-
gate into the role of the interplay between conversations (participation) and visuals (reifica-
tion) for the integration of knowledge in decision making.  
4  Methods 
We inquire into the above outlined object of study and guiding research questions 
with a mixed method research design and triangulate qualitative (multiple case studies) and 
quantitative (class room experiments) methods (Creswell, 2003; Jick, 1979) (see: Figure 2). 
More specifically, we use a “sequential exploratory strategy”, which develops in two 
phases starting with qualitative data and analysis and later moving to more quantitative 
analysis (Creswell, 2003: 215). Using such a design, the focus of the study lies on the quali-
tative data in order to explore a phenomenon. We integrate the various data during data 
interpretation. Empirical data is used to enrich conceptual descriptions and less so to pro-
vide validations of conceptual claims. 
On the conceptual side, we use an interdisciplinary approach by integrating selected 
contributions from knowledge management (e.g. Brown & Duguid, 2001; Carlile, 2004; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Scarbrough et al., 2004), sense-making (e.g. Weick, 1995; e.g. 
Weick et al., 2005), decision making (e.g. Eisenhardt & Bourgeois III, 1988; Mintzberg et 
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al., 1976), communication studies (e.g. Clark & Brennan, 1991; Grice, 1975; Schwartz-
man, 1989; Watzlawick et al., 1967), socio-psychology (e.g. De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; 
Stasser & Stewart, 1992), and sociology (e.g. Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Giddens, 1984; 
Goffman, 1967). Risking a too syncretic view, we gain focus in having a bias towards con-
tributions that implicitly or explicitly share a social constructivist understanding of knowl-
edge. For the more specific literature reviews, in particular the ones on knowledge integra-
tion and conversation management, we used explicit selection criteria to further gain con-
sistency in our choices.  
Empirically, we address the main research question, its sub-questions, as well as both 
focal point questions first from an explorative standpoint. We thereby particularly focus 
on the macro and contextual aspects of the knowledge communication between experts 
and decision makers. We attempt to engage in mid-range theorizing on the basis of case 
studies (Eisenhardt, 1989) and present a cross-case analysis of three explorative cases. The 
case studies are based on semi-structured interviews and on the qualitative analysis of 
communication documents (articles, reports, website, etc.). We consolidate the manifold 
findings from the explorative case study work by drawing on the literature and propose 
more refined hypotheses particularly with regard to the second sub-question (micro chal-
lenges and practices of the single expert-decision maker interaction) and the second focal-
point question (role of visual boundary objects) (see: Figures 1 & 2). We then conduct a 
comparative classroom experiment (using a between-subjects single factor group design) 
and analyze quantitative data of a post-test questionnaire with the structural equation 
modeling approach (Gefen, 2000; Kline, 1998).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
For a more detailed description of the specific methods we employed for the case 
studies and the experiment, we refer to the specific sections at the outset of the Chapters 3 
and 5.  
Main research question 
2nd subquestion:
>case studies
>experiment
1st subquestion:
>case studies
1st focal question:
>case studies
>experiment
2nd focal question: 
>case studies
>experiment
Figure 2: Triangulation of Methods in Addressing Research Questions 
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With the research design we use, the objective is not to ‘validate’ conceptual ideas 
and frameworks with empirical data in order to generalize them to a population. Rather, 
as mentions Yin: "case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical proposi-
tions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, 
does not represent a "sample", and in doing a case study, your goal will be to expand and 
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalization)" (Yin, 2003: 10). The interplay between observations based on empirical 
data and the deliberations out of theory serve to develop thicker descriptions of a phe-
nomenon. On the one hand, the three conceptual frameworks we present serve to alter our 
perspectives and observations on the phenomenon of knowledge integration in decision 
making. On the other, the insights from the empirical observations help to refine and 
sharpen our conceptual descriptions. This is true both for the case study work and also for 
the experiment. We approached the case study work with almost no theoretical concepts in 
mind, only knew our object of study, and a few guiding questions. Advancing in the case-
study work, we discovered interesting recurring themes, went back to theoretical readings 
and refined our thinking. In this way, we experienced a sort of inspiring interactive dance 
between empirical and theoretical observations. En-route, even the most core ideas of the 
work changed. For example, we moved from an idea of ‘knowledge transfer’ to one of 
‘knowledge integration’, from a focus on outcome to one on process (with regard to 
knowledge integration), and shifted from a more functional perspective of communication 
for knowledge processes to one where communication is constitutive for knowledge inte-
gration. While this sort of approach is well accepted for qualitative case study work 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1993; Yin, 2003), it is less common for quantitative empirical en-
deavors. Yet, also with regard to the classroom experiment, we forcibly – but luckily – had 
to proceed in a similar way. While the first statistical tests of the data disconfirmed several 
of our initial hypotheses, we explored data further, went back to the literature, and itera-
tively refined our thinking. One example is the development of the claims on the relation-
ship between conflict and knowledge integration. The statistical approach of structure 
equation modeling revealed to be a useful formal structure to engage in such refinements 
and readjustments in thinking. In this way, we engaged, to some extent, in a use of ex-
perimental studies as proposed by Karl Weick (1977). He argued that an understanding of 
the work with experiments that is less oriented on control and precision, but more on en-
hanced ‘requisite variety’, redundancy, and creative chaos, could be of great value. Ex-
periments, in this form, give the possibility to think in novel and more concrete ways: 
“Perhaps if we could simply improve the tangibility of the problems we think about and 
the trappings we work with, the quality of our thinking would improve” (Weick, 1977: 
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126). In this sense, both the qualitative case study work and the classroom experiment 
serve to the further refinement of conceptual ideas.  
5  Procedure and Structure 
This PhD thesis is an integral part of a larger research project on the “knowledge 
communication between domain experts and decision makers in the realm of manage-
ment” (see: www.knowledge-communication.org). Under the guidance of Professor Martin 
J. Eppler, two researchers worked for two, respectively three years on the project. In its 
realm, we conducted ten case studies, developed a visualization software for the support of 
face-to-face conversations, and conducted an experiment. The present thesis presents se-
lected findings of this project, yet, as we hope, forms an integrative whole in itself. 
We structure the thesis in the following chapters:  
This first chapter provides an introduction to knowledge integration in decision mak-
ing, argues for the importance of the object of study, presents research questions, and the 
overall research design. 
In the second conceptual chapter, we argue for a communicative perspective on 
knowledge integration in decision making and review the literature, not only on knowledge 
integration, but also on the management of conversations from a knowledge perspective. 
We develop two frameworks for the analysis of the knowledge communication between 
experts and decision makers who attempt to integrate knowledge in decision making. The 
first framework allows for a diachronic analysis of the more macro communicative chal-
lenges and practices present in the knowledge communication process (an analysis of the 
communicative challenges along the process of the knowledge communication). We then 
address the question of the role of face-to-face conversations in knowledge integration and 
discuss the issue of how conversations can be managed on a micro-level. We provide an 
overview on the state of the art on the literature on conversation management and propose 
an integrative framework for the management of conversations from a knowledge perspec-
tive. With this second framework, we are able to study the phase unspecific, more micro 
challenges and practices of the knowledge communication. We use both frameworks as 
analytical lenses for the study of the three case studies discussed in Chapter 3.  
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In Chapter 3, we aim to further develop a communication theory on knowledge inte-
gration by presenting the cross-case analysis of three explorative case studies on the 
knowledge communication between experts and decision makers. Referring the reader to 
the Appendices 1, 3, and 5 for the description of the single cases, the cross-case analysis 
outlines both process-specific and unspecific challenges and practices of the knowledge 
communication as it can be observed across the various real-life contexts. Particular atten-
tion is given to the discussion of the roles of face-to-face conversations and visual bound-
ary objects for the integration of knowledge across knowledge boundaries. 
In Chapter 4, we synthesize the theoretically and empirically elaborated concepts on 
knowledge integration by proposing a reflective communication model of knowledge inte-
gration in decision making. The model is based on the findings of the cross-case analysis of 
Chapter 3, in which it turned out that three communicational challenges in particular have 
to be overcome in order to successfully integrate knowledge. These challenges are: the lack 
of the big picture, relational tensions, and the lack of a sufficient common ground. We add 
to these three elements further insights from the literature discussed in Chapter 2 (balanced 
participation, moderate content conflict) to complement the model for knowledge integra-
tion. After the discussion of the model for knowledge integration, we refine our thinking 
on one additional finding of the case studies: the role of visual boundary objects. We apply 
the concept to the support of face-to-face conversations and propose five specific hypothe-
ses for the (moderating) effect of the use of collaborative visual tools on the model of 
knowledge integration.  
Chapter 5 presents a first evaluation of the model for knowledge integration and of 
the proposed moderation hypotheses presented in Chapter 4. With a comparative experi-
mental study, we examine if some challenges of knowledge integration process become 
more (less) important when supporting face-to-face conversations through collaborative 
visual boundary objects. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis in a final discussion on the major findings and on the 
contributions to research and practice. We further outline limitations of the present work 
and propose suggestions for future research.  
The references and an extensive appendix, in which, among others, the reader can 
find the full description of the case studies, can be found at the end of the thesis. 
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21 The Process of Knowledge Integration 
1  The Process of Knowledge Integration 
Differentiation and the consequent need for integration and coordination is a classi-
cal theme in organizational studies (Galbraith, 1995; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). With the 
more recent discussion on expertise and knowledge as key resources of organizations 
(Grant, 1996b), the discourse on specialization and integration is led more specifically with 
regard to knowledge. Grant describes this idea as follows:  
“If knowledge is a critical input into all production processes, if efficiency requires that it is 
created and stored by individuals in specialized form, and if production requires the applica-
tion of many types of specialized knowledge, then the primary role of the firm is the integra-
tion of knowledge” (Grant, 1996a: 377).  
Organizations that aim to create complex products or services, solve multifaceted 
problems, and make decisions in uncertain environments, need to manage and facilitate the 
collaboration of people with different expertise and specializations. In view of the central-
ity of knowledge integration for the organizational activity, a still rather small but growing 
community of scholars started to focus on this particular knowledge process (Alavi & Ti-
wana, 2002; Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2004; Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003; Dougherty, 1992; 
Eisenhardt & Santos, 2000; Grant, 1996a). Knowledge integration has been understood on 
an individual and on a social level.  
On an individual level, knowledge integration is conceived as a learning process in 
which an individual incorporates new information into existing knowledge structures and 
creates a robust and usable understanding (Linn et al., 2004). The ‘old’ knowledge is not 
simply replaced by other ideas, neither is the new idea simply assimilated in the existing 
knowledge structure. Instead, knowledge integration takes place through a processes of 
interlinking, contextualizing, comparing, interpreting, and evaluating (Linn et al., 2003). 
All these processes are understood cognitively and researchers are interested in instruc-
tional designs that can enhance them (Davis, 2003: 23). 
On the other hand, knowledge integration is discussed on a social level, in particular 
in relation to organizations (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002; Grant, 1996a; Huang & Newell, 
2003; Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002). On a social level, knowledge integration is under-
stood as the process of incorporating different domain specific knowledge into systemic 
group knowledge and of applying it in action such as tasks or decision making. Knowledge 
integration lives up to the simultaneous need for a specialization of knowledge and for 
coordination among specialized knowledge areas. Given our object of study – the knowl-
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edge communication between experts and decision makers - we focus, in the following, on 
this social conceptualization of knowledge integration. 
The process of knowledge integration is distinguished from the one of knowledge 
transfer. The aim of knowledge integration is not to minimize specialization and diver-
gence through the exchange of knowledge, but to maintain or even foster specialization, 
yet being able to incorporate the specialized knowledge into joint actions and decisions. 
The expert-novice interaction, for example, aims at leveling the novice’s knowledge at the 
height of the expert’s and comes closer to an idea of knowledge transfer or knowledge 
sharing. Instead, for the expert - decision maker interaction, the specialization is functional 
and the aim is at no time to dissolve it, which is why this situation is more accurately con-
ceived as one of knowledge integration. Relationships that may have begun as ones of 
knowledge transfer become ones of knowledge integration in the moment when specializa-
tion among alliance partners arise (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2000). 
Carlile and Rebentisch are more elaborate about this distinction and say that models 
of knowledge integration are preferable to ones of transfer not only if the various sources 
of specialized knowledge highly depend on each other, but also if the amount of novelty 
arisen in the environment between the moments when knowledge is stored and retrieved 
(fast changing versus stable environments) is considerably high. They claim that when nov-
elty and dependence are high, transfer models are insufficient because they do not envision 
transformation processes (Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003). From this point, knowledge trans-
fer models can be criticized more generally to be founded on a mechanical understanding 
of knowledge processes and on a conception of knowledge as an object rather than as an 
activity and practice (Cook & Brown, 1999). Knowledge is situated (Bechky, 2003) and 
bound to practice (Brown & Duguid, 2001) and cannot be transferred, distributed, or dis-
seminated, but has to be “generated in” other contexts, groups, or organizations (Cook & 
Brown, 1999: 398). Knowledge always has to be actively constructed in a new context, it 
has to be transformed (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2004). Unlike knowledge transfer, the term 
‘knowledge integration’ better accounts for the transformations involved in the interactions 
between people using “knowledge as a tool” (Cook & Brown, 1999: 388). With this, the 
focus on knowledge integration (as opposed to knowledge transfer) implies that the wide-
spread object-view of knowledge (Argote & Ingram, 2000; Walsh & Ungson, 1991) is 
replaced by a conceptualization of knowledge as a part of action, an activity of knowing. 
Although we believe it is important to explicitly distinguish between knowledge transfer 
and knowledge integration, not all authors who researched in this area do so, but quite 
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freely interchange the concepts of knowledge transfer, sharing, and integration. This is why 
in the following review on the existing work on knowledge integration, we also included 
some studies that do not explicitly refer to the term as such (e.g. Hargadon & Sutton, 
1997). For an inclusion criteria we have chosen studies that discuss the knowledge process 
in a situation where different sources of specialized knowledge highly depend on each 
other to be able to carry out their tasks and where the context involves a considerable 
amount of novelty and uncertainty (Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003).  
The integration of knowledge from various specialized areas is conceived by scholars 
as a challenging process. The main challenge is given by the fact that the specialization of 
knowledge creates ‘knowledge boundaries’ where knowledge differences across the 
boundaries are not only a question of degree, but of kind (Carlile, 2002). People across a 
knowledge boundary do not only know things with different depth (specialization), they 
know different things, and most of all, they know the same things differently (differences 
in perspectives) (Dougherty, 1992). Similarly, Brown and Duguid found that knowledge is 
sticky across practice boundaries, but flows within one community of practice (Brown & 
Duguid, 2001). Scarbrough et al. hence stated that “knowledge integration within a project 
involves overcoming barriers to the flow and transfer of knowledge arising from pre-
existing divisions of practice among team members”(Scarbrough et al., 2004: 1582). To 
overcome knowledge boundaries, knowledge has to be translated and transformed, shared 
meanings elaborated, and different interests that arise from the different perspectives have 
to be negotiated (Carlile, 2004).  
In view of this general challenge that is intrinsically bound to the situation of knowl-
edge integration, researchers have analyzed what further challenges exist and what facili-
tates the integration of knowledge. They have done so typically on three different levels of 
analysis: 1.knowledge integration within a group (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002; Okhuysen & 
Eisenhardt, 2002; Piontkowski & Keil, 2004; Piontkowski et al., 2004); 2. within an or-
ganization (across occupational groups, departments, geographical locations, etc.) (Bechky, 
2003; Carlile, 2004; Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003; De Boer et al., 1999; Eisenhardt & San-
tos, 2000; Grant, 1996a; Huang & Newell, 2003; Ravasi & Verona, 2001); and 3. across 
organizations (within networks of organizations) (Grant, 1996a; Hargadon & Sutton, 
1997; Swan & Scarbrough, 2005). A general overview on the research on knowledge inte-
gration can be found in Table 1. 
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Group Organization 
Network of Organiza-
tions 
Focus of 
Research 
Analyze the micro communi-
cative process within which 
individuals pool individual 
knowledge and recombine it 
to create group-level knowl-
edge and to apply it in deci-
sion making  
Analyze the organizational 
barriers and enablers to 
knowledge integration on a 
level of organizational proc-
esses, structures, routines, 
and culture  
Inquire into the mechanisms 
that meaningfully combine 
specialized knowledge of 
different organizations or 
industries within an organiza-
tion or a network of organiza-
tions to allow for innovation 
and high flexibility. 
Knowl-
edge In-
tegration 
Settings 
• (experimental settings) of 
groups interacting 
(Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 
2002; Piontkowski et al., 
2004) 
• virtual teams (Alavi & Ti-
wana, 2002) 
• across occupational 
groups (Bechky, 2003; 
Swan & Scarbrough, 2005) 
• across functions (Carlile, 
2002) 
• across departments 
(Dougherty, 1992) 
• across geographical loca-
tions (Swan & Scarbrough, 
2005) 
• in mergers (De Boer et al., 
1999) 
• between projects and 
organization as a whole 
(Scarbrough et al., 2004) 
• across organizations in 
formal and informal inter-
firm networks (Grant, 
1996a; Hargadon & Sutton, 
1997; Swan & Scarbrough, 
2005) 
Factors 
Consti-
tuting or 
Influenc-
ing on 
Knowl-
edge In-
tegration  
• micro-interaction patterns 
(can be structured by me-
dia and formal interven-
tions) (Okhuysen & Eisen-
hardt, 2002) 
• transactive memory (Alavi 
& Tiwana, 2002; Piont-
kowski et al., 2004) 
• common ground (e.g 
shared contextual knowl-
edge) (Alavi & Tiwana, 
2002) 
• organizational ties and 
forms (e.g. self-managing 
teams) (Alavi & Tiwana, 
2002) 
• knowledge management 
systems (Alavi & Tiwana, 
2002) 
• level of common knowl-
edge/ground (amount and 
type of difference between 
knowledge sources) 
(Bechky, 2003; Grant, 
1996a) 
• amount of dependence 
between sources of 
knowledge (Carlile, 2004) 
• type of task (Grant, 1996a; 
Scarbrough et al., 2004)  
• prior learnings 
(Scarbrough et al., 2004) 
• novelty & variability (Carlile 
& Rebentisch, 2003; Grant, 
1996a)  
• coordination mechanisms 
(Bechky, 2003) 
• organizational structure 
(De Boer et al., 1999; 
Grant, 1996a; Ravasi & Ve-
rona, 2001) 
• type and extent of knowl-
edge boundaries (Carlile, 
2002) 
• use of boundary objects to 
transform local meanings 
(Carlile, 2002; Star & Grie-
semer, 1989) 
• engage in boundary-span-
ning practices (Bechky, 
2003; Grant, 1996a) 
• attributes of networks and 
forms of relationships 
(strong ties, interpersonal 
links, relational contracts) 
(Grant, 1996a; Hargadon & 
Sutton, 1997) 
• importance attributed to 
technology (Swan & Scar-
brough, 2005) 
• organizational structure 
and routines (e.g. discon-
nected domains, continu-
ously forming and dis-
banding teams, reward 
system) (Hargadon & Sut-
ton, 1997) 
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Main Au-
thors 
(Alavi & Tiwana, 2002; Ok-
huysen & Eisenhardt, 2002; 
Piontkowski & Keil, 2004; 
Piontkowski et al., 2004) 
(Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2002; 
Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003; 
De Boer et al., 1999; Dough-
erty, 1992; Eisenhardt & 
Santos, 2000; Grant, 1996a; 
Huang & Newell, 2003; 
Ravasi & Verona, 2001; Scar-
brough et al., 2004; Swan & 
Scarbrough, 2005) 
(Grant, 1996a; Hargadon & 
Sutton, 1997; Swan & Scar-
brough, 2005) 
Table 1: Three Units of Analysis for Knowledge Integration Understood on a 
Social Level 
On a group unit of analysis knowledge integration is defined as “the synthesis of 
individual's specialized knowledge into situation-specific systemic knowledge” (Alavi & 
Tiwana, 2002: 1030). Scholars aim to understand how knowledge is integrated in and 
through communication and examine interaction patterns and media (e.g. online, face-to-
face, knowledge management systems) (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002; Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 
2002; Piontkowski & Keil, 2004). Okhuysen and Eisenhardt (2002), for example, found 
that providing simple formal structures for group communications creates a second agenda 
and by interrupting conversations in their natural flow, they help interaction partners to 
reflect on the own knowledge integration process and on how to improve it.  
On an organizational level, the literature focuses not only on how to integrate 
knowledge through communication, but analyzes other forms like integration through 
routines, giving direction, or installing self-contained tasks (Grant, 1996a; Huang & New-
ell, 2003). Authors discussed the role of organizational structure for knowledge integration 
and argued that divisional or matrix forms (De Boer et al., 1999) and loose couplings 
among units and structural ambiguity (multipolarity, fluidiy, and interconnectedness) 
(Ravasi & Verona, 2001) favor knowledge integration. Scarbrough et al. (2004) discussed 
knowledge integration in projects and showed that a structural autonomy of projects pro-
motes knowledge integration. Grant (1996a) defined knowledge integration as the incor-
poration of the individuals’ specialized (mainly tacit) knowledge into tasks and organiza-
tional action and discussed its role for strategy, as did also Eisenhardt and Santos (2000). 
One important characteristic of knowledge integration is that it provides flexibility, in so 
far as new knowledge can be accessed and existing knowledge can be reconfigured to cre-
ate new knowledge. Grant deemphasizes the importance of communication and envisions 
major integration capacity in routines and directions.  
Another important group of scholars (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2002, 2004; Carlile & 
Rebentisch, 2003; Dougherty, 1992; Scarbrough et al., 2004; Star & Griesemer, 1989), 
who also conceive knowledge integration on the organizational level, instead stress aspects 
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of communication and coordination and inquire into how people can create a shared 
meaning and negotiate interests across knowledge boundaries. They analyze knowledge 
integration efforts across functional divisions (Carlile, 2004), between occupational groups 
(Star, 1989) or between projects and the organization as a whole (Scarbrough et al., 2004). 
Dougherty, for example, showed how different ‘thought worlds’ that subsist across organ-
izational departments (between manufacturing and planning) become engrained in routines 
and impede shared understandings. She argued that collaborative mechanisms (e.g. inter-
disciplinary responsibility for focus groups) are necessary in an organizational context to 
allow for the overcoming of barriers to integration (Dougherty, 1992). Bechky discussed 
the problem of common ground and showed how it can be elaborated across knowledge 
boundaries (e.g. through tangible definitions: physical objects embedded in the loci of prac-
tice of the addressee). In view of the embedded nature of knowledge, knowledge integra-
tion requires a transformation process of meaning (Bechky, 2003) and of interests (Carlile, 
2002: 452), which is why it is fundamental to engage in boundary spanning activities (e.g. 
position knowledge brokers, i.e. people who move between two knowledge domains and 
like to engage in processes of translation, coordination, and alignment between perspec-
tives) (Bechky, 2003; Grant, 1996a; Wenger, 1998) and the use of boundary objects 
(Carlile, 2002; Lyons et al., 2004). Boundary objects (documents, forms, methods, objects, 
etc.) provide individuals and groups at both sides of a knowledge boundary a common 
structure, which is flexible enough to adapt to the specific needs of the local contexts, but 
provides a common means of translation (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Next to the focus on 
how to create shared meanings across knowledge boundaries, a specialization of knowl-
edge and the need for integrating it in coordinated action also leads to conflicts of interests 
and to issues of politics. Carlile states on regard, that in these situations, knowledge is “at 
stake” for that the “knowledge developed in one domain generates negative consequences 
in another” (Carlile, 2004: 559). Swan and Scarbrough found that while power on re-
sources played a relatively small importance for the successful integration of knowledge, 
“politics of process (how people form and co-ordinate networks) and politics of meaning 
(how networks coalesce around particular interpretations) were highly important (Swan & 
Scarbrough, 2005: 939).  
Finally, there are few contributions dealing with knowledge-integration on an inter-
organizational level. For an organization to be innovative, the integration of external 
knowledge is fundamental (Swan & Scarbrough, 2005). Depending on the type of knowl-
edge to be integrated, but also on the speed, with which such knowledge has to be inte-
grated, the couplings between organizations must be of a different nature. Grant argued 
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that while market contracts might work if the knowledge is embedded in the product itself, 
networks with close relationships are useful if knowledge is ambiguous, uncertain, and 
tacit. Further, if companies gain important advantages from the speed of integration (dy-
namic environments), knowledge integration is preferred to happen in networks rather 
than through vertical integration (Grant, 1996a). Swan and Scarbrough (2005) finally 
claimed that if knowledge is particularly diverse among the various organizations (differ-
ence between knowledge sources), close ties and informal interactions are particularly im-
portant to establish the sufficient common ground. Hargadon and Sutton (1997) finally 
found that for an organization to be able to integrate knowledge from different industries, 
the organizational structure has to provide relatively disconnected domains where employ-
ees constantly form and disband teams, where they are exposed to a wide range of pro-
jects, and where a culture of information sharing is fostered for example through reward 
systems. 
In view of this panorama of research on knowledge integration and in view of our 
object of study, we define knowledge integration as the communication process by which 
people with differing specialized knowledge (i.e. skills, perspectives, priorities, experiences) 
engage in joint sense making and deliberation to co-create new and shared meanings and 
to embed this inter-personal knowledge in decision making. 
This definition has two implications. First knowledge integration is understood as a 
communicative process. Berger and Luckman argued that “all human ‘knowledge’ is de-
veloped, transmitted and maintained in social situations” and that scholars should gain a 
better understanding of the process, by which this is done (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 3). 
Similarly, Nonaka and Takeuchi state that “both information and knowledge are context-
specific and relational in that they depend on the situation and are created dynamically in 
social interaction among people” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 55). From these considera-
tions, we can understand that social interactions and, in particular, face-to-face interac-
tions that are a “prototypical case of social interaction” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 28) 
are constitutive of knowledge processes (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). In a broad under-
standing of communication as the form of social interaction, we can understand knowl-
edge processes to be communicative processes. The definition proposed for knowledge 
integration reflects this understanding.  
The second implication of this definition is that knowledge integration is understood 
as a two phase process. The first phase is the integration of the various specialized individ-
ual knowledge into some form of social knowledge. In this phase, people bring in their 
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different points of view and their specific perspectives. They try to understand which of 
these elements are important and how they relate to each other. From these often divergent 
views, they try to develop a shared understanding. The co-construction of such a form of 
group knowledge always entails new insights and is more than the simple aggregation of 
the different specialized forms of knowledge. In the second phase, the group knowledge is 
integrated into the actual decision making. We conceive this as a second phase because the 
introduction of the elaborated group knowledge into decision making is by far not an 
automatic process, but is challenged by the aspects such as the knowing-doing gap (Pfeffer 
& Sutton, 1999), which we will discuss later.  
On the basis of this understanding of knowledge integration, we aim to understand 
what challenges the successful integration of knowledge in the expert decision maker inter-
action. Are the challenges of differences in language use and the lack of common ground, 
which have already been discussed in the literature (Bechky, 2003; Dougherty, 1992) also 
characteristic for the expert - decision maker communication? What other challenges can 
we identify in this communication? Research on the integration of knowledge in decision 
making is rather limited and focuses mainly on experimental settings without considering 
the organizational contexts in which decisions are taken (see, for example: Okhuysen & 
Eisenhardt, 2002; Piontkowski et al., 2003). To our knowledge, there is no study available 
which specifically presents an analysis of the integration of knowledge between experts and 
decision makers.  
In the next section, we will present the expert - decision maker situation and then 
propose a process model that can serve as an analytic lens to study the knowledge commu-
nication between experts and decision makers.  
2  The Expert – Decision Maker Situation 
In the following, we will circumscribe the expert - decision maker situation and ar-
gue why it is possible to conceive experts and decision makers as distinct categories.  
In the dictionary, an expert is defined as someone with a “special skill or knowledge 
representing mastery of a particular subject” (Webster, 2006) and also as someone ”whose 
special knowledge or skill causes him to be regarded as an authority” (OED2, 1989). 
These definitions of experts reveal that an expert not only is someone who has in-depth 
knowledge on a special area of expertise, he/she is also regarded as such by a community. 
Sociological studies on experts and expertise very much focus on this aspect and show 
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through which mechanisms an expert is recognized as such by his/her community, and why 
and how expert positions are not only formulated, but also maintained, and lost (for an 
overview, see: Hitzler, 1994). In such an understanding, “the expert” is fundamentally a 
social construct and his/her knowledge (and the appreciation of which) always stands in 
relation to the knowledge of others (Mieg, 2001). Mieg argued that “’the expert’ has to be 
regarded as a social form of interaction, and that ‘expert’ is an attribution to the person 
who, in this interaction, provides information or explanation, respectively” (Mieg, 2001: 
73). Elements in the analysis of the social construction of experts and expertise are, to 
name two, the processes of self-representation (e.g. ways how experts talk, and use certain 
emblems and symbols) and power constellations (e.g. affiliation to certain institutions leads 
to institutionalized competence, funding of specific scientific discourses and not others) 
(Hitzler, 1994).  
Next to sociologists, the study of experts and expertise has been of special interest 
for researchers from cognitive psychology and many definitions reflect their research find-
ings. In most cases, experts are allocated on a continuum of expertise, called also the ‘pro-
ficiency scale’ (Ericcson, 2006: 22), which ranges from novice to master and has in the 
middle people with growing levels of expertise like the initiate, the apprentice, the jour-
neyman, and the expert2. Along this axis, Hoffman (1998), as adapted by Ericsson et al. 
(2006: 22), defined an expert as: 
“the distinguished or brilliant journeyman, highly regarded by peers, whose judgments are un-
commonly accurate and reliable, whose performance shows consummate skill and economy of 
effort, and who can deal effectively with certain types of rare or ‘tough’ cases. Also, an expert 
is one who has special skills or knowledge derived from extensive experience with subdo-
mains.”   
The definition resumes the already mentioned aspect of the social recognition of an 
expert. An expert is not merely defined by his/her skills and expertise, but also by his/her 
reputation in the community, which shows a social and communicative dimension of the 
expert’s definition. Second, the above definition makes reference to many findings of cog-
nitive psychology research (for an overview, see: Ericsson et al., 2006; for an overview, see: 
Keil, 2001). Experts (in relation to novices) tend to excel in their speed of thought, in the 
accuracy of the solutions they find to solve problems or to design tasks (Klein, 1993), they 
have a better memory capacity with regard to their domain of expertise (Gobert & Simon, 
                                                 
2 A question often discussed in the literature is how an individual passes from the stage of a novice to the 
one of an expert. Researchers agree that, next to formal education and training, it is most of all prac-
tice and experience, which make an expert. It has been confirmed in various studies that ten years of 
intense practice are required in order to become an expert. 
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1996) and are better in detecting and recognizing patterns and features of an issue and are 
therewith able to understand the deep structure of it (Chi et al., 1981). This in part is re-
lated to their major capacity of understanding qualitative differences of problems. Ericsson 
and Lehman argue (1996), for example, that there are qualitative differences in the organi-
zation of the experts’ knowledge and the way they represent it. In fact, experts encode their 
knowledge around key concepts of a certain domain and use more domain-general heuris-
tics, which allow them, on the one hand, for a rapid and reliable retrieval, and on the 
other, to adapt more quickly to changes in the environment (Ericsson, 2006). In this way, 
they can also better deal with particularly ‘rare’ or ‘tough’ cases. Because of their specific 
organization of knowledge, they are said to retrieve relevant information with less cogni-
tive effort and suffer less quickly of effects from information overload (Swain & Haka, 
2000). Next to all these positive capabilities, experts tend to be more overly confident in 
their domain-specific judgment than novices (Oskamp, 1982). They are further ‘glossing 
over’, which means that, at the expense of their knowledge of deep structures of an issue, 
they overlook and lack to recall surface or peripheral aspects and details (Ericsson, 2006: 
25). Finally, from organizational research, we further know that knowledge can be an in-
hibitor of novel solutions and innovations (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levitt & March, 1988). 
Knowledge is highly ‘path-dependent’ (Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003) as it needs large in-
vestments of time, which makes it difficult for organizations and individuals (like experts), 
to ‘give up’ their own knowledge and start to build on completely new promises. For this 
reason, if changes lead to challenges outside the usual range of expertise, experts tend to 
continue to rely on their expertise and proceed by analogy. Yet, in fast-changing environ-
ments where situations change radically, analogous behavior might not be adequate.  
It is for the risks associated to the path-dependency of expert’s knowledge in fast-
changing environments that decision makers, on the other hand, need to be generalists. 
Langlois argued that managers as generalists have the function to buffer the uncertainty of 
the environment (Langlois, 1986). This, in effect, is the most apparent way how to distin-
guish experts from decision makers: While experts are specialists in a specific knowledge 
domain, decision makers are generalists that allow for the vertical integration of the func-
tionally specialized domains on a corporate level (Chandler, 1994). To some degree, one 
could argue that decision makers are specialists as well, but that their area of specialization 
is transversal. In fact, they are highly skilled in activities such as planning, organizing, mo-
tivating, and controlling. Yet, in terms of the functions of an organization, their knowledge 
is one of a generalist. To further distinguish decision makers from experts, we can mention 
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the controversial research on the traits of decision makers3, discussing managers’ and lead-
ers’ capacities, guiding values, power orientations, and patterns of behavior. Scholars 
found (see for example: Jago, 1982; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991; Yukl, 2005) that leaders 
positively differ from non-experts with regard to tolerance to stress, energy level, self-
confidence, adjustment, integrity, cognitive ability, and knowledge of the business and to 
some extent also in terms of charisma, creativity, and flexibility. Alternatively to traits, 
experts have been defined in terms of their behavior. Mintzberg’s study on managerial 
work is classical in this vein. Managerial work is characterized by a big work load (long 
hours of work), brevity (short time allocated to a single task), variety (quantity of different 
daily activities), fragmentation (frequent interruptions), and communication intensity 
(strong engagement in meetings, phone calls, emails) (Mintzberg, 1973).  
In the following, the trait characterizations and definitions of experts and decision 
makers are conceived as approximate tendencies. In fact, the expert - decision maker dis-
tinction is not a polar opposition as is the one of the expert and novice. Former experts 
might be promoted and become decision makers. On the other hand, decision makers 
might resign from their decision position and take over a more reflective work and expert 
position (as is the case for the experts of the Brookings Institution, see Chapter 3). As a 
consequence, managers might have in-depth knowledge within one or two definite speciali-
zation areas and experts might be characterized by traits otherwise attributed to decision 
makers. In certain instances, in terms of acquired knowledge, mental models, and social 
orientations, experts and decision makers might not differ radically and a considerable 
common ground exist (see: Figure 3, situation 1). In other cases, experts and decision mak-
ers differ largely in their specializations and their common ground is almost non-existent 
(see: Figure 3, situation 2).  
While experts’ and decision makers’ knowledge and orientations can be closer or 
more distant, they can be clearly distinguished on a functional level. The decision makers 
are the ones who make the final choice among alternatives. The experts instead have no 
formal substantive decision making power, but rather advice decision makers either on 
direct request, on indirect request (through funding of experts’ activities by decision mak-
ers) or on proper initiative. The functional differentiation brings along different types of 
tasks and task qualities. For example, while an expert can dedicate longer uninterrupted 
time slots for analysis and development, decision makers can allocate only a brief amount 
                                                 
3 Research on traits of decision makers was criticised by authors following more contingency based ap-
proaches who claim that while certain traits may be favorable in some situations they are not in others 
(Jago, 1982).  
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of time for each decision. In addition, while the experts tend to analyze a phenomenon 
from a functional perspective and with an intrinsic interest in the phenomenon itself, the 
decision makers, on the other hand, are surrounded by political and cost coercions, have to 
foresee and compromise among a variety of perspectives, and have to be pleased with a 
solution that is not the most functional, but a relatively good and feasible one. In this way, 
the different roles and functions, which experts and decision makers hold, lead to specific 
experiences and furthers specialization.  
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 Figure 3: The Common Ground between Experts and Decision Makers – 
Two Situations 
 
We have shown that experts and decision makers can be distinguished clearly in 
terms of their functions (who holds the decision power and who has the role of the ad-
viser). Experts and decision makers can be further differentiated – even if in a less clear-cut 
way - in terms of their capabilities, skills, experiences, and mental orientations. There are 
expert - decision maker constellations where there is more common ground and others 
where the specialization is strong and the common ground poor so that considerable 
knowledge boundaries exist between the two and challenge their knowledge communica-
tion.  
Having shown the particularities of both experts and decision makers, we can envi-
sion that their particular situation leads to a set of communicative challenges. For example, 
expert’s knowledge is to a large extent tacit and contextually based in actions (Polanyi, 
1966) so that experts have difficulties to verbally represent and communicate it (Benner, 
1984; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Nonaka, 1994). To gain a better understanding of the 
knowledge communication process between experts and decision makers, in the following, 
we will describe the communication process between this duplet and discuss which chal-
lenges are specific to certain phases in the process.  
33 A Phase Framework of the Knowledge Communication of Experts and Decision 
Makers along the Decision Making Process 
3  A Phase Framework of the Knowledge Communica-
tion of Experts and Decision Makers along the De-
cision Making Process 
The knowledge-rich interaction between experts and decision makers does not start 
and end with the transfer of expertise and of research results at the moment decision mak-
ers take their decisions. Experts interact with decision makers – although with various 
intensity - along the whole decision process. It might even be the case that experts present 
an issue to the decision makers at a moment when the latter have not yet developed a sen-
sibility for the topic and are not aware that there is a need or possibility to take a decision 
(see: Agenda building theories, e.g. Dutton, 2002). One question of interest therefore is 
how the interaction between experts and decision makers is structured in time and which 
communicative challenges and practices are of particular significance at which moment of 
the interaction (compare 1st sub-question, Chapter 1). Yet, we cannot propose a knowl-
edge communication process as a phase process along the decision making process without 
considering the extensive literature on phase frameworks of decision making.  
Phase frameworks that follow the ‘phase theorem’ (Witte, 1972) have a long tradi-
tion in decision science (Gerwin, 1969; Mintzberg et al., 1976; Nutt, 1984; Simon, 1960). 
Many of them refer to the one of Simon (1960), in which he presents three core phases of 
the decision process. These are: ‘intelligence’ (finding occasions for making a decision), 
‘design’ (finding possible courses of action), and ‘choice’ (choosing among courses of ac-
tion) and are interrelated in a cyclical manner. Sequential, linear phase frameworks were 
criticized to a great extent as they are said to be based on the paradigm of rationality and 
as such offer poor descriptions of actual decision processes. The presumption of rationality 
was challenged from a variety of perspectives, for example from the behavioral and cogni-
tive position (Bazerman, 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Simon, 1979) as also from a 
political stance (Allison, 1969; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois III, 1988; Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1974). Linear phase frameworks are based on the assumption that actors enter 
the decision process with known and stable objectives and then have to pursue logical 
steps, which lead to an optimal decision outcome (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). Cohen 
et al. (1972) and Cyert and March (1963) were among the first to question these assump-
tions of the rational view and showed that goals are ill-defined and inconsistent across 
people and time, that search procedures are local, and that decision makers’ attention is 
limited. Limited is also the decision makers’ understanding of technology, that is they are 
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poorly aware of how means are connected to ends and in which operational routines they 
engage to reach said objectives. In view of these limitations, Cohen et al. concluded with 
regard to linear phase frameworks:  
“Although it may be convenient to imagine that choice opportunities lead first to the genera-
tion of decision alternatives, then to an examination of their consequences, then to an evalua-
tion of those consequences in terms of objectives, and finally to a decision, this type of model 
is often a poor description of what actually happens” (Cohen et al., 1972: 2).  
Opposing (linear) phase frameworks, the authors proposed an alternative descriptive 
model, valid for highly ambiguous settings, and called it the ‘garbage can’ model. They 
describe the decision process as the coincidental meeting of problems, solutions, partici-
pants, and choice opportunities (situations that need a decision). These four organizational 
streams develop in a parallel, but uncoupled way from each other and are not casually or 
logically correlated (Cohen et al., 1972). Rather, it is a “stochastic meeting of choices look-
ing for problems, problems looking for choices, solutions looking for problems to answer, 
and decision makers looking for something to decide” (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992: 27). 
All four streams develop in long timeframes and a solution developed several months or 
years ago, might all of a sudden gain attraction and be considered by decision makers to 
best meet a problem. For this reason, it is most difficult to identify when a decision process 
starts or ends and how to structure it in time.  
In spite of the fundamental critique of prescriptive, rational frameworks, which de-
fine clear-cut phase processes, the ‘phase theorem’ (Witte, 1972) continued and continues 
to be of importance. In part, this can be explained by the soft empirical support for the 
garbage can model and its modest methodological validity (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992: 
27) or by the fact that these descriptions of the decision making process did not lead to 
advancements in prescriptive accounts, that is they hardly led to new approaches how a 
decision maker could manage decisions. The phase frameworks, even if used from a de-
scriptive stance, do not preclude prescriptive implications. For the management of deci-
sions, structuring the decision process in phases, even if the structure is not fully accurate, 
might help decision makers to structure a complex and ambiguous problem, which other-
wise would be too intricate to activate an action whatsoever. In fact, Mintzberg et al. 
(1976) showed that decision makers need to reduce the complexity and ambiguity of their 
decision task and structure it in a set of manageable phases made of specific procedures or 
routines. Weick (1995) argued for the importance of tangible structures for sense-making 
and problem resolution, even if these structures are not accurate representations of the 
‘reality’. He gives the example of a Hungarian detachment lost in the icy Swiss Alps, which 
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finds its way back to the base thanks to a wrong map. In retrospect, the lieutenant discov-
ers that his group used a map not of the Alps, but of the Pyrenees. Weick claimed that the 
wrong map was sufficient to animate and orient people and that inciting action and a con-
tinuous comparison of the map and the new location was more important than an accurate 
representation of the Alps (Weick, 1995: 54-55).  
Having argued that phase frameworks of decision making continue to have an im-
portant role even for unstructured, complex, and ambiguous decision tasks, we will briefly 
present one of the most influential phase frameworks, which is the one of Mintzberg et al. 
(1976). We will particularly refer to its major characteristic, which is its recursive, iterative 
and cyclical nature. Mintzberg et al. (1976) attempted to structure seemingly unstructured 
decision processes in the context of strategic decisions made under ambiguity. They identi-
fied a model for the decision making process by identifying, on the one hand, phases (char-
acterized by routines) and, on the other, dynamic factors that lead to recursive iteration 
loops between and within the various phases. By referring to Simon (1960), Mintzberg et 
al. (1976) showed that the decision making process consists of three phases – an identifica-
tion, a development, and a selection phase. In the identification phase, the need for a deci-
sion must be recognized and then the decision makers must try to make sense of the situa-
tion and engage in diagnosis activities. In the development phase, one or several possibili-
ties for courses of action are elaborated. Decision makers search ready-made solutions or 
dispose that novel, custom-made solutions are designed. The third phase, the selection 
phase, stands for the various moments in which decision makers select among alternatives. 
Mintzberg et al. characterize each phase by specific behavioral routines (e.g. diagnosis rou-
tines, search routines, evaluation routines) and discuss support routines present across the 
various phases (decision control, communication, and political routines).   
The most important aspect of Mintzberg et al.’s decision process model is that the 
three main phases of the strategic decision making process do not progress in a linear flow, 
but that the process is ‘groping’ and cyclical (Mintzberg et al., 1976: 265). The authors 
describe various internal and external interferences, which can lead to dead ends (for ex-
ample caused by unexpected constraints, political impasses), delays, or feedback loops. 
One key reason for feedback loops are the ‘comprehension cyles’, which the authors de-
scribe (by referring to Deising, 1967) as follows:  
“By cycling within one routine or between two routines, the decision maker gradually comes 
to comprehend a complex issue. He may cycle within identification to recognize the issue; dur-
ing design, he may cycle through a maze of nested design and search activities to develop a so-
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lution; during evaluation, he may cycle to understand the problem he is solving” (Mintzberg et 
al., 1976: 265) 
The decision process is cyclical not only because of politics and the negotiation of in-
terests, or because of delays or abrupt changes in the context of the decision (e.g. introduc-
tion of a new technology). Most of all, there are cyclical movements within the process 
because of how decision makers make sense of a problem or opportunity. Decision makers, 
who recognize to have a potential issue of decision, do not identify firsthand, what exactly 
the problem is and in which direction to take a decision. Their recognition of the problem 
is still fuzzy and can be refined only after first analyses. While in Mintzberg et al.’s case the 
decision maker is a single individual who is struggling to make sense in order to take a 
decision, these ‘comprehension cycles” in most cases involve communications among vari-
ous partners. 
The phase framework for knowledge communication we present aims to cast light on 
how experts and decision makers make sense of a decision issue within and through their 
communications and how they integrate their diverse knowledge into the decision process. 
We aim to show with the model how the specialized knowledge between experts and deci-
sion makers is integrated in decision making through communication. We will particularly 
focus on the role of cycling behavior, not for fostering single comprehension, but for creat-
ing a shared understanding among experts and decision makers. The model leaves out 
other explanations why cycling behavior is taking place (Mintzberg et al. referred to the 
political and organizational reasons, as well as to reasons outside the organization’s 
boundaries). As opposed to decision theories focusing on how people make choices, for 
example the prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which outlines a variety of 
heuristics people use when evaluating and making choices, we focus on preceding phases of 
the decision making process and concentrate on communicative (and not cognitive) issues. 
The question we are addressing with such a focus is how experts and decision makers try 
to develop a shared understanding of what the problem, the goals, and the alternatives are. 
Weick states that „sensemaking is about the interplay of action and interpretation rather 
than the influence of evaluation on choice” (Weick, 1993: 634). In this way, the focus is on 
the co-construction of meaning within decision making and not on decision making as 
choice. 
By identifying distinct phases, we are able to provide only an approximate and to 
some degree erroneous description of the knowledge communication. However, we believe 
that the phase framework is useful in order to locate which communicative challenges and 
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practices exist when decision makers aim to integrate the experts’ expertise in their deci-
sion making.  
The knowledge communication framework is of fractal nature or self-similar. As 
such it serves as an ex-ante structuring device and the reader can imagine that the whole 
communication process we will describe in the following pages, can take place both within 
one of the three decision phases proposed by Mintzberg et al. (1976), or along the whole 
decision making process. Within one decision phase means that the decision makers, for 
example in the design phase, need to contact specific experts, expose to them their request, 
and try to implement the conveyed insights. Applying the knowledge communication proc-
ess to the decision making process as a whole means that the decision makers contact ex-
perts when they struggle to identify the issue of decision and unfold the whole communica-
tion process until the decision is taken. Both scenarios are possible and we will not aim to 
align the two processes precisely.  
A final remark on the knowledge communication model is necessary. For reasons of 
simplification, we do not consider the whole communication taking place within the deci-
sion maker group and that within the expert group. We equally do not consider the case of 
multiple expert groups working with the decision makers on the same decision process at 
stake. We focus more narrowly on the direct interaction within the dyad of the expert and 
the decision maker. This narrow choice gives us the possibility to single out the communi-
cative dynamics present in the interaction between the expert and the decision maker. Lar-
ger communicative and socio-political dynamics will be described as part of the context of 
the single expert - decision maker interaction. 
Figure 4 shows the knowledge communication process between the experts and the 
decision makers. In five phases it outlines how experts and decision makers communicate 
with each other in their attempts to integrate knowledge in the decision making process. 
These phases are: identification of experts and expertise; articulation of need; analysis of 
issue and development of possible courses of action; conveying insights suggestions, and 
solutions; and applying and implementing suggestions and solutions. The arrows “A” to 
“E” show the feed-forward and the arrows “a” to “j” the feedback loops and express how 
communication partners move from one phase to the other and back. In the following 
paragraphs, we will describe the phases, as well as the cyclical nature of the loops by which 
the communication partners navigate through the process.  
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Figure 4: Knowledge Communication Process between Experts and Decision Makers 
 
3.1 Identification of Experts and Expertise 
Decision makers aim to identify experts and expertise when they have at least 
roughly recognized that there is a need or opportunity for taking a decision and that they 
alone will not have the necessary expertise for taking it. Decision makers need to identify, 
first, which knowledge they are lacking and, second, who could provide them with the 
relevant expertise. They have to identify possible knowledge sources and assess whether 
they can provide relevant knowledge for the issue of decision. It is an intertwined activity 
of search and assessment (Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003: 1189). 
As decision makers often have only a very vague idea about the issue of decision, in 
some cases they might even have difficulties in identifying which areas of expertise are per-
tinent to the decision to take. A real estate company, for example, which plans to build a 
huge holiday resort along a coastal line might, at a first moment, not consider it to be nec-
essary to draw on biologists for their decision making process. Yet, going on with the pro-
ject, the decision makers learn that the coast is an important hatchery for turtles and that 
the light emissions from the hotel complexes would impede the baby turtles to find their 
way to the sea (usually, freshly hatched turtles orient themselves on the moonlight shim-
mering over the sea). Once at knowledge of this situation, the real estate company fears 
that this possible biological drama could severely damage the image of the holiday resort 
as a preferred holiday destination. Thus, at a second moment, the company identifies bi-
ologists as important experts advising them in their decision making processes.  
Important for the identification of experts and expertise is that the decision makers 
need to be well connected within formal and informal networks (Harryson, 2002) so that 
they can potentially access experts from various fields, both internal or external to the 
organization. Important is also that the decision makers have access to knowledge brokers, 
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that is particularly well connected people in the social network who can provide access to a 
variety of expertise.  
Also from the perspective of the experts, a well functioning social network is particu-
larly important in this phase. Experts need to gain the attention of the decision makers, 
especially if experts and decision makers are not organizationally bound. An expert needs 
to convey credibility and assure that he/she is perceived as a thought leader in his/her spe-
cific domain (Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003). Experts will apply specific communication 
strategies to create awareness in different target communities and promote their ideas 
through various communication media and formats. In these activities, the experts very 
often not only have to promote their name and credibility, but also have to argue more 
generally for the importance of certain issues and perspectives, and have to increase the 
decision makers’ sensitivity for a certain issue. They help decision makers to perceive spe-
cific signs as different from a “normal” behavior and provide a language, which facilitates 
the noticing and bracketing of cues as noteworthy objects or events (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2005). Finally, the better the experts are informed on the strategic directions of the deci-
sion makers and the better they know the existing decision agenda, the better they are able 
to proactively propose their expertise to management.  
Multiple Feedback Loops Leading to the ‘Identification of Experts and Expertise’ 
The example of the real estate company has shown that decision makers, potentially, 
can realize after each phase in the communication process, that they need additional exper-
tise and that they have to call in alternative experts in the decision making process. Feed-
back loops from each phase of the knowledge communication model are possible (see: 
feedback loops “a”, “b”, “c”, and “d” in Figure 4). When decision makers formulate their 
need to the experts (‘articulate need’ phase) and try to circumscribe what before has not 
been much more than a gut feeling, the decision makers might realize that the decision 
touches unsought areas of expertise (feedback loop “a” in Figure 4). It might also be that 
the experts say that they cannot really help with the problem and that they would have to 
identify experts from another field. Alternatively, it could also be that the decision makers, 
only once the decision is taken and implemented (‘apply & implement insights & solu-
tions’ phase), realize that it has completely unforeseen consequences and that they need to 
collaborate with additional experts (feedback loop “c” in Figure 4). 
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3.2 Need Articulation  
Once the decision makers have identified the experts with which they would like to 
work, they have to present to them the issue of decision and specify with regard to what 
they would need their expertise (see: arrow “A” in Figure 4). In other words, they try to 
articulate their need. To do so they struggle making sense of the past and present and give 
a first rough definition of the problem or opportunity. At the same time, they try to imag-
ine a future state and a possible solution. Weick argues that this sense-making activity can 
often be better described by decision makers “imagining” the past and “remembering” the 
future as they superimpose own categories and values to past events and think of a future 
state in supposed analogy to the past (Weick, 2005). In the case of the expert - decision 
maker interaction, the sense-making activity is particularly challenging for the decision 
maker, as the issue deals with domains where he/she lacks knowledge and expertise. We 
will show various reasons, which make us believe that it is not feasible that the decision 
makers alone play an active role in this phase and hand in a precise and specific brief to the 
experts. Rather, both parties have to take over a very active role in this phase, engage in an 
iterative process of gradual refinement of the need articulation and an extensive use of 
face-to-face conversation, in order to then reach a joint understanding of what kind of 
insight is expected of the domain experts. 
The literature on decision making, and in particular also the literature on defining 
designs and briefings in the construction industry, has dealt with the issue of problem defi-
nition and the structuring of problems. March and Olson, for example, state that the chal-
lenge of defining problems and outlining courses of actions is bound to the fact that our 
goals are in flux and often conflicting (March & Olsen, 1997). For Simon (1973), the 
problem definition is difficult, but less problematic. He believes that even ill-structured 
problems can be structured, decomposed and become computable trough a process of 
transformation (imposing closure). While for him, the difficulty of the definition of a prob-
lem depends on the characteristics of the task, Schön and Rein claim that the task has no a 
priori structure, which could be uncovered, and the process of structuring depends more 
on the qualities of the decision maker or designer rather than the task. In his view, the 
determining factor for the definition of a problem is how decision makers frame both 
problem and solution. A frame is made of “structures of beliefs, perceptions, and apprecia-
tion” (Schön & Rein, 1994) and the decision maker or designer uses them to add structure 
to unstructured or even wicked problems (Rittel & Webber, 1984). The research on abduc-
tive reasoning (as understood by Peirce in his later work, see: Weick, 2005: 433), which 
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inquires into a form of thinking that allows for the creation of novel explanations of prob-
lems and solutions (Nesher, 2001; Roozenburg, 1992; Zimring & Craig, 2001), also ac-
counts for the weight of frames and mental models in the definition of a problem. 
While much of the mentioned research focuses on cognitive processes and how indi-
viduals make sense of a problem, the question gains complexity if we acknowledge that a 
problem is framed not by individuals, but mostly by groups interacting. Experts and deci-
sion makers with their different background knowledge, will frame a problem differently, 
identify diverse aspects to be priorities and attribute different structures. In this constella-
tion, communication issues become a central role. The question to be asked is how experts 
and decision makers can interact with each other in a way so that they can both benefit 
from the varieties of their framings, but at the same time gain a shared understanding of 
the task to tackle and of the objectives to reach. 
Bowen et al. (1997) acknowledge the centrality of communication within the defini-
tion of a problem and argue that the formulation of a clear brief is directly related to the 
quality and satisfaction with the later decision and project outcomes. They conclude that 
clients need to “define their needs more clearly and communicate these requirements to 
procurement team members unambiguously” (Bowen et al., 1997: 10). To do so, the au-
thors limit themselves to indicate that decision makers (clients) need to be more actively 
involved and that the experts (architects) have to spend considerable time with them to 
elicit clear requirements. Barrett (1999: 637) shows that communicating clear requirements 
is, in fact, a challenging task and mentions language problems in briefing situations. Cli-
ents have, for example, difficulties in reading the drawings of architects and understanding 
their jargon. 
Another important reason why it is difficult for the decision makers to articulate a 
clear need is that, themselves not being experts on the topic at issue, they are often unable 
to clearly articulate what precise analysis and expertise they need from the domain experts. 
They do not know what are the important factors of the problem (Barrett & Stanley, 
1999), where to focus the attention, and what is needed to solve the problem. In the con-
text of information retrieval, Belkin et al. called this situation the “ASK”-problem, an 
“anomalous state of knowledge”, in which a user identifies his knowledge as inadequate 
for completing a specific task and recognizes that he needs further information. Yet, he is 
unable to specify what information he needs. “The ASK hypothesis is that an information 
need arises from a recognized anomaly in the user’s state of knowledge concerning some 
topic or situation and that, in general, the user is unable to specify precisely what is needed 
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to resolve that anomaly” (Belkin et al., 1982: 62). For the information retrieval context, 
Belkin et al. conclude that “it is more suitable to attempt to describe that ASK, than to ask 
the user to specify his/her need as a request to the system” (1982: 62). Transferred to the 
context of the expert - decision maker interaction, this means that the decision maker 
might be able to define what the problem or opportunity is, but have difficulties in deline-
ating clear directions for a solution. The experts cannot expect from the decision makers a 
document, which clearly outlines the requirements to a solution. Rather, it is the task of 
the experts to guide the decision makers through a process, which leads to a gradual re-
finement of what the decision makers need, starting with the inquiry of the anomalous 
state of knowledge, a description of the problem, to then move to objectives and a general 
outline of the directions for a solution. Communication needs to be interactive and allow 
for various forms of expression in order to gradually reach a clear definition of the deci-
sion maker’s need. 
 Multiple Feedback Loops Leading to the ‘Need Articulation’ 
We have argued that it is almost impossible for the decision maker to articulate a clear 
need in a one shot communication attempt. Their formulation of their need is gradual and 
requires multiple iteration cycles of formulating, analyzing, conveying, and implementing 
(see feedback loops “a”, “e”, “f”, “g” in: Figure 4).  
The theory of sense-making explains why these iteration loops are necessary: sense-
making is “about the interplay of action and interpretation rather than the influence of 
evaluation on choice” (Weick et al., 2005: 409). Weick’s sense-making formula, drawing 
on Wallas, “how can I know what I think until I see what I say” (Wallas, 1926: 10; Weick, 
1995: 12) expresses this need of interaction between thinking, saying, and doing. In fact, 
sense-making can only take place in iterative cycles of talk and action. Sense-making does 
not start as a purely cerebral and abstract activity, but is profoundly rooted in action. Peo-
ple have made an experience and want to understand and change it. In talk, people 
“bracket” certain elements of the passed action and give their tacit and private knowledge 
a verbal representation (Weick et al., 2005). In this way, the issue receives a more tangible 
existence and can be confronted with other representations. The recognition of differences 
makes it also possible to develop a shared understanding, which lays the ground for future 
actions. This idea that a decision maker alone will not be able to define a clear request 
upfront, but that the interaction between thinking, saying, and doing is necessary is sup-
ported also by research more classically focusing on decision making. Wildavsky (1969), 
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for example, showed that managers do not know that they want until they see what they 
can get.  
For the expert - decision maker interaction, this means that feedback loops from the 
analysis and development phase to the need articulation phase are necessary. A first inter-
action helps decision makers to sense whether their perceptions of past and present events 
are meaningful also to experts and to delimit the issue and gain an idea of which elements 
are pertinent to it. In other words, the first interactions are useful to align their different 
frames of reference and understandings, realize the motivations behind diverging priorities, 
and start developing shared understandings. Yet, after these first interactions, experts start 
to conduct a first analysis on the issue and elaborate scenarios and possible solution paths 
(“analyze issue & develop possible courses of action”). In the interactions that take place 
during this analysis phase, decision makers might realize that the direction of the analysis 
is the right one, but that the experts should focus more narrowly on a specific issue. It 
might also be that with the analysis ongoing, experts and decision makers realize that they 
have only in part understood each other and that there are still persisting misunderstand-
ings. They see the necessity to articulate their need more precisely, to orient the project in a 
different direction, or to remediate a misunderstanding and move back to the ‘articulate 
need’ phase (feedback loop “e”). This recognition can take place also only after the experts 
have finished their analysis and convey their insights or suggestions to decision makers 
(feedback loop “f”). In unhappy cases, it can also be that only after having taken a deci-
sion and implemented a solution, decision makers realize that they actually need a different 
insight from their experts and have to redefine a new request (feedback loop “g”). In this 
way, in order to reach a more refined understanding of an issue, a cyclical entanglement 
between action and talk is necessary and various loops that feed back to the articulation of 
need are possible.  
3.3 Analyze Issue & Develop Possible Courses of Action 
With a more or less precise request on behalf of the decision makers, the experts start 
analyzing the issue, inquire into problems, and elaborate possible courses of action (see: 
arrow “C” in Figure 4). Mintzberg could show that this phase, when solutions to problems 
have to be developed, is the most demanding in the decision making process in terms of 
resources (Mintzberg et al., 1976).   
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This phase is generally under the lead of the domain experts who applies techniques 
for analysis (e.g. conducting interviews, doing tests, studying documents, using analytic 
frameworks etc.) and other techniques for solution development (e.g. scenario techniques, 
creativity techniques, or evaluation techniques). Given the necessity for the distribution of 
expertise and the division of labor between experts and decision makers, the collaboration, 
in most cases, will not be too close and time-consuming, but can show various degrees of 
collaboration and formality, ranging from a rather loose collaboration and sporadic inter-
action (e.g. in the case of imprecise requests on behalf of decision makers) to a rather close 
collaboration (e.g. in the case of a consultancy that goes working at the client’s place 
where the consultants conduct interviews, work with the clients’ documents, or observe 
processes).  
Within a close collaboration that is characterized by frequent and informal interac-
tions, trustful relationships can grow and tacit knowledge might be integrated simply 
through socializing, but also through joint work activities and observing the others’ work 
(Leonard & Sensiper, 1998; Nonaka & Toyama, 2003). Experts have the possibility to get 
to know the decision makers’ context, their room of maneuver, their preferences and pri-
orities. They have the possibility to ask specific questions on parameters of the analysis, 
which are not yet clear to them. The decision makers, on their side, can communicate 
quickly and informally changes in their request. Misunderstandings can be uncovered and 
readjusted steadily. During these interactions, the diverse frames of reference of experts 
and decision makers at times will certainly abut on each. Yet, depending on the way of 
communication (e.g. a communication that is oriented on continuous feedback, that allows 
for a constructive dealing with content conflict) and depending on how the interaction 
partners deal with relational and political tensions that arise from knowledge gaps such as 
threats to authority (Black et al., 2004) or micropolitics of knowledge (Lazega, 1992), the 
contact with different perspectives gives experts and decision makers the chance to develop 
novel approaches and widen their own perspectives.  
Instead, if collaboration is loose and interaction rather infrequent, knowledge inte-
gration, if at all, takes place in more formal means of communication. Experts have fewer 
chances to become acquainted with the context of the decision maker and to readjust their 
analysis on the basis of this information. For this reason, the risk to go on with the analysis 
in a wrong direction for a considerable time is much larger. Also, as domain experts are 
less exposed to different perspectives and approaches, the risk is greater to repeat hitherto 
solutions, which experts consider somewhat uncritically as the one best solution. In such a 
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constellation, decision makers need to ask not for one solution proposal, but for many so 
that experts have to start thinking in equally feasible alternatives, each of which with its 
advantages and disadvantages.   
Multiple feedback loops leading from and to the ‘analyze issue & develop possible 
courses of action’ 
Earlier, we have mentioned that it is particularly difficult for decision makers to de-
fine their need very clearly upfront and that various iteration circles are necessary. Depend-
ing on how precisely the need could be articulated, the quicker the expert can do the analy-
sis and the less modification requests are necessary (feedback loops to ‘articulate need’ 
phase, see: arrow “e” in Figure 4). On the other hand, there are two feedback loops (ar-
rows “h” and “i” in Figure 4) leading from phases ‘convey insights, suggestions, & solu-
tions’ and ‘apply & implement insights & solutions’ to the ‘analyze issue & develop possi-
ble courses of action’ phase. We will discuss them when describing these phases.  
3.4 Conveying Insights, Suggestions, & Solutions 
When the experts have concluded the analysis and have elaborated various decision 
making options, experts communicate (arrow “D”) their insights in a variety of ways and 
formats (e.g. reports, in face-to-face meetings, presentations) to the decision makers. 
Communication formats might vary depending on the content that needs to be communi-
cated, the characteristics of the decision maker, and the decision making situation more at 
large. Rosenthal and Hart (1991), for example, argue that in crisis situations, experts in-
teract with decision makers mainly through face-to-face interactions.  
From a communication perspective, this phase contains a variety of communicative 
challenges, with which experts have to tackle if they want to successfully convey knowl-
edge to decision makers. A first challenge for the integration of knowledge is related to the 
limited absorptive capacity (Szulanski, 1996) of communication partners and the risk of 
information overload (for a review on the topic, see: Eppler & Mengis, 2004). Ackoff 
commented already in the sixties that the more urgent problem for managers was not the 
lack of information, but the overabundance of irrelevant information and this should be 
true both for the number of documents, as well as for the number of information items per 
document (Ackoff, 1967). Iselin (1993) could show in the accounting context that manag-
ers are and feel overloaded with information when exposed to financial reports that show 
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both financial ratios and statements (Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Statement) so that 
their decision quality declines. They conclude that design recommendations for communi-
cation formats (structure and types of information to show) should be aligned with such 
insights from information overload studies. 
In the case of the expert decision maker interaction, information overload is a press-
ing problem as the expert needs to synthesize a huge amount of information. The experts 
have worked for weeks on the issue, they have analyzed thousands of pages of documents, 
conducted a large number of interviews etc. and now are faced with the difficult task to 
make, for example, a brief report out of it or a 10-minute presentation. To do so, they 
need to prioritize which information is most pertinent for the decision maker. Yet, since 
experts have different mindsets and value systems than decision makers and the decision 
makers’ priorities are quite unknown to the experts, this prioritization work is rather diffi-
cult. As a result, experts might deem types of information to be relevant, which then are 
not particularly useful to the decision maker. 
Validity is another, related aspect in this phase of the knowledge communication. In-
formation overload is caused not only by too much information or by an overabundance 
of irrelevant information (Ackoff, 1967). If information is ambiguous (Schneider, 1987; 
Sparrow, 1999), uncertain (Schneider, 1987; Tushman & Nadler, 1978), or of poor qual-
ity (Sparrow, 1999) people tend to suffer more quickly from information overload. Thus, 
when conveying their insights, experts need to think of procedures to guarantee the validity 
(Eppler, 2006) of a piece of information (e.g. through internal review processes, templates, 
checklists), find forms of communication that make this validity easily perceivable (e.g. 
through certificates, testimonies, user votes) or at least make the piece of information veri-
fiable (e.g. give the decision makers access to the raw data on which the interpretation is 
based so that they can recheck the information). The validity of information is important 
not only to facilitate the decision makers’ navigation within the sea of information and to 
fight information overload, it is equally important to prevent known biases that make peo-
ple tend to discard ambiguous solutions (Ellsberg, 1961; Sutcliffe, 1994). Thus, experts, in 
order to avoid that their insights not to be fully considered in the decision making process, 
must have as one of their top priorities to guarantee the validity of their insights. Sutcliffe 
recalls that one way to deal with ambiguity (the fact that information allows for multiple 
equally plausible interpretations) is to install debate. In discussion, people clarify issues and 
“shape a reality on which they agree” (Sutcliffe, 2005: 421). Finally, validity is important 
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for experts in order to affirm and maintain their reputation of being an expert and with 
this guarantee the acceptance of the information.  
Another challenge in this phase of the knowledge communication is related to lan-
guage and comprehension. Knowledge is very context dependent and rooted in practice. 
For this reason, there is always an inherent risk in the knowledge communication that 
there are unconscious or conscious misunderstandings taking place between the communi-
cation partners (Husted & Snejina, 2002). They can only interpret the message within their 
context of reference, and when these contexts differ substantially – as is the case for the 
expert - decision maker interaction - misunderstandings and differences in language use are 
highly probable. 
Finally, the ‘common knowledge effect’ (Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Piontkowski et al., 
2004; Stasser et al., 2000; Sutcliffe, 1994; Wittenbaum et al., 2004) is another major chal-
lenge in this phase of the knowledge communication. It stands for the tendency according 
to which people with diverse knowledge tend to focus in their communications on those 
parts of the knowledge that they already share (the common knowledge) rather than dis-
cussing the types of information that are distributed and unique to the single individuals. 
In other words, experts and decision makers tend to discuss more those ideas that they 
already share rather than exploring new elements, which represent unique knowledge of 
the experts or the decision makers respectively. As a consequence, they only sub-optimally 
profit from the diversity of their knowledge. 
Multiple feedback loops leading from and to the ‘Convey Insights, Suggestions, & 
Solutions’ 
There are various feedback loops possible stemming from this phase of the knowl-
edge communication. Once the experts have presented to the decision maker, what are the 
important elements to consider in the decision, which are the feasible solutions to envision, 
etc., decision makers might decide that they need an additional analysis on a specific aspect 
(arrow “h”) or that they still have doubts on specific aspects of the issue and need to draw 
in additional experts (arrow “c”). They might even realize at this stage of the interaction 
that they have not completely understood each other, which is why they have to reformu-
late their need (arrow “f”).  
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3.5 Applying and Implementing Suggestions and Solutions 
At a certain point, when the experts’ knowledge has been conveyed to the decision 
makers, the question is what communication is necessary between the two parties so that 
the decision makers want and are able to implement part of the gained insights into their 
decision making and actions (arrow “E”). There is a set of important challenges related to 
this process.  
A first one is related to the resistance of the decision makers to accept the expertise of 
the domain experts. Above, we have mentioned that ‘the expert’ is a social construct, 
which is always relative to other people (e.g. laypeople). As such, in the communication of 
knowledge, the knowledge proposed by the expert, the expert himself, and the institutions 
of which he/she is part, can always be called into question (which is why the expert has to 
continuously nurture and affirm his credibility). Dirk Baecker observes regarding this:  
“Das wichtigste Qualitätsmerkmal dieses Wissens ist, dass es kommuniziert werden muss, um wirk-
sam zu werden, und dass die Art und Weise, wie es wirksam wird, davon abhängt, wie es in der 
Kommunikation ausgewertet wird. Qualität und Wirksamkeit sind dabei davon abhängig, dass ta-
tsächlich nicht das Wissen als solches kommuniziert wird, sondern immer nur die Differenz zwi-
schen Wissen und Nichtwissen. (..) Die Ablehnungswahrscheinlichkeit jeden Wissens erklärt sich 
daraus, dass mit jedem neuen Wissen sowohl die Realitätssicht des sozialen Systems, in dem dieses 
Wissen kommuniziert wird, als auch das System selbst, das sich diese und nicht eine andere Realität 
konstruiert, auf dem Spiel steht.“4 (Baecker, 1999: 78) 
Following these arguments of Baecker, the decision maker risks in accepting the 
knowledge provided by the expert and this not because the proposed insight is wrong, but 
because it puts into question the decision maker’s view of the world. There is therefore a 
considerable probability that the decision maker will discard the knowledge communicated 
by the experts. Carlile argues similarly that knowledge integration across functional board-
ers often puts current knowledge ‘at stake’ because people would have to discard part of 
their hard-won knowledge and skills (path-dependency of knowledge) (Carlile, 2002; Car-
lile & Rebentisch, 2003). Especially if the novelty of the communicated knowledge is con-
                                                 
4 The most important quality attribute of this knowledge is that it has to be communicated to be effective 
and that the means how it becomes effective depends on what is prioritized in the communication. 
Quality and effectiveness thereby depend on the fact that it is not the knowledge, which is communi-
cated as such, but always only the difference between knowing and not knowing. (..) The probability 
of rejection of all knowledge can be explained by the fact that with each new knowledge, the current 
view of reality of the social system is at stake, as well as the system itself, which constructs itself this 
reality and not another.” (translation by the author) 
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siderable and the changes it implies are substantial, the decision maker is reluctant to ac-
cept this knowledge.  
If experts and decision makers are not part of the same organization, decision makers 
might be reluctant to consider a solution just for the fact that it has not been developed 
within the organizational boundaries. Katz and Allen (1982) called this phenomenon the 
not-invented-here syndrome, which finds its more general socio-psychological explanation 
in in-group favoritism (Brewer, 1979): the stronger the group affiliation, the more the 
knowledge of the in-group is favored with respect to the outgroup knowledge (Husted & 
Snejina, 2002). In this way, if the experts and the decision makers feel like belonging to 
different groups and communities, the aversion to accept insights from the out-group 
might be an issue.  
Political reasons like, for example, the need to gain prestige vis-à-vis other organiza-
tional members, can also be responsible for decision makers tending not to consider the 
experts’ advise. Forms of communication are more promising, in which decision makers 
feel their own knowledge to be valued and where the solution does not seem to be invented 
and proposed, but only solicited by the experts.  
Next to the problem of knowledge acceptance, an additional challenge is the transla-
tion and reification from the accepted knowledge into concrete action plans and actions. 
Pfeffer and Sutton call this problem the “knowing-doing gap”, a phenomenon such that, 
although people accept a certain knowledge to be useful and although they would know 
how to do something, they are reluctant to implement their knowledge into action (Pfeffer 
& Sutton, 1999, 2000). The authors mention various reasons for the ‘knowing-doing gap’. 
The focus on talk and building elegant plans and strategies, for example, often substitutes 
for a focus on action. In addition, a culture of fear, distrust, and competition within com-
panies may inhibit learning from mistakes (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000). 
Another reason why we argue that it is difficult to close the knowing-doing gap, is 
that the passage from the abstract (because not self-experienced, but provided by the ex-
pert) knowledge to its concrete implementation in decision making and action is not obvi-
ous. Are the recommendations of the experts really embedded and exemplified in the con-
text of the decision makers so that they have a chance to interpret them correctly? Is the 
experts’ knowledge communicated in a way that it can be recalled and activated easily? 
What are the concrete implications of the experts’ recommendations, and which opera-
tional steps are needed to implement them? In view of this additional reason for the know-
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ing-doing gap, it would be useful that the experts assist the decision makers in the passage 
from knowing – for example, a government principle, an analysis of the major competitive 
threats, a strategic conduct etc. – to doing. They would need to lead ‘doalogues’ (Eppler & 
Mengis, 2006), a dialogue that prepares the doing. In such knowledge intensive conversa-
tions, experts help decision makers to translate an analysis into a concrete action plan, to 
discuss operational details, and to define responsibilities and timelines. Put it bluntly, 
without a concrete talk of the walk, the knowing-doing gap risks to remain open and the 
walk of the talk stands on shaky ground. 
Departing from this phase, again, several feedback loops are possible.  
Multiple Loops Leading from the ‘Implement Suggestions & Solutions’  
The implementation of insights and ideas into decisions is not the endpoint of the in-
teraction between experts and decision makers. When decision makers engage very practi-
cally with the ideas, they come up with more questions to the experts. The latter will con-
vey further insights (feedback arrow “j” in Figure 4) and conduct additional analysis for 
the specific implementation challenges the decision maker encounters (feedback arrow “i” 
in Figure 4). In some cases, decision makers who engage at this point in doing, realize that 
the insights provided by the experts were not exactly what is needed and have to reformu-
late their need (feedback arrow “g”). In still other cases, they ask experts to do an evalua-
tion of the implementation to monitor and analyze the effects and implications of the deci-
sion taken (feedback to analysis phase, arrow “g”). Yet, if the same experts are not the 
right people for this type of service, decision makers have to identify additional/alternative 
experts (arrow “d”). In this way, also from the “last” phase of the knowledge communica-
tion process, various feedback loops originate so that it becomes the “first” phase. 
We have proposed a process framework for the knowledge communication between 
experts and decision makers. It has shown that the delegation of the “preparatory work” 
of the decision to the expert brings with it the need for a whole set of coordination and 
communication efforts so that the knowledge can be successfully integrated into the deci-
sion making. We have outlined a set of challenges such as how to gain visibility and credi-
bility, how to overcome the ASK-problem, how to reach in-between complexity, how to 
gain and sustain the big picture of an issue, how to overcome the knowing-doing gap: all 
these threaten the successful integration of experts’ knowledge in decision making. The 
framework does not only identify phases and specific challenges that are related to them, 
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but, more importantly, postulates feed-forward and feedback loops among these phases. 
We have particularly stressed this cyclical nature of the knowledge communication be-
tween experts and decision makers. 
The discussion of the process framework is a general description of the knowledge 
communication between experts and decision makers and we have left out certain qualify-
ing arguments. For example, we have not mentioned which weight the single phases carry 
in the knowledge communication process. Do these weights depend on whether the knowl-
edge is actively pushed by experts (without a specific request from decision makers) or 
specifically sought by decision makers? Does the push versus pull situation impact on the 
configuration of the feed-forward and feedback loops? Finally, in the description of the 
knowledge communication process we also have not highlighted who (experts/decision 
makers) takes over which engagement in the various phases. In Chapter 4, when presenting 
the case studies and analyzing whether the process framework provides a useful structure 
for describing the actual communication between experts and decision makers, we will 
address the above mentioned – and yet unanswered – questions.  
In the outline of this thesis, we have mentioned that we will highlight particularly the 
role of face-to-face conversations in the process of knowledge integration. Face-to-face 
conversations represent a major form of how experts and decision makers interact and are 
a “prototypical case” of how people develop, share, and integrate knowledge in social 
interaction and that “all other cases are derivates of it” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 28). 
Giddens claims similarly that “contexts of co-presence” are “always the main ’carrying 
contexts’ of interaction” (Giddens, 1984: 143). In this way, gaining a better understanding 
of the micro-interactional patterns of face-to-face conversations helps to sharpen the un-
derstanding of how decision makers integrate experts’ knowledge in more macro-
communicative processes as we have described them in the phase framework for knowl-
edge communication above5. The next section will provide an overview on the literature 
on face-to-face conversations in the organizational context, in particular with regard to 
social knowledge processes, such as knowledge integration.  
                                                 
5 Giddens argued that it is not possible to directly infer from the micro to the macro context and that the 
macro communicative structures are not aggregations of the conversational patterns on a micro level. 
Yet, the “interaction in contexts of co-presence is structurally implicated in systems of broad time-
space distanciation” (Giddens, 1984: Xxvi). With this Giddens contributed to the longstanding discus-
sion of sociologists on the difference between agency and structure and reminded us that we cannot di-
rectly infer macro communicative structures from micro-interactional patterns. 
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4  The Role of Conversations for Knowledge Integra-
tion and Approaches for their Management  
Already in the seventies, Weick stressed that members of an organization make sense 
of their daily actions mainly in meetings and face-to-face conversations (Weick, 1979: 133-
134). Face-to-face conversations are this “class of events which occurs during co-presence 
and by virtue of co-presence”, in which people interact with each other through verbal 
statements, but also glances, gestures, and positioning (Goffman, 1967: 1). Conversation 
partners do not merely interact to transmit information, but also to affirm themselves 
(Goffman, 1981), express their relation with others (Watzlawick et al., 1967), to recur-
sively form the social (Giddens, 1984), and also to develop and share human knowledge 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Face-to-face conversations are central to the co-construction 
of knowledge because they are a highly flexible, interactive, and iterative form of commu-
nication that allows participants for asking clarifying questions, deepening certain aspects, 
asking for the larger context of a specific piece of information, and for recursively adapting 
their communication style to the language and knowledge of their vis-à-vis. In addition, 
through conversations people create shared experiences (Dixon, 1997); they build trust and 
strengthen relationships between participants (Harkins, 1999) a prerequisite for the effec-
tive sharing (Szulanski, 1996) and integration of knowledge. Conversations (and particu-
larly meetings) are therefore said to be the “cradle of social knowledge in any organization 
(..), they allow the first and most essential step of knowledge creation: sharing tacit knowl-
edge within a microcommunity” (von Krogh et al., 2000: 125).  
Conversations can also create problems for the successful integration of knowledge. 
The previously praised flexibility of conversations leads to situations in which topics alter-
nate chaotically in the conversational flow and it is difficult to know for the conversation 
partners what the outcome of the conversation is. Conversations are also ephemeral and 
contributions of the single interaction partners vanish the moment they are pronounced. 
This linear structure puts limits to complex comparisons of multiple variables as well as to 
the persistence of conversations over time (Bregman & Haythornthwaite, 2001). In addi-
tion, several of the mentioned advantages of conversations are bound to the physical co-
presence of the participants (para- and non-verbal signs are important factors in the sense-
making process). Therefore, geographical distance still represents a major challenge to the 
use of conversations for the systematic management of knowledge (Chidambaram, 1996). 
Certain conversational routines and interaction patterns, such as defensive arguing 
(Argyris, 1996), unequal turn-talking (Ellinor & Gerard, 1998), or dichotomous arguing 
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(Tannen, 1999) impede the successful integration of knowledge. These patterns are based 
on cognitive and socio-psychological processes and tendencies like face-threatening or face-
saving behavior (Slugoski & Turnbull, 1988), poor analogical reasoning (Thompson, 
2000), in-group favoritism (Brewer, 1979; Messick & Mackie, 1989), and groupthink 
(Janis & Mann, 1977).  
In view of the arguments for the centrality of conversations for knowledge integra-
tion in the organizational context and, concomitantly, the challenges bound to this form of 
communication, the question is how conversations can be managed to allow for the inte-
gration of knowledge across knowledge boundaries, such as across experts and decision 
makers. Such a management of conversations from a knowledge perspective has to take 
into account that face-to-face conversations are highly flexible. “It is comparatively diffi-
cult to impose rigid patterns upon face-to-face interaction. Whatever patterns are intro-
duced will be continuously modified through the exceedingly variegated and subtle inter-
change of subjective meanings that goes on” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 30). As we have 
argued above, we believe that the flexibility of conversation is one of the main reasons why 
this form of communication is so important for the co-construction of knowledge. Conver-
sation partners continuously adjust to the state of knowledge of their vis-à-vis and can 
swiftly react to their understandings and perspectives. A conversation management that 
imposes structure on conversations results in a minus in flexibility, which can result coun-
terproductive if the structure is too rigid (especially for conversations such as informal 
chats during coffee-breaks or for very emotional discussions). The questions are thus what 
conversational patterns favor knowledge integration and what methods for the manage-
ment of conversations encourage such patterns without imposing too rigid and formalistic 
structures? By looking at the literature on conversations in organizations as it relates to 
knowledge management, we propose a synthetic framework for the management of con-
versations from a knowledge perspective and we aim to give answers to these questions. 
Conversations have been analyzed in a wide range of disciplines such as sociolinguis-
tics, socio-psychology, sociology, communication, decision making, and studies of organi-
zations. The literature is of such a scope that it would be impossible to review it all in this 
stance. Even if we took only one branch that would be pertinent for the analysis of sense-
making and social knowledge processes in talk-in-interaction, ethnomethodology, first 
proposed by Garfinkel (1967), the literature would be immense and would merit specific 
reviews (see, for example: Atkinson, 1988; Linstead, 2006). Our scope is much narrower 
as we focus merely on the scientific contributions that examined conversations in the or-
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ganizational context. We further focus in our analysis on contributions that examine the 
conversations’ potential to share, integrate, or create knowledge. This choice has various 
reasons. First, while organizational scholars argued for the central role of conversations for 
social knowledge processes and sense-making (see, for example: von Krogh et al., 2000; 
Weick, 1995), we aim to show what research has unfolded from these rather general delib-
erations on the role of conversations. Second, as the expert - decision maker interactions 
take place in organizational settings (even if their interaction can be inter-organizational), 
organizational studies represent our direct domain of reference. In a first moment, we out-
line the various understandings and definitions of conversations in organizations and dis-
cuss the different roles that have been attributed to them. Based on the literature of com-
munication theory, we propose a conceptual framework for the management of conversa-
tions, which identifies six dimensions that conversation partners take into account when 
making sense in their conversations and along which conversation management can be 
structured. We thus use the framework as an analytic lens to review specific ways of man-
aging conversations from a knowledge perspective. In this endeavor, we particularly focus 
on conversational principles and rules. 
We have identified the relevant literature by carrying out a systematic search within 
the electronic databases of ABI Inform, Science Direct and ACM Digital Library using the 
keywords conversation, dialogue, group communication, and group interaction. We have 
considered those contributions in which conversations are discussed as a central subject 
and are related to social knowledge processes within organizations. We have merely taken 
into account those articles that appeared in journals, which are embedded in organiza-
tional studies. From the references of the identified articles, we have moved backwards and 
identified other relevant research on the subject to complement our sample (the so-called 
snowball method). To further complete the literature base, we have also included major 
book contributions (Donnellon, 1996; Frey et al., 1999; Harkins, 1999; Isaacs, 1999; 
Schwartzmann, 1989; Senge et al., 1994; von Krogh et al., 2000). We have not considered 
the many purely practitioner-oriented ‘how-to’ books on crucial, fierce or otherwise special 
conversations in organizations. We have developed several synthetic tables on the reviewed 
literature in order to identify recurring issues and research gaps. 
4.1 Perspectives on Conversations  
One could argue that the study of face-to-face conversations in organizations is part 
of the more general discipline of organizational discourse analysis. Discourse analysis, in 
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the organizational context, investigates how discourse is intertwined with processes of 
organizing in other words, how organizational practices are shaped by the way meaning is 
negotiated in organizational discourse (Fairclough, 2005; Grant & Hardy, 2003: 7; Hera-
cleous & Barrett, 2001). On the other hand, if discourse analysis is understood very nar-
rowly as the linguistic analysis of language use beyond the boundaries of a sentence, the 
studies on conversations in the organizational field is not confined purely to discourse 
analysis. This already becomes apparent when looking at the multitude of labels, defini-
tions, and descriptions attributed to the concept (see: Table 2). 
Label Definitions/Descriptions Authors 
Appreciative 
conversation 
A conversation in which conversers collectively share diverse 
ideas, try to identify positive possibilities by focusing on past or 
current strengths, but at the same time challenge existing think-
ing and organizational practices.  
(Barge & Oliver, 
2003)  
Decisive 
dialogue 
A form of conversation that addresses the ineffective organiza-
tional culture of indecision. This dialogue is characterized by 
openness and inquiry (outcome is not predefined), candor (ex-
pose sensitive issues, air conflicts), informality (invite conversa-
tion partners to ask questions), and at the final stage by closure 
(point concrete ways to action). 
(Charan, 2006) 
Dialogue A specific form of conversation which conversers collectively 
pursue to open up problems into multiple best perspectives in 
order to explore the whole among the parts and the connections 
between the parts, to inquire into assumptions and combine 
inquiry with disclosure. Through dialogue, one aims to learn 
about the nature of the problem from all interlocutors and to 
create a shared meaning among many. Its etymological roots 
come from the Greek word logos which signifies word, meaning, 
and dia which means through. Dialogue is thus a process for 
transforming the quality of conversation, and in particular, the 
thinking that lies beneath it.  
(Argyris, 1996; 
Bohm, 1996; Ellinor 
& Gerard, 1998; 
Isaacs, 1999; 
McCambridge, 2003; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Schein, 1993; 
Senge, 1990a; Tan-
nen, 1999; Thomas 
et al., 2001) 
Generative 
conversation 
A conversation in which different bodies of knowledge meet the 
individual subject and develop new knowledge and generate 
innovative activities. It is a form of conversation that is creative, 
encourages the linking of concepts and ideas and the upholding 
of divergent ideas.  
(Steyaert & Bouwen, 
1996; Topp, 2000)  
Good conver-
sation 
A vocal interaction, in which people speak up and challenge 
views and assumptions and in which all sides participate and 
listen to each other’s view. 
(Quinn, 1996) 
Good fight A conversation that keeps a constructive conflict over issues 
from degenerating into dysfunctional interpersonal conflict and 
aims to argue without destroying the ability of the conversers to 
work as a team. 
(Eisenhardt et al., 
2000) 
Great talk A great talk is a conversation where questioning and doubt are 
institutionalized and big and broad questions legitimized. 
(Gratton & Ghoshal, 
2002) 
Honest con-
versation 
A public, organization-wide conversation about essential issues 
that engage in uncovering the ‘truth’ in order to allow fundamen-
tal change. 
(Beer & Eisenstat, 
2004)  
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Powerful 
conversation 
An interaction between two or more people, which progresses 
from shared feelings, beliefs, and ideas to an exchange of wants 
and needs to clear action steps and mutual commitments. 
(Harkins, 1999)  
Skillful dis-
cussion 
A conversation that intends to come to some sort of closure (e.g. 
make a decision, reach agreement, identify priorities) but at the 
same time aims to explore and create a deeper meaning and 
insight. A skillful discussion incorporates some of the techniques 
and devices of dialogue, but also focuses on tasks. 
(Ross, 1994) 
Strategic 
conversation 
– A conversation that is oriented towards the advancement of 
the company, to the creation of the future for the business, and 
to the creation, acquisition and allocation of resources for the 
future. It promotes a dialogue for understanding rather than an 
advocacy for agreement (von Krogh & Roos, 1995). 
(Eisenhardt et al., 
2000; Manning, 
2002; von Krogh & 
Roos, 1995; Westley, 
1990) 
  – A micro-level interaction between superior and subordinate to 
obtain an understanding of the actual origin of the feelings of 
exclusion and the presence and absence of energy around stra-
tegic initiatives (Westley, 1990). 
  
Table 2: Prescriptive Labels and Definitions Attributed to Conversations in Organizations 
The main distinction we can draw between the definitions and labels on conversa-
tions in organizations (as shown in Table 2) is between descriptive and prescriptive con-
cepts. Some authors look at conversations from a descriptive standpoint and simply outline 
their (multiple) functions within organizations. These authors use generic terms such as 
conversation (Ford & Ford, 1995; Overman, 2003), talk-in-interaction (Huisman, 2001), 
group communication (Hirokawa & Salazar, 1999; Poole, 1999; Sunwolf & Seibold, 
1999), meeting (Schwartzmann, 1989: 61), or team talk (Donnellon, 1996). The descrip-
tive intent can be seen in the way that these authors define and describe conversations: 
Huisman, for example, states that a talk-in-interaction is made up of “interactional and 
linguistic features that characterize the construction of a ‘commitment to future action’” 
(Huisman, 2001: 70). In contrast to this approach, many authors in the area of organiza-
tion studies have a more prescriptive aim (see: Table 2) (Charan, 2006; Gratton & Gho-
shal, 2002; Harkins, 1999; Ross, 1994). Researchers who study “dialogue” in organiza-
tions share a prescriptive understanding of their object of study: Dialogue is seen as a spe-
cific conversational form in which participants collectively open up problems into multiple 
perspectives in order to explore the whole among the parts and see the connections be-
tween the parts (Argyris, 1996; Bohm, 1996; Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; Isaacs, 1999; Schein, 
1993). The prescriptive focus is also evident in the fact that these authors propose an effec-
tive communicative behavior for facilitating innovation and learning. They do not, how-
ever, systematically analyze and describe actual conversational patterns, as we will discuss 
below.  
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In organizational studies, knowledge processes have been discussed in relation to 
conversations in at least four disciplinary areas: knowledge management, organizational 
learning, decision making, and change management.  
In the field of knowledge management the contributions on conversations outline the 
central role of dialogue and face-to-face conversations for knowledge processes. They do 
not analyze conversations more closely. Nonaka and Takeuchi argue, for example, for the 
importance of dialogue in the knowledge-creation process. They show that especially in the 
knowledge-externalization phase, when one tries to find a (verbal) structure for one’s tacit 
knowledge, the dialogic culture of openness, trust and collaboration is crucial (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995). On the basis of this premise, von Krogh, Ijicho, and Nonaka provide 
some more specific suggestions on how conversations among interaction partners should 
be managed. They outline four principles for managing conversations and show how they 
can be applied within the various phases of the knowledge-creation process (von Krogh et 
al., 2000). Unfortunately, contributions in the realm of knowledge management (Overman, 
2003; Thomas et al., 2001; Topp, 2000; von Krogh et al., 2000) often lack an empirical 
base and do not demonstrate empirically which conversational behavior hinders or enables 
group knowledge processes.  
Authors who view conversations from the perspective of organizational learning rep-
resent quite a homogeneous group of research. Many refer to David Bohm who conceives 
conversations as being directly related to thought. In his view, the ability to adapt systemic 
thinking or to question mental models is dependent on how people interact with each other 
in conversations (Bohm, 1996). Dialogue – as a qualified conversations that is character-
ized by systemic reflection and inquiry - helps to uncover premises, inferences and defen-
sive routines (Argyris, 1996) and thus becomes central to innovation and organizational 
learning (Dixon, 1997; Schein, 1993, 1995). The researchers in this field have opened the 
black box of conversations (at least conceptually) and they have highlighted various con-
versational mechanisms (Argyris, 1996; Harkins, 1999). But these studies often confine 
themselves to being prescriptive and lack extensive descriptive accounts on the micro-
processes of conversations. Their synthetic case-study work (Argyris, 1996; Gratton & 
Ghoshal, 2002; Harkins, 1999; Isaacs, 1993; Senge, 1990b) mainly outlines the impor-
tance of dialogue and its impact on the organizational reality, as well as how to best profit 
from this potential, but provides only little evidence on specific interaction patterns.  
Researchers who study conversations in relation to decision making form the largest 
community and provide an extensive empirical base. Many adopt a rather functional per-
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spective on conversations (e.g., conversations are instruments for dealing with tasks and 
making decisions). In this view, conversations are just a medium of group interaction and 
mediate the effects of the personal traits or of the task characteristics, which impact on the 
decision making process and outcome. We do not refer to this body of research systemati-
cally as excellent reviews in this field already exist (Frey, 1996; Frey et al., 1999; Hirokawa 
& Poole, 1996). It is important to note, however, that there are very few empirical studies 
that view conversations not from a functional perspective, but as constitutive of group 
decision-making (Hirokawa & Poole, 1996: 7). Only the latter understanding opens the 
way to analyze conversations from a knowledge-perspective by analyzing how people ac-
tually make sense of a subject or decision option during an interaction. In this vein, lin-
guists as Huisman (2001), or management scientists as McCambridge (2003) or Eisenhardt 
et al (2000) aim to understand how the formulation and content of decisions are connected 
to the (communicative) situations in which they are produced.  
Authors who approach conversations in the context of change management mainly 
hold a constructivist view on organizations: in conversations, people construct a meaning-
ful organization and do not merely transmit information. Conversations are the generative 
mechanisms in which change occurs and not only a tool for it (Ford et al., 1995). To struc-
ture conversations means to shape change directly and to form an organizational reality 
(Barge et al., 2003). The empirical work in this field is based on a few case studies (Beer & 
Eisenstat, 2004; Manning, 2002; Steyaert & Bouwen, 1996). 
Finally, there are contributions in which authors argue for the central role of conver-
sations for organizations in general. Conversations are vital in shaping the socio-cultural 
system and reality of the organization. Most of these contributions are conceptual (Bohm, 
1996; Donnellon, 1996; Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; Quinn, 1996; Weeks, 2001), while a few 
present interesting qualitative evidence (Isaacs, 1999; Schwartzmann, 1989). 
A first analysis of the literature on conversations in organizations shows that contri-
butions are mainly conceptual and often only refer anecdotally to empirical evidence. Case 
studies have been used to argue for the importance of conversations for organizing and for 
social knowledge processes. These case studies have not resulted in actual and accurate 
analyses of real-life conversations. The research on group communication and decision 
making constitutes an exception to this trend, but as it mainly holds a functional perspec-
tive on conversations, it is less enriching if we are interested in conversations as the central 
mechanism for social knowledge processes such as knowledge integration. In the functional 
paradigm, communication is merely an unproblematic medium to reach change, making 
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decisions, sharing information, or carrying out other types of tasks. It has been criticized 
that such an approach does not consider the socioemotional qualities of conversations and 
presumes that there is an objectively best solution (Hirokawa & Poole, 1996). Instead, 
communication can be understood as a constitutive process in which people take decisions 
or integrate knowledge. In such a frame, the conversation does not “serve” to transmit 
information, but recurringly creates a social reality within which people make sense and 
co-construct knowledge. Shotter claims that it is from “within the dynamically sustained 
context of these actively constructed relations that what is talked about gets its meaning” 
(Shotter, 1993: 2). A first suggestion for future research is therefore to consider the exten-
sive literature outside the organizational field, which disposes of vast empirical material, 
which is more qualitative and contextual in nature and conceives communication to be 
constitutive of social knowledge processes. These contributions can be found in the areas 
of argumentation studies (Walton, 2000), medical communication (Gülich, 2003) or man-
ager-subordinates interaction (Courthright et al., 1989). Furthermore, complimentary to 
the currently well-positioned case-study research, future contributions in the field should 
study the micro-interaction patterns empirically and examine their relation to larger organ-
izational processes and structures (as for example Barry & Crant, 2000). A key impedi-
ment to this research strategy may be the reluctance of managers to let researchers partici-
pate in strategic conversations and document and analyze their interactions. 
After this first overview on the field, we will review specific ways of managing con-
versations from a knowledge perspective.  
4.2 Towards a Framework for Conversation Management 
Managing conversations implies paying attention to the key elements that have an 
impact on the quality of such interactions. Through the analysis of the existing literature 
on conversations, we have identified six areas that influence conversations and along 
which conversations can be managed and structured (see: Figure 5). These key areas are: 
the message, the conversation process, the conversational intent, the mental models of the 
participants, the group dynamics and the outer context. They reflect the factual (message), 
temporal (conversation process), pragmatic (conversational intent), cognitive (mental mod-
els), emotional (mental models, group dynamics), and social (group dynamics, outer con-
text) aspects of conversations.  
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We can also trace these dimensions back to various communication models (Gerbner, 
1956; Herrmann & Kienle, 2004; Jakobson, 1960; Merten, 1999; Shannon & Weaver, 
1949; Sonesson, 1997). From a knowledge perspective, old transmission models of com-
munication (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) are insufficient for various reasons: First, they do 
not elucidate the sense-making process involved in communication, but proceed from the 
assumption that meaning is a property of the message and is fully specified by its elements. 
Yet, messages have to be selected, contextualized, interrelated, and appropriated by the 
receiver. Active construction and knowledge-generating and transforming mechanisms are 
involved in the sense-making process (Cook & Brown, 1999: 393). Second, transmission 
models are linear and static in nature and do not include evolving contextual aspects. If we 
are interested in how people make sense and integrate knowledge through and within their 
conversations, context-rich and not purely sender-based, but also receiver oriented com-
munication models like the ones presented by Merten (1999), Herrmann and Kienle 
(2004), Krauss and Fussell (1998), or also Sonesson (1997) are more insightful. Merten, 
for example, refers to reflexive, circular communication structures that involve a selective 
elaboration of information (Merten, 1999: 63). In his understanding, the construction of 
meaning within the communication is bound not only to the stimuli of the message, but 
also to the inner (e.g. previous experiences) and outer (e.g. social norms) contexts, and to 
temporal elements of the communication (feed-forward and feed-back structures) (Merten, 
1999). 
Our aim is not to extend or replicate such general communication models, but rather 
to present a simpler, management-oriented framework that explicitly refers to the interac-
tive group context of conversations. Our aim is to outline the most important dimensions 
that need to be taken into account when managing conversations and to provide guidelines 
for each dimension (based on a review of existing literature). We present key diagnostic 
questions for each dimension to facilitate this management approach.   
The first area or dimension that conversation management has to consider regards 
the exchanged messages of a conversation. This dimension includes all signs that are 
shared by conversation partners. From a knowledge perspective, the main question we 
have to ask is: Does the message (both in its format and its content) provide sufficient cues 
so that the conversation partners can make a shared sense of it, given their inner (i.e., the 
interaction situation) and outer (i.e., organizational) context? Appropriateness not only 
refers to the alignment of the message to the specifics of task and audience (Krauss & Fus-
sell, 1998), but also to whether it is rooted in facts or not. More specifically we therefore 
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ask, is the message aligned to task and people and rooted in facts? The more a message is 
rooted in actual facts, the better we can ground our sense-making process and the less 
problematic are inference processes (Argyris, 1996). This aspect refers to a first intercon-
nection of this dimension with the one of the mental models. Another interconnection ex-
ists with the group dynamics dimensions. The ‘para-verbal’ (i.e. intonation) and ‘non-
verbal’ (i.e. gestures) qualities of the message are of great importance for the emotional and 
relational aspects of the communication (group dynamics). Situations are frequent where 
verbal signs are correct and clear, but the para- and non-verbal signs express underlying 
inter-relational conflicts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mental Models
Are interlocutors 
aware of framing me-
chanisms and do they 
question judgments 
and polarizing 
viewpoints?
Group Dynamics
Are relationship conflict and power structures 
addressed and moderated within the conversation, 
and is a certain amount of content conflict enabled? 
Message
Is the content and 
form of the message 
aligned to task and 
people and is it 
rooted in facts?
Conversation Process
Is the overall conversation flow structured in a way that allows
both focus and synthesis as well as outreach and exploration? 
Are the single contributions equilibrated between the 
participants, interrelated, and well paced?
Conversational Intent
Are individual and common goals of the 
conversation explicit and oriented towards the co-
creation of meaning?
Outer Context
Does the selection of people, time, space, and the organizational 
culture support the creation, sharing, and integration of knowledge?  
Figure 5: Key Dimensions and Questions of Conversation Management
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The conversation process is the dimension which represents the time element of con-
versations and designates the flow of a conversation in time (e.g. the agenda of a meeting). 
The process of a conversation is recursive (therefore the circular representation in Figure 5) 
and creates, on the one hand, expectations for future interactions (feed-forward) and, on 
the other, allows feed-back on interactions that have already occurred (Merten, 1999: 
107). The question that arises in this dimension is whether the overall conversation flow is 
structured in a way that allows for focus and synthesis, as well as outreach and explora-
tion. Also, are the single contributions balanced between the participants, do the single 
contributions build on each other, and are they paced in a way that permits silence, reflec-
tion and attentive listening? Various authors have different opinions regarding an adequate 
degree of structure in a conversation process (i.e., Bohm 1996 versus (Beer & Eisenstat, 
2004; Harkins, 1999).  
From a management point of view, the overall intent and objective that is pursued 
with a conversation is an important aspect to consider. The conversational intent includes 
the specific common and individual goals which are pursued with the conversation. The 
various participants often do not have the same or even compatible goals. Also, individual 
intentions often remain obscure to other interlocutors. The supposed or explicitly shared 
conversational intent is one of the main elements people draw on when making sense of an 
interaction (Giddens, 1984). A key diagnostic question to ask is therefore whether the 
communicational intent is explicitly shared by all participants and whether this purpose 
reflects the main interests of all involved parties. 
Group dynamics are the socio-psychological aspects that are present in the conversa-
tion and that emerge as a result of the interaction among the participants. When groups 
co-construct meaning within conversations, group dynamics play a central part in the col-
laborative sense-making process. Each conversation incorporates both an aspect of content 
and one of relation (Watzlawick et al., 1967). The participants treat not only factual is-
sues, but always consider (at least implicitly) the relations between them. The sender com-
municates his/her self image and says something about the relation between him/her and 
the others. The relational aspect of the communication gives the receiver indications of 
how to interpret the content of the message. Group dynamics are also the cause of “politi-
cal” conversations and mistrust, which are obvious in conversations where only certain 
people speak, particular issues remain taboo, participant try to save face and do not dare 
to contribute dissenting views (Janis & Mann, 1977; Schein, 1995; von Krogh, 1998). 
From a knowledge perspective, previous research suggests that while content conflict can 
have positive on the elaboration and interpretation of exchanged information, conversa-
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tion partners usually do not know how to deal constructively with relationship conflict 
(Argyris & Schon, 1978; Eisenhardt et al., 2000). The question at this level is: Are rela-
tionship conflict and power structures addressed and moderated within the conversation, 
and is a certain amount of content conflict enabled? Another interrelationship between the 
group dynamics dimension and the outer context dimension can be identified. In fact, 
group dynamics are strongly dependent on the organizational structure, the formal and 
informal hierarchies, and on the communication culture. We will see in the next section 
that the main question in this dimension is how to deal with informal and formal power 
structures and how to cope with relationship conflict (in particular how to ensure that 
content is not primarily understood on a relational level) so that knowledge can be effec-
tively shared, created and integrated.  
The mental models represent the frames and interpretive schemes with which we 
choose new information, make sense of it by relating it to a certain situation or to other 
information (Kim, 1993). Mental models are the deeply anchored, internal pictures of how 
the world works (Senge, 1992) and consist of the values which fundamentally determine 
our actions. In conversations, mental models play a fundamental role both in talking and 
listening. They are responsible for the selectivity of our attention, the interpretation of a 
message, and the construction of meaning. If conversations are entirely social, then the 
mental models represent the individual level. When constructing or making sense of a mes-
sage, not only rational, but also emotional aspects intervene (that is why in Figure 5 the 
circles around mental models include a heart icon). We use a whole network of values, 
convictions, assumptions, and psychological dispositions for our sensemaking and move in 
a nanosecond from the original message to our interpretation of it (Argyris, 1996; Bohm, 
1996; Isaacs, 1993; Schein, 1993). Conversers are usually quite unaware of the active role 
of their mental models, which leads to implicit misunderstandings, unsound inferences, and 
rather aggressive forms of discussions. A key diagnostic question is thus whether the con-
versation partners are aware of the mental models and framing mechanisms that come into 
play in a conversation and whether they are able to suspend and question them (Argyris, 
1996; Isaacs, 1999; Schein, 1993; Senge et al., 1994).  
Finally, the outer context represents the larger setting in which conversations take 
place and includes general communicative structures (e.g. reporting systems), the physical 
space (e.g. sitting in a circle) and the organizational setting (e.g. hierarchies, guiding values, 
norms, and relationships within the organization or the single working groups). Conversa-
tions are embedded in a larger organizational context and participants use this context to 
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make the communicated messages meaningful (Herrmann & Kienle, 2004). At the same 
time, conversations shape and structure the larger organizational context (Giddens, 1984). 
Goffman (1967), but also Giddens in his structuration theory (1984) have advanced that 
the single interaction and the more general communication processes are reciprocally inter-
linked. According to Giddens, conversations are highly influenced by the communication 
structure that surrounds them. At the same time, ongoing conversations form the more 
global communication structure (Giddens, 1984)6. We define the outer context of conver-
sations as all the physical, organizational and habitual elements that are not directly acti-
vated within the conversation, but that constitute the outer frame in which conversations 
are embedded and that exert an influence on the conversations. The outer context includes 
the physical space, the organizational and cultural setting of conversations, but also the 
social networks and the general communicative routines. The key diagnostic question in 
this dimension is whether the selection of people, the allocation of time, the choice of the 
physical space, and the organizational culture support the integration of knowledge. By 
structuring these contextual elements (i.e. providing coffee corners or/and time for infor-
mal encounters and socializing), conversations can be managed in an indirect and less rigid 
way.  
We have presented the six dimensions of conversations as distinct, while stressing 
their interdependencies; group dynamics, for example, influence the conversational proc-
ess: in a conversation with strong formal or informal leaders (group dynamics), the turn-
taking (conversational process) is most likely to be dominated by one or two conversers. In 
addition to this, some of the conversational dimensions can be more easily managed than 
others. Conversational problems can be discovered and managed in the first place along 
the rather visible dimensions of the message and process. Yet, challenges on these dimen-
sions are linked to the less accessible dimension of group dynamics or mental model. Fu-
ture research could examine this proposition and study whether certain problems of less 
tangible and manageable dimensions (like mental models or group dynamics) can be ad-
dressed by measures that act on the interlinked, but more tangible dimensions (process, 
message).  
                                                 
6 In sociology, the micro-macro distinction is one of the most historic discourses, also referred to as the 
agency-structure distinction, whereby agency stands for the continuous flow of conduct and is charac-
terized by temporality. Structure, instead, is the patterning of interaction and its continuity in time 
(Giddens, 1984). Without pretending to contribute to the conceptual discourse on agency and struc-
ture, we aim to incorporate its general idea in that we acknowledge that each conversation takes place 
in a larger context, is both influenced by it and also forms it, which is why it cannot by analyzed com-
pletely detached from the context.  
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In the following section, we show how and in which direction management activities 
try to structure the six dimensions of conversations we have presented. We thereby particu-
larly focus on the role of conversational rules and principles. These rules prescriptively 
define how conversations have to be characterized in order that conversation partners can 
integrate their specialized knowledge among them.  
4.3 Approaches for the Management of Conversations 
Conversations are guided by specific, but implicit rules or routinized (behavior) pat-
terns between the interlocutors (Lyotard, 1984). The set of conversational rules and re-
sources that are instantiated in ongoing conversations form the structure of conversations 
(Giddens, 1979; Orlikowski, 2000). Conversers continuously draw on theses rules and 
resources when they communicate and make decisions (Poole & Hirokawa, 1996). Specific 
implicit rules and communicative behavior patterns may not be in line with certain objec-
tives that are pursued with the conversations. Chris Argyris particularly discussed one 
problematic conversational pattern which inhibits learning. He labeled it ‘defensive reason-
ing’ on a cognitive level and ‘defensive routines’ on a behavioral one. “Defensive reasoning 
occurs when individuals make their premises and inferences tacit, then draw conclusions 
that cannot be tested except by the tenets of this tacit logic” (Argyris, 1994: 81). Other 
such negative patterns are, for example, destructive argumentation (Ellinor & Gerard, 
1998), dichotomic reasoning (Tannen, 1999), or groupthink (Janis & Mann, 1977). To 
our knowledge, there are not many contributions that descriptively study such conversa-
tional patterns which in effect inhibit social knowledge processes. Mostly, authors define 
how conversations should be characterized (mainly through conversational principles and 
rules) and how to overcome “unwanted” conversational behavior. 
In the following, we will give an overview of two ways to change unwanted conver-
sational patterns that are currently being discussed in the literature: formal procedures and 
conversational rules.  
The literature proposes the use of formal procedures to be an effective mean to be-
come aware of conversational patterns and to actively shape the structure and mode of 
conversations (for an overview, see: Sunwolf & Seibold, 1999) Such formal procedures are, 
for example, devil’s advocacy, idea writing, straw polls, dialectical inquiry, learning maps, 
or the lateral thinking approach. Formal procedures offer guidelines for structuring the 
conversation process and supporting groups in analytic and creative tasks and in reaching 
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agreements (Jarboe, 1996). Their use has various objectives, such as reducing social pres-
sure, equalizing participation, promoting non-judgmental idea generation or fostering 
knowledge integration (Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002; Sunwolf & Seibold, 1999). The 
term “formal procedure” is used to label a variety of – often combined – cognitive and 
interaction frameworks and techniques. A few formal procedures work with visual formats 
(e.g. cognitive maps, lotus blossom, fishbone diagrams) while others designate specific 
roles to certain conversation partners (e.g. devil’s advocacy, external expert approach, role 
switching) (Sunwolf & Seibold, 1999). Certain procedures shape conversations “in action” 
while others are more reflective. The action oriented ones (e.g. dialectical inquiry, devil’s 
advocacy) provide formats for overcoming conversational patterns, which are problematic 
in certain contexts. The aim of the use of brainstorming techniques, for example, is that 
conversers overcome conversational orientations like dichotomous arguing, a focus on 
status-quo solutions, the - too strong - urge to come to solutions, or the counterproductive 
criticism of the ideas of others. Reflective tools are intended to make people aware of their 
own (conversational) behavior. Examples are the “ladder of inference” or the ‘left-hand 
column’. They foster direct reflection on certain conversational routines (Senge et al., 
1994) and can be used to ‘freeze’ (Weick & Quinn, 1999) an interaction, to pause for a 
moment and raise awareness of the social processes occurring. This process of creating 
awareness is a first important step in changing conversational behavior (Argyris, 1990; 
Isaacs, 1999; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Topp, 2000). While action-oriented procedures 
have been analyzed mainly by scholars from the fields of group decision-making and group 
communication, reflection-oriented instruments have been of greater interest for research-
ers from the organizational learning domain.  
Secondly, a change in conversational behavior can result from the introduction of 
explicit conversational rules and principles. In the following, we will review this second 
approach more extensively since, as we will show further on, it has been widely discussed 
in the literature and there exists, to our knowledge, no literature review on the matter. 
Besides formal procedures, many authors present a set of explicit conversational principles 
and rules as a way to change conversational behavior (Beer & Eisenstat, 2004; Gratton & 
Ghoshal, 2002; von Krogh et al., 2000). The idea pursued by these authors is that, with 
time, people substitute their implicit rules with explicit ones which they gradually interior-
ize until they become their new routines. Rules have the advantage of being easily memo-
rable and through their “vividness also aid in focusing reflection” (Putnam, 1994: 261). 
Rules have the advantage not to structure conversations excessively (Bohm, 1996; Isaacs, 
1999), but impose only a relatively loose structure that can be appropriated quite differ-
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ently by the interacting group. As we have argued earlier on, the flexibility is a central 
characteristic of conversations and the means of their management should take this aspect 
into account. Conversational rules should always be enacted by conversation partners be-
yond a guideline-based behavior: they should link them to a certain spirit, as a spirit of 
appreciation or of collaboration (Barge & Oliver, 2003). At the same time, conversers 
should be cautious in applying rules across different contexts since what is a fruitful con-
versational behavior in one setting (e.g., assessing different options), can be inhibiting in 
another (e.g., creating new ideas). While fostering a positive attitude may be functional for 
conversations focused on change, this may be counterproductive for learning, argues 
Argyris: “in the name of positive thinking managers often censor what everyone needs to 
say and hear” (1994: 79). Von Krogh and Ross (1995) argue that strategic conversations 
should be guided by principles that radically differ from those of operational conversa-
tions. Rules thus always depend on the specific purpose attributed to the conversation (von 
Krogh et al., 1995). Specific rules are proposed for leading difficult conversations 
(Harkins, 1999), initiating change (Barge & Oliver, 2003), or stimulating group learning 
(Argyris, 1994). The probably most famous formulation of rules for leading conversations 
are the ones of Grice subsumed in his ‘cooperative principle’: “make your conversational 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or 
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice, 1975). Under this princi-
ple he discussed four maxims, one of quantity (give as much information as is required, 
and not more than is required), one of quality (do not say what is false or that for which 
you lack adequate evidence), one of relation (be relevant), and finally one of manner (be 
clear, orderly and avoid ambiguity). While we do not aim to present a reflection of Grice’s 
cooperative principle (it has been widely discussed in the literature, both vigorously criti-
cised and resolutely supported. For an overview, see: Lindblom, 2001), we limit ourselves 
to highlight one aspect, which is that Grice himself showed that these maxims are fre-
quently not followed by conversation partners. The same is true for the conversational 
rules, which we are going to review in the following. “Breaks” in conversations are very 
frequent and, within these breaks, conversation partners continue to try to make sense of 
their interactions. Even if a communication is ambiguous and badly ordered, conversation 
partners try to make sense of it, yet, depending on the gravity of the “break” in the conver-
sation, they are severely hampered in doing so. Below we review the rules discussed in the 
organizational literature, prescribe how conversations should be characterized in order to 
foster social knowledge processes such as knowledge integration. We structure the rules 
identified in the literature with the help of the previously discussed six dimensions of our 
management framework. 
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Table 3 gives an overview of the conversational rules that can be attributed to the 
message dimension. Some rules regard the form of how messages should be communicated, 
e.g. using humor (Eisenhardt et al., 2000) or visual support (Harkins, 1999), making hypo-
thetical expositions and, in general, fostering innovative language (von Krogh et al., 2000). 
The two latter rules are important for developing new visions, looking at familiar issues 
from new angles and creating new knowledge. Other rules concern the content of the mes-
sage, like the one that urges participants to distinguish between facts and opinions 
(Margerison, 1989).  
Expansive Message Form (verbal & non-verbal)   
• foster innovative language and experiment with new words (von Krogh et al., 2000) 
• make hypothetical expositions  (von Krogh & Roos, 1995) 
• use humor (Eisenhardt et al., 2000) 
• use visual support to gain focus (Harkins, 1999) 
• make clear statements by avoiding euphemisms and talking in circles (Weeks, 2001) 
• use a neutral and moderate tone (intonation, facial expressions, body 
language, type of language) in difficult and stressful conversations 
(Weeks, 2001) 
Fact-based, Prioritized, and Positioned Message Content   
• select topics that are broad, relevant and personally meaningful to 
participants  
(Gratton & Ghoshal, 2002) 
• focus on the issues that matter most (Beer & Eisenstat, 2004) 
• distinguish between facts and opinions  (Margerison, 1989) 
• include data in a democratic way and remain close to it (Argyris, 1996; Dixon, 
1997; Quinn, 1996) 
• distinguish between identifying problems and giving recommenda-
tions 
(Beer & Eisenstat, 2004) 
• allow a certain level of ambiguity in strategic conversations  (von Krogh & Roos, 1995) 
Table 3: Conversational Principles and Rules Regarding the Message 
 
On the process dimension (Table 4), certain rules concern the way a conversation 
should be structured as a whole, while others regard the individual interactions. Regarding 
the first aspect, the question is discussed of how strict and in what way conversations 
should be structured and planned. Bohm made the argument that the natural flow (and 
with it flexibility and openness) is the strength of conversations (1996). Various authors 
define clear phases for conversations including a phase that aims to ensure a common un-
derstanding of the issue, an analysis phase, a more creative phase where solutions are de-
veloped, an assessment phase, and a more operational phase where action plans are de-
cided (Beer & Eisenstat, 2004; Harkins, 1999). These authors argue that conversations 
should include first a divergent phase, and then a convergent one. Since conversations in 
organizations often take place with great pressure of time, the divergent phase is often 
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missed out and people do not have the chance to develop new ideas, inquire into the sub-
ject more in depth, so that the organization’s capacity to be innovative is lowered 
(Harkins, 1999).  
Explicit Macro Conversation Structure   
• structure conversations in the following phases: analyze actual status - 
define fictitious, realizable objectives - elaborate main driving forces, 
root causes - draw out possible solutions - define action plan 
(Barge & Oliver, 2003; 
Beer & Eisenstat, 2004; 
Harkins, 1999; Manning, 
2002) 
• structure the conversation in time by including converging and diverg-
ing phases 
(Beer & Eisenstat, 2004; 
Harkins, 1999) 
• plan the agenda (Ross, 1994) 
• convert generalities to specifics and migrate from specific issues to 
general principles 
(Margerison, 1989) 
• start the conversation as broadly as possible (Topp, 2000) 
• edit conversations appropriately, make incisions to crystallize main 
concepts   
(von Krogh et al., 2000) 
• make very specific proposals for changing communicative behavior  (Ford & Ford, 1995) 
Balanced and Well-paced Micro Interaction Processes  
• alternate the contributions of the various participants in balanced ways 
to actively encourage participation and collaboration 
(Barge & Oliver, 2003; 
Beer & Eisenstat, 2004; 
Dixon, 1997; Eisenhardt 
et al., 2000; Ellinor & 
Gerard, 1998; von 
Krogh et al., 2000) 
• let it be continuous and speak when the spirit moves you (Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; 
von Krogh & Roos, 
1995) 
• always link new statements to the previous contribution (Topp, 2000) 
• do not rush but allow silence between phrases  (Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; 
Isaacs, 1999; Topp, 
2000)  
• engage in effective and deep listening (listen to whole phrases, re-
phrase, etc.) without resistance to ensure common understanding 
(Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; 
Harkins, 1999; Isaacs, 
1999; McCambridge, 
2003; Ross, 1994; Topp, 
2000) 
• alternate talking with writing down individually in order to lay out dif-
ferences and make possible constraints explicit  
(Beer & Eisenstat, 2004) 
Table 4: Conversational Principles and Rules Regarding the Conversational Process  
With regard to micro interaction processes, authors mention that the various mes-
sages should be connected explicitly (Topp, 2000) and that there should be pauses and 
silence between the single contributions (Isaacs, 1999; Topp, 2000). Moments of silence 
are important to calm down frenetic or aggressive discussions and to allow participants to 
reflect upon assumptions, arguments or emotions (Ellinor & Gerard, 1998). Another rule 
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states that the contributions of the various interlocutors should be balanced so that various 
perspectives can be considered (Ellinor et al., 1998) and knowledge is shared. This rule of 
the process dimension directly refers to an underlying dimension, that of group dynamics 
(actively sharing responsibility and leadership to encourage participation and collaboration 
(Ellinor et al., 1998)).  
 
Authentic Content Conflict  
• maintain a healthy level of content conflict over issues and be hesi-
tant to interpret a critique on an issue as an personal attack 
(Argyris & Schon, 1978; 
Eisenhardt et al., 2000) 
• speak with one’s own voice and listen to oneself  (Isaacs, 1999) 
Moderate Relationship Conflict  
• manage interpersonal conflict by focusing on facts and multiplying 
alternatives to enrich the level of debate 
(Eisenhardt et al., 2000) 
• disarm attacks by restating and clarifying intentions (Weeks, 2001) 
• lead personal talks to establish trust and empathy and to clarify 
relational aspects 
(Gratton & Ghoshal, 2002) 
• legitimize emotions (Gratton & Ghoshal, 2002) 
Balanced Formal and Informal Power Structures  
• balance power structures by leaving power fluid and defining roles 
dynamically 
(Ellinor & Gerard, 1998) 
(von Krogh & Roos, 1995)  
• suspend roles and status or pick them as a theme if they exert too 
much influence on the conversation 
(Argyris, 1996; Bohm, 1996; 
Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; 
Senge, 1990a) 
• actively share responsibility and leadership (by speaking to the 
group and creating common goals) to encourage participation and 
collaboration 
(Ellinor & Gerard, 1998) 
• become aware of games and tactics and name them in order to 
neutralize them 
(Topp, 2000; Weeks, 2001) 
• honor your partner by acknowledging responsibility  (Weeks, 2001) 
Table 5: Conversational Principles and Rules Regarding Group Dynamics 
The rules that regard the group dynamics of conversations (Table 5) aim to give an-
swers to the question of how the participants of a conversation can deal with relational 
issues so that these do not inhibit the group from completing its task successfully or inte-
grating knowledge. Various authors suggest that it is necessary to be able to address inter-
personal issues and lead emotional talks in order to create an atmosphere of trust (Argyris, 
1996; Bohm, 1996; Gratton & Ghoshal, 2002). In conversations in organizational settings, 
participants have different functional and hierarchical roles and a narrow understanding of 
one’s responsibility (or a sense of inferiority) might impede conversers to participate 
equally, challenge ideas, propose alternatives or share knowledge effectively (Dixon, 1997). 
Therefore, various rules propose means to deal with power structures (e.g. suspend roles or 
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status and balance power structures) (Argyris, 1996; Bohm, 1996; Eisenhardt et al., 2000; 
Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; Senge et al., 1994). 
Balance between (Playful & Analytic ) Discovering and Focusing   
• uncover underlying assumptions and unfold the invisible pat-
terned reality 
(Bohm, 1996; Isaacs, 1993, 
1999; Quinn, 1996) 
• balance inquiry and advocacy (Engage in advocacy by providing 
data, and explaining your reasoning. Engage in inquiry by slowing 
down the speed, reframing, open up for new solutions, asking for 
the person's observable data and reasoning, and by asking your-
self what led you to a specific view) 
(Argyris, 1996; Beer & 
Eisenstat, 2004; Dixon, 
1997; Ellinor & Gerard, 
1998; Harkins, 1999; Ross, 
1994) 
• release the need for specific outcomes and leave room for explo-
ration, imagination, and learning 
(Bohm, 1996; Ellinor & 
Gerard, 1998; Quinn, 1996) 
• institutionalize doubt, vigorous, disciplined questioning and big, 
broad questions  
(Gratton & Ghoshal, 2002) 
Suspended Immediate Judgments and Emotional Reactions  
• suspend assumptions, certainties and your judgment, acknowl-
edge that they don't have to be out of necessity and actively en-
gage in reframing problems and issues 
(Bohm, 1996; Dixon, 1997; 
Isaacs, 1993, 1999; Senge, 
1990a) 
• suspend and observe your immediate reactions (e.g. anger)  (Bohm, 1996; Topp, 2000) 
Interrelated Statements & Viewpoints   
• do not polarize viewpoints, but explore and respect differences 
and look for their interconnections and the shared meaning (sys-
temic thinking) also by putting yourself in the other person's shoes 
(Bohm, 1996; Dixon, 1997; 
Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; 
Isaacs, 1993, 1999; Putnam, 
1994; Ross, 1994; Senge et 
al., 1994; Topp, 2000) 
• develop a shared meaning and seek (but not force) consensus 
with qualification  
(Dixon, 1997; Eisenhardt et 
al., 2000; McCambridge, 
2003) 
• think of the dynamic nature of things  (Isaacs, 1999) 
Affirming Options   
• develop an affirmative and generative competence and think in 
positive possibilities and solutions rather than problems 
(Barge & Oliver, 2003; Topp, 
2000) 
Table 6: Conversational Principles and Rules Regarding Mental Models 
The rules and principles regarding the mental model dimension (Table 6) aim to cre-
ate awareness about the role of our inference processes. They allow us to develop a critical 
capacity towards the way we make messages meaningful. If such processes remain hidden, 
then participants continue to misunderstand each other, fall back into the same paradigms, 
and are incapable of seeing interconnections between various perspectives. For this reason, 
one central rule of the mental model dimension is to uncover underlying assumptions and 
to unfold the invisible patterned reality (analytic exploring) (Argyris, 1996). In a second 
step, the conversers learn to suspend and question their assumptions, certainties and judg-
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ments (Bohm, 1996; Isaacs, 1993, 1999; Senge, 1992). The argument is not that certain 
mental models are wrong and have to be changed, but that some are more suited to achie-
ve a certain goal than others. Problematic patterns for social knowledge processes are di-
chotomic reasoning, polarizing viewpoints, defensive routines (Argyris, 1996), problem-
oriented thinking (Barge & Oliver, 2003) or the focus on advocating (Ellinor & Gerard, 
1998; Harkins, 1999; Ross, 1994).  
To overcome these problematic patterns, participants should, on the one hand, en-
gage in systemic thinking and relate diverging statements and viewpoints. Systemic think-
ing (Bohm, 1996) is important to see the interconnectedness between various aspects or 
points of view and to discover the complexity of certain issues. It therefore leads to conver-
sations that are less aggressive because they are not oriented on either-or thinking and 
therefore on winners and losers. Secondly, conversers should balance inquiry and advo-
cacy, i.e. balance discovering and focusing, encouragement and criticism. This implies that 
one has to inquire further into new alternatives, explore the standpoint of others, and in-
quire into one’s own viewpoints (its reasons, implications, etc.). The aim is to see the con-
nections between viewpoints. In this way, diverging opinions are put forward so that new 
ideas can emerge (Dixon, 1997). 
The rules regarding the conversational intent of a conversation (Table 7) mainly 
originate from authors from the field of organizational learning who distinguish general 
goals that any conversation should achieve, and specific, context-related goals. Bohm ar-
gues that the final goal of dialogue is to enhance learning, innovation and understanding, 
which is why the conversational intent has to leave room for unforeseen outcomes (Bohm, 
1996). Harkins states that a conversation should always include three general objectives: 
advancing the agenda, creating shared learning, and creating stronger relationships 
(Harkins, 1999). Harkins thus not only points out the learning aspect of conversations, but 
also their emotional and relational function.  
With regard to the conversational intent of a specific conversation, two authors point 
out that the conversers have to share their individual objectives, or at least clarify the 
common objectives that are pursued by the conversation (Bohm, 1996; Ross, 1994). To 
reveal one’s own intentions seems to be a rather difficult requirement (Wittenbaum et al., 
2004). It seems more productive to define clear common objectives than just individual 
ones. In this context, Eisenhardt, Katwajy, and Bourgeois refer to the fact that working out 
shared objectives is important for the group in order to create a collective vision and not 
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see the conversation as a simple exchange of individual interests where some win and the 
others lose (Eisenhardt et al., 2000).  
Explicit Individual Goals of the Particular Conversation  
• pay attention to your intentions and make sure that the intentions of 
the various participants are shared by the conversing group 
(Bohm, 1996; Ross, 1994) 
Shared Aim of Conversations for the Co-Creation of Meaning   
• define common objectives and a shared vision to be pursued jointly (Eisenhardt et al., 2000) 
• do not define the conversational intent too narrowly, but leave space 
for unforeseen outcomes. Thus, let the intention of a conversation 
be threefold: advancing the agenda, creating shared learning, and 
creating stronger relationships 
(Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; 
Harkins, 1999) 
Table 7: Conversational Principles and Rules Regarding the Conversational Intent 
Finally, various authors discuss rules that regard the context of conversation i.e. the 
situation in which the conversation takes place (Table 8). Some rules concern the constella-
tion of participants. Together, the conversers should bring in the necessary knowledge to 
effectively address the issues at hand. Certain authors see a great advantage in including a 
facilitator who leads the conversation, but who always backs out of this leading position 
and does not impose an artificial hierarchy. Next to people, the physical space in which the 
conversation takes place plays an important role. Suggestions range from arranging par-
ticipants in a circle to organizing the meeting in a location outside the organization’s walls. 
Harkins suggests that in doing the latter, in closing the doors on the everyday context, the 
conversers will open up and have a more distant, external view of the issue (Harkins, 
1999). Another important set of rules regards the general conversational etiquette and the 
conversational culture in which the conversation takes place. Other aspects of the context, 
such as general organizational values, are rarely considered in the literature on conversa-
tions and would merit further research attention. 
Assorted People & Roles  
• ensure that relevant information and individuals are present at the 
conversation, e.g. involve generalists  
(Gratton & Ghoshal, 2002; 
von Krogh & Roos, 1995) 
• assign a 'facilitator' who 'holds the context' of dialogue  (Senge, 1990a)  
Allocated Time and Conversation Formats  
• create time and space for (emotive) conversations (Gratton & Ghoshal, 2002) 
Supporting Space  
• choose and arrange the physical space of a conversation so as to 
facilitate a certain type of conversation (sitting in circles, blocking 
out interruptions, holding meetings outside the walls of the organi-
zation, etc.) 
(Bohm, 1996; Harkins, 
1999) 
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Shared Conversational Culture  
• establish a conversational etiquette and communicate it at the be-
ginning of a meeting 
(Beer & Eisenstat, 2004; 
Gratton & Ghoshal, 2002; 
von Krogh et al., 2000) 
• make the type of conversation (e.g. strategic conversations) explicit  (von Krogh & Roos, 1995) 
• create a safe haven for participants by making openness and trust 
the rule rather than the exception and by encouraging and reward-
ing the injection of new perspectives 
(Ross, 1994) 
Table 8: Conversational Principles and Rules Regarding the Outer Context of 
Conversations 
4.4 A Framework for Conversation Management 
We have argued for the centrality of conversations for social knowledge processes 
such as knowledge integration and for a communicational approach towards issues of 
knowledge management. Members of an organization often engage in sense making during 
conversations and it is through this communicational form that they share, create, and 
integrate knowledge. Yet, conversations are often characterized by routines that inhibit the 
integration of knowledge. Given the crucial role of conversations, but being aware of the 
challenges related to this form of communication, we have argued for the active manage-
ment of conversations from a knowledge perspective. In order to develop such an ap-
proach, we have viewed at the literature on co-located conversations within the organiza-
tional context that stress aspects of learning, sense-making, and knowing. In particular, we 
have reviewed research on conversations from the fields of knowledge management, organ-
izational learning, decision making, and change management. We have found that most of 
this research is prescriptive in nature and lacks a strong empirical base (with the exception 
of the studies in the field of decision making). While such empirical evidence is provided 
outside the organizational domain a stronger integration of this literature is needed. Stud-
ies on ethnomethodology, for example, which engage in conversation analysis (e.g. Sche-
gloff, 1987), are certainly of great relevance for the study of conversations from a knowl-
edge perspective. Next to the integration of studies conducted outside the organizational 
domain, future scientific contributions need to conduct more empirical research to study 
micro-conversational dynamics from a knowledge perspective. Feasible research methods 
for this endeavour are conversation analysis, ethnographic studies, action research, partici-
patory observation, or other research approaches that are also highly immersive, focused 
on language, and generally context-rich. 
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Referring to general communication theory, we have proposed a framework with six 
dimensions along which conversations can be managed from a knowledge perspective. 
These dimensions are the message, the conversation process, the conversational intent, 
group dynamics, mental models, and the outer context. Conversers contemporaneously 
draw on each of these dimensions when making sense of and within an interaction. Each of 
these dimensions can be shaped more or less directly (from message to mental model). We 
have presented two specific means of managing conversations: formal procedures and con-
versational rules and have provided a more thorough review of the latter. While many 
reviewed studies outlined one single rule, we have tried to present a more systematic pic-
ture and 1. showed on which level of the communication these rules act (e.g. on the mes-
sage dimension) 2. provided a structure (the framework) thanks to which the interconnec-
tions between the various rules becomes apparent. 
Figure 6 is an integrative result of this work and presents a prescriptive framework 
for the management of conversations. It ties the six dimensions of the management of con-
versations to the conversational rules that prescriptively define how conversations should 
be characterized to allow for the integration of knowledge among conversation partners.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•Expansive message form (verbal & nonverbal)
•Explicit macro conversation structure
•Equilibrated and well-paced micro interaction processes-
•Authentic content conflict 
•Balanced formal and Informal power structures 
•Moderate relationship conflict 
•Balance between (playful & analytic ) discovering and focusing 
•Suspended immediate judgments and emotional reactions  
•Interrelated statements and viewpoints
•Affirming options  
•Shared aim of conversation bound to the co-creation of meaning-
•Explicit individual goals of the particular conversation 
•Assorted people & roles  
• Allocated time and conversation formats 
•Supporting space 
• Shared conversational culture 
•Fact-based, prioritized, and positioned message content
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Figure 6: A Framework for the Management of Conversations in Organizations from 
a Knowledge Perspective  
 
In view of the discussed advantages (e.g. they impose a relatively loose structure, they 
are easy to recall) and drawbacks (e.g. a guide-line based behavior has to be combined 
with a certain spirit) of conversational rules, we believe that future research should also 
investigate other means of improving the quality of conversations. Such alternative means 
are important for conversers to acquire and interiorize effective conversational behavior as 
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defined by the various conversational rules. An example with a focus on training is 
McCambridge’s study on the use of film extracts to teach conversational behavior 
(McCambridge, 2003). Augmenting conversations with interactive, real-time visualization 
software provides another interesting alternative. In particular, applications that are based 
on interactive, content-specific visuals (Weinberger & Mandl, 2003) or on visual meta-
phors (Haber et al., 1994) seem promising from a knowledge perspective. Not only do they 
foster reflection on one’s own conversational routines, or invite conversers to try out alter-
native conversational patterns, they also provide an additional language (visual semantics 
and syntax) to enrich sense-making. 
Another implication regards the context of conversation research. Here, we see two 
developments: first, integrating the research on conversations in organizations in general, 
and, secondly, developing differentiated approaches to conversations, based on their spe-
cific application contexts (ranging from change discussions to strategic conversations).  
Regarding the first aspect, we have highlighted the fact that there is a need for more 
integrative research on conversations in organizations. An integrated approach is necessary 
to better understand the central role of conversations in organizations. A first step towards 
the development of such an integrated approach is the prescriptive framework we have 
presented (although it clearly focuses on the potential of conversations to enable knowl-
edge creation and transfer). An integrative approach can be further advanced by linking 
the definition of high-quality conversations with tools (e.g. formal interventions, software 
supported visual tools, work with film excerpts) to acquire and internalize the desired con-
versational behavior. An integrated approach to the management of conversations has to 
emphasize three major aspects: First, it has to outline the various functions of conversa-
tions and the various intents that can be pursued by conversations. Secondly, it has to 
show which conversational behavior is favorable in which context and to outline methods 
through which problematic conversational patterns can be uncovered. In fact, in the previ-
ous review of the conversational rules as they are discussed in the literature, we did not 
single out clearly which communicative behavior is favorable for knowledge creation, 
which for knowledge sharing, and which for the application of knowledge. In part, this 
was due to our focus on knowledge integration, where specialized knowledge is not only 
shared, but new insights are developed in this co-construction of knowledge and where the 
developed group knowledge has to be applied in decision making. Upcoming research 
should show more precision with regard to the type of knowledge process that aims to be 
fostered. Finally, it has to define a whole set of means that will allow conversers to change 
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their conversational routines and internalize the conversational behavior that is prescribed 
by conversational rules. These means have to differ in their modes (playful versus analytic, 
reflective versus active) and in the degree to which they structure and interfere with the 
conversation (providing a loose structure vs. a rigid structure). Such an integrative ap-
proach can drive micro-interaction patterns that foster sense-making and the co-
construction of knowledge.  
The term ‘conversation management’ seems adequate for this kind of systematic, bal-
anced and differentiated approach to conversations and gives a voice to the increasing 
awareness of the fundamental importance of conversations for organizational life.  
5  Section Summary 
This chapter has aimed at outlining a conceptual panorama within which the com-
munication and integration of knowledge between experts and decision makers can be 
studied. In a first moment, we have cast light on the process of knowledge integration and 
have argued that the expert - decision maker situation, in which there exists a concomitant 
need for specialization and collaboration, has to be conceived as a situation of “knowledge 
integration” and not as one of “knowledge transfer”. By referring to social constructivism 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and in view of our object of study, we have then proposed to 
conceive knowledge integration from a communication perspective and have defined 
knowledge integration as the communication process by which people with differing spe-
cialized knowledge (i.e. skills, perspectives, priorities, experiences) engage in joint sense 
making and deliberation to co-create new and shared meanings and to embed this inter-
personal knowledge in decision making. From this definition followed that we understand 
knowledge integration as a two-phase process where first, the individual specialized 
knowledge has to be co-constructed on a group level and then, in a second phase, this so-
cial knowledge has to be applied in decision making.  
After a brief clarification of the expert - decision maker situation, we have built on 
the idea that knowledge integration is a two-phase process and have aimed at developing 
more precision in what could be a communication perspective on social knowledge proc-
esses. We have proposed a process model for the knowledge communication between ex-
perts and decision makers. For each phase of the model, we have discussed challenges, such 
as the ASK-problem (Belkin et al., 1982) in the ‘need articulation’ phase, or the knowing-
doing gap (Pfeffer & Sutton, 1999) in the ‘conveying insights, suggestions, & solutions’ 
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phase. In the discussion of the model, we have put particular emphasis on the cyclical na-
ture (feed-forward and feedback loops) of the knowledge communication process.  
Arguing that co-located face-to-face conversations represent a major mean how ex-
perts and decision makers attempt to integrate their specialized knowledge in decision 
making, we have reviewed the literature on conversations in organizations and have par-
ticularly focused on contributions that adopted a knowledge perspective. From there we 
have developed a framework for the management of conversations from a knowledge per-
spective.  
On the basis of this interdisciplinary background – involving literature from the do-
mains of knowledge management, sense-making, communication and decision making – 
and with two conceptual frameworks at hand, we have the possibility, in the next chapter, 
to review the empirical material of the three case studies with the help of multiple struc-
tures. We thereby follow the idea of Minsky who argued that in order to understand an 
issue, it is necessary to switch perspectives and to try to understand it in more than one 
way (Minsky, 1986).  
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1  The Scope of Building Theory from Case 
Studies 
This chapter addresses the basic questions of this study: how does the knowledge 
communication between experts and decision makers unfold? By which communicative 
challenges is the knowledge integration in the decision making process challenged and 
what practices have experts and decision makers in place to overcome these challenges? 
What roles thereby have face-to-face conversations and collaborative visualization in 
overcoming these challenges? 
To find answers to these questions, we studied the process of knowledge communi-
cation and integration in three contexts.  
1. the senior scholars of The Brookings Institution (a major U.S. Think Tank) and 
the policy makers of the U.S. Senate,  
2. the consultants of pom+ (a consultancy specialized in construction, facility, and 
portfolio management) and their clients, 
3. the IT specialists of InSure7 (a European leader in the insurance market) and the 
managers of InSure’s business line 
The single cases can be found in the Appendices 1, 3, 5 and we will only present the 
cross-case analysis in the body of this thesis. In this way, we believe that the argumenta-
tion will be more stringent. Yet, the richness of qualitative case study research lives from 
thick contextual descriptions; this is why we warmly invite the reader to consult the long 
recounts in the appendices.  
We develop the discussion around the three questions raised above. We first aim to 
see whether the process model of the knowledge communication provided in Chapter 2 
provides an accurate structure for the description of the interaction between experts and 
decision makers in the various contexts. We discuss these challenges and practices specific 
to the single phases of the knowledge communication process, which are common to the 
three cases. We then present more general, phase-independent challenges and practices 
and structure them around the framework presented in Chapter 2. The two conceptual 
lenses help us switch perspectives in analyzing knowledge communication in more than 
                                                 
7 For privacy reasons, we omit the name of the corporation, as well as the characteristics that make its 
identification definite. 
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one way (Minsky, 1986) and are conductive to a fruitful engagement in theory-building 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
2  Methods 
The research design sets up qualitative analysis of three explorative cases of knowl-
edge integration. The unit of analysis is the knowledge integration process. The focus 
within this process is on the expert aiming to convey his expertise, although we do not 
completely exclude the perspective of the decision maker8.  
Multiple case design (Yin, 2003) provides rich contextual data and at the same time 
allows for analyzing patterns across the single cases in order to engage in a theory building 
activity (Eisenhardt, 1989). The approach includes both within-case analysis and cross-
case analysis and the aim is to engage in mid-range theorizing, as proposed by Eisenhardt: 
“Overall, the idea behind these cross-case searching tactics is to force investigators to go 
beyond initial impressions, especially through the use of structured and diverse lenses on 
the data.” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 541). Developing theories out of multiple case studies stands 
for the idea that researchers can gain novel, testable, and empirically valid theories by the 
continuous and systematic comparison of evidence first within and then across “real-life” 
contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003; Yin, 2004). In its pure form, such an approach is 
inductive in nature and does not rely on existing literature or previous empirical evidence. 
It is most appropriate when little is known about a phenomenon or when current perspec-
tives seem inadequate (Eisenhardt, 1989: 548). While we have proceeded very inductively 
for the collection of the data, during the analysis we have drawn in literature from various 
domains and have structured the data according to the two conceptual frameworks pre-
sented in Chapter 2. These frameworks mainly have helped us to engage in theorizing on 
knowledge integration from a communicative perspective.  
A second argument for the case study method refers to the type of questions we aim 
to answer. Yin argues that while, for example, the survey method is suited to answer who, 
what, where, and how much questions, case studies are apt to answer how or why ques-
tions (Yin, 2003: 5). With this research, we aim to understand “how” the communication 
between experts and decision makers is characterized and “how” important face-to-face 
conversations and interactive visualization in this interaction are. More basically, we aim 
                                                 
8 This choice is in part due to pragmatic reasons as access to decision makers was much more difficult. 
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to understand why it is that even if both communication partners are interested and moti-
vated in sharing, developing, and integrating knowledge, these knowledge processes re-
main challenging9.  
Finally, a multiple case study design leads to findings with a stronger external valid-
ity (Leonard-Barton, 1990). If we find, in spite of the variations in the contexts of the case 
studies, similar communicative challenges or practices, similar communicative processes, 
and similar roles attributed to conversations within the knowledge communication be-
tween experts and decision, we can be slightly more confident in the robustness of our 
findings.  
2.1 Sampling 
The three cases were carried out as part of a larger study dealing with the knowl-
edge-intensive communication between experts and decision makers. Within the scope of 
this research program, we conducted a total of ten case studies by using theoretical sam-
pling, which means that we have stopped adding cases when the learning from case to case 
decreased (Glaser & Strauss, 1967)10.  
We have chosen to report three cases because their contextual settings allow us to 
have an interesting mix of communalities and differences in order to search for recurring 
challenges and practices of the knowledge communication process across the contextual 
settings of the singular case. Yin (2003) argues that variety favors both comparison and 
contrast and therewith facilitates the identification of meaningful patterns. Table 9 out-
lines the main contextual similarities and differences of the knowledge integration situa-
tion between the cases studied. 
For the theoretical sampling (Glaser, 1998), we aimed to vary the industry, organiza-
tional, and institutional contexts in which the knowledge integration process takes place 
(see: Table 9). Different are also the knowledge domains, in which the experts are special-
ized. We also looked for variance in terms of how the knowledge integration process is 
initiated; either by a unique, explicit, and specific request by the decision maker, by an 
institutionalized general mandate, or by no mandate at all. Depending on these situations, 
knowledge tends to be either pulled by decision makers or pushed by experts. The idea 
                                                 
9 In the knowledge management literature it is frequently argued that a major reason why employees are 
reluctant to share knowledge is because of organizational structures and processes that do not moti-
vate them to do so (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). 
10 For a detailed documentation on all the case studies, see: www.knowledge-integration.org
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behind including these different types of variances is that if we are to observe similar 
communicative challenges across these various contexts, we can be more certain that the 
challenges are not due to these contextual elements, but bound to aspects, more intrinsi-
cally related to the knowledge integration situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Context of decision and knowledge integration:
•Organizational context: Size of organization and 
geographical reach
•Institutional context, in which knowledge 
integration is taking place: inter-organizational 
(Brookings, pom+) inter-functional departments 
(InSure) 
•Industry and market as well as sector (public vs. 
private) in which knowledge integration is taking 
place
Context of decision and knowledge integration:
•Dynamic, uncertain, and ambiguous 
environments
Decision type:
•Strategic impact of decisions: Corporate 
(pom+), national, political strategies 
(Brookings), functional strategies (InSure)
Decision type:
•Decisions to take by decision makers are 
complex, involve in-depth expertise of various 
interconnected domains, involve considerable 
risks and take place in dynamic environments
•The decision is of a nature so that decision 
makers would be in considerable difficulties if 
they were to take their decisions without calling 
in experts on the issues tangent to the decision
•The need for taking a decision does not arise 
within a classical crisis situation (low probability, 
high consequence)
Expert – decision maker situation:
•Area of expertise of the experts (e.g. financial 
expertise, economic expertise, process 
expertise)
•Initiation of relationship between experts and 
decision makers and organizational bonding:
1) initiation by decision makers who actively 
call in experts and commission a concrete 
unique service (no institutional bond) (pom+)
2) initiation by experts who try to “push” their 
knowledge and gain the attention of decision 
makers (no institutional bond) (Brookings)
3) enduring, general assignment from decision 
makers in the realm of which concrete 
requests can be formulated (strong 
organizational bond) (InSure)
Expert – decision maker situation:
•Presence of domain experts and decision 
makers. Both parties have clearly attributed
functional roles
•There is not a sole decision maker, but decision 
making is always collegial among various 
decision makers
Differences between the casesSimilarities between the cases
 Table 9: Contextual Similarities and Differences between the Case Studies (Sampling    
 Choices) 
 
While allowing for all these variations, cases have a set of similarities. First and 
foremost, cases are akin with regard to the fact that experts and decision makers can be 
easily identified and that there is a clear functional difference between the two roles (see: 
Chapter 2, on the expert-decision maker distinction). Experts are not empowered to take 
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decisions conjointly with decision makers; their role is limited to counseling. Equal to all 
cases is also that decision contexts are complex and are often characterized by ambiguity, 
extensive dynamism, inconsistencies, and the fuzziness of reality (March, 1994). In other 
words, decisions are subject to considerable complexity and decision makers feel a great 
need to draw on the advice and evaluations of domain experts. Finally, it is true for all the 
cases we studied that decisions are not taken by a single decision maker, but by a collegial-
ity of decision makers.  
2.2 Data Sources 
For each case study, we have worked with multiple data collection methods (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). First, we have visited the organizations to conduct semi-structured inter-
views mainly with experts, but also with some decision makers. In total, we have con-
ducted 32 face-to-face-interviews (10 for pom+, 14 for InSure, and 8 for Brookings) each 
of which lasting on average 45 minutes (a list of the interview partners can be found in 
Appendices 2, 4, and 6). In the case of Brookings, we merely interviewed their senior 
scholars and not the policy makers at the Senate. In the case of pom+, we have only inter-
viewed the consultants themselves and did not have the chance to interview their clients 
(which represent the decision makers of this case). Finally, at InSure, we have interviewed 
IT-technicians (four) and IT managers (ten), but there too, we were unable to interview 
the managers from the business line. In doing so, we clearly have an expert bias and the 
focus is on the practices and challenges involved in the communication of their expertise 
to the decision maker. 
The interviews were structured in three main parts: a first introductive part aimed at 
better understanding the context of the interviewee and the organization. Questions ad-
dressed – among others - the function of the interviewee within the organization, his/her 
educational and professional background, his/her areas of expertise and the types of deci-
sions part of his/her responsibility, the organizational context of his/her work, and the role 
of his/her organization/department/team in the interaction with a specific instance of deci-
sion makers. The second set of questions aimed at gaining insight into the process of in-
teraction between experts and decision makers. We asked how the interaction took place 
in time, what form it had at which stage of the interaction or for what type of content 
which media was preferred (media choice). We also asked what role the different commu-
nication forms played (oral communication, written communication, visual communica-
tion, metaphoric communication). The third part of the interviews was the most substan-
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tial one and dealt with the particular challenges and practices characteristic for the knowl-
edge-intensive interaction between the experts and decision makers. We asked, for exam-
ple, which concrete measures they put in place to improve the knowledge communication 
with the decision makers.  
All interviews were audio-taped and transcribed word-by-word. In addition, we took 
notes right after the set of interviews, documenting what had attracted our particular at-
tention and what we wanted to ask differently or ask additionally in the next interviews. 
As we sometimes had a large amount of interviews within one day, we did not always 
manage to transcribe them within a 24-hour timeframe, as proposed by Eisenhardt 
(1989a) and Yin (2003).  
To complement the interview data, we did a qualitative analysis of additional com-
munication documents ranging from annual reports, newsletters, presentations, brochures, 
articles, working reports, printed products, media guides, and also the organizations’ web-
sites. This documented communication material helped us mainly to study the organiza-
tion and structure of information items, as well as the visualizations that the experts used. 
For one case, pom+, we further held a half-day seminar and later an interactive 
workshop with all the employees of the organization. These interactive sessions were use-
ful to check our own understanding and interpretations of the collected data, whether they 
reflected the ideas of the interviewees, whether they were representative, or whether we 
missed important aspects. Between these very interactive contacts, a collaborative email 
exchange helped to verify our understanding and to receive the additional information we 
needed. 
2.3 Data Analysis 
We recursively coded the transcriptions of the interviews. In part, we used open cod-
ing (Glaser, 1998) and added tags with comments or categories to the single quotes. In 
other instances, we coded more theoretically (Glaser, 1998), for example, when attribut-
ing certain quotes to the phase model of knowledge communication or to the framework 
for conversation management we had in mind (see: Chapter 2). We used tables (Miles & 
Huberman, 1984) to further structure coding categories. For example, we made tables of 
the challenges and practices in the knowledge communication and documented in extra-
rows, to which phase of the knowledge communication model a specific challenge re-
ferred, or in relation to which other challenge it was mentioned. After a first analytic 
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work, we wrote teaching cases, as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989a), which helped us, in 
their more directive style, to understand the specifics of each case (see: www.knowledge-
communication.org). We then wrote detailed single research cases, each case around 60 
pages long and used the same structure for all three cases. 
For the cross-case analysis, we compared the phase-specific and unspecific challenges 
and practices of knowledge communication, which had emerged in the single cases and 
which we had structured along the phase model for knowledge communication and the 
conversation management framework. The aim was to see whether there are communica-
tive challenges or practices that are recurrent even if the organizational and institutional 
context of knowledge communication quite radically changes. Finally, we compared the 
various roles of conversations and visualizations in the three contexts. After various itera-
tions between the data of the cases and the emerging categories, we compared the results 
with the existing literature, which helped us to further structure and integrate the findings.  
3  Overview on the Three Contexts of Knowl-
edge Communication 
Table 10 provides an overview on the three organizations.  
 
The Brookings Institution Pom+ InSure 
Description of 
Organization 
One of the oldest “think 
tanks” of the United States: 
functions as an independent 
research organization that 
offers policy makers practi-
cal recommendations for 
dealing with current and 
emerging policy challenges. 
A medium-sized consul-
tancy, offering specialized 
consulting services in the 
fields of portfolio, facility, 
and construction manage-
ment. 
A large insurance company 
that is part of a worldwide 
leading financial services 
company. Offers insurance 
products in the life and 
pensions (e.g. retirement 
pension, life and disability 
insurance) and non-life 
segment (e.g. motor vehicle, 
property, fire). 
Number of 
Employees 
281 38 20‘000 (200 employees 
within IT) 
Geographical 
Reach 
national (partly international) Inter-regional worldwide 
Knowledge 
Integration 
Situation 
Inter-organizational:  
Scholars provide recom-
mendations and expertise to 
policy makers for up-to-date 
policy issues and in-depth 
analysis and conceptualiza-
tions of larger policy issues 
in order to nurture the U.S. 
policy making process 
Inter-organizational: 
Consultants assist clients 
with expertise, evaluations, 
specific proposals in real 
estate portfolio decisions as 
well as construction and 
facility management deci-
sions 
Inter-functional: 
Specialists of IT department 
provide managers of busi-
ness line with as-is analysis 
of today‘s IT system and 
with feasible proposals for IT 
application changes in order 
to assure that the IT-
applications will optimally 
support business processes 
Expert/ 
Decision Mker 
− Experts: academically 
trained scholars (PhD), 
− Experts: senior and junior 
consultants of pom+ 
− Experts: IT technicians 
with professional educa-
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with government experi-
ence and expertise not 
only in one, but several 
policy fields. 
− Decision Makers: large 
and heterogeneous group 
formed by representatives 
of the house, senators, 
committees, and congres-
sional staff. In part special-
ized in particular policy 
areas, but knowledgeable 
in various policy fields. 
mostly with technical de-
gree at university, special-
ized in facility-, portfolio, 
and construction man-
agement, but with trans-
versal (methodological) 
knowledge 
− Decision Makers: clients of 
pom+ (for ex. from public 
sector or from construc-
tion, financial, logistic), 
contact person typically is 
project manager, head of 
internal services depart-
ment, has limited knowl-
edge on facility-, portfolio, 
and construction man-
agement 
tion in informatics. Do 
programming of software 
applications. 
− Experts/Decision makers: 
IT managers (team lead-
ers, section leaders, IT de-
partment head) usually 
with double university de-
gree in informatics and 
business administration  
− Decision Makers: manag-
ers such as team or project 
managers of the insur-
ance‘s business line, 
knowledge in business 
processes, finance, and 
insurance 
Main Commu-
nication 
Modes* 
• internet 
• testimonies at congres-
sional hearings 
• policy briefs 
• books 
• workshops, seminars 
• interviews 
• daily work interactions 
• project presentations 
• project reports 
• Email 
• formal and informal co-
located meetings 
• workshops 
• reports such as business 
concept, technical re-
quirements 
• phone calls 
• Email 
Type of Rela-
tionship 
Information is pushed by the 
expert and only occasionally 
required by decision makers 
(e.g. congressional testimo-
nies) 
Long-term, occasional, 
formal, non-institutional, 
individual members of the 
organization 
Information is pulled by 
decision makers 
Mid-term, frequent, fairly 
informal, non-institutional, 
team 
Information is mostly pulled 
by decision makers, yet 
occasionally pushed by 
experts 
Long-term, frequent, infor-
mal, institutional, team 
Macro/micro 
perspective 
Macro Macro and micro macro and micro 
 
 
Table 10:  Overview on the Three Organizations Studied 
  * labelled in order of importance 
3.1 The Brookings Institution 
The Brookings Institution was founded in 1927 as one of the first think tanks of the 
United States. It conducts policy relevant research and provides advisory services to gov-
ernment, in particular to members of the U.S. Congress. It is a progenitor of a first genera-
tion of think tanks, that are mainly privately funded, have a strong commitment to aca-
demic research and, rather than contributing to policy enactment and doing policy evalua-
tion, aim to frame the political discourse and to develop the political agenda (Weaver, 
1989).  
Brookings’ activities fall into four main research programs (Foreign Policy, Govern-
ance Studies, Economic Studies, and Metropolitan Policy). It is engaged in over 40 re-
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search projects and holds 9 policy centers, many of which are joint-ventures with other 
institutions. Its mission is formulated as follows: 
“Brookings is an independent, non partisan research organization (that) seeks to improve the qual-
ity of U.S. public policies. It addresses current and emerging policy challenges and offers practical 
recommendations for dealing with them, expressed in language that is accessible to policymakers 
and the general public alike." (Brookings Institution, 2005a)  
Its founding values – non-partisanship and thorough scholarship – are combined 
with newer commitments such as timeliness, practicality and comprehensibility. Brookings 
sees its role not only in (1) building scientific, policy relevant knowledge by conducting 
research (proposing policy alternatives), but also in (2) effectively communicating these 
insights to policy makers, (3) convening political parties, and in (4) translating insights 
from the scientific to the policy world (working out the practical implications of theoreti-
cal ideas).  
The expert – decision maker situation is represented by, on the one hand, Brookings’ 
scholars and, on the other, policy makers of the U.S. Congress (representatives, senators, 
committees, staffers).  
The scholars of Brookings are all academically trained in well-known universities 
and most of them have a PhD in Economics or Political Science. In addition, many schol-
ars have important prior experience in government. Alice Rivlin, for example, is a senior 
scholar at Brookings, who spent about a third of her career working for the think tank, a 
small part in academia and about half of it in government (for example as Vice Chair of 
the Federal Reserve Board (1996-99) or as the founding director of the Congressional 
Budget Office (1975-1983).  
The policy makers are quite a fragmented group in the Congress of the United States 
(McGann & Weaver, 2000: 15) and are formed by the 435 representatives of the house 
and the 100 senators, and also by the thousands staffers of Congress. The representatives 
of the House and the senators form the legislative body of the United States (lower and 
upper house). They have the power, among others, to initiate revenue bills, impeach offi-
cials, and elect the president in electoral college deadlocks. Congressional staff assists 
members of Congress (e.g. by evaluating the outcome of legislative proposals, making 
recommendations regarding particular issues) and are often trained economists and spe-
cialized in specific policy areas (Capitol Advantage, 2005). Other important targets of 
Brookings’ communication are the media, academia, and the general public. All these au-
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diences can be the source of a new policy or can influence, at least indirectly, policy mak-
ers and the policy making process.  
To a large part, Brookings pushes its findings and recommendations without a clear 
request on behalf of the policy makers. Exceptions are testimonies at congressional hear-
ings, where policy makers directly ask scholars of Brookings’ to provide their expertise on 
a specific issue. It can also be that a congressional staffer or policy maker invites a scholar 
of Brookings to a meeting, or that a journalist asks for an interview.  
3.2 pom+ 
pom+ is a consultancy company active in the sectors of construction -, facility-, and 
portfolio management. In 2004, the company had a turnover of 6.5 million Swiss Francs 
(4.2 million Euros). It employs 38 people, and has offices in Zurich and Bern, Switzerland. 
pom+ was founded in 1996 as a spin-off of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zu-
rich. Under the mission “we make companies, real estate properties, and projects fit!”11 
(pom+, 2005a), pom+ offers a diversified set of consulting services. Next to project man-
agement it does consulting for organizational development, for information and commu-
nication management, and supports companies in the design of processes and structures. 
The experts in the case are the consultants of pom+ and the decision makers are 
formed by their clients. The consultants of pom+ mostly have a university degree in engi-
neering, informatics, or architecture. Some of them have an education in facility manage-
ment from an advanced technical college. While almost all of pom+’s experts have a rather 
technical background, some have completed secondary studies in management and issues 
related to business administration. A few consultants have a PhD. 
The clients of pom+ are state organizations like universities or state departments, but 
also many larger private companies from industries such as the insurance, the telecommu-
nication, or the retail industry. The contact people on the client side are mainly project 
managers of, for example, quality management or facility management projects, heads of 
the real estate or of the internal services department. While in the early days of pom+’s 
activity, the client had only a very limited know-how on facility -, construction -, and 
portfolio management, today, both the industry and also the single clients have become 
more professional and the knowledge asymmetry is no longer blatant.  
                                                 
11 Wir machen Unternehmen, Immobilien und Projekte fit! 
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These organizations ask for the support, assistance, and consulting of pom+ with re-
gard to their projects on facility, construction, or portfolio management. Typical decisions 
are: what type of facility management software to implement, what strategy to pursue in 
the development of a real estate portfolio, or what business model to adopt for a specific 
construction project. 
3.3 InSure 
InSure12 is an insurance company and part of one of the leading financial services 
companies worldwide. It employs around 20’000 employees and has a business volume of 
30 billion Swiss Francs. The group is active in Europe, North America, and Asia. It has 
close to 15 million clients worldwide, which are composed both of private individuals and 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Activities are divided into two main units: the smaller 
Non-Life segment and the more important Life & Pensions segment. The Non-Life seg-
ment offers insurance products that cover the range of health and accident insurance, mo-
tor vehicle, property, fire, and general liability insurance. The Life & Pensions segment 
offers 1) retirement pension and saving solutions (voluntary & mandatory), 2) life and 
disability insurance and 3) investment products.  
The knowledge communication deals with the communication around decisions that 
concern the remodeling of the internal IT applications and IT systems. These IT applica-
tions have to be developed or changed in order to better support the typical insurance 
business workflows and processes such as compiling offers, managing customer informa-
tion, consulting clients, managing remunerations, calculating risks, verifying costumer 
claims, handling the back-office tasks, or analyzing and reporting financial numbers to the 
CFO.  
In order to take knowledgeable decisions on these issues, the communication takes 
place not merely among a duplet, but a triplet of experts and decision makers. In fact, the 
expert – decision maker situation exists, first, between the IT technicians and the IT man-
agement and second between the IT (both technicians and managers) and the business line 
managers.  
                                                 
12 For privacy reasons, we omit the name of the corporation, as well as the characteristics that make its 
identification definite. 
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The IT technicians have a variety of professional backgrounds (e.g. teachers, electri-
cians, etc.) and most of them completed, in addition, the informatics school internal to the 
organization.  
The IT managers (from team leaders up to IT-department leader) mostly have a mas-
ters degree in informatics or in related topics such as electrical engineering and many of 
them completed a postgraduate study in management sciences as, for example, an execu-
tive MBA.  
The business line managers, finally, are the team managers, project managers, and 
up to the members of the executive board of the business line of the market unit Switzer-
land. They are specialized in business, finance, and insurance issues and conduct the daily 
activities of an insurance corporation. 
The knowledge communication can be initiated in basically two ways. First, and this 
is true for most cases, it can be a request from the business line and be initiated by a 
change in the law or by wishes from the business line regarding the automation of a proc-
ess that has been carried out manually until today. Such requests can be rather short term 
and small or involve rather big, mid-time projects that are decided by the steering commit-
tee. Finally, IT-experts also proactively propose projects that grow, for example, from 
necessities out of the technical development (e.g. migrate an old system). We focus on the 
communication of larger projects that grow out of the business line. 
4  The Knowledge Communication Process be-
tween Experts and Decision Makers and its 
Main Challenges and Practices 
Figure 7 shows the phase model of knowledge communication between experts and 
decision makers by bringing together those challenges and practices, which have ensued 
from the three case studies. The figure also shows the major feedback loops of the cases. 
Many additional challenges and practices, specific to the singular cases, are documented in 
the Appendices 1, 3, 5.  
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4.1 Identify Expert and Expertise 
Experts are identified quite differently across the three case studies. In the case of 
Brookings, expertise is generally pushed to decision makers and policy makers address 
Brookings’ scholars only for specific occasions (e.g. to testify in front of Congress). In such 
occasions, policy makers contact a certain scholar because they know him personally or 
because the expert is well known for his/her expertise in a specific field. Other possibilities 
of how the policy makers identify an expert is through Brookings’ communications office 
(which has the role of a knowledge broker), through Brookings’ website, the media guide 
or through an article they have red of a scholar in the newspapers. At pom+ and InSure, 
knowledge is very specifically requested by decision makers (and not generally pushed by 
experts). In the case of pom+, potential clients get to know the consultancy during one of 
Figure 7: Major Challenges along the Phase Model of Knowledge Communication 
between Experts and Decision Makers 
vi
endo
sibility and to 
rse credibility
•Organize events to 
nurture informal 
networks
•Hire people with
high credentials and 
manage quality
processes to foster
sustained credibility challenges
(c1-c6)
practices
(p1-p12)
valid for pom+ 
and  InSure case
valid for Brookings 
and pom+ case
Legend: 
valid only for 
single cases
ef
gbc
h
i
A C D E
Manage an 
interactive process 
of continuous 
refinement and 
alignment until 
reaching a shared 
understanding of a 
specific request: 
Engage in feed-
forward & feedback
Collaborate as close as 
possible with decision 
makers and elicit & 
structure knowledge
Move from abstract to 
concrete definitions 
and between various 
contexts
•Activate social 
networks (through 
board member-
ships, affiliations 
with associations) 
to gain credible 
visibility
looping between these phases and combine informal, face-to-face 
communication with formal marking down of binding agreements. 
Chapter 3 - Three Theory Building Case Studies 94 
the informative events it organizes for people from the industry, through a recommenda-
tion or, more formally, through a publication in a professional journal, or even through 
the business directory of the Swiss facility management market. They then contact the 
consultancy for very specific services. At InSure, the managers from the business line are 
institutionally bound to the IT-specialists and so have clearly designated IT-teams to 
whom they can submit their concrete requests. 
Difficulty to Gain Visibility and Credibility  
What is common to all three cases is that experts have to gain visibility and assert 
their credibility in ever more competitive markets of expertise (Evers & Menkhoff, 2003) 
and in a situation, where decision makers are ever more overloaded with information. 
Experts therefore have to engage in various means to gain the attention of the decision 
makers (visibility) and to merit their trust (credibility).  
In the case of Brookings, visibility is a major issue as the organization is active in a 
very competitive market of expertise, in which more than 300 think tanks are active in the 
United States alone (Rich & Weaver, 1998). In the case of InSure, despite of the institu-
tional bonds, it remains an important challenge to identify who are the real cracks in a 
specific domain and who are the grey eminences with the most power.  
Experts often have to deal with the fact that their credibility13 is questioned, which is 
truer for non-technical experts (consultants, public policy analysts). A senior scholar of 
Brookings mentions referring to this:  
”Virtually every major politician figures that I am as good as this guy in what is going to happen in 
the economy. (..) Whereas when they deal with a physicist, even if he is not able to effectively 
communicate and sell his insights to a policy arena, everybody agrees he is a real expert and knows 
something I don’t.” 
At pom+, a challenge related to the problem of credibility is that consultants have to 
be careful in not giving away too much valuable knowledge to their potential clients, but 
nevertheless manage to signal their expertise. 
                                                 
13 Wright (2002) argued that management consultants’ challenge of legitimacy is twofold as their ser-
vice, which is highly discretionary and lacks tangibility, requires more legitimacy than other services 
and the consultants often have to address the issue that their profession does not enjoy the legitimacy 
of other established professions.  
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In all three cases, we can see that experts have similar practices in place to deal with 
this challenge. 1. They build formal and informal social networks by engaging in institu-
tional bonds, affiliating with associations, and organizing events; 2. They recruit experts 
with high credentials (degrees); and 3. They conduct quality controls. 
Activate Social Networks (through Board Memberships, Affiliations with Associa-
tions) to Gain Credible Visibility 
In the two cases where the knowledge communication takes place across organiza-
tional boundaries (pom+ and Brookings) experts try to gain a better access to decision 
makers by engaging in more or less formal social networks.  
 
Figure 8:  The Direct Links between the Brookings Institution and Companies, Uni-
versities, and Governmental Organizations at the Level of the Board of 
Directors  
(Source: www.theyrule.net) 
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One type of rather formal bond can be established by assigning those people to be 
members of the board who have the same function also in other organizations. Figure 8 
outlines such connections at the board level for the case of Brookings. Informally, Brook-
ings tries to guarantee a well-functioning informal social network by hiring mainly schol-
ars who have served in government and therefore know a lot of policy makers personally. 
Their geographical location in Washington also favors such informal contacts and which 
leads, in fact, to a higher media visibility and more testimonies in front of Congress (Rich 
& Weaver, 1998). 
Similarly, pom+ is affiliated to a set of organizations. The company is a member of 
more than 20 associations and is also actively related to various universities. Such affilia-
tions are important to increase the visibility and the possible paths through which a poten-
tial client will contact pom+. The consultancy can further benefit from the trust in exper-
tise and excellence, which is associated to the brand of a particular association. Finally, 
theses networks are fundamental also for continuously renewing and affirming the com-
pany’s knowledge.  
Organize Events to Nurture Informal Networks 
Another way to gain credible visibility and to nurture social networks is to organize 
events and to engage in a dialogue with decision makers. We can observe this practice 
throughout the three cases. A very illustrative example of such an event is Brookings’ 
practice to organize luncheons on Capitol Hill. During lunchtime, Brookings – in collabo-
ration with other organizations – holds talks and offers some food - not only for thought. 
Brookings often invites also a senator to comment on one of their research results and 
policy recommendations. Such events have various functions as, for example, convening 
parties or gaining attention for a topic. The choice of holding them on Capitol Hill is im-
portant to provide more ease of access. Policy makers not only have ever less time for 
reading Brookings’ books, articles, or policy briefs, but also to attend their seminars or 
talks. Through such events, Brookings also marks its presence as one of major ‘providers 
of policy expertise’ right at the center of where policy making takes place. The fact of 
teaming up with other organizations, like for example with the Committee for Economic 
Development or the Heritage Foundation, gives the event a larger visibility. It gives the 
event also more credibility as the partner organization might stand for a different orienta-
tion and the policy maker cannot simply discard the event because he/she suspects it to be 
tendentious anyhow. Finally, the fact that they invite senators also serves various func-
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tions. First, senators enjoy a high visibility so that the event will be taken up more easily 
by the media. Second, if senators comment on a book, for example, they engage with the 
subject rather intensively and are more likely to put forward some of its ideas in the Sen-
ate. By commenting, the senators also translate what was previously closer to the language 
of economists or political scientists into the language of policy makers. Finally, Brookings 
receives valuable feedback from the policy makers and is likely to improve the quality of 
its contribution and idea.  
Next to Brookings, also pom+ and InSure organize informative events, to which de-
cision makers are invited. During such occasions, internal and external experts hold pres-
entations and lead discussions. In this way, Brookings, pom+, and InSure strive to gain the 
attention of decision makers, to continuously nurture their informal social networks, and 
to engage in a dialogue across partisan, functional, or disciplinary boarders.  
Hire People with High Credentials and Manage Quality Processes to Foster Sus-
tained Credibility  
We have seen that a lot of practices that aim to foster visibility contemporaneously 
also improve the credibility of the experts. In the three case studies, we can identify some 
additional practices that specifically aim not only to signal, but also to assure the quality 
of the offered expertise. Only if the promise of expertise is later supported by high quality 
advice, will credibility be sustained in the long run. One way how experts and expert or-
ganizations signal credibility, but also guarantee the quality of expertise, is by recruiting 
almost exclusively experts with high credentials (it is mostly the case for pom+ and Brook-
ings, but to a minor extent also for InSure). Experts hold university degrees from prestig-
ious universities, have double qualifications (e.g. at InSure: a master in business admini-
stration and one in IT), or have previously worked for prestigious organizations (e.g. at 
Brookings: experience in the U.S. administration).  
Next to recruiting procedures, the expert organizations (Brookings, pom+) and de-
partments also have various internal processes in place to actually guarantee the quality of 
their services. They engage in continuous formal and informal review processes, they call 
in external experts, and they push standards in the presentation formats of their products 
(we will come back on this last aspect when discussing the phase ‘convey insights, sugges-
tions & solutions’).  
Brookings, for example, is known for its high quality and it’s academic standards. It 
sticks to these values, but at the same time adapts to today’s request for shorter outlet 
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formats and production cycles. Brookings therefore continually has to find new means to 
assure quality. A historic example shows how Brookings, already for many years, has been 
attempting to move within the stretch of maintaining high quality standards and respond-
ing to the changed environment: when the Heritage Foundation was founded and imposed 
a completely different form of communication (shorter formats, events, etc.), Brookings 
responded and launched the “Papers on Economic Activity”. They wanted to publish an 
article more quickly, yet to guarantee a high quality. Therefore, they decided not to peer 
review the article any longer, but to place, next to the article, two comments by discuss-
ants. In addition, they carefully selected very renowned people for the board of the senior 
advisors, which not only signaled but also assured quality (R. Lawrence). 
Non-partisanship remains another central fundament of Brookings in order to guar-
antee quality and credibility. Non-partisanship is fostered not only at the level of the or-
ganization, but also at the level of the single projects, as mentions one senior scholar of 
Brookings: 
”The different scholars working for this project (Restoring fiscal sanity) did not all share the same 
vision of how to resolve the problem of fiscal sanity. I do think it is a strength that Brookings does 
not have an institutionalized view. For this project, I deliberately chose authors who were well in-
formed, that’s the most important criteria, and secondarily who would have somewhat diverse per-
spectives on whatever is the issue. (..) I think that if you have to work with someone who has a dif-
ferent view than you, but who is equally well informed, you get a better product. I think that’s a 
motivating factor and then, in my view, I think it leads to a more interesting book because not all 
people are singing from the same hymnals” (I. Sawhill). 
Finally, Brookings assures quality through its procedures for approving a project (by 
board of trustees) and through the numerous formal external and informal reviewing 
processes. All books published by Brookings are externally reviewed by three reviewers, a 
process similar to what is common for a university press. 
Similarly, pom+ tries to assure the quality of its service and has in place a tutoring 
system for new employees, invests in individual continuous education and spends re-
sources on company wide education (e.g. workshops on specific issues). 
All these practices show that the continuous signaling, sustaining, and nurturing of 
expertise are fundamental aspects in communicating knowledge. They are important not 
only to gain the decision makers’ attention and to have the necessary access for the 
knowledge communication. We will show that these practices are directly related to the 
very last phase in the knowledge communication process. Credibility is an important pre-
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condition for the acceptance of knowledge and its integration in the decision making 
process.  
4.2 Articulate Need 
In the ‘articulate need’ phase (see Chapter 2), the decision makers communicate to 
the experts what insights and services they need from them. This phase is almost non-
existent in the case of Brookings as Brookings’ scholars mainly push their expertise with-
out a precise request on behalf of the decision maker. On the other hand, it is very impor-
tant for pom+ and InSure. In the following discussion, we will focus mainly on these two 
cases.  
Poor Specification of Need: in View of ASK-problem Decision Makers Follow “just 
go ahead” Approach 
In most occasions, decision makers do not articulate a clear need upfront. While in 
some cases, decision makers are subject to excessive time constraints, in others, they are 
really in the impossibility of formulating a precise request. In many cases, decision makers 
vaguely communicate where they have a problem and that the experts should resolve it. A 
consultant of pom+ mentioned, for example: “Just right now I have a project where the 
client does not know a lot himself. He simply communicates his requests and says: just go 
ahead and do something14” and an IT-manager at InSure states this problem very poign-
antly: “Information is something, of which you have yet no knowledge of. And I really 
can’t pose the right questions about something of which I do not know that exists”15. She 
adds that, as a consequence, decision makers are unable to formulate precise written re-
quests: “The assignment from the business department is quite blurry. They know that 
they want more or less this and that. But they do not know enough to expose on five 
pages what we need to do”.  
These quotes show that we find support for the ASK-hypothesis (“anomalous state 
of knowledge”, discussed in Chapter 2): The decision makers, acknowledging that they do 
                                                 
14 Translation from German by the author, for quotes in original language, see: Appendices 3 and 5 
15 This understanding of information goes along with Bateson’s famous definition of information as a 
difference which makes a difference (Bateson, 1972). Information always represents a novelty to the 
person who receives the piece of information. To illustrate this point, Bateson gives the famous exam-
ple of a coin that drops in a person’s palm. It is first understood by the person as information, but 
with the time that the coin stays in the palm, it stops being news and as such information.  
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not have the sufficient knowledge to tackle the decision issue alone (they realize that their 
state of knowledge is anomalous with regard to the issue of decision), lack the sufficient 
knowledge to specify precisely what is needed to solve the anomaly (Belkin et al., 1982). 
In other words, the decision makers’ knowledge of the issue is too limited to even state 
what precise insights they need from the experts. In view of their limited time and the dif-
ficulty of formulating a precise request, decision makers often ask experts to start their 
analysis and to ‘just go ahead’. 
Manage an Interactive Process of Continuous Refinement until Reaching a Shared 
Understanding of a Specific Request: Engage in Feed-forward & Feedback Looping 
between these Phases and Combine Informal, Face-to-face Communication with 
Formal Marking Down of Binding Agreements  
The experts of both pom+ and InSure address the problem of a poor need specifica-
tion in a similar way. They engage in a process of continuous refinement and reciprocal 
alignment and both give weight to a lot of face-to-face communication, which is yet com-
bined with officially marking down a clear request in written form. A strong involvement 
of the decision maker is equally of particular importance.  
InSure, for example, has a complex process in place, which involves various feed-
forward and feedback loops between the phases ‘articulate need’, ‘analyze issue & develop 
possible courses of action’, ‘convey insights, suggestions, & solutions’ (for a visual repre-
sentation of this process, see Figures 25 and 32, in Appendix 5). IT-experts first conduct a 
series of workshops to identify and demarcate the problem and to develop a shared under-
standing of it. They then conduct a series of interviews with the business managers to un-
derstand processes in more detail. The business managers then write, in close collabora-
tion with the IT-experts, a business concept. Sometimes, collaboration is so ‘close’ that it 
is actually the IT-team, which writes the business request. They do so if the business is 
literally unable to write down what they actually need, but can recognize it once they have 
seen it16. After this first broad definition of the problem from the business perspective, 
                                                 
16 The difficulty in articulating something, but recognizing it when one sees it (‘I know it when I see it’) 
is a phenomenon that arises when people have to deal with knowledge with a strong tacit dimension. 
It is hard to externalize tacit knowledge through words, but it is easier to recognize it once we see it. 
Weick claims, in addition, that this difficulty has to do with the way people make sense of their ac-
tions and the world around them. He refers to Wallas’ sentence ‘How can I know what I think until I 
see what I say’ to argue that our sense-making process is mainly retrospective and that only after hav-
ing done or said something, we can actually be more sure of what we think (Wallas, 1926: 10; Weick, 
1995: 12).  
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they move from the ‘articulation phase’ to the ‘analysis phase’ (arrow “C” in Figure 7), 
but only to come back to it and refine the request. In fact, the IT conducts a high level 
technical analysis (identifies possible technical solutions, their impact on IT infrastructure, 
rough time and cost estimations) and discusses these first options with the business (feed-
back arrow “e”). Experts and decision makers now have the possibility to remediate pos-
sible misunderstandings and to specify the request. The IT-experts then move again to the 
analysis phase, conduct a more detailed technical analysis and come up with an elaborate 
description of three feasible technical solutions, which they present in the so called ‘pre-
paratory study’. In this way, experts and decision makers then move to the ‘convey in-
sights, suggestions, & solutions phase’ (arrow “D”) and present the study in front of the 
steering committee (formed by both IT managers and business managers). The committee 
discusses the proposal and decides whether to go forward with the recommended option 
or whether further modifications and analysis are necessary (feedback arrow “h”). Once 
they receive the definitive order from the business, they move back to the ‘articulate need’ 
phase (feedback arrow “g” and sign a ‘scope contract’ and can they finally proceed to the 
“apply & implement insights & solutions” phase.  
The example of InSure shows that the ‘articulate need’ phase can actually be fully 
completed only when experts have conducted some analyses and conveyed some of its 
insights and results. The refinement and alignment loops serve to gradually reach a more 
precise (refined) understanding of the issue, which is shared (aligned) among experts and 
decision makers. The process is similar for pom+, although not as articulated (see: Figure 
7).  
This process topology actually comes close to how sense-making theory describes 
how people make sense of problems and solutions (see: Chapter 2). Sense-making is not a 
purely cerebral process, but needs the continuous interplay of talk and action, and of ret-
rospect and prospect (Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005). The decision makers are not able 
to make sense of a problem by pure thinking, but need to talk with the experts to be able 
to bracket certain elements of the issue as particularly noteworthy. They need to engage 
into some action, for example, by letting experts start their analysis or developing a proto-
type. They then can reflect on these experiences, engage in further talk, and refine their 
thinking (Weick et al., 2005). In this way, sense-making requires a certain cycling behav-
ior between talk, action, and reflection. Cohen et al. argue similarly that only in retrospect 
people know which questions were actually answered. “Despite the dictum that you can-
not find the answer until you have formulated the question well, you often do not know 
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what the question is in organizational problem solving until you know the answer” 
(Cohen et al., 1972: 3).  
More than other forms of communication, face-to-face interactions, activate sense-
making processes (Weick, 1979: 133-134). In the three case studies, we find that interac-
tive talk is central in this phase also for other reasons. It also helps to elicit the decision 
makers’ knowledge, to show sincere interest and commitment, to avoid misunderstandings 
between experts and decision makers, to gradually reach a shared understanding among 
them, and to counteract possible resistances to change. This is why pom+, after the first 
classical customer request, relies on meetings, brainstorming sessions, and interviews with 
the customer. One consultant mentions: 
“If you flood people with documents at the beginning of a project, it is very possible that they un-
derstand them differently than how they were actually intended. They believe that the consultant 
wants to go in a direction that they do not want to. Therefore, in the beginning, interaction is key.” 
(C. Kaufmann). 
However, an ongoing cycling and engagement in talk is very expensive. For this rea-
son, face-to-face communication is in both cases combined with more formal, written, and 
official forms of communication. InSure relies on written business concepts, written tech-
nical concepts, a signed project scope. pom+ insists after a phase of interactive rap-
prochements and mutual adjustments in signing a written project definition. These docu-
ments bind both parties to certain commitments and mark the progress in the refinement. 
For both InSure and pom+, this combination of fluidity (through iterative talk and cy-
cling) and holding down (written documents) is a central practice in their knowledge 
communication.  
Until now, we have characterized feedback-loops as being necessary and positive 
elements to refine the need of the decision makers and align the understandings of experts 
and decision makers. Yet, at both pom+ and InSure, there are cases of rather problematic 
readjustment feedback-loops that are necessary to remediate an uncovered misunderstand-
ing or misalignment. There are instances where the request remains too vague, where the 
experts have misunderstood the decision makers, or where there are various expectations 
among decision makers. In the case of pom+ (see: Figure 9), for example, the consultants 
often work with their contact person at a clients’ – a project manager – and only at a later 
stage, when first milestone results are communicated, the project sponsor and head of this 
contact person is finally exposed to the work. At that point, it often becomes apparent 
that the project manager and the project sponsor did not really align their expectations. 
Giving attention to the subject only when the experts have already done a lot of their 
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work, they realize that they actually want from the experts a different service and insight. 
As a result, the need has to be rearticulated and the project can fall considerably behind 
schedule. An even worse case is when such readjustments turn out to be necessary only 
after the decision has already been implemented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of InSure, for example, sometimes was the case (before they defined the 
more elaborated need articulation process) that only after a new IT-application was al-
ready implemented, that the managers from the business line realize that the application 
did not satisfy what they actually needed and that a very late readjustment loop (arrow 
“g”) was necessary. It is evident that late stage feedback loops, from the phases “convey 
insights, suggestions, & solutions” and “apply & implement suggestions & solutions” to 
the “articulate need” (feedback arrows “g” and “f”) or to the “analysis” phase (feedback 
arrows “i” and “h”), can be highly problematic.  
Therefore, in both cases, experts insist in actively involving the decision makers in 
this early phase of their interaction (e.g. through the workshops) and try to gain access 
also to those decision makers with the more powerful positions.  
In sum, the ‘need articulation’ is not ‘a one shot moment’ in which the decision 
makers brief the experts on their needs. We have shown that a shared understanding of 
the decision makers’ request can only be elaborated gradually, both in terms of a gradual 
alignment between experts and decision makers’ perspectives and of a gradual refinement 
(concretization) of the request. The articulation of a clear request is in itself a process of 
Figure 9: Instances of Feed-Forward and Feedback Loops (Refinement, Alignment, and 
Readjustment Loops) within the Interaction between Consultants of pom+ 
and their Clients 
Identify Experts
& Expertise
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e – refinement and 
alignment loop: after a 
first general need articu-
lation and analysis, the 
request needs to be 
formulated more precisely 
and understandings to be 
further aligned.
h – refinement loop:
after a milestone 
presentation, more 
in-depth analysis of a 
certain issue is 
necessary 
A – contact pom+ 
after attendance at 
a pom+ event
D – project report 
combined with pro-
ject presentation
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report after several 
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parts of it
C – definition of 
project scope
f – readjustment loop: communication of milestone 
results to project sponsors leads to a late reorientation 
of the project and to a new definition of the client‘s need
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various feed-forward and feedback loops and spans to the phases of “analysis” and “con-
veying insights”. If the necessary interaction between talk and action (sense-making) does 
not develop well enough, later readjustment cycles are necessary. Too loosely defined re-
quests and implicit misunderstandings have to be remedied at the cost of delays and addi-
tional expenses. Experts and decision makers are therefore well advised to consider 
Drucker’s appeal that “the important element in decision making is defining the question. 
The important and crucial steps are to decide whether there is a need for a decision and 
what the decision is about” (Drucker, 1974: 466, as quoted by Weick, 1995: 15).  
4.3 Analyze Issue & Develop Possible Courses of Action 
With (pom+, InSure) or without (Brookings) a request of the decision makers at 
hand, experts start analyzing the issue of decision and develop possible courses of action. 
The cross-case analysis did not lead to identify recurring practices or challenges valid for 
all three cases.  
In Brookings’ case, the interaction with decision makers is rather poor during this 
phase. Mostly, scholars conduct their analysis independently from policy makers, yet fre-
quently interact with other scholars or experts in the field.  
At InSure, the interaction of IT-experts with the business is rather vivid. IT-experts 
translate the business request in a technical request, do a feasibility analysis and elaborate 
various technical options. A recurring challenge during this phase of the knowledge com-
munication process is that the IT-experts have to translate the very broad definition of the 
problem and objective on behalf of the business to a very specific and technical definition 
of the issue (requirements for the technical system). The definition must be so concrete 
that the actual programming code can be easily derived from it. The expert needs to move 
between various levels of abstraction and to contextualize the received information in a 
very different setting. To address this challenge, InSure employs people with a double 
qualification both in the insurance business and in IT. These function as ‘translators’ and 
are positioned both at the business and the IT side (for further details on this point, see in 
this chapter: Boundary-spanning Processes – Brokering).  
At pom+, the experts conduct their analysis at the site of the client (decision makers) 
and in order to understand certain work processes of the decision makers, they interact 
with them very frequently. The consultant needs to understand what exactly the client’s 
situation is, in what the problem consists and why it exists. The client is the consultants’ 
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major source of knowledge, and by directly working with him, the consultant tries to find 
ways to elicit all the relevant knowledge for finding a reliable solution. For pom+, close 
collaboration is also a necessary precondition for that the client more easily accepts the 
recommendations of the expert. The client himself brings up the solution and the consult-
ant only helps to voice, bring together, structure, and consolidate the propositions; as 
mentioned by a consultant:  
“In this way, we encounter fewer resistances - later in the implementation - because it is actually the 
collaborator who finally has the chance to express himself freely. Management gets information it 
would not get otherwise. It’s really all about compressing and processing the existing knowledge. I 
have to decide what the important problems are and which ones we can address at a later stage” (L. 
Schaerer). 
4.4 Convey Insights, Suggestions, & Solutions 
Once the experts have conducted their analysis and have elaborated their recom-
mendations for the decision makers, they aim to effectively convey their insights, sugges-
tions, and possible solutions. Experts have to find ways of communication in order to gain 
the attention of the decision makers, to make the complex issue easily understandable, to 
make the insights memorable, and to assure that the decision makers will know how to 
concretely implement the gained insights.  
The communication strategies, with which experts communicate their expertise, dif-
fer substantially between the three cases (detailed descriptions can be found for each case 
in the Appendices 1, 3, 5). For Brookings, this is the most important phase in their knowl-
edge-intensive communication with decision makers as the organization mainly pushes its 
scholars’ expertise to policy makers. They convey their insights in a very rich mix of writ-
ten and oral communications: books, policy briefs, op-eds (opinion pieces in newspapers 
opposite the letter of the editor), periodic journals, papers, reports, articles in newspapers, 
testimonies at congressional hearings, events, informal meetings, public briefings, inter-
views, participation at radio and TV shows, and discussion series. Almost all of these 
communications can be accessible over the website of Brookings, which is one of the most 
important communication instruments for Brookings. A scholar illustrates it as follows: 
”We came out with this new study (..) on the effects of match rates on saving. We held a conference 
here to get it out to different offices (..) and the policy community of the different think tanks. We 
held a conference call with reporters and had 20 or 25 reporters on the phone. I had conversations 
with specific reporters and there was a story in the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal, as 
well as a big editorial in the New York Times. This, I believe, influences policy makers. Then, I 
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brought it up again at a hearing before the Ways and Means Committee yesterday, which is yet an-
other audience. At the same time, we are getting the paper out to the academic audience” (P. Or-
szag). 
The experts of pom+ convey their insights not only at the end of the project, but also 
during the analysis phase, for example, when they have reached milestones. They present 
their results and recommendations in presentations, meetings, workshops, and project 
reports. After a milestone has been reached or the project has been concluded, the results 
and recommendations are formally conveyed in presentations and through a written re-
port. These situations are often of great importance as they constitute the few moments, in 
which upper management is present and have a determinant influence on the direction of 
the decision making. Prior to this moment, at the level of the project managers, much in-
tegration of more implicit knowledge has already taken place at this point since the client 
has been working for several weeks with the consultants of pom+.  
The case of InSure is similar to the one of pom+. A preparatory study (containing all 
the analysis, the feasible technical options, and the recommendation of the IT-experts) is 
presented to the steering committee, is then discussed, approved or submitted to changes. 
The written document itself reflects a strong collaborative effort between the IT and the 
business people and much knowledge has already been integrated between the business 
and the IT experts prior to the presentation in front of the steering committee. It is never-
theless an important moment as this organ has the final decisional power on the develop-
ment and implementation of a particular IT-application. 
For the three cases, many communicative challenges and practices differ. In the fol-
lowing, we will present the core challenges and practices, which we found repeatedly in 
the three cases.  
Misrepresenting Complexity: Imbalance between Conciseness and Comprehensive-
ness 
At the basis of the expert-decision maker constellation is that decision makers have 
too little time and expertise at disposition to make a decision on their own and conse-
quently ask experts to provide their in-depth knowledge in very short formats that are yet 
meaningful. Experts are asked to communicate their in-depth knowledge in a very concise 
manner, which appears to be a major challenge throughout the three cases, particularly in 
this phase of the knowledge communication process. 
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During congressional testimonies, for example, Brookings scholars have five minutes 
to outline to the Senate, House, Joint, or Special Committee of Congress the main causes 
and implications of a specific policy issue and to present possible solutions (Quarterly, 
2005). A major challenge is for Brookings’ scholars to break down the whole complexity 
of an issue and present it within a five minutes talk so that policy makers can understand 
and later remember it. 
Similarly, when Brookings’ scholars give interviews or participate at TV shows, a 
complex issue has to be turned into an extremely compact information format. Scholar 
Charles Schultze illustrates the difficulty of this undertaking: 
“Every month, I do a business, stock market TV show (..). I only have one minute and a half to get 
something across. If it is a subject I know, I can write what I have to write in half an hour. But it 
always comes out 2 to 3 times too long and then I spend hours to get it shorter.” 
At pom+, consultants have to break down the information of a thousand pages in a 
relatively small report: 
“The challenge is also that we got an enormous amount of information in these three weeks and we 
have to differentiate, what is relevant, what is not relevant. In the end, they get a report of 25 
pages, in which they have to find the whole spectrum and variety of the issue” (L. Schärer).  
In this way, experts are faced with the polar request of being extremely concise and 
simple and, at the same time, exhaustive enough to live up to the variety and complexity 
of the issue. Brookings’ scholars find themselves faced with, on the one side, their profes-
sional responsibility as researchers to do and present research thoroughly and, on the 
other hand, to present research results very swiftly and in a very concise format.  
From a knowledge perspective, the question is if the very concise formats allow for 
meaningful communications, in which the decision makers can transform the piece of in-
formation into knowledge. An IT-manager of InSure formulates this question as follows: 
„A big challenge today is to represent knowledge in a compressed manner. In the past, people 
wrote big books, reports. Today, nobody reads this anymore. There was a move to the one-pagers, 
these executive summaries. It is also a mentality of PowerPoint, that is, no more documents, just 
slides. The challenge really is how to communicate something in a meaningful way in such a short 
space.“ 
For written communication, the conciseness/comprehensiveness challenge is particu-
larly demanding because, depending on the characteristics of the single reader and the 
current situation he or she is in, different aspects of the issue have to be emphasized, as 
illustrates this quote from an IT-manager of InSure:  
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“How can I represent knowledge in a well structured manner? I would like to convey something to 
a client or to a decision maker. I have to do this on a few pages and here is the first problem: how 
can I present complex issues in a simple manner and give the reader the possibility to deepen certain 
aspects? (..) I think of a possible way of presentation that allows each reader to be informed himself 
on his/her level and exactly at the level of detail, which interests him/her.” 
In all three organizations, experts address this challenge of the concomitant request 
for meaningful conciseness and faithful comprehensiveness in part by scaling information 
within and across various media.  
Scale Information Within and Across Media & Allow for Multiple Mode of Access 
With the term ‘information scaling’ we designate the idea that a piece of informa-
tion, e.g. a conducted research and its results, is presented in a variety of lengths and me-
dia formats. A report has, for example, a half-page executive summary and the same piece 
of information is communicated as a paper, a power point presentation and a visual im-
age. Depending on the interest, specific need, and media preferences of the decision maker 
as well as on the time he has at disposition, he/she can decide how detailed he/she wants 
to be informed and whether he/she prefers to read to listen or to view a piece of informa-
tion (streamed audio or video file). We have observed this practice of information scaling 
in all three cases.  
At Brookings, this practice is dealt with very consciously and consequently. Within 
one media, Brookings has found out that an information product, such as a report, needs 
various summaries, as Ron Nesson outlines: 
“We did fairly recently a survey asking congressional staff and serious reporters (..) on the form 
they would like our findings to have. (..) What is the ideal length of a Brookings’ publication that 
they could really use? Some said one page, some said two paragraphs, and some said bullet points. 
(..) So we (..) will probably (..) keep the policy briefs (..), but we will have a one page summary of 
that, a two paragraph summary, and a bullet point summary.” 
Brookings scales a piece of information also across media. A one hour Public Brief-
ing, for example, can give a general outlook of a problem and serve as a “summary” of a 
lengthy book. In addition, the same information can also be accessed by reading a policy 
brief that will present the information with moderate details. In this way, the busy con-
gressmen takes the brief version that only outlines the conclusions and propositions, while 
the member of the congressional staff can look – in the longer version – at the numbers 
and facts that lead to the conclusions. The insights gained from a project might be com-
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municated in a book, in various articles, in a report, in policy briefs, op-eds, events, in 
testimonies at congressional hearings, in interviews for newspapers, and when attending a 
radio or TV show. Oral communications like public briefings or radio-/TV shows thereby 
serve to quickly get a general overview and become aware of a certain idea or approach 
that is discussed more in detail in a book or report.  
The different media and communication styles can serve various audiences. Combin-
ing different communication media and formats is further useful to reciprocally compen-
sate for the drawbacks specific to each single format and to profit from its particular ad-
vantages. Brookings’ books, for example, serve for in-depth conceptualizations of an issue 
and policy briefs or op-ed for more timely policy recommendations. At InSure, experts 
combine visual communication with written text and oral communication, as one IT-
manager mentions: “The communication is most effective if it is a mixture between a 
graphical elaboration, a possibly very short description and then a meeting”. While the 
face-to-face communication is particularly suited to convey the context of an information, 
show its implications, give an overview and elaborate jointly new ideas and insights, the 
written format allows for clearer structure, more in-depth information, and gives the 
reader the possibility to change the linear flow of the text, jump within the document and 
focus only on these aspects, which are most pertinent to him/her. The visual format has 
still other advantages as it provides an additional language and facilitates a shared under-
standing (see in this chapter: Boundary Objects, Visuals). By combining these three forms 
of communication, an IT-expert or decision maker can profit from the advantages of each 
one and overcome their respective weaknesses.  
We call this practice of combining different media to convey an idea or insight to 
“scale” information across media and representation formats. A same content can be ac-
cessed in a variety of ways and an addressee has the possibility, depending on his affini-
ties, needs, and interests, to focus on the format he/she prefers. 
Use Standard Structures & Presentation Principles 
In all three organizations, experts have developed standard structures and standard 
presentation principles for the specific information products. A standard structure facili-
tates a faster orientation within extensive sets of information and makes an information 
item also more quickly retrievable (Eppler, 2006). In the case of Brookings, Policy Briefs 
are organized following a loose standard structure. In size, Policy Briefs (see: Figure 10) 
are limited to 3000 words (8 pages), all have the same design, and show standard infor-
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mation items such as a summary, related resources, and Brookings’ corporate information 
at the outset of the article, as well as the contact information of the author, and singled-
out quotes. Certain information items, like for example ‘related resources’ are standard 
not only for policy briefs, but for all information products of Brookings. Also on their 
website, the user finds, next to an article, various links to alternative resources on the 
topic, such as related events, webcasts, online chats, related policy briefs, journals, or 
courses provided by Brookings. The cross-referencing to related material has become a 
rule for most of Brookings’ information products and provides the reader orientation 
across a single product. In this way, a standard can also span various information prod-
ucts. 
 
 
Figure 10: Example of a Policy Brief of the Brookings Institution (Labels of Standard 
Features Added by Author) 
 
pom+ and InSure also dispose of standard structures for their reports. InSure’s final 
‘preparatory study’ shows an executive summary, benefits of the IT application project, 
objectives, analysis of the starting position, identified measures and options, plus a rec-
ommendation for one of the options. Next to a standard structure, the reports also follow 
some basic principles of presentation.  
Principles of presentations are, for example, the use of little text as possible, but on 
the other hand, an extensive use of tables and a considerable use of visualization (e.g 
overview figures). Another principle is that all important terms are defined in the appen-
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dix or that meta-information like the status of the study (e.g. proposed), the names of the 
authors, the person in charge, the date of the last revision, and the name of the document 
have to be included. 
Next to written communication products, also oral communication outlets can have 
standard formats. At Brookings, there is the National Issue Forum, as the senior scholar 
Alice Rivlin explains: 
“A standard format for Brookings is what we call a National Issues Forum. That means that there 
is a Brookings paper or book, then we invite several political people, from the administration or out 
of the Congress to comment on the book. That gives them some exposure to the book, because they 
have to read it and comment on it. And it also gives wider exposure to the concept itself. If you 
have an important member of Congress giving a speech, then C-Span or others will be willing to 
cover it.” (A. Rivlin) 
Standard formats like the National Issues Forum are helpful for scholars as they do 
not have to reinvent new types of events after each book publication. It also helps policy 
makers to know, when receiving the invitation by Brookings for a ‘National Issues Fo-
rum’, what structure and quality to expect.  
Finally, standards are defined not only for communication products, but also for 
communication processes. At InSure, for example, change requests have to follow certain 
standard procedures and the managers form the business side cannot simply come to the 
IT people and ask them to change the project. 
To conclude, in the three case studies, we have seen that standards play an impor-
tant role in managing the knowledge communication between experts and decision mak-
ers. Such standards can be applied for written and oral communication products as well as 
for communication processes. They regard the formal structure of the information product 
(e.g. where is what type of information placed), its graphical design (e.g. color), the con-
ceptual structure of an information product (e.g. a presentation of an expert is followed 
by two comments by external experts) and can also include presentation principles (e.g. 
few text, many visuals). Standards facilitate the orientation and allow for a quicker screen-
ing and retrieving of the relevant information on both sides of the knowledge boundaries. 
They improve the quality of information products, and make coordination and the man-
agement of expectations easier. 
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4.5 Apply & Implement Insights & Solutions 
The application of the expert knowledge in the actual decision making and the im-
plementation of it in action take various paths in the three case studies.  
In the case of InSure, the expertise provided by the IT-specialists lays the direct 
foundation for the decision that the managers from the business line will take. And after 
the decision is taken, it is the IT-experts themselves who will conduct the implementation. 
Within two months, the IT-experts build the application and launch it in the larger IT-
architecture. During this time, the interaction between the IT-specialists and the decision 
makers is less frequent and the IT-experts develop the application rather autonomously. 
The IT team leader meets with the manager from the business line for weekly coordination 
meetings. Modification requests must follow formal procedures. Finally, when the applica-
tion is developed, test phases start and the communication between the IT-specialists and 
the managers is again intensified. At InSure, the passage from the conveying insights to the 
taking of the decision is almost automatic – and clearly defined in the organizational proc-
esses – since the real knowledge integration effort has taken place in the earlier stages.  
In the cases of Brookings and pom+, the opposite is the case. No organizational 
bonds exist between experts and decision makers and experts are not involved in the deci-
sion making processes. After having conveyed their insights and suggestions, they have 
poor control on whether and how their insights have actually impacted the decision mak-
ing process. It depends on the decision makers to whether to consider the knowledge pro-
vided by the experts or not.  
In such a situation the passage from knowing to doing is far from being automatic, 
but is rather a difficult path with various challenges. In the following, we will discuss the 
major challenges for the cases of Brookings and pom+. 
Difficulty to Integrate Conveyed Knowledge into the Decision Making because of 
Knowing-Doing Gap, Resistances to Change, and External Coercions 
In the case of Brookings the impact of the knowledge communications is very hard 
to measure. First, scholars do not know whether policy makers were actually exposed to 
their recommendations and insights. Second, even if the insights did reach the decision 
makers, Brookings does not know whether the policy makers will consider them in one 
way or the other in their decision making. One scholar of Brookings mentions on regard: 
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“It is very difficult to measure (..) how much impact this particular study had in the policy making 
process. Last year, when we put out our first book, it got quite a good attention. There were, I 
think, 12 major newspapers that mentioned the book by name. Many more editorials and articles 
talked about the substance of the book without citing it outright. We did many interviews with the 
press and with the media more generally. We had opportunities to testify before Congress and to 
meet with policy makers” (I. Sawhill)  
Traditional impact measures of a think tank in the public policy discourse are the 
number of testimonies in front of Congress and media visibility. As far as testimonies are 
concerned, the Brookings Institution is leading off the U.S. ranking together with the Heri-
tage Foundation (Brookings Institution, 2005a; Heritage Foundation, 2005). Also with 
regard to media visibility, Brookings is traditionally the most cited think tank by all U.S. 
newspapers, except for the clearly conservative Washington Times (Rich & Weaver, 
2000). While these indicators can give some more certainty on whether the policy makers 
were exposed to the ideas of Brookings’ scholars, the impact of these ideas on the policy 
making process remains diffuse and highly uncertain. Brookings’ communications interact 
with the thousands of other think tanks, journalists, advocacy organizations or interest 
groups. Rather than having a direct impact, Brookings’ communications might shape the 
perceptions of the policy makers, shift the attention to another aspect of an issue, redefine 
implicit priorities, reframe the discussion, or activate informal networks and friendships 
across partisan borders.  
At pom+, although decision makers explicitly ask for the consultants’ advice and 
guidance and although communication is therefore more direct, the step from knowing to 
doing remains uncertain. It is often the case that the decision makers do not implement the 
insights provided by the experts. A consultant of pom+ mentions on regard:  
“Oftentimes, we propose interesting things, but the client is not ready yet to integrate them. He has 
to live, in some way or the other, the whole development he buys in through our service. We can’t 
speed him up from 0 to 100 in just one year. That can be frustrating since right after the project, 
the reports end up in a drawer and nobody really profits from them” (C. Kaufmann). 
There are various reasons for this gap between knowing and doing. In Chapter 2, we 
have mentioned issues related to the in-group bias like the not-invented-here syndrome 
(Katz & Allen, 1982), to organizational cultures characterized by competition and fear to 
make a mistake (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000) and to an insufficient concretization of rather 
abstract decisions. In the case studies, we could identify some of these as well as additional 
reasons for the knowing-doing gap.  
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First, expertise has few chances to become actionable if decision makers find them-
selves in a narrow network of external coercions and already made commitments. A 
scholar of Brookings provides an illustrative example:  
”One of the things I said when I testified (..) was that you cannot strengthen social security without 
an increase in the payroll tax (..). But the President had given a very clear direction to the Commis-
sion that it was not to consider a payroll tax increase. They completely agreed with me, you cannot 
do this. But they were given the mandate that the payroll tax was not to increase, period. So the 
commitment was so strong that no information saying how stupid it was to do what they were go-
ing to do, would convince them not to do it” (K. Weaver). 
Commitments can also be less explicit and regard informal relationships since a deci-
sion maker does not want to attack another decision maker and rather prefers to maintain 
alliances intact.  
Face-saving behavior is another reason for not taking into account a certain piece of 
information. If decision makers have already exposed a certain opinion, they are reluctant 
to change it even if faced with substantial evidence that argues for an alternative conclu-
sion. They fear to loose face (cp: Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000) as explicates Charles Schultze 
from Brookings: 
“If, as a consequence of your estimates, it makes a policy look stupid, which someone is pushing, 
they might agree, but they (..) won’t start arguing. (..) They would try to find another expert who 
gives them another answer” (C. Schultze). 
In the case of pom+, we have further found that resistances to a certain suggestion or 
piece of information often arise because clients do not feel considered and are generally 
skeptical against the external consultant (cp: not-invented-here syndrome, Katz & Allen, 
1982).  
“It is important that the client can recognize himself and his situation (in the information we pro-
vide). We have to be descriptive so that the client does not have the feeling that just some external 
guys pop in and present a few theoretical approaches. Here again, conversations and the personal 
contact are hugely important” (B. Buser). 
In this way, credibility and even more so trust play an important role in the imple-
mentation phase. Only if the decision maker really trusts in the capability of the expert, 
he/she is willing to leave aside part of his/her convictions, mode of behavior and knowl-
edge and embrace the recommendation of the expert (cp. Baecker, 1999, Chaper 2). 
Poor agreements and non-clarified functions between the various decision makers 
represent a final reason why experts’ recommendations are not taken into account in deci-
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sion making. In many instances, experts often only have the possibility to frequently inter-
act with those decision makers whose decision power is rather limited and who can be 
easily overruled by upper management. If the agreements between the various decision 
makers are not very clear, it is improbable that experts’ recommendations will be taken 
into account. The consultants of pom+, for example, found themselves several times in a 
situation, in which, during the final presentation of a project, the project sponsor finally 
attended and exposed a completely different view on the issue. As a consequence, the pro-
ject was either filed or had to be completely redefined (feedback loops to articulate need 
phase).  
We have exposed a panorama with multiple reasons for the knowing-doing gap. 
Many of them are part of the outer context of the expert-decision maker interaction and 
cannot be addressed by the expert directly. There is nevertheless a practice, which we 
could observe both at pom+ and InSure and this is the early stage active involvement of 
decision makers and the late stage guidance by experts. 
Early Stage Involvement of Decision Makers and Late Stage Guidance by Experts 
pom+ and InSure both try to involve decision makers early on in their projects and 
give them a very active role in the knowledge communication process. A first meeting, in 
which also project sponsors and upper management are involved, is often useful to assure 
a common understanding and a commitment also from the top. The active involvement of 
decision makers is further important to make them feel that it is actually them who pro-
posed the solution. pom+ persistently uses its clients as the most important source of 
knowledge and the consultancy considers itself as operating ‘only’ to structure, compress, 
and contextualize that knowledge with the help of its methods and approaches. Early 
stage involvement of the decision makers then has various important roles in order to re-
duce the gap between knowing and doing. 
At InSure, we have further seen that late stage guidance by the experts very much 
helps to write down decisions in concrete terms and to integrate their expertise in the con-
crete actions for implementation. If it is the experts themselves who are responsible for the 
implementation, the continuity can be guaranteed even further.  
The analysis of the knowledge communication process has shown that there are 
many communicative challenges and practices that are similar throughout the three cases. 
However, we have seen also differences in the knowledge communication process like, for 
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example, the importance of the single phases, the party (experts or decision makers) that 
holds the lead in the various phases, the challenges with which experts are confronted, the 
practices they put in place to address these challenges, and the level of interconnectedness 
(looping behavior) among the various phases.  
Figure 11 shows differences in the knowledge communication process by comparing 
intra- versus inter-organizational communication and ‘push’ versus ‘pull’ cases. From this 
comparison, we can propose that:  
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Figure 11: Cross-Case Analysis: Impact of Push-/Pull Situation and of Existence of Or-
ganizational Ties on Knowledge Communication Process 
 
Note: The intensity of the knowledge communication between experts and 
decision makers goes from “very low” to “very high” and has been attributed 
by the author on the basis of the qualitative data of the cases.  
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First, if the experts aim to push their insights and knowledge to the decision makers 
(Brookings, pom+): 
− the least intense is the knowledge communication between experts and decision 
makers during the “articulate need” and “analyze issue & develop possible 
courses of action” phases; 
− the least looping behavior and refinement cycles characterize the knowledge com-
munication process.  
Second, we can state, that the more knowledge communication takes place across institu-
tional boundaries, 
− the more experts need to be active in the “identify experts & expertise” phase; 
− the smaller is the possibility that the experts play an active role in the implementa-
tion phase.  
Overall, the process model of knowledge communication, as we have proposed it in 
Chapter 2, provides a useful structure for describing the knowledge-intensive interaction 
between experts and decision makers, especially for the case when expertise is pulled by 
decision makers. Instead, if knowledge is pushed by the experts without a clear request on 
behalf of the decision makers (case of Brookings), the communication is concentrated 
mainly on the two phases “Identify Experts & Expertise’ and the ‘Convey Insights, Sug-
gestions, & Solutions’ and the phase model does not provide a particularly insightful 
structure to grasp the particularities of the expert-decision maker interaction. Weaver and 
Stares (2001: 24), by referring to Kingdon, alternatively described the role of expertise in 
decision making with the help of March’s “garbage-can” model: solutions (proposed by 
experts) often linger around unattended for quite a while until they meet quite coinciden-
tally decision makers and are attached to a focal policy issue (Kingdon, 1995: 165). 
In the next section, we will describe communicative challenges and practices, which 
are not specific to one or the other phase of the knowledge communication process, but 
more generally characterize the expert-decision maker interaction. 
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5  Phase Independent Challenges and Practices 
in the Knowledge Communication between 
Experts and Decision Makers 
Some recurrent challenges and practices of the knowledge communication between 
experts and decision makers cannot be attributed to a specific phase in the knowledge 
communication process, but are valid throughout the process. These challenges and prac-
tices regard often more micro communicative aspects, like, for example, how to uncover 
terminology discrepancies between experts and decision makers, which otherwise lead to 
implicit misunderstandings.  
In the following, we will discuss these general challenges and practices, which re-
curred in the three case studies. We have structured them along the framework for manag-
ing conversations from a knowledge perspective, as we have discussed it in Chapter 2. We 
argue that distributing these challenges and practices along the five dimensions of the 
framework allows for a better understanding of the dependencies between the various 
challenges and practices. Figure 12 gives an overview on the phase-unspecific challenges 
and practices of the expert-decision maker interaction.  
In Figure 12, we outline phase-independent practices as we have elaborated them in-
ductively for the three case studies and two meta-practices, which reflect concepts stem-
ming from the literature, yet which grasp the kernel aspects of the case studies. In this 
way, the meta-practices are subsuming the inductively elaborated practices from the three 
case studies (indicated by the dashed lines). The arrows connecting the various challenges 
show proposed positive dependencies as they have emerged in the case studies and can be 
read ‘leads to’. A lack in common ground, for example, ‘leads to’ a mismatched terminol-
ogy. Although these arrows propose positive relationships (the more, the more), it is not 
our aim to elaborate precise propositions of causality (which is why we represent them in 
dashed lines). The arrows leading from the meta-practices to the challenges indicate nega-
tive relationships (the more, the less) and can be read ‘reduces’. For example, engaging in 
boundary-spanning practices ‘reduces’ the problem of the lack of common ground. The 
lines from the meta-practices to the practices indicate “consist of”. 
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5.1 General Challenges in the Knowledge Communication be-
tween Experts and Decision Makers 
Mismatched Terminology and Discourse Lead to Undiscovered Misunderstandings 
Different language use has emerged as a recurrent problem in the three case studies. 
It often leads to undiscovered misunderstandings among experts and decision makers. We 
attribute the differences in language both to the message (mismatched terminology) and to 
the process dimension (mismatched discourse patterns) of the proposed framework (see: 
Figure 12). The problem of the undiscovered misunderstandings, instead, relates to the 
experts’ and decision makers’ interpretations and meanings and is therefore located on the 
Figure 12: Major Phase-independent Challenges and Practices in the Knowledge Com-
munication between Experts and Decision Makers across the Three Case-
Studies 
Mismatched terminology
Relational tensions in view of 
knowledge gap and lacking trust
Lack of big picture
m
es
sa
ge
p
ro
ce
ss
gr
o
up
 
d
yn
am
ic
s
m
en
ta
l
m
o
d
el
s
Undetected misunderstandings
o
ut
er
co
nt
ex
t
Time pressure
Mismatched discourse patterns
Lack of common ground and too 
distant perspectives
Using boundary 
objects
Engaging in boundary 
spanning processes
Visuals
5 DIMENSIONS
OF COMMUNICA-
TION MANAGE-
MENT FROM A 
KNOWLEDGE 
PERSPECTIVE
CHALLENGES IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE COMMUNICATION 
BETWEEN EXPERTS AND 
DECISION MAKERS 
META-PRACTICES IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE COMMUNICATION 
BETWEEN EXPERTS
AND DECISION MAKERS 
Glossaries
Standardized forms
Shared methods
Brokering: Double 
qualification of experts
Metaphors
IT artefacts
Boundary encounters:
•Internships & partnering 
•Engage in co-located, 
personal, face-to-face 
communication
PRACTICES IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE
COMMUNICATION 
BETWEEN EXPERTS AND 
DECISION MAKERS 
Chapter 3 - Three Theory Building Case Studies 120 
dimension of the mental models. As both aspects are closely interrelated, we will discuss 
them conjointly.  
On the surface, the problem is about a different use of terminologies. At Brookings, 
for example, certain concepts that are very common to Brookings’ experts like “cross-
elasticity of demand”, “multiplier effect”, or “present value” are difficult to understand 
for policy makers. If Brookings’ experts use such terms, the policy makers will concentrate 
on these and will divert their attention from the central issue, as William Gale mentions: 
 “If you start: ‘The present value of the social security deficit is 4 trillion dollars’, they ask what you 
intend with present value, and you go and say that it is the amount today that with interest will 
equal.. and it just puts them off. I will say ‘present value’, (..) to make sure it is accurate, but I kind 
of put it at the end so that (..) so it does not block the listeners mind. I would say: ‘Over the next 75 
years the social security deficit is 4 trillion dollars in present value’.” 
At InSure, the use of technical terms equally makes a common understanding be-
tween experts and decision makers difficult. An IT-specialist explains that also the people 
from the business have a rather thick jargon, which is hard to understand for the IT ex-
pert: 
“The business side views the problem at a different level and speaks a different language than us. In 
order to make the communication work, it is our task to understand their language. If someone 
from the business unit comes and says: ‘Regarding the premium reserve for external saving proc-
esses in the principality of Lichtenstein, next year, you have to give 1 percent of extra interests.’ The 
typical IT-specialist can only shrug his shoulders and ask: ‘What did he just mean with that?’ A 
team leader is not allowed to shrug his shoulders”. 
The two quotes show that experts can counter this problem by de-emphasizing technical 
expressions and scientific terms and appropriating the vocabulary of the decision 
makers. 
Yet, vocabulary problems do not only relate to the use of very technical terms. The 
more subtle problem is that experts and decision makers often use the same terms to des-
ignate different things or, to the contrary, that they use different terms to designate the 
same thing. A consultant of pom+ exemplifies this as follows: 
“It often happens that someone from the construction industry uses the same term as someone from 
the IT industry, but understands something completely different. (..) For example: what is a build-
ing? From a microeconomic standpoint a building is understood as a utilization unit and as such it 
is also represented in SAP. Added to this definition are criteria like how to rent and charge for the 
building. From a legal point of view, it is all different. There is a cadastral register, in which the 
121  Phase Independent Challenges and Practices in the Knowledge Communication 
between Experts and Decision Makers 
building is marked with a cadastral number, its borders are clearly circumscribed, and it has an in-
surance number. (..)” (R. Becht) 
The example of the ‘building’ shows that misunderstandings are probable not only 
for abstract terms and abbreviations, but also for apparently very common and easy 
terms. At InSure misunderstandings have frequently arisen in relation to relatively simply 
words such as ‘workflow’, ‘software production’, ‘admin-console’, or regarding, for ex-
ample, the difference between ‘software’ and ‘application’17.  
The language difference cannot be grasped fully by the semantic differences. Lan-
guage differences (at the message and process level) are based on differences in knowledge, 
experiences, and perspectives, which shows an interrelationship between the message and 
the mental model dimension of the framework (see: Figure 12, lack of common ground). 
A Brookings’ scholar exemplifies this connection: 
”The language difference is often a proxy for a different set of experiences and backgrounds. You 
have members of Congress who have been running for Congress for 15 or 20 years and are used to 
a variety of activities that are not fundamentally based on economic research. (..) Economists talk 
in one type of way and, policy makers talk in a different way. Economists are almost naturally in-
clined to thinking: ‘all else being equal, the partial equation of changing this is changing that’. 
Members of Congress often are not thinking in that way. They see two things happening at the 
same time so they must be casually related. It’s much less theoretical. (..) There are often different 
languages involved. (..) The language difference is a proxy of a whole lot of other differences. Back-
ground and training really; and that manifests itself in language” (P. Orszag) 
In this way, different modes of reasoning and ‘thought worlds’ (Dougherty, 1992) 
are expressed in language. In the previous quote it is shown that economists live in a 
‘thought world’ of mathematical equations (‘all else being equal, the partial equation of 
changing this is changing that’). IT-specialists, as shows the following quote, think in 
terms of information inputs and outputs: 
                                                 
17 Bechky (2003) similarly discussed misunderstandings across occupational communities and showed 
that one reason for it is „decontextualization“: A community assumes that their use of language is uni-
versal while it remains incomprehensible to another occupational community that is not sharing the 
same context. Bechky found that engineers attributed different meanings to the same word than as-
semblers or used different words to represent the same objects. While engineers had a more concep-
tual, schematic understanding of machines and work processes, assemblers’ understanding was more 
spacio-temporal and processual. The misunderstandings that derived were either readily discovered or 
remained unknown for a considerable amount of time. Bechky showed that these misunderstandings 
could be reconciled through the use of „tangible definitions“, that is the use of physical objects (such 
as machines) for illustrating one’s understanding in a very tangible way. She claimed that these ma-
chines served as ‚boundary objects’ and helped to create a common ground among the occupational 
groups. On the other hand, technical drawings from the engineers were not suited to create common 
ground as they were too abstract and unfamiliar and did not invoke „the loci of practice and concep-
tualization of the product that each group had“ (p.325). 
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“The client has difficulties saying: ‘In this and that module, you have to read the following con-
stants from the database and multiply them with the value X, which is saved in another place’. We 
cannot expect from the client to know such internal aspects of the application”. 
As a result, not only vocabulary changes, but also discourse patterns18. While deci-
sion makers talk of cost efficiency, process reengineering and business opportunities, ex-
perts talk of functionality and risk containment. Language differences of this kind are not 
as easily remediable as when confronted with simple mismatches in terminology. The nec-
essary translations can mostly be accomplished by developing a larger common ground 
and gaining a better understanding for the others’ group preferences and perspectives.  
Lack of Big Picture 
The experts and decision makers in all the three case studies mentioned repeatedly 
that a major difficulty of their interactions with decision makers is to gain and sustain the 
big picture of an issue. At InSure, an IT-manager formulates this challenge as follows: 
“One cannot always construct a complex image at first go. Everybody contributes some tesserae. 
That is often the problem: when can one be sure enough to know what is going on so that one can 
really make a reliable decision?” 
Characteristic for a complex decision making issue is that it is tangent to a variety of 
specialized knowledge domains and that one expert or decision maker alone is unable to 
get an overall idea of it. The reported quote shows that because the experts’ and decision 
makers’ views are limited, it is difficult for them to know when the aggregation of the 
various specialized expertise allows for a faithful representation of the issue and for truly 
seeing the big picture.  
At InSure, for example, if a change in an IT application has repercussions not only 
within the whole IT-infrastructure, but impacts also on a variety of business processes, 
then it is hard to see the big picture. IT-experts and managers have to pool and interrelate 
their various specific expertise, concerns, priorities, and points of view. The complexity 
and the ambiguity of the issue are often such that only as a collective can the group grasp 
the big picture.  
                                                 
18 There are a multitude of meanings attributed to the concept of ‘discourse’. Michel Foucault has men-
tioned that the term can be used to denominate “the general domain of all statements” or an “indi-
vidualisable group of statements” or even “a regulated practice that accounts for a number of state-
ments” (Foucault, 1972: 80). We use the term ‚discourse’ in Foucault’s second understanding to indi-
cate a group of statements which are concerned with a particular subject area, e.g. a discourse on func-
tionality rather than one on productivity. 
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“Informatics is a very heterogeneous area. There are so many technologies, so many types of infor-
matics. (..) This makes it very difficult to gain an eagle’s view and understand what actually is at 
stake.” 
While the big picture challenge is related to the issue that is an object of communica-
tion (its complexity), we argue that the challenge is mainly of procedural nature (which is 
why we locate it at the process level of the framework). Weick similarly argues that “the 
big picture” is a misleading concept as it suggests something static whereas the issue is 
more one of a “big story” that evolves. (Weick, 2002: S9). The question is whether the 
communication process is such that the interlocutors can see the connections among the 
various contributions and maintain an adequate level of detail at the same time. In fact, 
experts and decision makers not only have difficulties in gaining the big picture, they 
might see it in the beginning, but then loose it underway and digress into (technical) de-
tails. In the case of pom+, for example, details are often difficult to understand and the 
client has to invest a considerable cognitive effort to do so. Yet, by focusing on them, he 
does not see how these details relate to the more general picture.  
“Our IT-specialist sometimes runs into the risk of digressing into technical details that the client 
cannot follow. Then you have to find a common language in order to make these technical aspects 
understandable. In other instances, explaining exactly how the technical aspects in the background 
work does not really serve the client, it rather confuses him. He lacks the connector pieces in order 
to understand.” (A. Pesenti) 
The capacity of gaining and sustaining the big picture is therefore also a challenge of 
making relationships explicit and showing the interconnections between the concrete de-
tails and the more general, abstract notions. An IT-manager of InSure illustrates why this 
is a challenging undertaking: 
“The interconnections among the various business processes and the technical systems are very high 
and the communication is difficult if someone does not have a broad knowledge and does not know 
the interconnections. It is as if you were to explain a very small part out of a ball of wool. This tiny 
part often has so many influencing factors and larger connections that it is often difficult to explain 
something without going very far afield. (..) If someone would not only do, but also understand, we 
would have to invest a much more time”.  
This final quote shows that the big picture challenge is about the seeing and explain-
ing of the multiple connections of an issue. Experts and decision makers have to juggle 
simultaneously a multitude of causes, (indirect) implications, and contextual factors. In 
this view, the challenge of creating the big picture is also related to the capacity of sys-
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temic thinking and relates to a cognitive capacity (arrow to mental model dimension on 
Figure 12). 
Relational Tensions in View of Knowledge Gap and Lacking Trust 
On the level of the group dynamics evolving between experts and decision makers, 
we can observe in all the three case studies that relational tensions often grow from the 
knowledge gap between experts and decision makers and represent a major challenge in 
their communication.  
A first issue is that decision makers themselves feel knowledgeable about a certain is-
sue and question the experts’ status as such. A critique of this type does not refer to a spe-
cific argument an expert puts forward, but more generally questions the legitimacy of the 
expert as a person. From there, the expert can easily feel hurt in his/her pride and rela-
tional tensions can emerge19.  
The knowledge gap can lead to relational tensions also on the side of the decision 
maker. The decision maker might feel threatened to loose his/her face by admitting his/her 
own ignorance regarding a particular issue. A consultant of pom+ reports such an in-
stance: 
“The ignorance of a client sometimes inhibits the knowledge transfer. Once I had to deal with an 
older, experienced manager who then realized that I – by that time I was still very young – knew a 
little more in this specific field than he did. And then, his ignorance really blocked the knowledge 
transfer” (R. Baumann).  
In this way, issues of pride and power are often related to the knowledge differences. 
Decision makers are used to think that they hold a certain power position because of their 
knowledge and experience. The interaction with the decision maker puts them in a rather 
unfamiliar and unpleasant situation, in which they have to admit their own ignorance on 
the issue.  
“Oftentimes, this is a problem of the upper and middle management. They do not ask, ‘how should 
I understand this?’ (..) It’s not everybody’s thing to say: ‘This, I really haven’t understood.’” (A. Pe-
senti). 
                                                 
19 In this regard, we mentioned earlier (see: Chapter 2) that during knowledge communication, knowl-
edge often is at stake (Carlile, 2002) and that a person accepting a certain knowledge claim needs to 
question his/her own already acquired knowledge (Baecker, 1999) and might have to discard it. 
Feeling one’s own knowledge to be questioned can be easily understood as a poor acknowledge-
ment of one’s value as a person and lead to relational challenges. 
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At InSure, where the knowledge communication takes place within the organiza-
tional borders, relational tensions can also grow from the organizational setting since de-
cision makers are in a higher organizational position than experts (the IT-managers are 
the supervisors of IT-technicians)20.  
In this way, formal hierarchical levels can lead to informal dynamics between ex-
perts and decision makers, which are problematic for the integration of knowledge. One 
IT-manager recalls from her experience:  
“Often, there is an inhibition threshold ‚from down to top’ in the communication between IT tech-
nicians and IT managers or also between IT technicians and the operating managers from the busi-
ness side. ‚How should I talk with him?’ And there it is my task to inquire with the right questions 
and to insist not to use a too strong technical language. And if the IT-technicians know that they 
can do it with me then they can also do it with the people from the business line.“ 
Together, the knowledge gap difference and the supervisor-subordinate constellation can 
lead to considerable relational challenges. An often mentioned issue is trust, as this exam-
ple of an IT-expert at InSure shows:  
“Management should have more trust. We always have to document everything, justify, and make 
things transparent. This takes a lot of time. In the end, the result is the same. We say, we need that 
much time, with or without a document outlining the exact evidence. They always require a de-
tailed documentation in order to take decisions and this is quite difficult”.  
Mostly, such relational tensions do not become explicit topics of discussion. Yet, 
they build a context, within which it is difficult to criticize constructively, to share and 
develop knowledge, and to reach new solutions, as one IT-technician expresses:  
“Sometimes, one is so absorbed by the emotional issues so that it is a double challenge to talk 
about the same issue, even just business-wise”.  
In part, these relational tensions are reflections of larger organizational develop-
ments. InSure, for example, lived through a large reengineering process, which led to lay-
offs, redistribution of existing job-functions, and a more formal definition and execution 
of processes. In times of such transformations, uncertainties, fears, and resentments are 
lived intensely. 
                                                 
20 Szulanski (1996) empirically showed that ‘arduous relationships’ – i.e. distant and laborious rela-
tionships between individuals - are a main reason why knowledge is sticky and is not transferred be-
tween people.  
Chapter 3 - Three Theory Building Case Studies 126 
Lack of Common Ground and Too Distant Perspectives 
Different mental orientations and a lack of common ground appeared in all the three 
cases as a central challenge in the knowledge communication between experts and deci-
sion makers.  
Without a sufficient common ground, a shared context and a minimal common 
knowledge base, communication partners are unable to embed their communications in a 
context that is meaningful to all of them. Continuous (implicit) misunderstandings (as we 
have described them earlier on) are the result. Yet, as experts and decision makers have 
different educational backgrounds, lived through very distinct professional experiences 
and, in most cases, interact only very sporadically with each other, their common ground 
is often very thin and their mental orientations and perspectives vary considerably.  
Different mental orientations means that experts and decision makers not only know 
different things, but also that they know things differently21. One such recurrent difference 
in mental orientations is that while decision makers are by necessity oriented on finding 
yes-or-no or go versus no-go solutions, experts are trained to think: “it depends”. Charles 
Schultze, a senior scholar at Brookings, gives an illustrative example to underline this 
point: 
”It’s particularly (difficult) if three or more things interact. You write in terms of: ‘now what I am 
going to tell you is difficult to know, but for God’s sake, it is not enough. Therefore, I am going to 
tell you this. But, by the way, this is only true if..’ (..) I just recently remember trying to do some 
consulting for an investment bank. It had to do with the U.S. trade deficit and what to do about it. 
For an economist, what really drives the deficit is the national saving and investment. If you invest 
more than you save, you got to borrow abroad. If you save more than you invest, it’s vice versa. 
However, it is also true, and that is driving the trade deficit in the long run, that there are things 
happening in international trade itself which feed back to saving and investment. So the influences 
go both ways.” 
                                                 
21 Dougherty (1992) showed in a qualitative case study of five firms how different “thought worlds” 
inhibit expertise to be synthesized across departmental boarders in the context of product develop-
ment. “Thought worlds” differed not only in relation to what things these people know, but how they 
know them. Each “thought world” has different systems of meaning and people of the different 
“thought worlds” interpret the same information differently as well as select different information as 
important. Similarly, Carlile (2002) describes the differences in orientation and perspective between 
different functional departments in terms of the ends pursued and the objects used in their practices. 
He claims that the sales work aims at “getting the numbers right”, the design engineering at “getting 
the prototype to pass spec”, the manufacturing engineering work at “building a high-volume ma-
chine”, and the production work at “getting product out the door” (Carlile, 2002: 449).  
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While the expert often sees an issue to be interwoven with multiple other variables 
and to be entrenched in various feedback loops, the decision maker looks for “clear-
cutting answers even where there really aren’t any.” (P. Orszag). 
This difference in orientation can be beneficial both for the decision makers and for 
the experts. Decision makers’ discourse is nurtured by richer thinking and additional evi-
dence, which allows them to open up to new perspectives. On the other hand, experts risk 
less to fall into the “paralysis by analysis”-syndrome. Yet, if this difference in orientation 
is very pronounced, both experts and decision makers will interpret information differ-
ently and they will possibly not understand each other and only poorly know how to 
benefit from the other’s perspective. At the end of the day, the decision makers have to 
take a decision and cannot make use of too much ‘it depends’. On the level of the message 
of communication (see: Figure 12), this implies that the expert has to find an ‘in-between 
complexity’, an aspect, which, as we have outlined earlier on, is particularly important 
during the ‘convey insights, suggestions, & solutions’-phase.  
In the three case studies, various other differences in mental orientations appeared. 
In the case of pom+, for example, consultants reflect on issues on a more theoretical, 
methodological, and procedural level while their clients are much more practically ori-
ented. Clients often are skeptical about this theoretical approach and see it as discon-
nected from their practical problems.  
“Sometimes, our approach is a little bit too theoretical for certain people. The theoretical path - 
that we need for the development of a concrete procedure – is for some people too long and too 
burdensome. (..) Most of the times I am responsive to the client’s whish that I become more con-
crete. Then things start to go upside-down and become chaotic until the client realizes that the 
theoretical and methodological had its advantage” (N. Merkt). 
Another difference is that pom+’s consultants are oriented towards providing com-
prehensive, integrated solutions, while clients are often mainly interested in finding quick 
fixes and ready-made solutions.  
“The client had the very strong idea that I would present a ready-made solution that he then could 
simply implement. I did not present such a ready-made solution because it did not exist.” (S. Am-
sler) 
While these differences in perspectives are functional for the expert-decision maker 
interaction, the challenge is to find a sufficient common ground so that experts and deci-
sion makers can benefit from their diverging orientations. During one of the interviews for 
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the case studies, an IT-manager of InSure draws two ovals with a very small intersection 
area and makes this central comment:  
“It is most important that the two sections are not completely disjoint. Intersections are needed and 
the one has to know something from the other and vice versa. If the knowledge and context are 
completely different, the translation work is huge. On the other hand, if the intersection is too 
large, one or the other is superfluous. (..) The intersection of the two understandings of the piece of 
information is so relatively small and this is really the central point”.  
Experts and decision makers have to identify this intersection and build on in it in 
order to further increase it. If experts and decision makers pursue a common overall goal, 
for example, they already share a very important common ground22. At InSure, the busi-
ness line and the IT have a strong shared interest: the business unit can only work with 
well functioning IT-applications and the IT can only work in collaboration with the busi-
ness unit. Further developing the existing common ground does not imply that the knowl-
edge differences between experts and decision makers are deemed to be eliminated. Quite 
to the contrary, it is important to stand for one’s own perspective, to keep the differences 
in orientation, but try to make one’s own perspective accessible and interesting to the vis-
à-vis.  
In sum, a major challenge in the expert-decision maker interaction consists in finding 
the right balance within the concomitant polar needs for specialization and common 
ground. In the case of InSure, for example, specialized knowledge and skills are necessary 
to inform and implement a decision regarding an IT-application. Yet, in view of the impli-
cations of these decisions on the workflows and processes of the business line, the business 
line needs to be in power of the decision making. In this way, there is a need to function-
ally separate expertise and decision power. On the other hand, IT-experts and the decision 
makers from the business line must share some common ground in order to have a suffi-
cient understanding of each other’s language, perspective, and mode of reasoning, and 
ultimately be able to integrate it in decision making. 
Many of the practices we will discuss later on provide means to bridge the differ-
ences in perspectives and to establish the sufficient common ground that is necessary for a 
shared understanding. 
                                                 
22 Carlile (2004) shows that knowledge integration is more challenging if not only meaning has to be 
translated across the knowledge boundary (semantic boundaries), but also interests have to be negoti-
ated (pragmatic boundaries).  
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Time Pressure 
A final challenge we have found throughout the three case studies is the ever grow-
ing time pressure. We can attribute it to the outer context of the proposed framework.  
Time is a very important contextual constraint of the expert-decision maker interac-
tion as it is, in the first place, a core reason why decision makers build on experts’ knowl-
edge. When describing the “articulate need”-phase for the three cases, we have mentioned 
that decision makers even do not have (or want to take) the time to explain experts in 
detail what their problems are and what types of solutions they envision. We have also 
referred to practices that indirectly respond to the increased time pressure: information 
scaling and pushing standard structures. We have further discussed the issue that they 
have to release a piece of information in ever shorter time cycles. Brookings for example 
has to publish their articles much quicker than they used to and it has to time its research 
more narrowly along the policy making process. At InSure, certain adjustments within the 
IT-application have to be completed within one day, as an IT-technician explains: 
 “We all have to react very quickly. For example, interest rates for tender offers. They used to be 
adjusted once a year or every second year and we had three to four months for the decision process. 
Today, we have to decide within one day.”   
Time for communication is often very limited, since contextual information is often 
left away, as this IT-manager mentions: 
“I only give minimal information. I don’t have the time to educate the people profusely and as in-
depth as I would like. This is another problematic point. (..) I just say what the task is and briefly 
explain the larger context, but just what is absolutely necessary.” 
For experts, it would be important to receive such contextual information so that 
they can better engage in sense-making and understand the reasons behind a certain re-
quest or estimate the potential implications of their recommendations. 
The discussion of the general, phase-unspecific challenges has shown that three ma-
jor communicative challenges obstacle the successful integration of knowledge between 
experts and decision makers.  
First, how can experts and decision makers build the necessary common ground 
among them to benefit from their different perspectives, but manage to gain a common 
understanding and not be troubled with too many implicit misunderstandings? It is inher-
ent in the expert-decision maker situation that they build on a different ground and it is 
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functional for their collaboration, yet too little common ground implies too much transla-
tion work and impedes a common understanding.  
The second major challenge is how they can establish jointly the big picture of the is-
sue and understand it on an accurate level of detail or abstraction. We have argued that 
while this challenge is related to cognitive issues, such as systemic thinking, it is mainly 
related to the communicative process like, for example, how people draw explicit relation-
ships between one and another contribution and do not get lost in detailed “lateral” dis-
cussions.  
Third, we have shown that relational challenges grow from the knowledge gap and 
from the hierarchical distance that often reigns in the expert-decision maker constellation.  
Structuring this discussion with the knowledge conversation framework helped us 
single out how the challenges relate to each other. We could show more precisely, for ex-
ample, how the different discourse patterns relate to differences in perspectives and lack of 
common ground. In the next section, we will present the most important practices in 
which experts engage recurrently in the three cases that allow them to address these chal-
lenges and to effectively communicative knowledge across its boundaries. 
5.2 General Practices in the Knowledge Communication be-
tween Experts and Decision Makers 
Manifold practices have recurrently become evident in the three case studies, which 
apply not only to a single phase in the knowledge communication process, but which are 
of a more general nature. Rather than discussing all of them, we refer the reader to the 
single case studies in the Appendices 1, 3, 5 and discuss only two meta-practices that sub-
sume many of them. These meta-practices do not reflect only the findings from the purely 
inductive research of the case studies, but have been discussed in previous research (Arias 
& Fischer, 2000; Bechky, 2003; Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; Carlile, 2002, 2004; Koskinen, 
2005; Star, 1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989; Wenger, 1998). While these conceptualizations 
helped us structure the phase-independent practices ex-post, the elaboration of the chal-
lenges nevertheless followed a very inductive approach. We therefore remain, also in their 
descriptions, very close to the case study work. When presenting the practices, we aim to 
show how they address the communicative challenges we have discussed for the expert-
decision maker interaction. 
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The first meta-practice is the use of boundary objects, which aims to overcome the 
knowledge boundaries between experts and decision makers. Thanks to the use of bound-
ary objects, experts and decision makers can bridge their two knowledge domains and 
create a shared understanding across the boundary.  
The second practice aims to transform boundaries by boundary-spanning processes 
(brokering and boundary encounters), which turn the knowledge boundaries more flexi-
ble, elastic, and permeable. Rather than bridging two knowledge domains, and with this 
also signaling the distinctness of the two, this second meta-practice leads to an interlock-
ing of two domains.  
In the following, we will discuss the two meta-practices in detail.  
5.2.1 Using Boundary Objects 
Star and Griesemer (1989: 393) coined the term ‘boundary objects’ and defined 
them as flexible epistemic artefacts that ‘inhabit several intersecting social worlds and 
satisfy the information requirements of each of them’. They are flexible in so far as they 
can have different meanings in different communities, professional groups, departments, 
etc., yet their structure is common to all these groups so that they are recognizable to them 
and can serve as a means of translation.  
Boundary objects are “weakly structured in common use, and become strongly 
structured in individual use” (Star & Griesemer, 1989: 393). Their general abstract struc-
ture allows various groups to adapt the object to their local needs. On a geographical 
map, for example, various expert collaborators of a zoology museum (e.g. conservationists 
and biologists) can mark their very different domain specific information (e.g. campsites, 
trails vs. ecological ‘life zones’) (Star & Griesemer, 1989: 411). The shared basis of the 
map (e.g. the common conventions) helps the two professional groups to interact and cre-
ate a common understanding. The map is a relatively flexible structure, on which one can 
position the most various domain specific knowledge (logistical systems, war strategies, 
etc.). With this domain specific knowledge positioned on the map, it becomes a specific 
and strongly structured object. A Gantt-chart, to provide another example, shows a rela-
tively loose structure and arranges time information on the x-axis and activities on the y-
axis. A project manager who uses the visual tool to plan a project together with his team, 
places various information along the two axes and creates a much more concrete and 
strongly structured object. An auditor uses the same structure and adds information items 
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specific to his interests, requirements, and domain of expertise. An expert who communi-
cates his domain specific knowledge through the boundary object has to adapt to its loose, 
but standardized and common structure and, in this way, is guided to communicate at a 
level of complexity and in a language that is comprehensible to the other side of the 
knowledge boundary.  
In order to reach a shared understanding across knowledge boundaries, it is impor-
tant that the various groups become aware of the differences in understanding, perspec-
tives, and approaches. In fact, by providing a loose, but shared structure and a possibility 
to adapt it to the local needs of the various groups, the boundary object provides a means 
“for individuals to specify and learn about their differences and dependencies across a 
given boundary” (Carlile, 2002: 452). Boland and Tenkasi argue that when communica-
tors do rich representations of their understandings, they can then more easily engage in 
the perspectives and understandings of others. In this way, boundary objects facilitate 
perspective taking (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995). 
Boundary objects can be ordered in four categories, as proposed by Star (1989)and 
later Carlile (2002): 1. repositories (e.g. client database), which are adaptable locally as 
different groups can extract information pertinent to their domain; 2. standardized forms 
and methods (e.g. shared approach for problem solving, for assuring quality standards), 
which are relatively abstract structures that help to elicit, document, and organize local 
knowledge; 3. objects or models (e.g. sketches, assembly drawings, mock-ups), which are 
developed in specific loci of practice and carry both local meaning, but also meaning that 
is shared across knowledge boundaries; and finally, 4. maps of boundaries (e.g. workflow 
matrices, process maps, Gantt charts), which help to clarify dependencies and boundaries 
among various groups.  
Boundary objects can be created collaboratively by representatives from both sides 
of the knowledge boundary or they can be created unilaterally by one side and then be 
communicated to the other (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995). In both cases, it is in combination 
with the communication that structures around these objects (and not the objects alone) 
that allows for a shared understanding across the knowledge boundary. Wenger argues, 
similarly, that both ‘reification’ and ‘participation’ are needed to make learning across 
knowledge boundaries possible. Boundary objects serve for reification, for holding down 
something and therewith, as we have discussed earlier, make differences in perspectives 
apparent. Yet, reification is also functional for coordination if the constituencies work in 
temporarily displaced areas and interact unilaterally with the object: in claims processing, 
for example, Wenger showed how the people who process the due payments of medical 
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services do not have to understand, on a content level, what the provided information on 
the medical services mean. Thanks to reification through standard forms, contracts, and 
procedures, this transition of the different types of information process takes place 
smoothly without the need of a common understanding (Wenger, 1998: 106). This implies 
also that reification alone does not lead to a common understanding, but serves to manage 
intersections. Yet, only if combined with participation – like co-located, face-to-face con-
versations or working together – interactive negotiations of meanings can take place and a 
common, coordinated, and generative meaning can be developed. For the context of the 
expert-decision maker interaction, it is this second form of the use of boundary objects, 
which is of highest importance. The interaction between experts and decision makers aims 
to create a shared understanding and integrate the experts’ knowledge in a meaningful 
way in the decision making process. Therefore, reification and participation have to be 
combined and interactive talk has to structure around the boundary objects. In the forth-
coming examples from the three case studies, we will show at various instances that the 
practices of developing and using boundary objects call for the practice of engaging in 
boundary-spanning activities. 
Throughout the three cases, boundary objects of various forms are used to mediate 
meanings between experts and decision makers and to coordinate their interactions. We 
give examples of the use of boundary objects such as glossaries, standardized forms, 
shared methods, visuals, information technology artefacts, and metaphors. We discuss 
how these objects take over the function of boundary objects and we will therefore both 
refer to the defining characteristics of boundary objects as discussed in the literature (cre-
ate awareness of differences in understandings and of the dependencies across knowledge 
boundaries; provide abstract and loose structures that become concrete and highly struc-
tured in their specific instantiations) as well as to the major communicative challenges we 
have elaborated in this cross-case analysis (overcome the lack of the big picture and of 
common ground and manage to deal with conflict constructively). In this discussion, we 
will particularly argue for the importance of combining boundary objects with flexible 
forms of communication, such as co-located, face-to-face conversations.  
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Glossary: Discover Differences in Understandings and Negotiate, Document, and 
Refer to Agreed Understanding  
In the case of InSure, IT teams maintain glossaries with definitions of terms that are 
related to the team’s area of expertise and that they make accessible to decision makers on 
the intranet or within reports. In this way, they want to counteract the frequent implicit 
misunderstandings of terms that were often only uncovered late in a project process and 
led to expensive project readjustments and delays. The head of the workflow team states: 
„We started to do a glossary to define the concepts with which we work so that everybody who 
works with us knows what we conceive of a ‘task’, a ‘process’, or a ‘work step’. It is important that 
our interaction partners share the same understanding and speak the same language.” 
 
Access layer of data
Application with 
pop-up window for 
user
Administration 
console
Administration-console
An administration-console is a dialogue, which 
enables selected people to change the central 
services.
From a technical perspective, the access mode 
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of an application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Excerpt of the Glossary of a Preparatory Study for an IT Application 
Project at InSure: the Verbal Definition is Supported by a Visual Il-
lustration  
(translation from German by the author) 
 
The definition of a term in a glossary often has to be negotiated between experts and 
decision makers and is not simply imposed by the experts or the decision makers. The 
institution of the glossary invites both sides to make their understandings explicit, to dis-
cover differences in understandings, and to negotiate meanings. Knowing of the impor-
tance of these shared definitions, InSure’s IT-experts note them also in their preparatory 
studies. For more complex concepts, verbal definitions are accompanied by visual illustra-
tions as can be seen in Figure 13. Such visuals give verbal definitions a more tangible 
character and incite concrete visual imagination. The tangible quality helps to understand 
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a term on a more concrete level and facilitates the reasoning about the concrete implica-
tions of an issue23. 
Standardized Forms: Align Complex, Idiosyncratic Knowledge to a Loose Common 
Structure to Represent it with the Right In-between Complexity 
Another boundary object that helps translate meanings across knowledge boundaries 
are standardized forms. At InSure, experts and decision makers also have institutionalized 
standardized forms that serve as boundary objects among them and make differences in 
understandings visible. For the ordinary requests, there are simple standardized forms 
through which the managers from the business line communicate their needs to the IT-
specialists and through which the IT-experts note down the technical specifications of an 
application. Wenger notes that such forms lead to a “standardized reification”, which 
serves as a coordination mechanism between various practices and constituencies without 
requiring a specific shared practice (Wenger, 1998: 106-107). The coordination between 
experts and decision makers becomes easier because standardization improves the consis-
tency and persistency of the communication (Bregman & Haythornthwaite, 2001) and 
lowers the risk of misunderstandings. The same conventions, labels, and structures are 
used both by the IT-experts and the managers from the business side and throughout the 
various projects. Such standardized forms facilitate both the recognition of a type of in-
formation across the knowledge boundary and the possibility to reuse it persistently. A 
negative consequence, however, is that the more formalization is imposed, the less one has 
the possibility to express the full complexity of an issue as one IT-technician with regard 
to the intersection between IT-technicians and IT-managers mentions:  
“It is often difficult to convey the entire complexity of an application when writing down the de-
tailed specification. The designer who works on the basis of these detailed requirements might not 
understand them fully and we have to discuss the issue again.”  
In this way, the structure provided by the boundary object can result too rigid for 
the expert who struggles to faithfully delineate the complexity of an issue. On the other 
side of the knowledge boundary, the object then results too abstract to make sense of it. 
                                                 
23 Bechky (2003: 324) argued that tangibility is an important aspect of boundary objects. In the context 
of her study, working machines served as meaningful “tangible definitions” for engineers as they are 
embedded in the physical locus of practice of the assemblers. They can be touched and their meaning 
is very concrete and does not depend on verbal language. In this way, the tangibility of the machine 
helped assemblers to understand the concrete implications of the abstract concepts and designs of the 
engineer. 
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Therefore, it is important that the structure of the standardized form is loose enough to 
allow the expert to represent his knowledge on an adequate level of in-between-
complexity so that he/she can represent his/her idiosyncratic knowledge with a structure 
that still allows for faithfully displaying the complexity of the issue, but that is – at the 
same time – remaining accessible to the decision maker. In the cases examined, we can see 
that the standardized form alone cannot function as a boundary object, but has to be 
combined with “participation” and face-to-face interactions (Wenger, 1998). In the case 
of InSure, standardized forms are combined with more flexible forms of communication 
and IT-managers engage in face-to-face conversations with their IT-technicians in order 
for the latter to be able to fill in the standardized forms of the technical requirements. 
Only this combination of fluid interactions around standardized forms allows for an effec-
tive translation of meanings. The standardized forms leave trace of a persistent knowledge 
and that then has to be flexibly contextualized and specified through conversations.  
This aspect of the need to combine standardized forms with flexible forms of com-
munication comes out even more clearly in another example of InSure: it is the case of the 
‘business concept’ and its transformation into the ‘technical concept’. Here again the 
boundary object is best able to translate meanings across knowledge boundaries if it is 
combined with very flexible forms of communication. We have described the interactive 
process through which the IT-experts and the business managers gradually reach a shared 
understanding of an ever more specific request (see: ‘articulate need’ phase). Following 
several workshops and meetings, the business line puts down its request in writing in the 
so-called “business concept” (‘reification’). The experts then do a first analysis on this 
basis and write the “technical concept”. Both the business concept and the technical con-
cept can be understood as boundary objects. They are standard documents that keep track 
of the differences in perspectives (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995) – one from the business, the 
other from the IT point of view – and allow for the ‘translation of meaning’ (Carlile, 
2004) in both directions (towards the business and the IT side). In this case, one boundary 
object alone (one standard concept) would not have been sufficient for the transformation 
of knowledge. IT-experts and the managers need to engage in a very interactive communi-
cation process that is structures around two boundary objects. Meetings with the IT and 
the business team, interviews with single managers from the business side and interactive 
workshops are the most important elements of this communication. The combination of 
boundary objects and flexible and interactive communication processes based on face-to-
face conversations fosters precision, reification, and holding down as well as flexibility 
and alignment. The communication around the boundary object is necessary, to external-
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ize implicit knowledge on the one side of the knowledge boundary, and, to concretize it in 
the specific context on the other side of the boundary.  
Shared Methods: Convey own Knowledge through an Abstract Form that Can be 
Filled with Concrete, Implicit Knowledge 
A more complex and abstract boundary object than glossaries and standardized 
forms are shared methods. Methods often receive tangible forms in visual representations 
(and therewith have an object character). In view of their loose, abstract structure that can 
be instantiated and filled with concrete, contextual knowledge, we view it as another im-
portant boundary object between experts and decision makers. At pom+, a shared method 
among the consultants and the decision makers at the client side is one of the key elements 
they use to try to translate and integrate the knowledge of the experts into the decision 
context of the client. Methods regard, for example, approaches for quality management 
(i.e. how to assure the quality of a certain process) or for facility management (i.e. how to 
move from the analysis of the problem to the development of the solution, and to its ap-
plication). A consultant outlines regarding this: 
“Often, we guide the client on a methodological level and not so much on technical aspects. We 
have a moderation task and mainly provide the client with methodological knowledge. Also (..) 
during the as-is analysis, in which we need the information from the client, we give away methodo-
logical knowledge” (R. Baumann) 
The method permits pom+ to systematically use the client as a source of knowledge:  
“There exists a lot of internal knowledge already. In part, it is only a matter of opening up a prob-
lem and better structuring the knowledge” (B. Buser). 
The method has an integrating function because it allows the consultants of pom+ to 
elicit the client’s knowledge that is embedded in practice, to embed this knowledge in a 
more general structure and to combine it with the more abstract and theoretical knowl-
edge of the consultant. From the perspective of the client, the method provides a structure 
into which he/she can model his/her problems. The method avoids loosing sight of the 
goal and allows to view the big picture, although it cannot yet be envisioned upfront. 
Only by working with the method and eliciting the contextual knowledge, the big picture 
– the interplay of abstract and concrete information – can be obtained, but the method 
provides a meaningful structure for bringing together various types of concrete knowledge 
and perspectives. The common method also fosters the creation of sufficient common 
ground as it represents a shared platform thanks to which the consultant can grasp the 
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clients’ practices and concerns and the client, on his side, sees a direct application in his 
context of the consultants’ ideas and knowledge.  
As is the case for standard forms, also a method can impose rigidity. The client of 
pom+ might perceive its structure as too inflexible if the consultant is not responsive 
enough to his particular case or that he is just making issues much more complex than 
they actually are. Therefore the reification provided by the boundary object always has to 
be combined with participation. Analogous to what we have mentioned previously, it is 
not the boundary object alone, it is the combination of the object and the communication 
that is structured around it, which is most important so that expert knowledge can be 
integrated in decision making, as this final quote illustrates:  
 “I do not start by imprinting someone certain methods. I use them only in the background, to get 
to know what is important. (..) One needs an approach also so that the client knows the aim of the 
journey. (..) I first let the people talk and ask some questions. The disadvantage of this approach is 
that it needs a lot of time. But it also creates the trust that one listens and tries to understand“ (C. 
Kaufmann).  
 
Visuals: Foster Common Understanding and Recall 
According to Star and Griesemer (1989) and to Carlile (2002, 2004), drawings, 
sketches, prototypes, models, and all sort of two or three dimensional visualizations can 
also take the function of boundary objects. Throughout the three case studies, but particu-
larly in the cases of pom+ and InSure, we have found support for his argument and have 
seen that visuals serve as a major boundary object in the expert-decision maker interac-
tion. The use of visuals is a particularly rich tool to address a whole set of communicative 
challenges, which we have discussed earlier: visuals provide a form for representing in-
between-complexity (conciseness-completeness), for developing a common ground, for 
gaining the big picture, and dealing with conflict more constructively. By outlining these 
functions of visual boundary objects, we would like to contribute to the discourse on the 
role of visuals in the communication across knowledge boundaries.  
During oral communications (e.g. meetings, one-to-one conversations, presenta-
tions), experts of all three case studies engage in ad-hoc sketching on flipcharts, sheets of 
papers, and whiteboards. They use slideshows to project not only tables and analytic fig-
ures, but also photographs and other (often metaphoric) visual representations. They 
work with visual software for brainstorming and structuring thoughts like, for example, 
the MindManager tool. In their written communications (such as in reports, articles, etc.) 
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experts also increasingly use visual forms to represent information, for example, to pro-
vide overviews and present summaries.  
A first benefit of visuals is that they provide an additional language for conveying 
and understanding the often complex issues. This visual language needs to build on gener-
ally accepted conventions and asks for conciseness and simplicity. In this way, it facilitates 
the bridging of strong knowledge asymmetries that exist across knowledge boarders. A 
consultant of pom+ mentions with regard to this:  
”I often use images, symbols, or pictograms. Everybody understands a pictogram, it is universally 
understandable. For clients, I usually work with simple pictograms that do not need superfluous in-
formation” (N. Merkt). 
Figure 14 shows an example of a visualization of pom+ that works with such pictograms 
and symbols. 
 
Figure 14: Visualization is Used to Reduce the Complexity of the Content and to 
Expand the Existing Common Ground (Example of pom+, which Shows 
Pictograms that Refer to (Metaphoric) Language that is Understandable 
Across Knowledge Boundaries) 
 
The visual language provides additional elements that facilitate the development of a 
sufficient common ground among the experts and the decision makers. Earlier, in the sec-
tion on the communicative challenges, we have found that, because of the experts and 
decision makers’ distinct perspectives and lack of common ground, they often use lan-
guage rather differently and have problems of misunderstandings. By supporting talk with 
instant sketching and drawing, a tangible, persistent trace of the conversation is developed 
to which the interlocutors can refer (enhanced co-presence) and thanks to which they can 
review the evolving arguments (enhanced reviewability). Co-presence and reviewability are 
both central arguments in establishing a common ground among conversation partners 
(Clark & Brennan, 1991) (for a detailed on this point, see: Chapter 5). The reference to 
the visual does not only take place by someone pointing at the object, the visual can also 
become incorporated into the language itself. A consultant of pom+ recalls: 
”For presentations, I work with colors. One alternative gets colored in blue, the other in green, etc. 
The client often starts to talk in these colors” (S. Jäggi).  
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The common ground is enhanced also because by visually fixing down a certain un-
derstanding, the conversation partners might discover differences in understandings and 
only by understanding these differences they can engage in developing a more solid shared 
understanding.  
Thanks to the visual, an abstract concept, which is difficult to communicate in 
words, receives a very concrete quality (a visual form, a color), to which the communica-
tion partners can more easily refer. In this way, the concrete visual language can be incor-
porated into the verbal language and give this latter a more concrete quality as well.  
Figure 15 shows a particular type of organigram of pom+ outlining its core processes 
and areas of activity (in green), the support processes or functional structure (in red) and 
the management processes (in grey). It is a typical type of visualization that helps the client 
to gain a more tangible idea of what pom+’s main activities are (it is less abstract as it has 
a visual reality).  
 
Figure 15: Visualization Makes Processes and Areas of Activity More Tangible (E-
xample of pom+ Showing an Extended Organigram) 
 
An additional quality of Figure 15 is that the visual representation incites meta-
phoric allusions and therewith confers certain qualities from the source (or vehicle) do-
main of the metaphor to the conceptual domain (or tenor) (Inns, 2002). The image re-
minds us of a football court. In this way, the visual transports certain qualities of a soccer 
game to the corporation pom+ and the services it provides. This can be, for example, a 
high commitment, enthusiasm and fun, team spirit. The metaphor further enhances the 
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development of common ground among experts and decision makers as the ‘vehicle’ of the 
metaphor (Inns, 2002) (e.g. football) refers to a world that is known to both experts and 
decision makers. The following two quotes – the first of an IT-technician of InSure and 
the second of a consultant of pom+ - both show that metaphors activate the interlocutors’ 
imagination when making sense of an issue.  
“I often need metaphors or images so that one can better envisage what I am talking about. Also, 
my thinking is oftentimes visual and in front of my inner eye, I see loops that twinkle shortly.” 
“Whatever I want to convey, I try to relate it with associations. One creates another access than if 
one came up with big theories or analyses. (..) In this way, the client can imagine the aspect visually 
and he often becomes more open to the issue” (N. Merkt). 
By working with visual associations, the information not only receives a more con-
crete quality, but it also becomes anchored in a context that is familiar to the addressee.  
„Rather than representing a time chart in a rather vacuous way, I mix it up and relate the single 
milestones with images. For instance, you then know to drive in a subway and get off at a mile-
stone. Another track can represent another part of a project. I remember another instance when 
someone explained something with LEGO bricks. One LEGO brick represented a module and with 
modules one could say what one needed and we then assembled the various modules “ (N. Merkt). 
All experts and decision makers know underground maps or have played with 
LEGO bricks. The experts can explain something that is new and complex for the decision 
makers in analogy to the already known and familiar domain.  
A final illustration of how metaphoric visuals can be used in the knowledge commu-
nication between experts and decision makers is the case of the “Alinghi”. The largest part 
of the Swiss population remembers with pride that the Swiss “Alinghi” sailing boat won 
the America’s Cup’s in 2003. Working with this image, pom+’s consultants refer to a 
shared national experience and use what they and their clients share in common ground 
even if they do not know each other yet and even if their perspectives might be very dis-
tant. In addition, the boat metaphor (“we are all in the same boat”) can be instrumental in 
addressing sensitive issues like group solidarity and spirit when faced with uncomfortable 
change. The “Alinghi”-image frames the issue from a positive perspective and helps to get 
the client “in the boat” for the project. 
Visual representations give communicators the possibility to express the essence of 
an issue in a very concise way and help to express an issue on an adequate level of in-
between-complexity and to gain the big picture. Figure 16 shows an example such a visual 
summary. 
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Figure 16: Visualization Used to Provide a Summary (Example of InSure, with which 
IT-specialists Aim to Give an Overview on the IT-Applications and on the 
Technical Process that is Needed for the Calculation of Interests) 
(Translated from German) 
The integration of text and image can be rather poor, as is the case for an example 
from InSure (see: Figure 16). The arrangement of the six written elements around the star 
does not particularly facilitate understanding. Nevertheless, the managers from the busi-
ness side that were exposed to this information might more easily remember that there 
were six IT-measures as the star shows six edges, or he/she might be left unconsciously 
with the impression that the proposed solution is a “star”-solution. We will come back to 
this mnemonic function of visuals later on. 
Figure 17 shows another example, in which the integration between written text and 
visual elements are more closely interlinked.   
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An IT-manager of InSure comments Figure 17 as follows: 
Figure 17: Visualization Used to Provide Overview (Example of InSure, with which 
IT-specialists Aim to Give an Overview of the IT-Applications and of the 
Technical Process that is Needed for the Calculation of Interests 
(real desig ations changed) 
“That is why I have brought to you this [a poster, see: Figure 17] as a possible idea on how to dis-
cuss and elaborate a topic with the help of a graphical object. It shows interests that have to be dis-
tributed quickly. There is a location, where the interest rates are defined. One makes a fixed pack-
age and distributes it all over. It is the case that everybody has to test these when one incorporates 
the package in the application. Nobody had the overall picture of the sum of the places to where 
the package was distributed. That is why we elaborated this figure and it shows all that is needed in 
order to change the interest rates within one day. This representation turned to be a powerful 
communication instrument, first to elaborate the issue, but now also to communicate with the 
business line. Before, there were so many misunderstandings around this process and with a good 
figure you can really achieve a lot. And as we have such a limited space and time for our communi-
cations, the way we package our information is really central”.   
The quote illustrates that the elaboration of a visual both helps to gain the big pic-
ture (among the different IT-teams) as well as to convey and sustain it (when communicat-
ing to the business line). Without the visual, the different IT-teams did not fully under-
stand which communication processes among the various elements of the architecture are 
needed to change the interest rates within a day’s time. The visual provides this big picture 
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and makes the IT-teams comprehend which role the single IT-applications play within the 
overall IT architecture. In this way, each IT-team makes its own sense of the visual as it is 
mainly interested in how its own IT-application (for which it is responsible) is related to 
the overall system. The visual allows for different meanings in the different contexts, yet 
its overall structure provides means for coordination and translation. However, the ques-
tion is whether the visual helps to bridge the knowledge boundary between the IT and the 
business department and provides a structure that is meaningful to both experts and deci-
sion makers. In fact, one other IT-manager is skeptical on regard: “In my experience, this 
representation is too technical and complex for the business line.” 
Not only static and finished visuals help to gain and maintain the big picture. 
Equally important are visuals that develop steadily by the evolving of a conversation or 
meeting.  
„In our meetings, I sometimes use the ‘MindManager’ tool and this works very well. One is con-
cerned more with developing ideas rather than dealing with technical details”.  
The evolving, collaborative visualization helps to stay on the more conceptual level 
of the discourse and not get lost in a too detailed discussion on technology. In this way, 
with the support of the visual tool24, it seems that the risk of loosing the big picture and of 
getting lost in a sea of technical details is lowered. Keeping track of the main arguments 
that are made during a discussion further serves to make comparisons and to better under-
stand differences. Stefan Jäggi illustrates this point: “The idea is to retain what is discussed 
in order to put the different aspects in relation to each other.” In this way, non-sequential 
processing of information becomes possible. 
As a consequence, interrelationships, but also differences in perspectives become ap-
parent. This is important not only to gain the big picture, but also to deal with conflict in 
a more constructive way, as this quote of a consultant of pom+ shows.  
“Once I was in a meeting, in which a conflict arose and I did not know how to react. Fortunately, 
someone else was there, he went to the flipchart and laid out who said what and which relations 
existed. This deeply impressed me since one could see that they said the same thing, but expressed it 
differently. As a matter of fact, both wanted to go along the same way, towards the same goal, just 
that the one a little bit slower than the other” (N. Merkt). 
                                                 
24 As the visualization effort here is supported by a software tool, the visualization can be more flexibly 
handled: “I always have the chance to develop the mindmap exactly in the direction, where I then 
don’t find any more space on the paper or flipchart. This is why I very much like such tools“ („Ich ha-
be immer genau das Glück, das Mindmap in die Richtung zu entwickeln, wo ich dann auf dem Blatt 
oder Flipchart kein Platz mehr habe. Deswegen kommen mir solche Tools sehr gelegen.“)  
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Figures 18 shows an example of a visualization that designates and clarifies differ-
ences in perspectives. It is a central function of boundary objects to make differences ap-
parent because only by being aware of the differences in perspective, can experts and deci-
sion makers reach a shared understanding and uncover otherwise implicit misunderstand-
ings (see also: Carlile, 2002). Outlining differences visually also helps to deal with conflict 
more constructively. Communication partners can better comprehend the logic of the di-
vergent view and do not simply perceive it as “wrong” or as the personal opinion of the 
vis-à-vis. 
 
 
Figure 18: Visualization Used to Outline Differences in Perspectives (Example 
Drawn from pom+ Showing the Commercial, Geographical (Physical), 
and the Maintenance Points of View on a Real Estate Object) 
 
Visualizations are further instrumental for integrating knowledge across boundaries 
because they activate collaboration.  
“I have realized over and over again that whenever someone in a meeting starts drawing an image, 
on a writing pad or anywhere, then people start talking around this drawing. It really helps to iso-
late the important aspects and to concretize the conversation topic”.  
Not all types of visualizations foster collaboration in the same way. Spontaneous 
paper and pencil sketching is often preferable than well designed PowerPoint slides. The 
latter visually communicates that the image is already completed for that an active col-
laboration and a joint development of an issue is hindered. 
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“I believe that it does not have to be such super ingenious PowerPoint presentations. It can equally 
be a flipchart and four colors. There, you can draw gradually and you can also cross something 
out. I believe that this is more important to develop something. It incites everybody to collaborate 
actively. If I just show a slide and ask: ’Do you agree with that?’, then everybody says: ‘yes, yes.’” 
Visualization not only serve for developing a shared understanding across knowl-
edge boundaries (establishing a common ground, gaining and sustaining a big picture, 
activate collaboration, and deal with conflict in a constructive ways), it also helps as a 
mnemonic device so that the communicated information can be recalled later on and be 
activated during decision making. In part, visuals can serve as a concise documentation of 
a conversation, of a main idea that emerged in a discussion, or of a written document (see: 
Figure 16). At InSure, this was mentioned by several interviewees as an established prac-
tice: “I often ask people at the end of a meeting to bring me the next time a sketch of this 
specific aspect we elaborated today.” Yet, apart from documenting through visuals, 
visuals that are used in face-to-face or written communication are often those elements, 
which are remembered later on. An IT-manager of InSure illustrates this point:  
“When I use visualizations, it is often not the topic, but the image, a mental anchor, which is refer-
enced in a conversation. ‘You showed there an image, didn’t you?’ and therewith, the people mean 
a whole topic. (..) Once I tried to show the complexity of our business, which exists because of the 
variety of products and sales channels we have. I first showed a surface area of one color and said: 
‘this is our business seen from far’. Then I have started to show distinctions and divided the area 
ever further in colored sub-areas. In the end, this became a very heterogeneous patchwork. (..) This 
image very much impressed the people and became a fixed reference point.” 
An image can be more easily remembered than an abstract and complex idea25. In 
addition, the interaction with a visual often implicates also an emotional involvement, 
which fosters an increase of the mnemonic capacity of the people seeing it. Finally, also 
the facilitated active participation leads to a better remembering of the issues. Facilitating 
the recall of an information item is an important aspect when decision makers not only 
have to understand expert information, but also have to activate these insights when actu-
ally taking the decision. 
                                                 
25 The mnemonic capacity is enhanced both if people need to engage into a deep semantic processing or 
if they are involved emotionally. Images have both qualities. See also Pavio’s (1971, 1986) argumenta-
tion on visual imagery where he claims that remembrances from images (in relation to verbal text) are 
more rapid, happen more holistically and allow for freer associations (an image “offers a complex set 
of spatial arrangements at a glance, showing both the object and its relationship to its surrounding” 
(Opdahl, 2002: 47)) 
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To conclude, we have shown that visuals serve as an important boundary object in 
the knowledge communication between experts and decision makers. First, they are in-
strumental in order to develop a shared understanding between experts and decision mak-
ers and to integrate the knowledge from the individual to the group level. In particular, we 
have shown that using visuals has positive impacts on several of the main challenges of the 
knowledge communication between experts and decision makers: visuals facilitate the 
creation of a common ground, they help to gain and sustain the big picture of a conversa-
tion, they support a more constructive handling of conflict, and finally, they incite col-
laboration.  
When describing the other boundary objects used by the experts and decision mak-
ers of the three case studies, we have stated that the objects alone would not be sufficient 
to integrate expert knowledge in decision making. The same is true also for visuals. 
Visuals often are polisemic and ambiguous and allow for various interpretations. A visual 
alone is also often difficult to understand as it only provides very synthetic information. In 
fact, an “unaccompanied” visual can result as “empty air” as an IT-manager of InSure 
calls it. He further outlines: 
“One goes to the flipchart and starts drawing boxes, arrows... But behind each symbol one draws 
there is also a semantic. And this semantic is not standardized, each one interprets an arrow a little 
bit differently. I have two systems, system A and system B and I draw an arrow between the two. 
What does that mean? Does the data flow in this direction or does the system A call up system B? 
One has to clarify semantics. Of course, if I know the person next to me, I know that he draws 
principally in this way and I in that way. But if one does not know each other so well yet, it is hard 
to find out these semantics. An unambiguous notation is very important.” 
While the loose semantics can be advantageous for experts and decision makers in 
order to turn tacit knowledge explicit or to jointly develop new knowledge (people can 
express something by analogy, of which they have more of an intuition), it can also lead to 
misunderstandings. 
Visuals therefore have to be combined with other verbal or written communication. 
Only in this way, communication partners have an indication, in which direction they 
should interpret the image and thus they can dig deeper into the issue (see also: ‘Convey 
Insights, Suggestions, & Solutions’ phase: Scale Information Within and Across Media). 
We have mentioned above that a major function of visuals is that they incite conversations 
and collaboration. It is precisely in combination with these conversations that are struc-
tured around the visuals that they become a really powerful mean to communicate knowl-
edge across boarders.  
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Information Technology Artefacts: Refer to Tangible Objects that are Meaningful in 
the Loci of Practice of the Addressee 
Another object that can take over the function of a boundary object is a three-
dimensional artefact that is part of the practice of the decision makers and can be used by 
the expert to concretely illustrate his/her more abstract ideas and recommendations. We 
have found this case only at InSure, as in this case the IT-application itself takes over the 
function of a boundary object within the knowledge communication between the IT-
specialists and the managers from the business side. The different IT-applications are part 
of the daily practice of the managers from the business side and they conduct all insur-
ance-relevant operations with them. Seeing the new IT-application developing, they can 
understand very concretely how the IT-specialists have interpreted their request. In the 
past, it happened frequently that the managers from the business side were able to pre-
cisely formulate their request once they had the concrete boundary object at hand. In this 
form, such a refinement was too late in the process and the process around the need ar-
ticulation had to be changed. Yet, IT-specialists have learned to use already implemented 
parent applications to clarify with the managers what they envision with the new applica-
tion26. In this way, the IT-application serves as a shared artefact to create common ground 
(Kraut et al., 2003; Olson & Olson, 2000) and around which to organize interaction. 
Metaphors: Expand Common Ground to Specialized and Abstract Domains 
In the three cases, metaphors play an important role in the expert-decision maker in-
teraction. A metaphor can take over the role of a boundary object as the vehicle of the 
metaphor (the source domain e.g. military invasion) provides a loose structure that is 
common to both experts and decision makers and can be turned specific by relating it to a 
specific conceptual domain (or tenor e.g. internationalization strategy) (Inns, 2002). For 
this particularity, Koskinen argued previously that metaphors can be viewed as boundary 
objects. Using metaphors, interaction partners can build on something that is common 
across the boundaries (the concrete vehicle of the metaphor) and on which basis both par-
ties can further develop their common ground and explore differences in points of view 
(Koskinen, 2005). The playful language of the metaphor provides a flexible enough struc-
                                                 
26 Bechky (2003) made a similar point in an ethnographic study of a production floor, in which she 
analyzed the communication of knowledge between different occupational communities. While a 
shared understanding between two communities was difficult because of different conceptualizations 
and loci of practice, it was facilitated through the fact that both communities had a same work objec-
tive (e.g. creating a same product). 
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ture to elaborate a shared understanding despite the diverse knowledge bases of the inter-
locutors. Koskinen exemplifies this idea for innovation processes and shows how the 
metaphor of the “knowledge navigator” and its gradual transformation into the metaphor 
of the “knowledge atlas” helped an interdisciplinary team to move from the product idea 
to the final product (Koskinen, 2005: 332).  
To some degree, we are hesitant to expand the idea of the boundary “object” to a 
type of language use, as is the metaphor, which has no physical reality. Yet, the use of 
metaphors evokes imagery that is similar to viewing a concrete object. Metaphors can 
become a concrete reference point, as it is the case for physical objects. For these aspects, 
together with the capacity of metaphors to provide a flexible structure that becomes more 
concrete in the single instances, we consider metaphors to have the potential of being used 
as boundary objects.  
In the three case studies, metaphors play an important role in the expert-decision 
maker interaction. In the case of Brookings, for example, books, articles and policy briefs 
often have metaphoric titles such as “Sisyphus Revisited” (Closa, 2005), “Leaving Money 
(and Food) on the Table” (Fellowes & Berube, 2005), or “A Guns and Caviar Approach” 
(Gale & Orszag, 2002). With the title “guns and caviar approach”, for example, the 
Brookings’ experts describe President Bush’s politics of war spending and simultaneous 
tax cuts for high income-households and refer to an older metaphor that was developed in 
the 1960s to designate President Johnson’s politics to simultaneously expand war and 
domestic spending, which was then discussed as the “guns and butter” politics. The ex-
ample shows well how metaphors become meaningful reference points for both the policy 
makers and the experts. The experts can refer to them, and as the metaphor is a flexible 
construct, they can adapt it to today’s circumstances and fill it with slightly different 
meanings. 
At InSure, metaphors that have become important points of references are for ex-
ample ‘the awakening of the sleeping beauty’. This image has become an organizational 
myth and an image for how the organization and the whole insurance industry work to-
day at a much faster speed. Other examples of such metaphors are the image of a ‘driver 
who used to stroll in the streets with his Renault 4 and now has to run formula one races’ 
or the image of the ‘elk test of the Mercedes A class’ to illustrate the importance of quality 
controls and of their meticulous execution. These images are again and again used during 
the interaction between IT-experts and managers from the business line and their mean-
ings are adapted to the changing circumstances. In this way, they simultaneously refer to 
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what is common ground between the employees and new elements and ideas that are to be 
conveyed through the vehicle of the metaphor. 
Metaphors are used by experts to gain some similar benefits in the knowledge-
intensive communication as the ones we have discussed for the use of visuals: metaphors 
not only facilitate the understanding by referring to what is already common ground be-
tween the interlocutors and further developing this common ground to more abstract and 
specific knowledge domains, they also enhance the mnemonic capacity of the communica-
tion partners. The following quote of an IT-manager of InSure illustrates this point: 
“It is important that the counterpart in the communication can recall the few important aspects of 
one’s communication. This is why I often work with images, establish analogies, and use my quote 
library. For example, to illustrate the importance of maintenance work within the total tasks of an 
IT-specialist, I often use the image of brushing one’s teeth. If one does not brush one’s teeth every 
day – and that costs five minutes each time – it can be that 10 years later, the teeth fall out. Then 
the costs and the pains are much more substantial”.  
One difficulty with metaphors is that the analogy is suited only to illustrate part of 
the issue and is problematic for other aspects of the same issue. In addition, people might 
focus extensively on the metaphor rather than on the issue that it stands for, as is ex-
pressed in the final quote of an IT-technician: “The stupid thing with metaphors is that I 
mostly find the error in the metaphor and not in the problem”. Yet, finding out in what 
sense the metaphor does not help to explain the issue, can help to better understand what 
the issue at hand is and what it is not27.  
Overall, metaphors have again and again been referred to in the interviews as impor-
tant instruments in communicating knowledge between experts and decision makers.  
In the description of the various boundary objects that experts use to communicate 
their knowledge to decision makers, we have continuously mentioned that it is not the 
objects alone, but it is them in conjunction with the communication processes that are 
structured around them and with a set of boundary-spanning processes, which makes the 
integration of knowledge between experts and decision makers possible. In the next sec-
tion, we will discuss these boundary-spanning processes more in-depth, that is the second 
meta-practice we could observe in the three case studies. 
                                                 
27 von Ghyczy has argued that it is not the metaphors that work are best to explain a phenomenon or 
concept, but that it is those that break down, which induce most novelty in thought. Innovative rea-
soning happens when developing “a suite of promising” metaphors rather than working with the “per-
fect” one (von Ghyczy, 2003). 
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5.2.2 Engaging in Boundary-spanning Processes 
The practice of engaging in boundary-spanning processes aims to soften the knowl-
edge boundaries existing between experts and decision makers and to turn them more 
elastic and permeable. Wenger (1998) distinguishes between two major boundary-
spanning processes: brokering and boundary encounters. We have observed both cases 
recurrently in the three case studies. Below, we will show how they serve to align the lan-
guage between experts and decision makers and to develop a sufficient common ground 
among them. 
Brokering 
One boundary-spanning practice is “brokering”, which Wenger defines as “the use 
of multi-membership” of a person in various practices so that she can introduce elements 
of one practice into another (Wenger, 1998: 109). A broker finds him/herself at a periph-
ery of various knowledge domains and has the role of coordinating, translating, and trans-
forming the knowledge between the various domains and perspectives (Carlile, 2004). 
Bechky, in the context of a production floor, described how technicians serve as important 
middlemen that span the boundaries between engineers and assemblers (Bechky, 2003) 
and translate back and forth both in verbal and in visual language. 
At InSure, brokering is a very important practice in facilitating the successful com-
munication between the IT-specialists and the managers from the business line. In the con-
text of the definition of the requirement, for example, the Support desk has a “broker” 
function as one IT-technician mentions. “We have a Support desk, which is the interface 
between us, the IT-specialists, and the client, the people from the business line. They sup-
port both us and the business people”. The people from the Support desk have previously 
been working in the business line, but have done an additional education in IT manage-
ment or programming. The Support desk translates in both directions and helps in defin-
ing the request.  
The IT-management28 itself has a broker function and translates back and forth be-
tween the business line and the IT-technicians. Their double qualification in IT and busi-
ness administration and their daily work, which engages them more actively in the busi-
                                                 
28 According to Wenger (1998: 109), a central role of managers is to broker across knowledge bounda-
ries and between practices. 
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ness decisions, helps them have a better understanding of the business context. An IT-
manager mentions: 
“A big challenge is really the comprehension between the IT-people and the people from the busi-
ness line. In this regard, I play an important interface role: the communication of the IT needs to be 
well aligned to the specs of the business line. But this is true also the other way round: when the 
business develops strategies, I have to be able to translate them so that my people can understand 
them. ‘What does that mean for our company, what does it mean for me as a programmer?’ (..) I 
am sort of a translator and only in this way can I effectively create sense.” 
Brokers not only have an important translation function (e.g. formulate the implica-
tions of a piece of information in another context), their double qualification allows them 
also to introduce some lateral thinking.  
“Thanks to my experience and to the fact that I am more distant from the daily programming, it 
makes it more possible for me to break up the tunnel view and the focus on details, and to show 
other possibilities” 
At Brookings, we have shown that many scholars have previous experience in Gov-
ernment and that there is an almost continuous in-and-out-flow between the administra-
tion and the think tank. These scholars have a broker role within Brookings and the 
Brookings organization as a whole has itself a broker function between the daily policy 
business world and the more theoretical, academic research.  
Boundary Encounters
Another boundary spanning activity are boundary encounters, which can be one-to-
one conversations across knowledge boundaries, the immersion into the other’s mode of 
working and thinking, for example, through visits, or delegations (Wenger, 1998). We 
have found various such boundary encounters to be major practices in the knowledge 
communication of the three cases.  
In the case of InSure, for example, IT-specialists are sent to the business line for in-
ternships. 
“[During these internships] my people really learn how the business works. For two, three, or four 
weeks they go to the business unit and work together with the people there. They might not be a 
100% productive, but they see very specifically on what the business unit is working. That is really 
a very important key success factor for the comprehension.” 
During these internships, IT-specialists can grasp not only some basics of the insur-
ance business, but more importantly, they get to know also the business’ mode of work-
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ing, its people’s main concerns, the issues which put them off, the stories that become lo-
cal myths, and the language they talk amongst each other29. By knowing these aspects, it 
is easier for them to enhance the mutual understanding between the two parties. 
Similarly, at pom+, the consultants work at the client’s site for several weeks to un-
derstand the client’s working mode, the working processes, and to solicit more implicit 
knowledge. This close collaboration has a central role because it induces trust and helps to 
establish real partnerships and amicable relationships.  
„If you get to know the client better, things in the communication become easier. He lets one ex-
plain to him what is exactly meant by something, what it is all about, what advantages it brings, 
and what consequences it has” (A. Pesenti) 
Care and trust are particularly important when communicating highly complex and 
domain specific knowledge and when trying to externalize tacit knowledge (von Krogh, 
1998). Knowing the client on a personal level further helps to establish common ground 
and the consultant can more easily embed the information in a context that is meaningful 
to the client.  
“Knowing private issues of the client helps to make conclusions by analogy. What type of car does 
he have, how does he make decisions? It also helps in order to explain something technical with the 
help of his hobby”. 
Finally, the interpersonal dimension is important also for dealing with political is-
sues. In cases of problems and escalations, these trusted people are very important to re-
solve conflicts and to successfully resume the project work.  
Next to these rather time-engaging practices (internships and on-site collaborations, 
which last several weeks), we can observe throughout the three cases a variety of shorter 
boundary-encounters. At InSure, IT-specialists invite the managers from the business line 
to selected IT meetings to sensitize them with the concerns and reality of the IT teams. 
There are the meetings of the steering committee where delegations of the IT and the busi-
ness side convene and there are more informal meetings and workshops between the IT 
and the business teams. Brookings organizes informative luncheons, conference retreats 
over the weekend, or invites policy makers to informal meetings or more formal policy 
                                                 
29 Nonaka and his colleagues make a similar point when underlining the importance of direct and shared 
experience for the sharing of tacit knowledge. They claim that since this type of knowledge is very 
hard to put into words, people can mainly share it by engaging in personal observation and doing 
(Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Nonaka & Toyama, 2002).  
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briefings. At pom+, there are the more formal milestone presentations, the workshops, the 
interviews, and the one-to-one interactions. In general, face-to-face encounters occupy a 
very central role in all three cases. These various forms of face-to-face communications 
represent the briefer boundary encounters between experts and decision makers and are 
an important complement to the more time-intense internships and on-site collaborations. 
Face-to-face communications, such as meetings, workshops, events, presentations, or one-
to-one conversations, have a central role within the expert-decision maker interaction and 
fulfill a variety of functions.  
Table gives an overview on these. For each function, the table shows in which case it 
was discussed and provides a quote from the interviews to concretize the function in the 
context of the relative case. We have inductively structured the functions in three catego-
ries: ‘access knowledge’, ‘develop a shared understanding’, and ‘nurture relationship’. 
These three categories show that face-to-face interactions play a central role in three fun-
damental aspects of knowledge integration: providing access to the relevant information, 
co-creating a shared meaning out of the various perspectives and insights, and finally, 
fostering trustful inter-relational bonds (as we mentioned earlier, this is a central aspect 
for successfully implementing knowledge in the actual decision making and action).  
The first rows of Table 11 show functions of face-to-face communications that are 
related to the access to knowledge: face-to-face encounters, such as events, are useful to 
gain the attention of the decision makers as events can be more advertised than an article 
or another written communication. They are more attractive also because they include a 
social element and give the decision maker the possibility to meet an expert and ask 
him/her very specific questions regarding a pressing problem. Face-to-face interactions 
further allow for coincidental contact with information. During a presentation, a decision 
maker might stumble upon apparently irrelevant information, which he will use, given his 
current concern, for solving the problem and create innovative associations and solutions. 
Finally, in a meeting, all relevant information can be assembled around a table, which 
leads to a more enhancing dynamic for developing novel solutions as opposed to a situa-
tion in which the necessary information is found only after various back and forth com-
munications displaced in time.  
The second set of functions is related to the elaboration and development of under-
standings and ideas. In all three cases, meetings, bilateral talks, workshops, etc. are central 
to develop a common understanding of an issue. A presentation or meeting can provide a 
good first overview of an issue and give a general orientation about the various aspects 
that are related to it. At Brookings, face-to-face encounters are also used to overcome bi-
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polar positions and to more collaboratively develop solutions. By engaging in interactive 
means of communication and participating in the decision makers’ work environment, the 
experts are further better able to elicit knowledge that is embedded in practice and of a 
more tacit nature. They do not simply superimpose their own knowledge, but adapt their 
expertise to the specific context of the decision makers. Interactivity and co-presence allow 
for continuously adjusting one’s communication mode to the specific characteristics of the 
conversation partners, that is to their ways of speaking (e.g. vocabulary), their level of 
knowledge, their humor, etc. (Krauss & Fussell, 1998; Schober & Clark, 1989). Ongoing 
face-to-face encounters, spending time together, grasping a lot of non-verbal cues, and 
being exposed to the other’s thinking gradually builds relationships (Wenger, 1998: 114) 
and people get to know each other on a more personal basis. These are very important 
elements in order to establish a common ground that is sufficient for creating a shared 
understanding between the expert and the decision maker. This understanding transcends 
a shared understanding of terms, but includes an appreciation and understanding of the 
reciprocal perspectives and leads to better aligned objectives. 
 
 
Functions of 
face-to-face: 
Brookings pom+ InSure 
Gain attention “What we will be doing more of 
is organizing events up at 
Congress, because (..) [policy 
makers] don’t have any time to 
come off the hill. They don’t 
only not have the time to read 
anything, they don’t have the 
time to take the cab and come 
here.“ 
   
Foster coinci-
dental contact 
with information 
 
” I guess the key thing was that 
we had a lunch on the hill and 
fifteen key staffers of the Con-
gress came. Of those also some 
moderate Republicans who 
were looking for something that 
would make the bill less aggres-
sive. They essentially took our 
proposal. (..) They stumbled 
across it almost by coinci-
dence.” 
   “I believe that communication 
is something chaotic, but one 
always tries to structure it. (..) 
Something that I have forgotten, 
I will only think about it if I grasp 
the word by chance during a 
break. ‘What are you talking 
about?’ Then it is also the right 
moment. The piece of informa-
tion has to reach me at the right 
moment in order for me to be 
able to anchor it.” A
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Assemble all the 
pertinent exper-
tise around a 
table   
    “Issues deal often around 
technical aspects, which I 
personally cannot and do not 
want to evaluate. In such occa-
sions, I normally assemble all 
the people from my sector or 
from other sectors around a 
table and we start discussing 
the issue. I have realized that 
this is much more efficient than 
if each one prepares a prepara-
tory study in his on cubby-hole” 
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Functions of 
face-to-face: 
Brookings pom+ InSure 
Provide over-
view on an issue   
“There is an enormous amount 
of written information (...) and 
policy makers cannot possibly 
assimilate it all. One way to do 
that is to hear it first, and then 
get some more information with 
more depth that is in a written 
format. So one function of oral 
communication is shortcuts, to 
gain attention.” 
  “If the topic is complex, a meet-
ing is good so that everybody 
receives a basis and under-
stands what the issue is about. It 
is also possible to very specifi-
cally outline what are the impli-
cations of a project” 
Elicit tacit 
knowledge (not 
to superimpose 
own ideas) 
  "The client is our major source 
of information. (..) During the 
project, there is an interactive 
exchange going on. The con-
sultant has to learn from the 
client. One has to understand 
what exactly the problem is, 
why the problem exists, and 
what the client’s situation is.”  
  
Create a com-
mon under-
standing 
“Explaining it face-to-face to a 
policy maker and hearing them: 
‘Oh yeah, I get it and it makes 
sense’, that helps a whole lot.” 
“If you flood people with docu-
ments at the beginning of a 
project, it is very possible that 
they understand them differ-
ently than how they were actu-
ally intended. (..) Therefore, in 
the beginning, interaction is 
key.” 
"To avoid misunderstandings 
(..), we usually start the project 
with a series of workshops." 
"If you make everybody sit 
around a table (..), you can 
simply be more certain that 
there won't be any misunder-
standing." 
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Bridge partisan 
debates (con-
vening function) 
"We had dinners in the evening 
and a lot of time for talking. (..) 
Our objective was to find areas 
where there were agreements 
across partisan boundaries, so 
they could start to think of 
agreements for policies, rather 
than getting barged down by 
partisan debates.” 
    
Create a sense 
of belonging, 
trust and an 
amicable and 
collaborative 
relationships 
"Another function of face-to-face 
encounters is to create a com-
munity, and a sense of belong-
ing." 
“If we are two days out in the 
countryside, then this has a 
methodological relevance, but 
the other thing is that you get 
closer on a personal level. 
Maybe you start to address 
each other in an informal way 
and slap each other on the 
shoulders." 
“It is the personal contact in the 
coffee break or in meetings, 
which allows the communica-
tion to flow. (..) It is important to 
get to know the people person-
ally in order to better under-
stand the other side. This helps 
to limit the misunderstandings 
and also to use the time more 
effectively.” 
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Facilitate the 
dealing with 
difficult or 
delicate issues 
  “The moments of crisis of a 
project are those instances that 
can have large consequences. 
Here, the personal contact, 
being present on the spot, and 
being knowledgeable how to 
communicate are really central.” 
“We speak of ‘reorganization’ 
and not of ‘re-dimensioning’. 
For the employees this is an 
important difference because 
they know that nobody gets 
laid-off. These are types of 
information, which one prefers 
to communicate orally. The 
spoken word is more ephemeral 
than the written text.” 
 
Table 11: Functions of Co-located, Face-to-Face Communication (e.g. Meetings, 
Events, Conversations) 
 
Finally, a last set of functions of face-to-face communication is related to relation-
ship. By engaging in informal talk and spending time together, conversations nurture an 
amicable and trustful relationship between the experts and the decision makers. We men-
tioned that trust is very important in the expert-decision maker situation: the decision 
makers only build on the insights of the expert if he/she considers him as a credible and 
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trustful source. Trust is equally important when the decision maker has to find words for 
what is cloudy and not well defined, when something is complex, and when one has to 
explain something he/she feels embarrassed about (e.g. admitting errors). The face-to-face 
communication engages the person as a whole and not only what he/she writes or thinks. 
For this reason and also because it is highly flexible, it is the preferred mode of communi-
cation when needing to address and clarify delicate or difficult issues. Finally, showing 
commitment through physical presence is particularly important in situations of crisis.  
Amidst all these important functions that have emerged in the case interviews, there 
are also important limitations of this form of communication for the interaction between 
experts and decision makers. Oral forms of interaction such as meetings, presentations, 
workshops, etc. are volatile and it is challenging to retain the knowledge created, shared, 
and integrated through and within this form of interaction. An IT-manager of InSure men-
tions on regard: 
“If one does a lot in a spontaneous way, then only a little is documented and this can lead to mis-
understandings. (..) A conversation… it emerges and then disappears again. One has to retain it in 
some way. Otherwise, you go out of the meeting, the one person has understood it in this way, the 
other in another. And both have the idea that the other is in charge of the issue.” 
Conversations and talk are also limited in the structural precision. Their flexible 
form usually goes at the expense of a clear structuring of the issue with which conversers 
are dealing. Conversers jump from one aspect to the other, follow immediate associations, 
and do not structure the issue in a thought-out manner. 
“The conversation is only the beginning, like the draft for an essay. From there a structure has to be 
developed and it has to be defined; how exactly will I proceed?” 
Yet, in combination with the use of boundary objects, e.g. developing visuals during 
conversations through the MindManager tool, conversations become less volatile. The 
flexibility of talk has to be combined with a more stable object that allows for ‘retention’ 
and that can lead to more precision and persistence. The two meta-practices of using 
boundary objects and engaging in boundary-spanning activities have to be combined to 
successfully overcome the communicative challenges that persist in the interaction between 
domain experts and decision makers. 
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6  Section Summary 
In this chapter, we have drawn on three case studies – The Brookings Institution, 
pom+, and InSure – in order to gain a better understanding of the knowledge communica-
tion between experts and decision makers in various contexts. In the analysis, we have 
particularly focused on the communicative challenges and practices that emerged across 
the various contexts of the cases.  
In a first step, we have found that the phase model for knowledge communication 
(exposed in Chapter 2) provides a useful structure for analyzing the expert-decision maker 
interaction, in particular for communicative situations, in which decision makers explicitly 
ask for the insights of experts (pull situation: pom+, InSure). By identifying specific 
phases, we could refine our understanding why looping behavior of refinement and align-
ment processes (feed forward and feedback loops across the various phases) are necessary 
in the interaction between experts and decision makers. In particular, we have seen how 
experts try to assure that these refinements and alignments happen early in the process 
and how costly late-stage readjustment cycles can be avoided. The combination of flexibil-
ity – through face-to-face talk – and holding down or ’retaining’ (Wenger, 1998) is 
thereby central. In view of the ASK-problem (Belkin et al., 1982) and sense-making dy-
namics (Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005), the precise and unequivocal need of the deci-
sion maker can only be defined gradually. Flexible and rich face-to-face conversations 
have to be combined with action and putting down in written formats. In the ‘convey in-
sights, suggestions, & solutions’-phase, similarly, only by ‘scaling’ information across 
various media formats, can experts find a balance between conciseness and comprehen-
siveness and can convey a complex issue on a level of a meaningful in-between complex-
ity.  
In a second step, we have discussed the major communicative challenges that are not 
specific to a particular phase of the knowledge communication process. In particular, we 
have elaborated on the challenges of a lack of big picture, lack of common ground (and 
implicit misunderstandings), and unconstructive handling of conflict. We have shown that 
also these challenges can be addressed by the same principle of a combined flexibility and 
retention. In particular, we have presented two meta-practices, the use of boundary ob-
jects and boundary-spanning activities. While the boundary objects are useful to retain, 
boundary-spanning practices allow for the necessary flexibility.  
In resuming these major findings of the case work, we would like to pinpoint also 
two major limitations of the presented analysis. A first limitation of the cross-case analysis 
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is that we have worked with relatively few cases. We have distinguished between situa-
tions of knowledge communication within and across organizations and between situa-
tions in which the knowledge was pushed by experts and those in which decision makers 
specifically sought for a certain type of insight or expertise. Basing the analysis on merely 
three cases, we only have one case (Brookings) for the push situation and equally only one 
case (InSure) for the within-organization communication. Furthermore, we have varied the 
context also by using cases from the private and from the public sector. There again, we 
only have one case in the public sector. Case study work does not strive for statistical gen-
eralizations, however working with more than one case per condition would have allowed 
us to sharpen our analytic generalizations (Yin, 2003).  
A further limitation of the case studies on the level of the measurement is that we 
have conducted qualitative interviews merely with experts and only a few with decision 
makers. This allowed us to describe the knowledge communication mainly from the 
standpoint of the expert providing knowledge and expertise and less so from the decision 
maker’s point of view. While access to decision makers was difficult, it would certainly 
have led to a more complete understanding of the knowledge communication process if 
we had taken into account their perspective more fully. In particular, the insights from the 
decision makers would have been necessary to gain a better understanding of the second 
phase of knowledge integration and of why knowledge could not be incorporated into the 
decision making. 
In the next two chapters, we build on the inductive findings of the cross-case analy-
sis to conceptualize them more systematically in a model for knowledge integration. We 
analyze, more specifically, how the major phase-unspecific communicative challenges that 
we have discussed – lack of big picture, lack of common ground, unconstructive handling 
of conflict – manifest themselves in face-to-face conversations. As we have seen, the prin-
ciple of combining reification (through boundary objects) and participation (through 
boundary-spanning processes) turned out to be a central element in the effective integra-
tion of knowledge across knowledge boundaries. In this discussion, the role of visual 
boundary objects and face-to-face conversations has emerged in particular and triggers 
further questions. In what way do visual boundary objects impact the process that sees 
experts and decision makers integrate knowledge in their co-located face-to-face conversa-
tions? In the following two chapters, we will address this question in particular with re-
gard to the use of a software-supported tool for collaborative knowledge visualizations 
that is designed for the support of face-to-face conversations. 
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1  A Communicative Model for Knowledge Inte-
gration in Decision Making 
This chapter aims at synthesis. It presents a communicative model for knowledge in-
tegration in decision making following the discussions from the previous chapters. The 
model is inspired by prior research on knowledge integration (Chapter 2, point 1), but it 
more directly reflects, first, the insights of the literature review on conversations from a 
knowledge perspective (Chapter 2, point 4) and, second, our findings from the cross-case 
analysis regarding the phase-independent, more generic communicative challenges of the 
experts’ and decision makers’ interactions (Chapter 3).  
The second aim of this chapter is to gain a more precise understanding of how the 
use of versatile, collaborative visualizations impacts the way experts and decision makers 
integrate their knowledge in decision making. The discussion of the case studies has shown 
that boundary objects – in combination with flexible forms of communication - are of par-
ticular importance in order to overcome knowledge boundaries and to integrate knowledge 
among experts and decision makers. In particular, we have focused on the role of visuals in 
supporting face-to-face conversations. In this chapter, we will refine our hypotheses re-
garding the impact of collaborative visualization on the knowledge integration in decision 
making. 
When presenting the communicative perspective on knowledge (Chapter 2), we have 
argued that knowledge is developed and shared in social interactions and that we can 
therefore understand social knowledge processes as communication processes. The model 
for knowledge integration is communicative in this understanding. More specifically, it 
says that the overcoming of certain communicative challenges specific to the expert – deci-
sion maker situation reflects the successful integration of individual specialized knowledge 
into systemic group knowledge (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002). This integration from the special-
ized individual knowledge into systemic group knowledge structures is what we have de-
fined the first phase in the knowledge integration process (see: Chapter 2, knowledge inte-
gration as a two-phase-process). In a second phase, the group knowledge is integrated into 
the actual decision making. The following model (see: Figure 19) shows these two levels of 
the knowledge integration process.  
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Figure 19: A Reflective Model for Knowledge Integration in Decision Making 
We argue that if domain experts and decision makers manage to overcome four cen-
tral communicative challenges, which are balanced participation, big picture, common 
ground, and constructive conflict, they are more likely to be successful at integrating their 
specialized, individual knowledge into synthetic common group knowledge structures (1st 
integration phase). Secondly, we stipulate that if specialized individual knowledge is suc-
cessfully integrated in group knowledge (1st phase integration), a stronger decision com-
mitment is the result. Decision commitment is an indicator of the integration of knowledge 
in action and decision making (2nd phase integration).  
In this form, the model we present is an indirect reflective model with multiple medi-
ating constructs (Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000). As a reflective model, the measures “repre-
sent reflections, or manifestations”, of the construct and are not viewed as the causes of 
the construct (Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000: 155). We therefore would not say that knowl-
edge integration is caused by balanced participation, the establishment of a common 
ground and a big picture, and finally by the presence of a constructive construct. Rather, 
the conjoint manifestations of the said variables are reflections of the occurrence of knowl-
edge integration. It is an indirect model insofar as the variables reflecting ‘knowledge inte-
gration’ are mediating variables that cannot be observed directly and ‘knowledge integra-
tion’ can be understood as a second order factor.  
Subsequently, we will present the single order constructs of knowledge integration 
one by one. We do so by referring, on the one hand, to the insights we have gained from 
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explorative case study work, and, on the other, to the existing communication and knowl-
edge management literature.  
1.1 Balanced Participation 
Groups often fail to maximize the contribution of all members (Stasser & Stewart, 
1992). Certain participants in a conversation, often subordinates, feel inhibited to expose 
their own ideas to management for fear of criticism (Dixon, 1997). In other instances, 
management has a rather autocratic style and does not actively seek for the contribution of 
others (Eisenhardt et al., 2000). Unbalanced power structures lead to instances in which 
conversation partners participate in an unequal manner in the conversation process so that 
the various perspectives on an issue are not brought up and considered equally (Ellinor et 
al., 1998). In Chapter 2, point 4, we have shown that the balanced participation of all 
conversation partners is an important pre-condition for knowledge processes, such as 
knowledge integration (see: Table 4, in Chapter 2). The literature stresses that effective 
knowledge-intensive conversation are those in which participants alternate their contribu-
tions in balanced ways and actively engage in participation and collaboration (Barge & 
Oliver, 2003; Beer & Eisenstat, 2004; Dixon, 1997; Eisenhardt et al., 2000; Ellinor & 
Gerard, 1998; von Krogh et al., 2000). Von Krogh et al., for example, argued that conver-
sations in which people can share tacit knowledge need to be characterized by active par-
ticipation of all conversation partners and an atmosphere, which invites open and unstruc-
tured contributions (von Krogh et al., 2000: 144). In a situation in which not all partici-
pants of a conversation can participate in the collaborative co-construction of knowledge, 
the specialized knowledge of all members will not be integrated. Without the balanced 
participation of all conversation partners knowledge integration is impossible at its basis.  
In the discussion of the case studies, we have seen that both experts and decision 
makers are aware that an important part of their job is to actively incite the participation 
of the other party. We have shown that the expert tries to actively involve decision makers, 
to solicit their knowledge, to develop an understanding of their perspective, to countervail 
possible fears related to change, to discover the hidden causes of a problem, and to prevent 
possible misunderstandings. To do so, they use interviewing techniques and work with 
methods to solicit and structure the decision maker’s knowledge. Arguing that balanced 
participation is a pre-condition for knowledge integration, we claim that:  
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H1: the balanced participation of all participants in a conversation positively reflects 
the process of knowledge integration.  
1.2 Big Picture 
In the cross-case analysis, we have shown that a particularly difficult challenge of the 
expert-decision maker interaction and an important indicator of knowledge integration is 
the fact of gaining and sustaining the ‘big picture’. For the experts and decision makers, a 
major difficulty of their interactions is not to loose track of the overarching thread of an 
issue, but to integrate their various points of view and the range of pertinent aspects in 
order to finally understand how these different elements interrelate with each other and 
form an integrative whole. They often had the feeling of being stuck in a sea of technical 
details of which they did not know how they related to the more general issue that was the 
object of decision.  
From the case studies, we have learned that the big-picture challenge is related to the 
capacity to see and draw interconnections and to find an adequate level of detail or ab-
straction. We define the big picture challenge as the difficulty to gain and keep an adequate 
overview of a complex issue by identifying its main drivers and the interconnections be-
tween them, while paying sufficient attention to its relevant details. 
Experts and decision makers have to see the interconnections between the various 
perspectives they bring into the discussion, between the specific issue on which they have 
to decide and the larger context in which it is embedded (e.g. related issues). Experts and 
decision makers have a very specific view on the issue and often are not able to envision 
the big picture of a solution or decision on their own, but have to integrate both perspec-
tives. In this situation, the challenge is to be open enough for another perspective and to 
see the interconnections between the different perspectives and points of view. Second, 
experts and decision makers have to understand how a specific technical aspect that an 
expert mentions relates to the more general discourse of the issue. Harkins defines “big-
picture thinking” as the “ability to conceptualize underlying or systemic causes driving a 
problem or issue” (Harkins, 1999: 34). In this light, the capability to gain and maintain the 
big picture is strongly related to the ability of systemic thinking. Senge advocates that while 
traditional analysis focuses on separating out different pieces, the holistic perspective of the 
systems thinking approach focuses on how things are interrelated and how they form an 
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overall system (Senge, 1990). The challenge is to connect isolated pieces into recursive 
causal chains and to develop a more dynamic view of a system28.  
Next and related to the issue of interconnections, the big picture problem is also 
about the adequate level of detail or abstraction. Too much detail leads to disorientation 
(how does the detail relate to the more general issue?) and a feeling of a loss of time and of 
a lack of pertinence. It has been argued that “creative processes involve first envisioning 
‘the big picture’ and then working out the details at a later stage. A sculptor, for example, 
starts by carving out a rough outline and then progressively adds finer detail” (Ringach, 
2003: 7). Yet, in many cases, experts and decision makers cannot simply adopt such “a 
top-down (or coarse-to-fine) method“ (Ringach, 2003: 7), but “the big picture is formed 
by small details” so that the challenge is not simply to understand the big threads of an 
issue, but also the small details of which they are made (Sull et al., 2005: 37). Providing 
details is often necessary to understand a more abstract concept, to see the implications of 
an issue, and to comprehend whether a certain solution is feasible or not. Rhodes argues 
on this purpose that “one of the most common reasons for being off the mark is operating 
on the wrong level or scale” (Rhodes, 1991: 162-163) and not marking clearly on which 
level of detail one is operating. It is not self-evident to judge upon the importance and per-
tinence of a piece of information and to determine the adequate level of detail. Experts, 
with their very domain specific, but profound knowledge (Hoffman et al., 1995), perceive 
something as still quite abrasive and superficial while for the decision makers it is already 
extremely specific and too rich in detail.  
With regard to the interconnectivity-capacity and the level of detail/abstraction, we 
can understand the big picture challenge as related to the issue upon which decision mak-
ers have to decide and for which they ask for the experts’ advice. Alternatively, we can 
understand the problem as related to the process of the conversation itself. The intercon-
nection issue, for example, refers to the challenge to see the links between the causes of an 
issue, or between the causes and their symptoms. But the interconnection issue can refer, 
also, to the challenge of drawing the connection between what X said five minutes ago and 
what Y said just a moment ago and whether there are explicit links among the single con-
tributions or phases in a conversation, which facilitate the creation of the bigger picture. 
 
28 In the realm of systemic thinking, the big picture challenge has been discussed mainly as an individual 
challenge and not as a social and communicative one as proposed here. Other authors who conceived 
this problem on an individual level, have further argued that certain cognitive styles (e.g. the ‘imagin-
ist’) are better suited to see the big picture than others (Graetz, 2002). While for them, the capacity to 
see the big picture is innate and stable for a person, Gasper and Clore have shown, in contrast, that 
the individuals’ mood impacts on his/her capacity to see the big picture; if people are happy, they tend 
to be more oriented on the forest, if they are sad they merely look at the trees (Gasper & Clore, 2002). 
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We believe that the big picture of the issue and the big picture of the conversation process 
are very much interlinked so that a more explicit structure of the conversation process also 
makes it easier to gain the big picture on the issue. In a conversation, in which it is clear 
how a certain statement relates to another and on what level of abstraction one is moving, 
it is also easier to understand how a certain technical detail of the problem refers to one of 
its more general drivers. In order to keep the ‘big picture’ construct as clean as possible and 
not to mix it up with the other constructs of our model, we focus entirely on the process 
level of the conversation process itself. We claim that:  
H2: successfully coping with the big picture challenge positively reflects the process 
of knowledge integration.  
1.3 Common Ground 
Alavi and Tiwana argued that ‘mutual understanding’ or mutual knowledge – under-
stood as the knowledge that is shared among people and that is known to be shared - 
represents one of the key challenges of knowledge integration. They say that “it lies at the 
intersection of the specialized knowledge sets that a virtual organization must integrate” 
(Alavi & Tiwana, 2002: 1033). Similarly, Carlile (2004)and also Bechky (2003) refer to 
the importance of ‘common knowledge’ or ‘common ground’ for managing knowledge 
integration across knowledge boundaries. In communication theory, this is best known as 
the ‘common ground’ challenge, as proposed by Clark and his colleagues (Clark, 1996; 
Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark & Marshall, 1981). Common ground is defined by the 
context that conversation partners can reasonably assume to be sharing among them. It 
includes their background knowledge, beliefs, current interpretations, goals, values, but 
also their social and physical context and more personal attributes as speech style or emo-
tional state (Krauss & Fussell, 1991). It is said that communication is more efficient and 
productive when people share greater amounts of common ground (Olson & Olson, 
2000). At least, participants of a conversation need to share a minimal common ground in 
order to understand each other and to take informed decisions. Fahey and Prusak outline 
for example: “In the absence of shared context, individuals’ differing perspectives, beliefs, 
assumptions, and views of the future are most likely to collide and thus immobilize deci-
sion making” (1998: 258). They believe that without the needed shared context, people 
will not reach a deeper understanding through dialogue and will not be able to traverse the 
difficult path from information to knowledge and neither from knowledge to decision 
making. A related concept to the one of common ground is “ba”, which has been intro-
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duced by Nonaka and his colleagues. They understand “ba” as a shared physical, virtual, 
and mental space, “a ‘phenomenal’ place” (Nonaka & Konno, 1998: 41), which is neces-
sary in order to create new knowledge. Although the concept of “ba” is larger than the one 
of common ground, it stresses the same idea that, in order to engage in processes such as 
knowledge creation or knowledge integration, it is necessary to share a certain common 
space, in which the knowledge to be integrated can be embedded. It is a space that involves 
shared experiences, ideas, values, but also common physical and virtual rooms, which in-
clude artifacts and universes of meaning.  
Interaction partners engage in grounding (activities to build common ground) by us-
ing the sources of community membership, linguistic co-presence, and physical co-presence 
(Clark & Marshall, 1981). If people know that they belong to a same group or population, 
they can assume that the peculiarities of this group can be considered to be common 
ground (community membership). Second, if they had prior interactions (linguistic co-
presence), they then have established certain aspects and relations to be common ground 
(they have agreed in earlier communications that when X is true then Y). Finally, if they 
share the same physical setting (physical co-presence), they can use it in the form of deictic 
speech (by pointing and using words like ‘that’ or ‘here’) and non-verbal communication 
(e.g. gestures) to build common ground (Clark & Marshall, 1981).  
In the expert-decision maker situation, these sources of common ground are often 
sparse; communication partners do not belong to the same professional community and 
have a few knowledge on the peculiarities of the other community, they have few interac-
tions with each other (lack of linguistic co-presence), and communicate in written formats 
(lack of physical co-presence). In fact, many interviewees of the here reported case studies 
referred to the common ground challenge: Experts, when preparing their reports or presen-
tations, often have difficulties in assessing the decision makers’ knowledge and even in 
evaluating their own knowledge in relation to the others: What should they expose that is 
valuable to the decision makers? What can they take for granted? The common ground 
challenge also comes to play when experts and decision makers have to deal with implicit 
misunderstandings. They are often unaware of using specific terms (e.g. process manage-
ment) in a completely different way (e.g. as a management versus a support process) and 
realize that they have misunderstood each other only much later. This can lead to consid-
erable consequences such as late redefinition of project scopes and consequent project de-
lays. The fact that experts and decision makers use language differently implies not only 
that they have different understandings of terms, but includes also different ways of ex-
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pression, the use of different jargon, and other conventional features (differences in pho-
nology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics (Clark, 1996)). It emerged several 
times in the interviews that underlain to language, experts and decision makers have quite 
different perspectives and modes of thinking, which makes a shared understanding quite 
challenging. While economic experts, for example, are inclined to think that when ‘all else 
being equal, the partial equation of changing this is changing that’, policy makers often 
infer from the concomitance of two events that they must be casually interrelated. Inter-
viewees reported throughout the various case situations that if the lack of common ground 
is very apparent (for example if the expert’s knowledge is very specific and technical or if 
experts and decision makers interact for the first times), it is particularly important to in-
teract frequently, meeting physically and informally, and rely on face-to-face conversa-
tions. 
The concept of “common ground” comprises not only the idea that the communica-
tion partners share a common understanding of an issue and a joint vision of what they are 
aiming to achieve. As the first examples from the case studies have shown, it also means 
that the experts and decision makers have a sense of the reciprocal knowledge and perspec-
tives (they know what and how the others know)29. Only with a sufficient common 
ground, the communicator is able to adjust his/her messages to the receiver: What does he 
know and where is he ignorant? What level of complexity will be suited to assure his/her 
understanding? Krauss and Fussell call this activity ‘reciprocal perspective-taking’, in 
which one tries to experience the situation as it is lived by others and adapt the content 
and form of the message to it (1998). The reciprocal perspective-taking is an important 
aspect in forming common ground among communicators. If it is missing, people ulti-
mately have to draw on their knowledge of the more general social categories to which 
their vis-à-vis belongs (e.g. car fan, engineer, New Yorker) and from which they can induce 
certain general characteristics (Clark, 1996; Krauss & Fussell, 1998). As the conversation 
partners go on in the interaction, they receive continuous verbal, para-verbal, and non 
verbal feedback and this additional information allows them for gradually fine-tuning their 
assumptions of the perspectives and information needs of the others (Krauss & Fussell, 
1998; Schober & Clark, 1989). In this way, the more the experts and decision makers in-
teract, the more they establish a common ground between them, and the better they can 
adjust their mode of interaction. Conversations are a communicational form that allows 
participants for sharing experiences and therewith is especially important in creating ‘per-
 
29 This aspect of having a sense of what knowledge is shared among experts and decision makers and 
what is unique to each party, is similar discussed in the literature under the concept of transactive 
memory (Hollingshead, 2001; Piontkowski et al., 2003). 
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sonal common ground’ (Clark, 1996). Common experiences are “powerful sources of 
shared meaning because it is possible to reference the experience and thus to bring to mind 
for everyone a meaningful image” (Dixon, 1997: 32). 
The critical reader might legitimately ask if there is not an apparent contradiction be-
tween the here proclaimed necessity of a common ground, on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, the growing necessity for strong specialization of functions and roles (it is the 
very scope of experts and decision makers to have different perspectives, backgrounds, 
priorities). Deetz, for example, describes the sustaining of differences (and the therewith 
going creativity) as an altogether opposite objective of dialogue than aiming for common 
ground and value consensus (Heath et al., 2006). Similarly, Dyer and Nobeoka could show 
in a different context (they analyzed the sharing of knowledge on a company network 
level) that “strong ties” (i.e. a lot of common ground) are well suited for the diffusion (ex-
ploitation) of existing knowledge rather than for the exploration of new knowledge, which 
is the strength of “weak ties”-relations (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000: 364/365). Translated to 
the context of experts and decision makers, this means that strong ties and a lot of com-
mon ground would lead mainly to status quo-oriented decisions, which are rather prob-
lematic in complex, ambiguous, high-velocity environments. We see this apparent stretch 
between common ground and specialization not as dualisms, but as dualities. The common 
ground challenge really is a question of balance. Too much common ground would render 
the separation of the expert and decision maker roles obsolete, too little common ground 
would render their communication extremely difficult if not impossible. The aim in the 
collaboration of experts and decision makers therefore must be to assure a necessary com-
mon ground, but not to have too large overlaps. For groups who have just been formed, as 
is the case of the experimental setting of this study, the risk of having too much common 
ground and not enough specialization is relatively small. We claim that: 
H3: establishing a common ground among the conversation partners positively re-
flects the process of knowledge integration. 
1.4 Constructive Conflict 
Conflict is both necessary and threatening for the integration of knowledge. In Chap-
ter 2, we have argued that conflict, on a content level, has an important function in devel-
oping novel approaches and integrating knowledge (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Eisenhardt et 
al., 2000). On the other hand, if interpersonal conflict arises, conversation partners are 
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mostly unable to deal with it in a constructive manner so that it mostly has a detrimental 
impact on the advancement of ideas (Gratton & Ghoshal, 2002; Weeks, 2001). In the case 
studies, a recurring issue has been that the knowledge gap between experts and decision 
makers led to such unconstructive relational tensions and conflict (Chapter 2, point 4). 
Conflict has been mentioned with regard to reciprocal negative prejudices (e.g. experts 
believe that the decision makers will never be able to understand the engineering aspects 
the decision involves), to lacking trust (e.g. decision makers calling systematically into 
question experts’ knowledge), or to the fear of loosing face and therefore pretending to 
know. On the other hand, conflict arises not only on a relational, but also on a content 
level. The differences in perspective lead to important discussions and arguments on the 
content. Experts and decision makers tend to weight issues differently and have different 
time horizons. The experts’ bias in proposing accurate, thorough solutions might stand in 
conflict to the decision maker’s need for pragmatic, quick fixes. The focus on more sys-
temic, integrated views might be counterintuitive for someone who is used to think at one 
thing at a time. The interviewers reported that such differences in orientation often re-
quired long discussions in order to achieve a shared understanding.   
The subdivision of conflict into relationship and task conflict was systematically pro-
posed by Jehn (1995). He made two claims when proposing this distinction. On the one 
hand, relationship conflict – understood as an emotional conflict and a perception of an 
interpersonal incompatibility - is detrimental for team effectiveness, decision quality, and 
decision commitment. People feel stressed and anxious and they perceive the conflict as a 
threat to their identity and their feelings of self worth (Jehn & Mannix, 2001). In such a 
situation, people are hesitant to expose their ideas, to inquire collaboratively into new so-
lutions, and to integrate their knowledge. Jehn and Mannix (2001) argue that their ability 
to process information is reduced since they spend most of their energy focusing on each 
other. For these reasons, relationship conflict negatively reflects knowledge integration. 
On the other hand, task conflict – a perception of disagreements (in terms of view-
points, ideas, opinions) regarding the content of a decision - can have important positive 
effects (Jehn, 1995). Advantages of task conflict are that people scrutinize task issues and 
engage in a deep and deliberate processing of the available information. It encourages a 
greater cognitive understanding of the issue (and therefore leads to a better decision qual-
ity). Finally, it fosters learning, the development of innovative insights, and a stronger deci-
sion commitment (Simons & Peterson, 2000). These are all important aspects for the proc-
ess of knowledge integration. Similarly, Eisenhardt and her colleagues argue that task con-
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flict is important for developing a more complete understanding of the choices and for 
creating a richer range of options (Eisenhardt et al., 2000: 77). Finally, task conflict is said 
to foster innovation because it makes people consider the perspectives of others and create 
new understandings of apparently known issues (De Dreu, 1997). Yet, a very strong task 
conflict is said to have negative effects on member satisfaction, or on the commitment to 
the team and decision (Amason, 1996; Simons & Peterson, 2000). People feel frustrated 
when some people continuously take their chance to disagree and oppose and therewith 
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Figure 20 : An Inverted-U-Relationship of Task Conflict 
and Knowledge Integration (Proposition) 
 
 
delay the decision (Peterson, 1999). Similarly, we argue that in presence of a too high level 
of task conflict, conversation partners have difficulties in integrating knowledge. However, 
if the perspectives, points of view, and opinions are very far away from each other, content 
based argumentations are not reflecting a real integration of knowledge. People will con-
tinue to believe their point of view. They might acknowledge the opposite opinion to have 
a reason of existence, but remain far from seriously considering it for the further develop-
ment of their own point of view. We will therefore stipulate that the relationship of task 
conflict and knowledge integration is one of an inverted U-curve: in the presence of a low 
or very high level of task conflict, knowledge is not integrated (see: Figure 20). A moderate 
level of task conflict best reflects knowledge integration. Task conflict (that increases 
group’s effectiveness) and relationship conflict (that reduces it) are not independent, but 
strongly correlated with each other. Rather, more task conflict leads to more relationship 
conflict (De Dreu & Van Vianen, 2001; De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Simons & Peterson, 
2000). Simons and Peterson (2000) report eleven studies that could show that content con-
flict is highly correlated with relationship conflict (range r = -.17 to .88, mean r = .47). As 
argued by Eisenhardt et al. (2000) and much earlier already Argyris and Schön (1978), a 
plausible explanation for this is that people often understand a critique, that is intended on 
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a content level, as a personal attack. Simon and Peterson call this a misattribution of task 
conflict, in which the participants of a conversation engage in biased information process-
ing and self-fulfilling prophecies. They induce intentions and hidden agendas and see them 
confirmed in their interpretations of the others’ ambiguous behaviour (Simons & Peterson, 
2000). Such a misattribution more easily takes place if conversation partners express their 
content conflict poorly and use harsh and homonym language. On the other hand, a misat-
tribution of relationship conflict as task conflict is equally possible. People masquerade 
their inter-relational problems as task issues and continue to sabotage a person by bringing 
up hesitations and critique on a content level (Simons & Peterson, 2000). It is for all these 
reasons that substantive issues can no longer be separated from those based on personali-
ties.  
This correlation between task and relationship conflict poses a dilemma in dealing 
with conflict. If we aim to have a moderate level of task conflict to create a deeper under-
standing and a better integration of knowledge, we risk, at the same time, that the task 
conflict is (mis)understood on a relational level (as a relationship conflict) and that the 
overall outcome in terms of team performance, decision commitment, or decision satisfac-
tion is negative.  
Thus, three conflict conditions have to be present in order to allow for knowledge in-
tegration: 1. a moderate level of task conflict; 2. a low level of relationship conflict; 3. a 
low correlation between task conflict and relationship conflict. We define the concomitant 
occurrence of these three conditions as a situation of constructive conflict. We stipulate 
that:  
H4: constructive conflict positively reflects the process of knowledge integration. 
1.5 Decision Commitment 
In order to conceptualize the second phase of knowledge integration, that is the inte-
gration of the systemic group knowledge into decision making and action, we include the 
variable decision commitment. The more the participants of a conversation are successful 
in integrating their individual specialized knowledge into systemic group knowledge (i.e. 
occurrence of first level knowledge integration), the more they will feel committed to the 
decisions taken. Decision commitment leads, as is discussed in the literature (see for exam-
ple: Dooley et al., 2000; Janis & Mann, 1977; Priem et al., 1995; West & Schwenk, 1996), 
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to a more successful implementation of decision and, as Habermas claimed, knowledge can 
be considered to be mutual and shared, not simply if the participants agree in their opin-
ions, but if they reach an inter-subjective acknowledgement of demands of validity, i.e. if 
they accept something as binding for their future behaviour (Habermas, 1984: 573-374). 
In this understanding, the requirement is rather high for what is considered to the result of 
knowledge integration. Yet, this view draws the link between knowledge and the commit-
ment to action. In other words, it implies that if knowledge really is integrated we can ex-
pect a stronger commitment to the decision taken. On the other hand, if the decision is not 
based on a real integration of knowledge, but rather on a unilateral exertion of influence, 
then also the commitment for the decision taken should be smaller. We therefore include 
‘decision commitment’ as a dependent variable of our model, while clearly maintaining the 
central interest for the construct of ‘knowledge integration’. Prior research could show that 
a stronger decision commitment leads to a more successful implementation of the decision 
in action (Dooley et al., 2000). We claim that:  
H5: decision commitment positively reflects the second phase of the knowledge inte-
gration process (integration of group knowledge into decision making) in that the better 
the knowledge integration of individual knowledge into group knowledge in the first 
phase, the higher the integration in the second phase (i.e. the higher the decision commit-
ment). 
Having outlined a communicative model for knowledge integration in decision mak-
ing, we will discuss, in the second part of this chapter, how the use of a software-based, 
interactive visualization tool impacts on the process of how people integrate their special-
ized knowledge in systemic group knowledge and decision making. In the discussion of the 
case studies (Chapter 3), we have shown that decision makers and experts use visual sup-
port as boundary objects (Carlile, 2002; Star & Griesemer, 1989) in elaborating a shared 
meaning among them. We have seen that knowledge integration in decision making re-
quires both persistence and flexibility in the communication process. While face-to-face 
conversations are very flexible and make it possible that experts and decision makers itera-
tively develop an ever more refined and shared understanding, visuals – particularly flexi-
ble or versatile visuals that develop with the ongoing interaction – account for persistence 
and instant documentation. Below, we would like to render this discussion more precise 
and outline in what ways versatile, collaborative visualization moderates the way how 
experts and decision makers integrate knowledge in decision making.  
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2  The Role of a Collaborative Visualization Tool 
within the Process of Knowledge Integration 
The idea of using interactive visual support in conversations to enhance understand-
ing is very old. Stafford refers to the frequent use of visuals to accompany conversations on 
knowledge-intensive issues already in the eighteenth century: Instruments, images, toys, 
preparations, cosmorama, or frontispieces were used as “interactive and flowing systems 
for understanding which were based on an ephemeral act of creation and which we now 
know as conversations” (Stafford, 1994: 25). Stafford outlines that the modus operandi of 
a conversation is very close to the one of the interaction with a visual.  
In today’s conversations and meetings, thanks to the recent improvements in infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT), communication partners have additional 
possibilities in supporting their conversations through visualization. Next to handouts, 
sketches on flipcharts or blackboards, printed images and figures or physical models, par-
ticipants of a conversation use media as overhead projectors, computer beamers, interac-
tive softboards, touch screens, (streamed) audio-video, etc. Visuals have become more dy-
namic and can be easily constructed in a collaborative and interactive manner. In addition, 
conversation partners can switch back and forth between electronic and physical presenta-
tions and therewith mark subtle changes in fluidity (in the electronic format, issues can be 
easily changed, if printed out, they become more official, decided and binding). Finally, an 
instant visual documentation of meetings and conversations and a company-wide distribu-
tion of these visual-minutes has become possible (Mengis & Eppler, 2005). Figure 21 
shows an example of an interactive visual tool, which is designed to support the knowledge 
creation (idea generation) and structuring in conversations. 
 
Figure 21: Example of a Collaborative Visual Tool -  
Mindjet MindManager Pro 6 (www.mindjet.com)  
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In spite of these new possibilities in enhancing conversations, the scientific discussion 
on the use of collaborative visuals for face-to-face conversations has remained rather lim-
ited. Researchers have mainly focused on computer mediated communication (CMC) and 
on conversations of geographically dispersed interaction partners (i.e. online conversations 
through chat applications). In this context, a main interest has been to find ways to make 
up for the lacking visual and social cues by leaving a persistent trace of the conversation 
and allowing for correctibility (Bregman & Haythornthwaite, 2001). Also in the face-to-
face context, there are few examples of gaining persistence in conversations by using visu-
alization (Lyons et al., 2004; Waibel et al., 1998). However, the major reasons for visualiz-
ing face-to-face conversations are to display the “thinking” of the conversation partners, 
respectively to depict casual arguments and relationships of concepts (Conklin, 2006; 
Conklin & Begeman, 1988). Visualization can also be used to make peripheral social in-
formation tangible (DiMicco et al., 2004), or to visualize the human voice (Levin & Lie-
berman, 2004).  
Subsequently, we will discuss the role of collaborative visualization for the presented 
model for knowledge integration. In particular, we will refer to a type of interactivity and 
visualization as it is provided by the software suite let’s focus (for a more detailed descrip-
tion of this tool, see: Appendix 10). We do so since we have worked with let’s focus for the 
empirical evaluation of the model for knowledge integration and for assessing the modera-
tion effect of the tool. 
We claim that the use of the visual tool has a positive moderation effect on the model 
for knowledge integration (see: Figure 22) and propose four moderation hypotheses. In 
particular, we propose that experts and decision makers, who use an interactive visual tool 
(like let’s focus) for their conversations, rely more on the creation of the big picture (Hm1) 
and the common ground (Hm2) in their knowledge integration efforts and less so on con-
flict (and if it arises, they manage to deal with it in a more constructive way) (Hm3) and 
balanced participation (Hm4). Instead, in the non-supported condition, experts and deci-
sion makers, when aiming to integrate their specialized knowledge by unsupported conver-
sations, the challenges of creating a big picture and a common ground are only difficultly 
to be met so that conversation partners rely more on balanced participation and conflict in 
their attempts to integrate knowledge. Yet, they do not manage to handle conflict in a con-
structive way, which is why, overall, their integration capacity is smaller in the non-
supported condition than for conversation partners working with an interactive visual tool. 
We therewith claim that the use of an interactive visual tool has a positive moderation 
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effect on a relational level of the presented model for knowledge integration (and not on a 
level of the means). 
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 Figure 22: Moderation Effect of the Use of Interactive Visual Tools (Hm1, Hm2, Hm3, Hm4) 
In the following, we will outline all four moderation hypotheses.  
Moderation Hypothesis One (Hm1): With the support of the visual tool, integration 
efforts rely more on the facilitated construction of common ground 
Several studies have argued for the importance of shared visual spaces in creating 
common ground among interaction partners who need to integrate knowledge (see for 
example: Bechky, 2003; see for example: Carlile, 2002). According to Carlile, a visual 
(which in his view is a specific instance of a boundary object) can become a shared re-
source and a common reference point and can help to establish a shared language among 
people and represent their knowledge so that they can better understand differences and 
communalities of their understandings (Carlile, 2002). Other studies focus more explicitly 
on conversations and discuss the role of visuals in establishing a common ground (Kraut et 
al., 2003; Olson & Olson, 2000). They found - by confronting co-located interaction situa-
tions with geographically dispersed settings – that communicative grounding is facilitated 
significantly in the dislocated situation if interlocutors can use visual support (e.g. through 
video communication systems) (Kraut et al., 2003; Olson & Olson, 2000). We believe that 
also in the co-located situation, the use of interactive visuals facilitates the construction of 
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common ground since they provide additional physical co-presence. Conversation partners 
will therefore rely more on this facilitated construction of common ground in their at-
tempts to integrate knowledge.  
Interaction partners can refer to these shared visual objects by using deictic speech 
(words like ‘this’ ‘there’ ‘I’ ‘then’ that have no fixed meaning, but that point to a person, 
place, or time and are conferred with meaning by the communicative context, Jesperson 
called them ‘shifters’ (Jespersen, 1922)). Since the visuals are dynamic and can be changed 
throughout the conversation process, the refinement and correction processes (that are 
most important for grounding activities) can be achieved not only through verbal commu-
nication, but are also supported through the interactively developed visual. Reviewing the 
current state of the visual, a conversation partner might see that an identified problem (e.g. 
technological change), which was categorized as an external problem, should instead be 
viewed as an internal problem (e.g. the real problem is that they do not have processes in 
place that are flexible enough to swiftly adapt to technological change). The interactive 
visual permits interlocutors ‘reviewability’ (i.e. they can re-examine each other’s messages), 
which is an important aspect for building common ground (Clark & Brennan, 1991). In 
addition to reviewability, these authors listed a set of characteristics of communication 
formats (e.g. co-presence, visibility, audibility, contemporality), which allow for the con-
struction of common ground (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Kraut et al., 2003). These are:   
• Co-presence: interlocutors share the same physical environment 
• Visibility: communicators are visible to each other 
• Audibility: interlocutors can communicate through speech 
• Contemporality: message is received the moment it is sent 
• Simultaneity: all communicators can send and receive at the same time 
• Sequentiality: turns cannot get out of sequence 
• Reviewability: communicators are able to re-examine each other’s mes-
sages 
• Revisability: one can modify messages before they are sent 
Clark and Brennan argued that while face-to-face conversations are characterized by 
most of the above listed aspects (and therefore represent a very apt communicational form 
for building common ground), they do not allow for reviewability and revisability (Clark 
& Brennan, 1991). Yet, when working with interactive templates that visually summarize 
Chapter 4 - A Communicative Model of Knowledge Integration in Decision Making and 
the Role of Knowledge Visualization 180 
 
the arguments and topics that are brought in during the conversation, interaction partners 
have the possibility to review others’ arguments and refine their understanding even at a 
later stage.  
Next to enhancing the referencing to physical objects and to providing reviewability, 
interactive visuals facilitate grounding also because they provide communicators with an 
additional, often metaphoric language (Kraut et al., 2003). Visual language can help con-
versation partners to articulate aspects that are implicit and hard to define (Meyer, 1991). 
This is especially the case for visuals that rely on metaphors. Nonaka and his colleagues 
argue that the use of metaphors is key in the externalization phase (i.e. when people engage 
in the difficult process of giving an explicit form to tacit knowledge) since metaphors per-
mit to understand one thing by imagining another (Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka et al., 2000). When having a visual metaphor at disposition (i.e. a 
bridge, a labyrinth, a scale, or a ruler), interlocutors refer to an already existing common 
ground between them. The attachment of abstract, unknown, and complex concepts and 
relationships (i.e. the topic (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980)) on the visual vehicle of the meta-
phor represents a clever way to use the existing common ground in order to extend it. In 
this way, conversation partners can communicate something which is domain specific, 
abstract, or something that is hard to grasp with words by using the specific and well 
known concept of the metaphoric vehicle (Inns, 2002). They can use the visual language 
and the conceptual domain of the metaphor, which are common ground to all participants. 
Participants of a conversation can, for example, place an identified problem at the very 
bottom of an iceberg or put two solutions close to each other. In these examples, the inter-
locutors can express the difficulty to access a particular problem or the relatedness of two 
types of solutions through the visual positioning of the concepts on the visual metaphor. 
The visual language helps them to express aspects, which are difficult to put into words.  
Finally, the visual language provides not only additional means for the expression of 
difficult issues; it also facilitates the understanding process. Images are said to afford a 
more direct access to meaning (Meyer, 1991). If information that is unfamiliar to people is 
visualized on a well-known object (like, for example, on a funnel, a boat, or a ladder, and, 
to less extent, also on a diagram like the Ansoff-matrix or a Strategy Map), people can 
quite intuitively explore the meaning of the unfamiliar and of the aspects that are not yet 
common ground (see also: Inns, 2002).  
The use of visuals in conversations gives interlocutors the possibility to use the exist-
ing common ground among them and to extend it to new conceptual domains. In doing so, 
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visuals facilitate both the expression of issues that are abstract, complex, and hard to ex-
press in words and also their understanding. Because the use of visual tools makes it easier 
for experts and decision makers to construct a common ground among them, they will give 
more weight to it when integrating their knowledge than those interacting without a visual 
support.   
Moderation Hypothesis Two (Hm2): With the support of the visual tool, integra-
tion efforts rely more on the facilitated construction and perpetuation of the big 
picture  
Interactive visuals (as the ones provided by the software suite let’s focus) allow con-
versation partners to visually document the synthesis of important arguments of their con-
versations and to structure them through the categories provided by the image. At the same 
time, the participants of a conversation also have the possibility to link, to this synthetic 
overview, more detailed information through the comment function of the tool. In this 
way, the visual tool helps to keep the difficult balance between overview and detail, which 
is necessary for the creation and perpetuation of the big picture. 
Visuals that are developed within the course of the conversation help participants to 
keep in mind the current state of the conversation and serve as a mnemonic device of what 
has been discussed earlier on and what are the themes still missing in the conversation. 
Kraut, Fussel, and Siegel state that “visual information helps people maintain up-to-date 
mental models or situational awareness of the state of the task and other’s activities. This 
awareness can help them plan what to say or do next and to coordinate their utterances 
and actions with those of their partners” (Kraut et al., 2003: 15). Dynamic visuals serve as 
an artefact around which interlocutors can coordinate their contributions, both in terms of 
time and content. They are constantly reminded of the overall picture to which they con-
tribute with their single statements. They can see what has been said before and what top-
ics have not been touched so far in their discussion. In this way, the visual helps to main-
tain the big picture and the participants of a conversation can understand how the specific 
contributions relate to the overall topic.  
Visuals are important for gaining and keeping the big picture also because they sup-
port systemic thinking and focusing on the interconnections, rather than the parts. Dimond 
and Beaumont (1974), Kosslyn (1978), and Maruyama (1986), as quoted by Meyer 
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(1991), all argued that cognitive operations on images do not require their decomposition 
into single elements. In view of an image, people are inclined to think of the interrelation-
ships between components rather than engaging in fragmentary thinking (Meyer, 1991). In 
a visual, the logic of presentation is not sequential. Various information elements are out-
lined in space and presented simultaneously. Meyer therefore argues that visuals serve for 
simultaneous processing of a variety of information and help to keep more information 
items in mind (Meyer, 1991: 222). Seeing various elements placed next to each other, con-
versation partners are invited to think whether there is a relationship between these and 
what the nature of such a relationship could be. If this visual is a framework that provides 
an all-embracing structure (which can be based on a metaphor or on a more abstract rep-
resentation) along which interlocutors can position their contributions, the capability to 
interconnect and see the big picture is even more strongly enhanced (Vincent & Rosse, 
2001). Finally, the work with interactive visual tools is a mapping activity of a sort, in 
which the important arguments are placed on visual metaphors or on other visual support 
such as diagrams, tables or coordinate systems. Huff and Jenkins (Huff & Jenkins, 2002) 
mentioned that working with mapping techniques brings advantages such as, among oth-
ers, connecting and organizing knowledge, or representing knowledge on different levels of 
abstraction. Using visual tools thus helps to interconnect, to think systemically, to better 
differentiate between the various levels of abstraction, and to create and maintain the big 
picture of a conversation. Being the creation of the big picture facilitated in the tool condi-
tion, experts and decision makers rely more on the big picture in integrating their knowl-
edge. 
Moderation Hypothesis Three (Hm3): With the support of the visual tool, integra-
tion efforts rely less on conflict and deal with it in a more constructive way 
Conversation partners, who manage to have a necessary common ground among 
them and, second, are capable of seeing and maintaining the big picture of the issue of 
decision throughout the conversation process, need to refer less to conflict when integrat-
ing their knowledge. For example, if an interlocutor A holds another opinion or view than 
interlocutor B, but if both of them see the big picture of the issue, they have a better chance 
to see that their opposition might be resolved at a higher level of abstraction. Similarly, if 
A knows interlocutor B well (that is they share a large common ground), but, on a specific 
issue, B disagrees with A, A might easily induce the reasons and motivations behind B’s 
disagreement and develop an understanding for it. He/she can also more easily refer to 
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these reasons and motivations and resolve the disagreement at this level. In this way, con-
versation partners who are interacting with the help of the tool, mainly integrate their 
knowledge through common ground and big picture and task conflict is a less important 
element in the integration process.  
We claim that, in the tool condition, conflict is not only less important for the inte-
gration of knowledge, but interlocutors are also capable of dealing more constructively 
with arising conflict30. This means that conversation partners will report a moderate level 
of task conflict and will not mistake it for relationship conflict (low correlation). Star and 
Griesemer state that “when participants in the intersecting worlds create representation 
together, their different commitments and perceptions are resolved into representations (..). 
This resolution does not mean consensus. Rather, representations, or inscriptions, contain 
at every stage the traces of multiple viewpoints, translations and incomplete battles” (Star 
& Griesemer, 1989: 412). The activity of representing the various perspectives makes it 
possible for the interlocutors to, first, more explicitly acknowledge and understand these 
differences and, second, to dissociate the differences from the people. The developing vis-
ual provides a resolution for the differences without forcing consensus. Cecez-Kecmanovic 
and Dalmaris (2000) found similarly that when people can see the representation of a col-
lective understanding or opinion, they can recognize the possible discrepancies with their 
own understanding. Such differences in opinion and inconsistencies in understanding are 
usually quite hard to detect, but become more apparent through the visual depiction. Par-
ticipants can critically review the various elements and the relationships among them if 
they are visually outlined in front of them. Instead of an uncritical acknowledgement of 
facts, the visual leads to a certain amount of task conflict. Yet, the handling of this conflict 
is collaborative. The framing that the interactive visual provides is one of integration: all 
contributions are potentially part of the same image. There is nothing beyond that image 
that could not be integrated and disagreements are only different perspectives of the same 
picture. In a subtle way, such an integrative image creates a more collaborative spirit 
among the conversation partners. Dichotomous (either-or) reasoning (Tannen, 1999) and 
defensive arguing (Argyris, 1996) can be contained and with that the non-constructive 
handling of conflict. What in addition fosters a constructive handling of conflict is when 
conversation partners switch from one visual support to another. They can frame, for ex-
 
30 Other important factors for dealing more constructively with conflict are the creation of intragroup 
trust (Simons & Peterson, 2000) or introducing interactional rules as focusing in the debate on facts 
and multiplying alternatives and to enrich the level of debate (Eisenhardt et al., 2000). Furthermore, 
specific tools, like the self-assessment-tool proposed by Drucker, are said to help communicators to 
more openly listen to each other and to deal more constructively with conflict (Drucker, 1994). 
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ample, a negotiation situation as a pie for which the total value is defined upfront and of 
which each party tries to get the biggest piece. Alternatively, the same situation can be 
viewed as a bridge. In this frame, each party starts with a departing situation and can cre-
ate additional value by building on the bridge, common interests. A change in the visual 
support permits conversation partners to alter their perspective on the issue and to re-
frame their thinking (Inns, 2002). By doing so, they realize that their perspective is, to 
some degree, contingent, which leads them to approach differences of opinion in a more 
collaborative spirit.  
Finally, by visualizing arguments and standpoints, these concepts receive a certain 
physical reality and are to some extent dissociated to the people who put them forward. 
The risk is thus lower to take a critique on an issue personally and to misunderstand a task 
conflict on a relational level. The correlation between relationship and task conflict is 
therefore lower. In sum, we claim that interlocutors, who interact with the support of a 
visual tool, refer less to conflict in order to integrate their knowledge and if they do so, 
they deal with it in a more constructive manner.  
Moderation Hypothesis Four (Hm4): With the support of the visual tool, integra-
tion efforts rely less on the balanced participation of all conversation partners 
We have argued that a balanced participation of all conversation partners is a basic 
reflection of knowledge integration. In both conditions (tool and non-tool), if a certain 
conversation partner does not participate in the conversation process, his/her knowledge 
cannot be integrated to a group knowledge. In this sense, balanced participation remains 
important in both conditions. There are visualization tools for face-to-face conversation 
that visualize the peripherical social cues of the conversation like for example the amount 
of contributions of each interlocutor (DiMicco & Hollenbach, 2006; DiMicco et al., 2004; 
Sack, 2000). DiMicco and her colleagues (2004) found that in a co-located setting, provid-
ing visual cues on the amount of contributions of each conversation partner made much-
talkers limit their amount of contributions and equilibrated participation. Since the visuali-
zation tool that was employed for this experiment does not visualize such social cues, we 
did not expect such an effect. Yet, we stipulate a similar effect as the one for the conflict 
construct. If the participants of a conversation do see the big picture of an issue, they more 
or less know which aspects they still need to discuss, which information is missing, and 
where they have to develop novel approaches. In this sense, even if there were some much-
talkers and little-talkers in the discussion, this is not forcibly seen as a threat to knowledge 
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integration. The orientation on the conversational process is thus tightly bound to the con-
tent and scope of the discussion so that the strict distribution of the turns taken by the 
conversation partners is perceived to be less important for the integration of knowledge 
than without the tool. Without the visual tool, conversation partners are more sensitive to 
interactional justice, i.e. balanced participation (Bies & Moag, 1986). 
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Figure 23: Tool Condition: Conversers, who 
Aim to Integrate Knowledge, Mainly 
Rely on the Construction of the Big 
Picture and of Common Ground 
Figure 24: Non-Supported Condition: Con-
versers, who Aim to Integrate 
Knowledge, Mainly Rely on Ba-
lanced Participation and Conflict 
To summarize, we stipulate that the visualization software has a positive moderating 
effect on the level of the relationships of our model and not on the level of the means. We 
claim that, in the tool condition, conversation partners integrate their knowledge mainly 
through the establishment of ‘big picture’ and a ‘common ground’ and that conflict and 
balanced participation carry less weight (see: Figure 23). For the non-tool condition (see: 
Figure 24), we find the opposite situation. Because of a lack of common ground and big 
picture, interlocutors give more importance to conflict and balanced participation. We 
further claim that, in the non-supported situation, interlocutors deal with conflict in a less 
constructive way and that relationship conflict and task conflict are more strongly corre-
lated (above, we have defined constructive conflict as the co-occurrence of moderate task 
conflict, low relationship conflict, and a low correlation between the two). Finally, there is 
a stronger relation between knowledge integration and decision commitment in the tool 
condition (2nd level integration).  
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In the following chapter, we will provide empirical evidence from an experiment for 
the proposed model of knowledge integration and discuss a first test of the moderation 
hypotheses.  
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1  Methods 
In this chapter, we will present a first empirical evaluation of the communicative 
model for knowledge integration and of the proposed moderation effect of the use of the 
collaborative visual boundary objects on the model (precisely the impact of the use of 
computer-supported, versatile visual tools on knowledge integration), which we have dis-
cussed in Chapter 4. For this first evaluation, we conducted a classroom experiment. 
1.1 Design and Participants  
The classroom experiment involves a preference task (DeSanctis & Gallupe, 1987), 
in which subjects have to make a selection of alternatives for which there is no objective 
criterion of a correct answer. We use a between-subjects single factor group design 
(Keppel & Wickens, 2004) by varying only the mode of communication (tool groups and 
non-tool groups). We have worked with a total of 64 respondents (32 per condition), 
forming 16 groups of four subjects each (8 groups per condition). Each group consists of 
two “experts” and two “managers” and students are randomly assigned to the groups and 
their function within the group. Participants were undergraduate students in communica-
tion science that follow a strategy or knowledge management course.  
1.2 Task  
The preference task is based on a hidden profile scenario31 (Stasser, 1992; Stasser & 
Stewart, 1992), in which there exists an information asymmetry between the single mem-
bers of the group. In order to make satisfying choices and to have enough information on 
the presented alternatives, conversation partners have to pool the unshared items.  
 
31 The hidden profile setting, i.e. the information asymmetry and explicit role assignments (Stasser et al., 
2000) had the mere function to establish the role of the expert and the one of the decision maker. We 
did not pursue the classical objective of hidden profile studies, which is to analyze whether conversa-
tion partners have an inclination to share and consider information that is already shared among them 
(and to consider uniquely held information to a lesser extent). The mere difference in information and 
the explicit attribution of roles do not make a person an expert or a manager. In fact, the language, 
mental models, past experiences, and the implicit knowledge of these ‘experts’ and ‘decision makers’ 
certainly do not differ in the way they do in a natural condition. Such a procedure though has been 
used in other experimental settings (Stasser et al., 2000) and we could suppose that if we can observe 
the said communicational challenges of knowledge integration already in this attenuated situation, 
they would be more blatant in a “real world” context. 
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Students receive a case study32 about a small-medium enterprise (SME) and its 
knowledge management projects, some of which it intended to implement. On the basis of 
the case study, students have to decide which three of the five project proposals they 
would choose for actual implementation. Half of the students receive a version of the case 
that provides more information on the knowledge management projects (expert version) 
whereas the other half obtains more strategic, corporate information (decision maker ver-
sion) (see: Appendices 7 & 8 for the two case versions). In total, the cases contain 12 in-
formation cues on corporate and strategy issues (of which only 3 are exposed in the expert 
version) and 52 cues on the knowledge management projects (of which only 11 are in-
cluded in the manager version; see: Appendix 9 for a comparative listing of the informa-
tion cues for both case versions). Each group is formed of two experts (students who have 
read the expert version of the case), and two decision makers (who have read the man-
agement version). During the one hour experiment, students are asked to identify with the 
roles attributed to them through the case study and to imitate a one hour meeting.  
In this meeting, two experts present five knowledge management measures and the 
CEO with another manager decide, which three of the five measures to actually imple-
ment. In the first half hour, in order to better understand the context, into which the 
knowledge management measures shall be implemented, the groups are asked to discuss 
the corporate objectives and problems of the company. They have to elaborate four crite-
ria by which they will evaluate and choose the knowledge management measures. In the 
second part of the meeting, the students have to present, discuss, and evaluate the five 
proposed knowledge management measures. Finally, the two managers have to decide (by 
consultation of the experts), which three of the five measures to further pursue and im-
plement. Figure 25 and Figure 26 outline exemplary solutions for the first and second part 
of the task, yet there is no one best solution for the given task. We used the software tools, 
with which half of the groups worked, as a visual support for the presentation of these 
solutions. 
The task we developed for the experiment had to satisfy the following criteria. First, 
the task needed to well imitate a real world problem and represent a good instance of a 
domain expert-decision maker interaction. It needed to be a problem, in which, decision 
makers typically draw in experts for consultation. In such a situation, neither the experts 
nor the decision makers alone could have taken an informed decision. Decision makers 
 
32 For the original case study, see: (Eppler, 2002). 
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call in experts only if they have to take a decision in a rather complex and uncertain envi-
ronment where there is no one best solution. The task therefore needed to show a consid-
erable level of complexity. In addition, we wanted to imitate the time pressure aspect, 
which is a major challenge in the expert-decision maker interaction. Finally, we were look-
ing for a task, in which subjects already had some prior knowledge so that they can poten-
tially bring into the discussion somewhat more implicit knowledge and not only report the 
explicit items from the case study. Since the respondents would be students that follow 
either a knowledge management or a strategy course, the task had to do with knowledge 
management, project management, and with strategy implementation.  
1.3 Tool 
The software tool we were using for the experiments is called let’s focus Positioner 
and is part of the software package let’s focus. The objective of let’s focus is to support 
knowledge processes of individuals or groups by using interactive visualization methods. 
In particular, all applications of let’s focus are thought to support face-to-face conversa-
tions as also computer mediated interactions.  
The software has been developed conceptually by the authors and by the Reflact 
Inc., a German company developing and using new media for organizational development, 
which technically and graphically developed the tool. The software is based on Flash und 
Java technologies and uses XML standards for data formats and format conversions. It 
has been used in various organizations, including reinsurance groups, logistics providers, 
banks, and universities. Conceptually, let’s focus is based on approaches of knowledge 
visualization, metaphor theory, Gestalt theory, and also on morphological research (let's-
focus, 2006). 
let’s focus can be used as a support in various settings. It is said to support the facili-
tation of workshops, virtual meetings, interactive presentations, training seminars, and 
can also be used in more individualistic problem-solving situations (let's-focus, 2006). As 
a communication device, the producers claim that the tool helps to overcome communica-
tion fallacies as “circular discussions, suboptimal use of time, insufficient fact-checking 
and hazardous and rashly conclusions, misunderstandings, and unfruitful conflict” 
(Reflact & Eppler, 2005). Yet, the aim of let’s focus is not only to serve as a communica-
tion device, but also to provide frames and conceptual structures for approaching specific 
task types like evaluative tasks (e.g. client- or competitor assessments, option evaluations) 
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or more general analytic tasks (e.g. problem analysis, stakeholder analysis) and also plan-
ning tasks (e.g. project or campaign planning meetings). In order to support these various 
tasks, the software package includes four tools: the let’s focus Timeliner, the let’s focus 
Ruler, the let’s focus Tracker, and the let’s focus Positioner (for an overview on the vari-
ous tools, see: Appendix 10). 
The let’s focus Positioner is the tool we used for the experiment. The Positioner is in-
tended to support groups to share information, analyze complex issues and to structure 
the integration of various types of information. The tool provides a large library of inter-
active and in part animated templates of diagrams and metaphors along which the user 
can position objects such as textboxes and symbols and visually underlie the relation be-
tween them. The tool includes functionalities of clustering, annotation, replay, levelling, 
and overlaying, all of them using simple drag and drop logics and which allow users to 
visualize their thinking and communication processes.  
A description of the specific features of let’s focus Positioner can be found in Ap-
pendix 11. We will limit ourselves to present only one distinguishing feature of the appli-
cation, which is that its user (e.g. the moderator of a meeting) can choose between a vari-
ety of backgrounds and templates. These represent diagrams (i.e. Fishbone, Balanced 
Scorecard, Five Forces, Value Chain, or Ansoff Matrix) or visual metaphors (i.e. a radar, 
an iceberg, a bridge, geographical maps, a ladder, a pyramid, a wheel, or a funnel). The 
templates combine such a background visual with some default text-fields and objects and 
provide more guided structure in approaching specific tasks such as, for example, a stake-
holder analysis. The idea is that the individual or group selects a visual guideline or cogni-
tive and communicative frame with which to approach and structure an issue or conversa-
tion. Since these frames are visible to all conversation partners, they are likely to provide a 
common ground and language to all the participants of a conversation and facilitate un-
derstanding.  
For the experiment, we prepared two templates, one for the corporate discussion 
and elaboration of evaluation criteria, the second for the evaluation of the proposed 
measures. 
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Figure 25: Template (Based on a Compound Metaphor) and Exemplary Solution for 
the First Part of the Task: Understanding Corporate Objectives, Problems 
and Defining Evaluation Criteria
 
Figure 26: Template and Exemplary Solution for the Second Part of the Task: 
Evaluating Proposals of Five Knowledge Management Projects
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The first template (see: Figure 25) is based on the visual metaphor including a sailing 
boat that is floating in the sea. It is guided by the light of a lighthouse and is threatened by 
underwater icebergs. The template invites interlocutors to place the organization’s internal 
problems in the bow of the ship, the external threats on the iceberg, the objectives of the 
company on the lighthouse’s light beam and, finally, the criteria for the evaluation of the 
knowledge management measures in the middle of the picture, on the sails. 
The second template (see: Figure 26) is more analytic and includes a table that al-
lows for evaluating how good each knowledge management measure corresponds to the 
previously developed evaluation criteria. On the left row of the table of Figure 26, evalua-
tion criteria are transferred and on the upper cells. 
1.4 Setting 
All groups are sitting in a small lecturing room on a square table, the two ‘experts’ 
on one side, the ‘managers’ on the other, but all facing each other. The groups of the tool-
supported condition have a notebook and a mouse placed on the table, which can be han-
dled by one of the group members (see: Figure 27). To facilitate the visibility of graphic 
template, the computer screen is projected by a beamer. All groups are audio and video-
taped during the one hour interaction.  
 
Figure 27: Group Conversing with the Use of let’s focus Positioner 
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1.5 Pretest 
The initial questionnaire was reviewed by an expert on experimental design and was 
tested on five people before we conducted the pre-test experiment. First changes were 
taken into consideration.  
In order to test the design, procedure, and questionnaire of the experiment, we con-
ducted a pre-test with an executive master class of 32 students (8 groups). At this stage, 
we handed out the case study just 30 minutes prior to the experiment and gave only a very 
brief introduction to the tool. Also, the task was more complex and involved an hour dis-
cussion that was divided in three parts: 1. sharing corporate information and elaboration 
of evaluation criteria for the knowledge management measures (with the support of the 
let’s focus Positioner); 2. sharing of project information and deciding three knowledge 
management measures to implement (with the support of the let’s focus Positioner); 3. 
planning action steps for implementing the decision (with the support of the let’s focus 
Timeliner). The students had 20 minutes for each task.  
At the end of the experiment, we held a plenary discussion with all the participants 
and asked feedback on the task, on the use of the tool, and on the questionnaire. We ana-
lyzed the questionnaires and changed the few questions to which several people hadn’t 
responded. We also analyzed the outcome of the questionnaires and found moderate con-
firmatory results on most variables.  
From the insights gained through the observation during the task, the results of the 
questionnaires and the plenary feedback session, we slightly changed procedure, task and 
questionnaire of the experiment. First, we determined that students should be more 
strongly familiarized with the tool. We decided that all students (the ones who will use the 
tool and the ones who will not) would receive a brief conceptual and practical introduc-
tion to the tool and they would use the tool in a task in the days and lesson previous to 
the experiment. Second, we would make them read the case study not right before the 
experiment, but would give it as homework for the day of the experiment. In the pre-test, 
the overall time schedule was very tight and the overall time request quite long (together 
with the reading of the case and the plenary discussion). We realized that students were 
quite tired and less motivated at the end. For the same reason of time and motivation, we 
shortened the task of the experiment and skipped the third part. That also brought the 
advantage that students had to use only one tool of the let’s focus suite (Positioner) and 
were able to focus more on the task and less on the learning of the tool. Finally, we made 
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some changes in the questionnaire, we added some questions for the big picture construct, 
the common ground construct, and included some control questions on the level of famili-
arity with the task. 
1.6 Procedure 
After pre-testing questionnaire and procedure, we conducted the experiment in the 
following way. By email or in a lesson prior to the training for the experiment, students 
were asked to confirm their participation at the experiment. Two lessons before the day of 
the experiment, all students (independently of whether they were part of tool or non-tool 
group) received a brief introduction to the tool (ideas behind it, possible uses, how to use 
it). Students also had to do an exercise for homework with the tool that they then had to 
present in class. In this way, we were able to assure that students have some familiarity in 
the use of the tool. A day or maximum a week before the experiment, the students re-
ceived the 5- respectively 8-page case study, which they had to read for the day of the ex-
periment. They were urged not to share information among them prior to the experiment.  
The day of the experiment, students were split into groups and received 10 minutes 
to again scan through the case study. The single groups were reminded that they were now 
part of a living case study and found themselves in a one-hour meeting in which they had 
to share information and make several decisions. For the tool groups, the supervisor also 
showed which visual template to use for the first part of the meeting and which for the 
second part. The groups working with the tool chose one participant of the conversation 
to handle the tool and visualize the contributions of all members along the discussion. 
After the one hour discussion, the groups were asked to collectively fill in a form in which 
they had to outline which projects they had chosen and argue why they had chosen them. 
In addition, they were asked to fill in a questionnaire, which took 15 minutes for compila-
tion. 
1.7 Operationalization of Research Variables and Measure-
ment Model 
All research variables are measured using multi-item scales (see Appendix 13 for 
original scales and Table 12 for adjusted scales after assessment of psychometric proper-
ties).  
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We developed our own scales for the constructs of Common Ground, Big Picture, 
and Decision Commitment and relied on already developed scales for Balanced participa-
tion (Murthy & Kerr, 2003) (to which we added some additional items), Content and 
Relationship Conflict (Pearson, 2002).  
Balanced Participation 
We measured the balanced participation construct with a 3-item scale including the 
following items:  
1. There was an adequate participation from all members of the group 
2. There were one or two people who dominated the discussion 
3. The other members of my group paid attention to the comments I made 
We borrowed item 1. from Murthy and Kerr (2003) and added 2. and 3. We intro-
duced item 3 since balanced participation is not only about making turns and actively 
contributing to the conversation. It is also about whether these contributions are actually 
considered and whether participation on behalf of the listeners (not only the speakers) is 
equal. If all participants engage in equal turn taking, but nobody listens or takes into ac-
count what participant A says, the turn taking might be equal, but not so the participa-
tion. 
Big Picture 
To our knowledge, the big picture challenge has not been object of empirical studies 
that applied quantitative measurement methods. For this reason, we have developed a 6-
item scale based on the insights we gained from the explorative case studies from the con-
ceptualization in the existing literature (Gasper & Clore, 2002; Harkins, 1999; Rhodes, 
1991; Ringach, 2003). The scale reflects a communicative, process oriented view on the 
big picture challenge and consists of the following items:  
1. The conversation process was very clear  
2. We never lost time on discussing irrelevant issues 
3. We never lost time on too detailed discussions 
4. I always knew how a specific contribution related to the more general topic of the discus-
sion 
5. At every point in time I knew why the group was discussing a specific issue 
6. I knew at every point in time where we were in the discussion 
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As a response scale, we used the 5-point Likert scale ranging from (0=”strongly 
agree”) to 4 (=”strongly disagree”). The scale was pilot-tested using a sample of 32 re-
spondents and fine-tuned in the following.  
Common Ground 
As is the case for the big picture construct, we are not aware of an empirical study in 
which common ground was measured quantitatively. Again, on the basis of the insights 
drawn from our explorative case studies and of the existing literature (Clark & Brennan, 
1991; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Krauss & Fussell, 1991), we have developed an own 
measurement scale. We wanted it to reflect three elements that we think are important for 
the common ground construct. First, the differences or communalities in language use 
were often reported in the case studies as a proxy for a whole set of differences such as 
knowledge background, training, everyday context, personal perspectives and values. Sec-
ond, the concept should enclose whether the participants managed to enlarge the intersec-
tion of their specialized knowledge sets and integrate it in order to create a shared under-
standing. Finally, the scale should reflect the interlocutors’ capacity to put themselves in 
the perspective of the others (Krauss & Fussell, 1998) and adapt their messages to it. We 
formulated the resulting 3-item scale as follows:  
1. During the conversation, the group developed and shared a common language to deal 
with the task 
2. During the conversation, the group created a shared and deep understanding of the topic 
3. I could now better adjust my communication style to the other members of the group 
As a response scale, we worked with the 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 
(=”strongly agree”) to 4 (=”strongly disagree”). 
Constructive Conflict 
We have bound constructive conflict to three conditions: 1. moderate task conflict 
(inverted u-curve relationship), 2. low relationship conflict, 3. low correlation between 
task and relationship conflict (see: Chapter 4). In order to avoid a third order latent vari-
able, we do not introduce constructive conflict as a second order latent variable for the 
statistical analysis, but work directly with task conflict, relationship conflict, and the cor-
relation between this two constructs. 
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For the measurement of the two interrelated conflict constructs, we relied on Pear-
son, Ensley, and Amason’s (Pearson, 2002) 6-item scale. They developed their scale on the 
basis of Jen’s famous Intragroup Conflict Scale, who developed a measurement for the 
two discussed dimensions of conflict (Jehn, 1995). Pearson et al.’s scale for relationship 
conflict consists of three items, which we took over: In one relationship conflict item 
“How much tension was there in the group during decision?” we replaced “during deci-
sions” with “during the exercise” as our focus was on the whole one hour group interac-
tion and not merely on the moments people took decisions. In the task conflict item “How 
many disagreements regarding different ideas were there?” we added “during the one hour 
discussion”. For both task conflict and relationship conflict, the responses were recorded 
on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (=”none”) to 4 (=”a great deal”). In order to 
model the curvilinear relationship (inverted u-shape) for task conflict, we introduced a 
quadratic component to the linear function (x2) (Backhaus et al., 2003). 
Decision Commitment 
We measured the level of ‘decision commitment’ with a 3-item scale we developed 
ourselves:  
1. I feel confident that our group made the right decisions;  
2. The group was better at making the decision than I could have done by myself;  
3. The decisions were unanimous  
4. There was a lot of agreement in the group.  
As a response scale, we have used the 5-point Likert scale ranging from (0=”strongly 
agree”) to 4 (=”strongly disagree”).  
1.8 Mode of Analysis 
The model we have presented for knowledge integration is an indirect reflective, sec-
ond order model with multiple mediating constructs. In view of the type of model, but 
considering our limited sample size, we will do a combination of structural equation mod-
elling (SEM) technique and traditional confirmatory factor analysis. SEM allows for the 
simultaneous analysis of all relationships in a model (and not merely the linkage between 
two constructs at a time), and, more importantly for this study, for the analysis of models 
that include second order latent variables. Yet, an important drawback of SEM is the need 
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for a large minimal sample size. While traditional regression analysis requires a minimum 
of only 30 cases to obtain robust results, in SEM, accepted minimal samples size range 
from 50 (if we operate with loading factors of more than 0.75) (Hair et al., 1998) to the 
more accepted 100 to 150 cases (Gefen, 2000). In view of models with second order latent 
variables, authors even mention 200 as an accepted minimal (MacCallum et al., 1996). 
Other scholars define minimal sample size in terms ratio of observations to parameters to be 
estimated (Jackson, 2003) and fix the ratio at 10:1 or even 20:1 (Kline, 1998). Barclay and 
his colleagues state, for example, that the sample should have at least ten times more data-
points than the number of items in the most complex construct in the model (Barclay et 
al., 1995).  
In view of our small sample size of 64 respondents (32 for each condition), we can 
obtain relatively robust results only when performing traditional regression analysis. Yet, 
since this type of analysis is not possible for the model we have proposed, we have opted 
for a combined approach (Hair et al., 1998; MacCallum et al., 1996; MacCallum et al., 
1999). We first conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (with the support of the software 
package SPSS) for the first order latent constructs, then introduced those constructs – in 
the form of indicators - in the AMOS program and treated them as observed variables. 
Even approaching the analysis this way, the problem of minimal sample size is not fully 
resolved so that this analysis can only be seen as a first inconclusive analysis that helps us 
to refine the model and our hypotheses for further studies that allow for an analysis with 
more statistical power.  
Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to examine the construct of knowl-
edge integration and its hypothesised dimensional indicators: balanced participation, big 
picture, common ground, constructive conflict (low level of task conflict, lack of relation-
ship conflict). In addition, it aims to understand the moderation effect of the use of con-
tent-specific, interactive visualization support on the model of knowledge integration. 
2  Results 
2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, we will present the results of the descriptive and factorial analysis. 
Since our hypotheses are on a structural level, we will not discuss distributions, frequen-
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cies, or central tendency in detail. Instead, we limit ourselves to briefly address issues con-
cerning the normality of distribution, the results of the confirmatory factor analysis, the 
mean and standard deviation of the latent variables and the discussion of the qualitative 
questions of the questionnaire.  
In total, 64 people participated at the experiment, that is 32 respondents for both 
the tool and non tool condition and a total of 16 groups (each of which consists of four 
people). The unit of analysis was set at the individual level. 23 of the participants were 
men, 41 were female. We have 4 missing data, but in view of our already small sample 
size, we decided not to proceed with a listwise, but with a casewise exclusion of the cases 
that showed missing values. The discussion of the normality of the distribution can be 
found in Appendix 15. 
Table 12 shows the results of the confirmatory factor analysis that is the psychono-
metric properties of the adjusted scales assessed in terms of the item loadings, the eigen-
values, the percentages of explained variance, and the Cronbach alphas. We conducted a 
principal component analysis with a varimax rotation. For the factor loadings, we used a 
cut-off criteria of 0.60 and for the Cronbach alphas of 0.70 (Devellis, 1991). The original 
scales with their psychonometric properties can be seen in Appendix 13.  
We were able to maintain the original scales for most of the constructs, but had to 
adapt them for ‘balanced participation’ and ‘decision commitment’. With regard to ‘bal-
anced participation’, we had to drop the item that checked for the equality in participation 
not with regard to the speakers and their turns made, but with regard to the listeners and 
their active consideration of what is said (The other members of my group paid attention 
to the comments I made.). 
The ‘decision commitment’ construct showed Cronbach alphas below 0.70 for the 
original 4-item scale, as well as for the various 3- and 2-item scale versions. Even though 
we have significant correlations for example between questions 1, 2, 4 (I feel confident 
that our group made the right decisions; The group was better at making the decision than 
I could have done by myself; There was a lot of agreement in the group) and factor load-
ing of above 0.70, we have insufficient Cronbach alphas. Apparently, the items, even if 
correlated do not measure the same characteristic of the decision commitment construct. 
Question 2 points more versus group performance, and agreeing is not the same as com-
mitting. Von Krogh et al. (2000: 134) for example made the argument that agreeing  
 
Chapter 5 - A First Empirical Evaluation of the Model of Knowledge Integration 
Considering the Role of Collaborative Knowledge Visualization 202 
 
Factor Item 
Factor 
Loading  
% of variance 
explained 
Cronbach 
alpha 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
Balanced partici-
pation (EP) 
1. There were not one or two 
people who dominated the 
discussion 
.891 
 2. There was an adequate par-
ticipation from all members of 
the group. 
.891 
0.79 0.74 
1.04 
(0.85) 
Big Picture (BP) 1. The conversation process was 
very clear 
.806 
 2. We never lost time on discuss-
ing     
 irrelevant issues 
.724 
 3. We never lost time on too 
detailed  
 discussions 
.602 
 4. I always knew how a specific 
contribution  
 related to the more general 
topic of the  
 discussion. 
.603 
 5. At every point in time I knew 
why the  
 group was discussing a spe-
cific issue. 
.774 
 6. I knew at every point in time 
where we  
 where in the discussion 
.632 
0.48 0.78 
1.23 
(0.57) 
Common Ground 
(CG) 
1. During the discussion the 
group created a shared and 
deep understanding of the 
topic. 
.879 
 2. During the conversation, the 
group developed and shared a 
common language to deal with 
the task 
.879 
0.77 0.70 
0.95 
(0.56) 
Task Conflict 
(TC) 
1. How many disagreements 
regarding different ideas were 
there during the one hour dis-
cussion? 
.838 
 2. How many differences about 
the content of decisions did the 
group have to work through? 
.749 
 3. How many differences of 
opinion were there within the 
group? 
.837 
0.65 0.73 
2.60 
(0.56) 
Relationship 
Conflict (RC) 
1. How much anger was there 
among the members of the 
group? 
.854 
 2. How much tension was there 
in the group during the exer-
cise? 
.898 
 3. How much personal friction 
was there in the group during 
decisions? 
.901 
0.78 0.85 
3.60 
(0.65) 
Decision Com-
mitment (DC) 
1. I feel confident that our group 
made the right decisions 
- - - 
0.92 
(0.63) 
Table 12: Factor Loadings, Percentages of Variance Explained, Cronbach Alphas, 
Mean Values, and Standard Deviations of First Order Latent Variables 
Notes regarding the mean values: All constructs are measured with five-
point Likert scales with the anchors 0 = strongly agree, 2 = neither/nor, 4 = 
strongly disagree, except for Task Conflict and Relationship Conflict that 
have five-point scales ranging from 0 = none, 4 = a very great deal 
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does not equal understanding. Rather, agreeing is a commodity, which does not require 
understanding. Similarly, we could say that an agreement without a full understanding 
does not necessary lead to more commitment. Out of this factorial analysis, we had to 
decide to work only with one item and have chosen the most straightforward one: I feel 
confident that our group made the right decisions. Overall, the choice to work with a pre-
established scale for decision commitment, as for example the one proposed by Earley and 
Lind (1987), would have been preferable. The fact that we can use only one indicator for 
the decision commitment construct confronts us with an important weakness of the 
evaluation of the proposed model for knowledge integration.  
From the mean values and standard deviations we can see that, as is true for the sin-
gular items, also most latent variables are positively skewed (see: Appendix 12). Mean 
values show that respondents reported participation to be generally equal, that they man-
aged to gain a pretty good big picture, created common ground, that task conflict was 
low, relationship conflict almost non-existent, that they were pretty satisfied with their 
performance as a group, and, finally, that they felt quite committed to the decisions taken. 
The results of the mean comparison between the two conditions (tool vs. non-tool) can be 
seen in Appendix 14. 
For a better understanding of the use and perception of the tool, we added some 
quantitative and qualitative control questions to the questionnaire, which can provide first 
indications. When asked to describe the two major advantages of working with the tool. 
People responded most frequently that the tool allows for gaining an overall idea, for 
keeping in mind the global outlook, and for visualizing schematically the major issues of 
the topic and thus providing a useful summary (see: Table 13).  
In contrast to these positive quotes, 33% of the respondents felt that the tool was an 
obstacle for the flow of the conversation and almost 30% said that it hindered a balanced 
participation at the conversation (cumulative percentage of respondents who answered 
with “strongly agree” or “agree”). People reported that the handling of the tool made 
them loose time (formulation problems) and interrupted the flow of the conversation (see: 
Table 13). In addition, the person handling the tool became either very dominant in the 
conversation or acted as being relegated to the silent secretary that takes minutes. Spend-
ing time on detailed discussions how to word an issue certainly is problematic for main-
taining the big picture. One reason for this sensation of loosing time with the handling of 
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Advantages  Disadvantages / Difficulties  
 No.  No. 
General Impression 
• practical/useful/effective  
• simple & easy to use 
• immediate, quick 
• open, generic, flexible 
• colored 
• innovative 
 
Provides big picture (overview and 
precision in detail) 
• allows for gaining overall idea/global out-
look/summary (schematic visualization of 
major points) 
• helps to stay in the discussion “great for 
knowing what we are talking about and 
where we are going” 
• helps not to loose track of the objectives of 
the discussion 
• allows for major precision 
 
Provides structure 
• turns issues explicit and clear 
• provides clear categories and structures 
 
Provides flexible persistence 
• gives possibility to cancel, change and up-
date with the unfolding of the conversation 
• documents the findings and decisions taken 
• helps to remember precedent decision 
• simplifies the reaching of conclusions 
 
Provides common ground 
• provides common ground "everybody has 
got the same in front of the eyes" 
• offers common discussion structure 
• unifies 
• facilitates sharing of information 
 
Fosters reflection and changes in 
perspective 
• activates reflection 
• fosters alternative perspective in thinking 
 
Supports the simultaneous juggling 
of large amounts of information 
items 
• allows for having at disposition all the 
information 
 
Fosters commitment 
• allows for major concentration and 
commitment of all group members 
 
19 
18 
4 
4 
2 
2 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
7 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
12 
3 
 
 
3 
 
3 
1 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
1 
1 
 
 
 
1 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
2 
Hampered conversation process 
• loosing time (because of formulation 
problems, handwriting is more immedi-
ate), interruptions in conversation flow 
• low correspondence between what is said 
in discussion and what then has to be filled 
in on tool (use the tool after the discussion) 
• breaks in conversation 
• person who handles mouse is out of dis-
cussion and distracted (unbalanced par-
ticipation) 
 
Difficulty to adapt to predefined 
categories, modes of thinking, and 
format 
• being forced to reason in the provided 
limited categories and metaphors - lack-
ing flexibility 
• packed templates do not provide enough 
space 
 
Excessive focus on technology 
• handling problems due to low acquaint-
ance with software 
• focus on the tool instead of looking at the 
group members 
• too much concentration on the tool instead 
of on the task (focus on the how (how to 
approach issue) rather than the what) 
 
Forced consensual representation 
• being forced to write also the aspects on 
which the group has not found a consen-
sus 
 
10 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Table 13: Results of the Two Qualitative Questions: ”What are the two major ad-
vantages/disadvantages of the use of the visual tool during the exercise?” 
Note: No. indicates for the numbers of times a specific answer was given 
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the tool can stem from the interlocutors’ relative unfamiliarity with the tool. As discussed 
earlier (see: Pretest), we tried to assure a sufficient familiarity with the tool in various 
ways. First, the tool is quite easy to use and resembles in its mode of operation very com-
mon software programs (i.e. drag and drop). Second, students had to do an individual 
exercise with the tool prior to the experiment for a first familiarization. Third, the mem-
bers of each group could decide themselves who should be appointed with the role of 
handling the tool during the discussion. It is therefore most likely that they chose a person 
who is quite adroit in handling software instruments. In spite of all these facts, students 
might have known the functionalities of the tool, but nevertheless did not feel very famil-
iar in using the tool. In fact, observing the adoptions and appropriations of the tool 
(DeSanctis & Poole, 1994) were quite insightful. Most groups used only a very limited 
range of the functionalities the tool offers. Many, for example, did not work with colours 
for clustering, they did not use the comments for adding more detailed information and 
did not add new textboxes. In addition, groups differed quite significantly in the way they 
used the tool. Some drew on it while conversing as an ongoing visualization of what was 
discussed; others used the tool only every five minutes as a summary device. In this latter 
case, it is clear that using the tool interrupts the conversation flow. Similarly, some groups 
gave the tool-handler more autonomy and let him/her document the conversation rather 
quickly, others decided in rather long collective processes what to write and how to for-
mulate each single statement. While each form of adoption has its advantages (e.g. collec-
tive formulation might turn tacit misunderstandings or task conflicts more apparent), it is 
most likely that the groups had not found out yet how to best make use of the tool. Fa-
miliarity with the tool might therefore be an important issue when stating that the tool 
hampered the conversation process. In spite of these reservations, only 9% of the respon-
dents stated that they would have preferred to complete the task without the tool and only 
11% reported that the tool added complexity to the task. Similarly, some people felt un-
comfortable to reason in the provided categories, metaphors and perceived those as an 
inflexible additional structure to th task. The perception of additional complexity is corre-
lated to the impression that the tool hampered a balanced participation (.71*). Secondly, 
individuals who reported that they were used to solve case studies, tended to state also 
that they would have preferred to work without the tool (correlation of .64*). It seems 
that if individuals were familiar with the kind of task, they did not need the structure the 
tool provides and perceived it therefore as less useful. 
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Finally, we controlled for satisfaction with performance using 3 items of Murthy 
and Kerr’s (2003) four item scale (one item was specific to their research context). Satis-
faction with performance measures the positive feelings and attitudes members of a group 
have toward a decision taken or a performance reached by the group (Keyton, 1999). Sat-
isfaction is an important control variable out of various considerations. Previous research 
could show that the sharing of information leads to a greater group member satisfaction 
(U-shaped relationship: Mennecke, 1997), that there is also a positive relationship be-
tween members’ participation and satisfaction (Fisher & Ellis, 1990; Olaniran, 1996), but 
that both content and relationship conflict lead to less satisfaction (De Dreu & Weingart, 
2003). Knowledge integration, as we have conceptualized it, involves balanced participa-
tion, the exchange of information, but also the examination of this information with a 
constructive level of conflict. For this reason, it is particularly interesting to measure this 
outcome variable as a control measure33. We found, comparing the tool with the non-tool 
condition, that there is no significant mean difference between the two conditions. Pearson 
correlations show that the satisfaction with the group performance positively correlates 
with the creation of the big picture (.70**) and with the creation of common ground 
(.52*) and negatively with relationship conflict (-.40*) (see: Appendix 15 for inter-
construct correlations). The creation and perpetuation of the big picture in a conversation 
seems thus to be an important aspect for the satisfaction with group performance and has 
to be further researched in future studies. With regard to balanced participation and con-
tent conflict, we were not able to confirm findings of previous studies as we did not find 
significant correlations between these constructs and the satisfaction with the group per-
formance. 
In summary, from the first descriptive and factorial analysis, we have gained the fol-
lowing insights. The descriptive analysis has shown that we have slightly abnormal distri-
butions both on the level of the items and on that of the latent variables. Conducting the 
factorial analysis, we were able to confirm many of the original scales we used in the ques-
tionnaire. Only for the constructs of balanced participation and decision commitment, we 
had to adjust the originally proposed scales. Finally, the discussion of the qualitative ques-
tions has shown that conversation partners using the visual tool perceived it as helpful and 
easy to use and that it allowed them to more easily gain a global overview on the topic, as 
well as making issues explicit. It was problematic though that the tool forced them to 
 
33 Other outcome variables like decision quality are more problematic in a study which works with a 
preference task and which views communication not simply as a medium for decision making or 
knowledge integration, but as the constitutive element of these processes (Poole & Hirokawa, 1996). 
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spend a lot of time on formulating and documenting and stopped the natural conversation 
flow. Such drawbacks are most likely to be lessened once the conversation partners are 
more familiar with the tool. 
Next, we will present our structural analysis of the knowledge integration model and 
later discuss the moderation effect of the software based visualization tool. 
2.2 Structuration Analysis: Testing the Knowledge Integra-
tion Model 
The structural analysis is geared towards the evaluation of the following two claims. 
First, we aim to evaluate the proposed model for knowledge integration (hypotheses H1-
H5) and, second, we want to test the hypothesis whether the interactive visualization tool 
has a moderation effect on the relationships of the model for knowledge integration 
(Hm1-Hm4).  
Before presenting the results of the structure equation modelling analysis, Table 14 
presents the inter-construct correlations of the latent variables.  
 EP BP CG TC RC DC 
Balanced participation (EP)       
Big Picture (BP) .36**      
Common Ground (CG) .31* .34**     
Task Conflict (TC) -.33** -.20 .07    
Relationship Conflict (RC) -.19 -.31* -.22 .26*   
Decision Commitment (DC) .21 .38** .04 -.38** -.15  
Table14:  Pearson’s Inter-Construct Correlations 
** Significance at .01 level, * Significance at .05 level 
Various correlations are insignificant and the significant ones show low correlations (0.2 < 
r ≤ 0.5). In view of our proposed second order reflective model, low correlations among 
the reflective constructs are expected (Edwards, 2001; Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000). 
Figure 28 shows the results of the structure equation analysis we have conducted with the 
help of the software package Amos 5. The latent variables reflecting knowledge integra-
tion are all – with the exception of task conflict - going in the direction we have claimed: 
balanced participation, big picture, and common ground reflect knowledge integration 
positively, while relationship conflict reflects it negatively. Again with the exception of 
task conflict, we have satisfactory and significant regression coefficients for the loadings 
(above 0.5) and the variances explained (above 0.3) for all the latent variables. Most im-
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portant for knowledge integration and most positively related is the big picture construct 
(with a loading coefficient (L) of 0.68***34 and an explained variance (EV) of 0.46) (H2 
supported). Balanced participation (L= 0.64***, EV= 0.42) is similarly important (H1 
supported), followed by common ground (L= 0.56***, EV= 0.31) (H3 supported). This 
means that if conversation partners manage to create and maintain a big picture over the 
decision that has to be taken, i.e. they know how single aspects and contributions relate to 
the more general issue and do not get lost in discussions on details or irrelevant side-
issues, then one can be quite confident that they manage to integrate their knowledge. Yet, 
also common ground and balanced participation are important reflections of the whether 
knowledge integration has taken place. On the other hand, as expected, relationship con-
flict reflects knowledge integration negatively (L= -0.57***, EV= 0.33). Regarding the 
second phase of knowledge integration – the integration of the group knowledge into the 
decision making process – we equally have satisfactory results with a coefficient of 
0.50**. Yet, the explained variance of 0.25 is fairly low. A successful first-phase integra-
tion of individual knowledge into group knowledge explains only a fourth of why people 
feel committed to a decision (H5 weakly supported). 
The results for task conflict do not meet our previsions entirely. We have made the 
hypothesis of an inverted U-curve relationship between task conflict and knowledge inte-
gration and have claimed that a moderate level of task conflict positively reflects knowl-
edge integration. As mentioned earlier, we have operationalized this curvilinear relation-
ship by squaring the task conflict concept (Backhaus et al., 2003). Yet, even when model-
ling such a curvilinear relationship, we find a negative coefficient of -0.39* (which is, as 
expected lower than for relationship conflict). In addition, task conflict explains only 15% 
of the variance of knowledge integration. Testing for the alternatively possible linear rela-
tionship, we find a -0.45 loading coefficient with an explained variance of 0.20. We inter-
pret these findings in that even a low or moderate level of task conflict reflects knowledge 
integration negatively and that a negative linear relationship is more likely (together with 
positive results for relationship conflict, H4 is supported). This finding stands in line with 
the recent quantitative meta-analysis on the literature on task conflict of De Dreu und 
Weingart (2003). In contrast to the general view of the positive effects of a moderate level 
of task conflict and the negative ones of relationship conflict, De Dreu and Weingart 
showed that task conflict actually has strong, negative effects on team effectiveness. They 
 
34 *** = significance at 0.001 level (99.9% of cases, ** = significance at 0.01 level (99% of cases), * = 
significance at 0.05 level (95% of cases), n.s. = non significant 
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found this result to be true even if the correlation between task and relationship conflict 
was low. They concluded, conflict should not to be considered inherently as non-
functional, rather, future research should study the circumstances, in which conflict can 
have positive consequences (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). It will therefore be particularly 
interesting to see whether the use of the tool creates a circumstance in which the relation-
ship of task conflict and knowledge integration is less negative or even positive.  
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Figure 28: Results of the Structural Equation Analysis for the 
Knowledge Integration Model  
The model we have proposed can be confirmed not only with regard to each single 
hypotheses. We have positive results also for the overall model as the general model of fit 
measures are positive: we have satisfactory results for AIC (37.601) and CAIC (78.666), 
as well as for BCC (40.851) and BIC (65.666), since their numbers are lower for the de-
fault model than for the saturated model. These information theoretical measures are most 
important to confirm our model for knowledge integration, given the non-randomized 
selection of the sample. We gain additional support for the model, presenting the follow-
ing descriptive measures: the GFI (0.951) is higher than 0.95, and AGFI (0.871) misses by 
a few points the 0.9 threshold. Furthermore, the chi-square (11.601) in relation to the 
degree of freedom (8) indicates a good model of fit, even a slight overfit. Finally, the 
measures of approximate fit, pclose (0.263, should be above 0.5) and RMSEA (0.263, 
should be smaller than 0.05) are not satisfactory.  
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The small degree of freedom shows the limited power of this first test of the model. 
MacCallum and colleagues, for example, argued, that when the degree of freedom is 
small, the confidence intervals will be very wide and the test will be subject to consider-
able imprecision unless N (the sample size) is extremely large (MacCallum et al., 1996). In 
view of the very limited power of this first empirical test, the most important measures of 
model fit indicate to tentatively confirm the model, while other important ones (such as 
pclose and RMSEA) remind us to remain cautious. 
One final comment on a measurement level is necessary. We needed to introduce one 
residual correlation (of 0.46) between common ground and task conflict in order to obtain 
the reported results. Apparently, people perceive a positive connection between task con-
flict and common ground. An explanation for this result is that task conflict can, under 
specific circumstances, lead to a more in-depth and richer understanding of the issue 
(Eisenhardt et al., 2000). While arguing on a content level, interlocutors develop a richer 
common ground among them.  
Having discussed the mostly positive results for the general model for knowledge in-
tegration, we now are going to present the results for the group comparison in order to see 
if the modality of conversation (supported by a visual tool – natural condition) impacts 
the way experts and decision makers integrate their knowledge.  
2.3 Testing the Moderation Effect of the Interactive Visuali-
zation Tool 
The general aim of this second structure equation analysis is to show that, introduc-
ing a group comparison, we obtain a better model fit for knowledge integration and that 
we have a significant moderation effect on a relationship level of the model. In other 
words, we will show that conversation partners, interacting with the support of a visual 
tool, rely in their attempts to integrate knowledge more on the establishment of the big 
picture and the common ground, and less so on conflict.  
Figures 29 and 30 show the significant moderating effect of the use of the interactive 
visual tool on our model for knowledge integration. The figures illustrate the single stan-
dardized coefficients and explained variances for the knowledge integration model, both 
for the tool and non-tool condition. Comparing the loading coefficients and the explained 
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variances35 among the two situations, we can see that people, interacting with the support 
of the visual tool, rely mostly on the creation of a big picture (L= 0.73**, EV= 0.53) and a 
common ground (L= 0.75*, EV= 0.57) to integrate their knowledge and much less on 
balanced participation (L= 0.51***, EV= 0.26) and conflict (task conflict: n.s; relationship 
conflict L= -0.67*, EV= 0.45). In the non-supported situation, the image is reversed: inter-
locutors account to a great extent on balanced participation (L= 0.70***, EV= 0.51) and 
conflict (task conflict: L= -0.66**, EV= 0.43; relationship conflict L= -0.74***, EV= 0.55) 
to integrate their knowledge and less so on the creation and perpetuation of a big picture 
(L= 0.56**, EV= 0.32) and a common ground (n.s.). Since conflict is reflecting knowledge 
integration negatively, we can say that in the non supported condition, interlocutors have 
more difficulties in integrating their knowledge. To visualize this overall finding of a par-
allel reversed image between the two conditions, we have drawn the sizes of the circles 
around the constructs corresponding to their importance for knowledge integration (see: 
Figure 29 and 30). The moderating effect of the tool use on the model for knowledge inte-
gration is significant as we find a p of 0.010. The CMIN of 15.057 further indicates that 
we have a considerably better fit assuming that the two conditions are different rather 
than assuming the contrary. 
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Figure 29: Knowledge Integration for Groups 
Interacting with the Support of the 
Visual Tool 
Figure 30: Knowledge Integration for 
Groups Interacting without a 
Visual Support 
35 We report standardized values even if it is custom for group comparisons (multiple-sample analysis) to 
report unstandardized values (Kline, 1998). Yet as we are doing a measurement model and have to fix 
one parameter to one (we selected balanced participation), we cannot see the changes for this parame-
ter in the unstandardized values, but only in the standardized. For completion we therefore report the 
unstandardized values in Appendix 16. 
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In more detail, we can observe the moderation effect of the tool most dramatically in 
the changes between common ground and task conflict. In the tool supported situation, 
common ground loads with a coefficient of 0.75* and explains 57% of the variance of 
knowledge integration. Task conflict, on its part, plays absolutely no role for knowledge 
integration. Its coefficient is no longer significant. On the other hand, in the non-
supported condition, the situation is exactly the opposite. Here, common ground does not 
explain knowledge integration in any way (coefficient is non-significant, yet the impact of 
task conflict is strongly negative (loading of -0.66**) and the explained variance is consid-
erable (0.43). This reversed picture and the apparent relationship between common 
ground and task conflict is further supported by the behaviour of the residual correlations. 
While in the general model, we have found correlations between the residuals of common 
ground and task conflict, the group comparison shows that, in the non-tool condition, the 
correlation is of only 0.14, whereas in the tool condition, the correlation is 0.61 high. The 
reversed picture in the tool situation versus non-tool situation with regard to common 
ground, task conflict, and the residual correlations leads us to the following interpretation. 
People perceive these two constructs to be interrelated in the sense that task conflict can – 
if conversations are supported by the visual tool - lead to a deeper understanding of the 
issue and to a greater common ground. For the interlocutors interacting without the visual 
tool, the condition is not given for that they conceptually interlink task conflict to com-
mon ground. In other words, in their attempts to integrate their knowledge, when lacking 
common ground, people start arguing about the issue. Carlile deliberates similarly on the 
challenges in knowledge integration: „In circumstances of strong specialization individuals 
who do not share enough background or common methods may have difficulty setting 
conflicts that arise across knowledge domains” (Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003: 1182). We 
have seen that the tool facilitates the establishment of a common ground between the par-
ticipants of a conversation, which makes task conflict become less important for the inter-
locutors’ endeavours in integrating their knowledge. We further see that, in the tool sup-
ported situation, conversers manage to deal more constructively with conflict.  
We have claimed that constructive conflict is defined by three conditions: 1. a mod-
erate task conflict; 2. a low relationship conflict; 3. a low correlation between task and 
relationship conflict. Comparing the model for knowledge integration between the two 
groups, we can find that, next to the already discussed differences concerning task con-
flict, relationship conflict loads strongly negatively on knowledge integration in both 
cases. In the tool supported situation, the loading coefficients and the explained variances 
are to some extent lower, but we can say that the use of the tool limits, but does not 
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eliminate relationship conflict to be a negative cause of knowledge integration. What 
about the correlation between task conflict and relationship conflict? Conducting a classi-
cal correlation analysis in SPSS and controlling for the two conditions, we find, in the 
non-supported condition, that task conflict and relationship conflict are significantly posi-
tively correlated by a coefficient of 0.50**. On the other hand, if interlocutors are sup-
ported by the visual tool, there is no significant correlation between the two constructs 
(Pearson’s correlation coefficient: 0.05 n.s.). This means that, for the interlocutors inter-
acting without the support of the visual tool, whenever they perceive a task conflict, they 
also perceive a relationship conflict. The interpretation is likely that, without a visual sup-
port, whenever conversation partners perceive content conflict, they understand it on a 
relational level, feel attacked personally and react on a personal level. Alternatively, it 
could also be that, in the non supported condition, interlocutors instrumentally use task 
conflict to fight out relational tensions among them. In both cases, a constructive handling 
of conflict is not possible. In sum, we can say that the use of the visual tool permits con-
versation partners to deal more constructively with conflict: first of all, it cancels out the 
commingling of task conflict and relationship conflict. Secondly, the weight and negative 
impact of relationship conflict can be lowered. Finally, we have found that also a moder-
ate task conflict does not reflect knowledge integration positively. Yet, we have seen that, 
in the tool condition, task conflict does not play an important role for knowledge integra-
tion. Its role is positively substituted by the successful establishment of a common ground 
and, as we will see in the following, by the creation and perpetuation of the big picture.  
For conversation partners interacting with the support of the tool, creating and sus-
taining the big picture is much more central for knowledge integration than for those in-
teracting in the natural condition. In fact, in the tool condition, the big picture construct 
loads with a coefficient of 0.73** on knowledge integration and explains 53% of its vari-
ance. In the non-tool condition, it loads with a lower coefficient of 0.56** and explains 
the variance only by 32%. This confirms our hypothesis that the tool facilitates the per-
petuation of the big picture since the tool helps conversation partners to better tackle the 
difficult balance between detail and general overview: it provides a dynamic visual sum-
mary so that interlocutors can position the main arguments, findings, questions that are 
emerging in the conversation, but can also deposit more detailed considerations thanks to 
the comment function.  
With regard to balanced participation, we see an opposite trend. While in the tool 
condition, balanced participation loads with .51** and explains 26% of the variance of 
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knowledge integration, in the non-supported condition, it loads with a high coefficient of 
.70*** and accounts for 51% of the variance of knowledge integration. As we have stipu-
lated, balanced participation remains important in both conditions. Yet, if conversation 
partners are not supported by an interactive visual tool, they are more sensitive to interac-
tional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986) and attribute more importance to balanced participa-
tion for the integration of knowledge. On the other hand, if they are supported by an in-
teractive visual, it is easier for them to see which aspects receive less attention and still 
need to be discussed, which areas have to be developed further and for which aspects they 
have already found a sufficient agreement. They might be focused more on what is said 
rather than on who says what. For this reason, the balanced participation of all interac-
tion partners becomes less central in the tool condition. 
We have argued that knowledge integration is a two phase process, in which, first, 
the specialized knowledge of the individuals has to be integrated into group knowledge, 
and secondly, knowledge has to be integrated and transformed into the decisions to be 
taken. First, conversation partners share their insights and their specific perspectives on an 
issue and develop a more complete understanding of it. Once they have developed such an 
understanding, they have to integrate and apply it in the decisions and actions to be taken. 
We have said that we measure this second phase of the integration process with the con-
struct of decision commitment. We have claimed that if the participants of a conversation 
are successful in the first phase of the integration process, this would lead to a better inte-
gration in the second phase and thus to a better commitment to the decision taken. We 
were able to show above that in the tool condition, conversation partners were more effec-
tive in integrating their individual knowledge into a group knowledge, which is why we 
also expected a better integration into decision making in the second phase, i.e. a stronger 
correlation with decision commitment. Yet, the numbers show that the correlation is more 
or less the same for the two situations. For the tool condition, we have a loading coeffi-
cient of 0.53* and an explained variance of 0.28. Similarly, in the unsupported condition 
we have slightly lower L (0.50*) and EV (0.25). Working with the tool in the decision 
making process does not make people feel more committed to the decisions taken. We can 
conclude that the work with the visual tool supports the first phase in the knowledge inte-
gration process (the integration of specialized individual knowledge into group knowl-
edge) as it facilitates big picture and common ground, but it seems not to facilitate the 
application of this knowledge into decisions and actions.  
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Finally we do find support not only for the single moderations, but we see also that 
the overall model of fit measures become better by introducing a group comparison in the 
structure equation analysis (tool versus non-tool). In fact, the information theoretical 
measures, (AIC 68.176) and BCC (83.343) are lower for the default model than for the 
saturated model. We find additional support for the model by the descriptive measures: 
GFI (0.923) is over the 0.9 margin, not so, for a few points, AGFI (0.798). The chi-square 
amounts to 16.176, which results in a slight overfit in relation to the degree of freedom of 
16. The important measures of approximate fit, pclose (of 0.600, should be and is above 
0.5) and RMSEA (of 0.013, should be and is smaller than 0.05), show also satisfactory 
results. We find that, controlling for the tool use, we have better overall model fit meas-
ures and that there are actually structural differences how people integrate their knowl-
edge when conversing in the unsupported or visually supported condition.  
3  Section Discussion: Implications and Limita-
tions 
Understanding knowledge integration as a communication process, we have defined 
– on the basis of existing literature (Chapter 2) and the discussion of three explorative case 
studies (Chapter 3) – a communicative model for knowledge integration. Consequently, 
we have argued that the communicative setting changes the importance of the constitutive 
elements – balanced participation, big picture, common ground, constructive conflict - of 
knowledge integration. In particular, we have claimed that interactive visualization can 
facilitate the communication across knowledge boundaries as communicators rely in their 
integration efforts more on the facilitated construction of common ground and big pic-
ture, manage to deal with conflict more constructively, and are less sensitive to interac-
tional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986) such as balanced participation. 
The aim of this chapter has been twofold: 1. provide a first empirical support for the 
model of knowledge integration in decision making, and 2. test whether the mode of 
communication moderates the way people integrate knowledge or not; more specifically, 
test if supporting conversations by interactive visual tools motivates conversers to adapt a 
different strategy to integrate knowledge and rely less on balanced participation and con-
flict, and more on the establishment of common ground and big picture.  
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In a first step, we have tested and found support for the reflective model for knowl-
edge integration presented in Chapter 4. In particular, we could confirm hypotheses H1, 
H2, H3, H5, and partially confirm H4. With regard to constructive conflict (H4), we have 
found that while relationship conflict does reflect knowledge integration negatively, a 
moderate task conflict does not reflect knowledge integration positively (confutation of 
inverted u-curve hypothesis as proposed in Chapter 4). This is an interesting finding also 
for the established discourse on conflict in decision making as it contradicts the long held 
belief that content conflict can have a positive effect on decision making (a result, which 
finds support by the meta-study of De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). One major critique to 
which the presented model is susceptible is that one could argue that the model actually 
shows a measurement rather than a structural model as it consists only of components 
reflecting the construct and no component impacting on the construct. We nevertheless 
have presented it as a structural model because we conceptually make a difference be-
tween the first phase knowledge integration and the second phase integration, which is 
why the arrow of Figure leading to decision commitment is a structural and not a meas-
urement arrow. One minor limitation of the model is, in addition, that although the re-
sults for decision commitment are positive (H5), the first phase of integration (when the 
specialized individual knowledge is integrated to a group knowledge) explains only 25% 
of the variance in decision commitment. Although the aim of this study was not to provide 
an exhaustive explanation for decision commitment, we have to acknowledge that the 
integration of individual knowledge into group knowledge accounts for relatively little 
and that our support for the second phase of knowledge integration (integration of group 
knowledge into actual decision making) is not very strong. 
With regard to the use of interactive visuals to support face-to-face conversations, 
we have found that the modality of the communication has an impact on the presented 
model for knowledge integration on a structural level and we could confirm all four mod-
eration hypotheses Hm1 - Hm4. If the conversers lack the common ground among them 
and the big picture of the issue, then they are more sensitive to balanced participation in 
their knowledge integration efforts and rely more on conflict. Yet, they are not able to 
constructively deal with conflict, which is why their attempts to integrate knowledge are 
less successful. In fact, we could show that in the situation where people interact without a 
visual support, not only both task conflict and relationship conflict strongly negatively 
reflect knowledge integration, also do task conflict and relationship conflict significantly 
correlate with each other and conflict cannot be handled in a constructive manner. Sup-
porting conversers through an interactive tool helps them to gain the big picture on an 
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issue, establish a common ground and to more constructively deal with conflict. Next to 
these positive accounts of the use of cooperative visual tools, we have equally discussed 
some drawbacks: It can interrupt the flow of the conversation when the moderator needs 
to document what has been discussed and the group waits for him to have finished36. Ob-
serving the various groups interacting, we find that this aspect depends considerably on 
the skills of the moderator and his familiarity with the tool. The work with the tool can 
also add complexity to the task by imposing an additional analytic frame, which further 
might be lived by conversation partners as limitative and adding a rigid frame of thinking. 
There might be additional problems related to the use of the visual tool for the integration 
of knowledge, which are not so easily observable by conversation partners. Visualization 
leads to a reification of abstract concepts in perceivable objects. This might facilitate, on 
the one hand, understanding, on the other, it can aggravate the tendency of people to cling 
to an inappropriate mode of approaching an issue (Eppler, 2003) and impede perspectives 
changes.  
Overall, the results from the group comparison suggest that there are important de-
pendencies among the various constituting elements of knowledge integration, which we 
upfront conceived as independent. When presenting the model for knowledge integration, 
we have identified four major communicative challenges present when experts interact 
with decision makers and aim to integrate knowledge in the decision process. Yet, we have 
not discussed eventual correlations amongst the various challenges. On the basis of the 
present literature and the insights we gained from the explorative case studies, we believe 
that it is already an important step to isolate some key knowledge integration challenges 
and gain an understanding of their importance for the phenomenon. The numbers of the 
group comparison (visualization support/natural condition) then have shown an exactly 
reversed picture in the two conditions and have led us to interpret the data in a direction 
where dependencies among the major four knowledge integration challenges are assumed: 
In the absence of a sufficient common ground and the lack of a big picture of the issue, 
conversation partners compensate with conflict and become highly sensitive to equal turn 
taking. These interpretations are somewhat daring as we have just observed a de-
cline/increase of certain constituting elements of knowledge integration, but have not ac-
tually tested for their dependence. Future research should therefore be more explicit about 
the interrelationships among the elements, which constitute the knowledge integration 
 
36 We have found support for this interpretation not only from the open-ended questions, but also from 
the fact that the overall explained variance is lower (.22) for the non-tool condition than for the tool 
condition (.22) (see: Appendix 16). 
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process. Our interpreted interrelations are also still somewhat unspecific and future re-
search should analyze more precisely whether it needs the creation of both big picture and 
common ground conjointly so that conflict becomes less important in the knowledge inte-
gration process or whether one of them is sufficient.  
A second limitation of the presented model for knowledge integration in decision 
making, which is generally true for models of all sorts, is that it is not comprehensive and 
misses out variables that might be crucial for the explanation of the phenomenon. In fact, 
we found a compound explained variance of knowledge integration only of .30. Thus, 
future research has to inquire which other variables have a major weight in explaining 
knowledge integration. One such variable could be the degree of novelty and variability 
inherent within the decision to take or task to confront. Scarbrough et al. for example 
state that the higher the novelty or uniqueness of a project task, the higher is the potential 
but also challenge for knowledge integration (Scarbrough et al., 2004). Similarly, Carlile 
refers to the knowledge’s nature of being path-dependent, which makes it particularly 
difficult for interlocutors to give up their knowledge and accept or develop new knowl-
edge: “The most challenging aspect of the relational nature of knowledge at a boundary is 
that for each actor there is novelty to share with others and novelty to assess from others” 
(Carlile, 2004: 557). Next to this aspect of novelty, there are other aspects that we have 
not taken into account. These might not be directly related to the communicative situation 
of experts and decision makers, but are present in the organizational context and have an 
influence on the interaction. Alavi and Tiwana for example discuss the inflexibility of or-
ganizational ties, which represents a challenge to knowledge integration efforts (Alavi & 
Tiwana, 2002). Hargadon and Sutton (2000) mention the rate of employee turnover to be 
another challenge for knowledge integration and which in fact is an element that impacts 
on the challenge of establishing a common ground. In this way, there are various exten-
sions possible for the model of knowledge integration we have presented. Yet, we have 
outlined that the model presented is a communicative model and aims to capture only the 
interactional, communicative challenges present at a knowledge boundary. In this way, its 
focus is more micro and it deliberately misses out larger organizational aspects already 
fairly well discussed in the organizational literature (De Boer et al., 1999; Dougherty, 
1992; Eisenhardt & Santos, 2000; Grant, 1996; Huang & Newell, 2003; Ravasi & 
Verona, 2001; Scarbrough et al., 2004). We have argued that if we adopt a relational, 
contextual, practice-bound understanding of knowledge and if we agree that knowledge is 
created, shared, integrated, or applied in social interactions (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), 
it is important to study the communicative challenges present in the primary form of these 
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interactions, which are conversations. In this way, the presented model on knowledge 
integration represents an attempt in this direction. It singles out major obstacles that are 
present in conversations and which inhibit the integration of knowledge across knowledge 
boundaries. Future research could aim to address more specifically the interrelations of 
such micro-communicative challenges with more macro-organizational aspects that chal-
lenge the integration of knowledge in decision making.  
Next to these limitations regarding our model, this study also has several limitations 
regarding its methodology. First and foremost, we have mentioned the small N of our data 
for conducting structure equation modelling analysis and we have discussed the limita-
tions this poses to the external validity and robustness. Second, we have seen that the re-
spondents were only semi-familiar with the visualization tool in spite of the pre-
arrangements we have made (presenting students the use and functionality of tool, making 
them work with the tool for a course exercise prior to the experiment). Third, the hidden 
profile situation might lead to an information difference, but not to a true difference of 
knowledge within the group. The in-depth knowledge of a knowledge management expert 
and the mode of thinking of a decision maker cannot be simulated fully in this way. Forth, 
the reliability of self-reporting (through questionnaires) on conversational processes is 
questionable insofar as conversation partners are not fully aware of their conversation 
behaviour and there might be important differences between their espoused theories (self-
descriptions of one’s behaviour, values, beliefs) and the ones in use (more implicit values, 
beliefs, and assumptions manifested in practice) (Argyris & Schön, 1978). Fifth, with the 
two step approach we have chosen for the statistical analysis (in view of the small sample 
size), that is doing the first factorial analysis in SPSS and only then introducing these first-
order factors in the structural equation model, we are unable to see in the structural 
analysis whether the two measures have been perceived differently in the two conditions 
or not (tool vs. non-tool). Sixth, with the statistical evaluation we have conducted, we 
were not able to show the overall strength of the moderation effect of the tool, that is we 
could only say that the model differed significantly, but we could not say how strongly the 
model differed in the two conditions. Yet, we believe that in view of the state of research, 
it is already an important step to show that the modality of the communication – in par-
ticular the use of visual tools - impacts the strategies people use to integrate knowledge in 
decision making. Finally, a general critique on the experimental design we have used is 
that we have worked with students as respondents for the experiment (Gordon et al., 
1986). 
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Future research can address these limitations in various ways. The experiment could 
be replicated by using – instead of students - two groups of professionals, between which a 
clear difference in specialization exists and can be assessed through knowledge tests and 
tests of thinking styles (Sternberg, 1997). Researchers could combine methods that rely on 
self-reporting and those that permit observation of communicative behaviour directly. 
Questionnaires could be complemented by recorded conversation analysis. A larger sam-
ple would permit to include directly the observed indicators in the structural equation 
model, instead of the first order factors. By doing so, more transparency of a possible 
moderation effect on the measurement level could be gained.  
To address the important issue of tool familiarization, more embedded and longitu-
dinal studies have to be conducted. Scholars could study in a mid-timeframe how collabo-
rative visual tools are appropriated by certain organizational teams or departments. They 
could also examine if a recurring use of the tool would lead participants of a conversation 
to change the way they deal with the identified challenges of knowledge integrating con-
versations, such as balanced participation, common ground, big picture, or constructive 
conflict. In addition, institutional aspects such as are discussed in Orlikowski and Barley 
(2001) have to be considered and need to be further investigated in future research en-
deavours. 
A more embedded study would allow to pursue a less deterministic view on technol-
ogy (for an overview, see: Bimber, 1998) and adopt theories of social construction (Pinch 
& Bijker, 1992). In the latter perspective, technology is viewed as an artefact and an out-
come of social interactions and is only mediating, and not determining, social processes 
and structures. Along this second stream, structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) is among 
the most widely used theories to study the interactions between information systems (IS) 
and organizational structures and processes. In this view, the technological artefact does 
not carry interpretive schemes and social norms (it does not carry social structure) and 
does not impose them on its users (Orlikowski, 2000). Users, depending on their needs, 
their knowledge and skills, but also depending on situational factors (e.g. accessibility of 
recipient, diffusion and acceptability of technology within community or organization) 
(Markus, 1994), develop their own way of how to make use of the technology. In would 
therefore be more reasonable to study in an embedded mid-timeframe investigation how 
collaborative, versatile visual tools are enacted and appropriated by conversation partners. 
Such a study would permit to understand which communicative structures emerge from 
the recurring conversations that are supported by the visual tool. From a knowledge per-
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spective, as we have pursued it, this would allow for understanding the social interpretive 
schemes within which experts and decision makers integrate knowledge in decision mak-
ing.  
Finally, practitioners and decision support developers can gain the following insights 
from this study. First, we have seen that even simple tools need a certain time for appro-
priation and familiarization. The benefits that a collaborative visualization tool can pro-
vide for a decision making meeting depend on the skills of the facilitator using it. If he/she 
is capable of summarizing a five minute conversation on a certain issue in one sentence 
and position it meaningfully in a visual template, the tool will not slow down the speed of 
the conversation, but help to structure it and help interlocutors in creating the big picture 
of an issue. Practitioners, who want to introduce a new collaboration technology in their 
organization, are therefore well advised to introduce the technology together with a meet-
ing facilitator, who is not only trained in the functionalities of the technology, but who is 
also knowledgeable about meeting facilitation and who has a knowledge on which visual 
templates are useful for which task type. We have further learned from the qualitative and 
control questions that using a visual tool can not only facilitate knowledge integration in 
decision making, but that the provided visual frame can also add complexity to the deci-
sion task or provide a perspective, which is not always beneficial. In practice, a facilitator 
should therefore realize when to change from one visual template to another, or when to 
stop using the visual tool altogether. There are moments in a meeting or there are entire 
meetings, where the use of a tool is counterproductive and inhibits what Gratton and 
Ghoshal call the trust-building or emotional ‘intimate exchanges’ (Gratton & Ghoshal, 
2002).  
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1  Resuming Major Findings 
The presented research has shed light on the knowledge communication between 
experts and decision makers and we have applied a variety of conceptual and empirical 
perspectives to engage in this investigation. A similarly variegated set of findings has 
emerged from it. In the following few paragraphs we will summarize the major findings. 
The first perspective was procedural, with which we aimed to find answers for the 
first sub-question of this research: Which communicative challenges and practices are of 
particular significance at which moment of the overall knowledge communication process? 
The diachronic view allowed us to identify five phases along which experts and decision 
makers structure their communication: (1) a phase when decision makers have to identify 
the relevant expertise and when the experts, on their side, struggle to gain the attention of 
decision makers (‘identify experts & expertise’), (2) a phase when the need of the decision 
makers has to be articulated in a clear and precise manner (‘articulate need’), (3) a phase 
when experts analyze the issue and develop possible courses of action, (4) a phase when 
experts ‘convey insights, suggestions, and solutions’ to decision makers, and finally (5) a 
phase when the experts’ insights and proposed solutions aim to be applied and 
implemented by the decision makers. With the help of this analytical subdivision into five 
phases we were able to see the cyclical nature of the knowledge communication process. In 
fact, we found across the different expert-decision maker contexts that the phases do not 
progress linearly, but are connected by a multitude of feed-forward and feedback loops. 
We have qualified the feedback loops in constructive refinement and alignment loops and 
in more problematic readjustment loops. We have further seen that, across the various case 
contexts, there are similar challenges and practices specific to each phase in the knowledge 
communication process. In particular, we have focused on the ASK-problem during the 
‘articulate need’ phase and on the difficulty to present an adequate ‘in-between complexity’ 
(or the risk to misrepresent complexity) during the ‘convey insights, suggestions & 
solutions’ phase.  
The ASK-problem (anomalous state of knowledge) is a situation in which the 
decision makers, though they realize that they do not dispose of the necessary knowledge 
to take a decision and that they need to call in experts to support them, lack the sufficient 
knowledge to expose clearly to the experts what kind of insight or solution they need. To 
avoid the consequent risks of unspecific requests and misunderstandings, experts and 
decision makers engage in an interactive process of communication aiming at a continuous 
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refinement and alignment of their understandings. In this process, informal, face-to-face 
communication is combined with the marking down of more formal, binding agreements. 
The flexibility of face-to-face conversations is necessary to gradually develop a shared und 
refined understanding of the decision task. On the other hand, formally holding down the 
progressing understandings (even if intermediate) and keeping hold of binding agreements, 
guarantees the advancement in the process. Marking down formally helps to define 
responsibilities more clearly and to better manage the respective expectations. This process 
is further characterized by an alternation of talk and action and highly resembles processes 
of sense-making (Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005) for which the decision makers can only 
know and express what they specifically need once they see what is possible. For this 
reason, decision makers cannot define a very clear request at first go, but only after 
extensive interactions with experts and after having viewed results of first broad analyzes 
conducted by the experts, they can gradually refine their need.  
Another major phase-specific challenge in the knowledge communication process is 
for experts to communicate their analysis of a complex issue and their recommendations in 
a way which adequately represents the complexity, yet outlines it in a way that is 
meaningful also to the non-expert decision makers who only have little time at disposition 
to digest the proposed analysis and insights. In order to find the right level of this ‘in-
between complexity’ and the right balance between conciseness and comprehensiveness, 
experts and decision makers engage in the practices of information scaling (within and 
across media) and of using standard structures and presentation principles to arrange a 
piece of information. These practices help to inform the decision makes on a level of detail 
which best suits them and allows them for a quicker orientation and an easier 
comprehension.  
The second perspective under which we approached the knowledge communication 
between experts and decision makers was structural and shed light on the second sub-
question of this thesis (‘Which communicative challenges and practices generally 
characterize the expert – decision maker communication that are not specific to one phase 
of the overall communication process and that impact on the single interactions?’). We 
aimed to structure these challenges and practices along different dimensions to which 
experts and decision makers refer when making sense and integrating knowledge in their 
communications. We therefore proposed a framework for the management of 
conversations from a knowledge perspective that outlines six dimensions: (1) the message, 
(2) the process of the communication, (3) the communicational intent, (4) the group 
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dynamics between the communication partners, (5) the mental models of the 
communication partners, (6) and the outer context of the communication. Analyzing the 
case studies with this analytical lens, we found that three challenges make the effective 
integration of knowledge between experts and decision makers a difficult endeavor. These 
are: the lack of the big picture of the issue (on the dimensions of the message and the 
process); the relational tensions that arise in view of the knowledge gap and due to the 
lacking trust between experts and decision makers (on the dimension of the group 
dynamics); and finally, the lack of common ground and the too distant perspectives 
between experts and decision makers (on the dimension of the mental models). In the 
reported case studies, experts and decision makers addressed these challenges by two 
concatenated meta-practices: Using boundary objects, on the one hand, and engaging in 
boundary-spanning processes, on the other. Regarding the use of boundary objects, we 
recurrently found across the single case studies that experts and decision makers use 
visuals, metaphors, glossaries, artefacts, standardized forms, and shared methods as types 
of boundary objects to support their knowledge communication. We could show how 
boundary objects enable experts and decision makers to learn about their differences in 
understanding, and, by doing so, help to explore how these differences are related, how to 
benefit from this variety of viewpoints, and to investigate how a common understanding 
and interest could look like. Thereby, it is important that they hold down an otherwise 
very flux understanding. By giving an understanding a more fixed reality, experts and 
decision makers are able to discuss it, identify it as different from their own understanding, 
dissociate from it, and discuss its implications. However, we found that boundary objects 
have to be combined with participation in order to help in the knowledge integration 
efforts between experts and decision makers. Only thanks to boundary spanning practices, 
such as face-to-face conversations, that structure around these boundary objects, experts 
and decision makers are able to develop shared understandings and to integrate 
knowledge. In this way, our investigation provides additional support for Wenger’s 
principle of combining reification (through the use of boundary objects) and participation 
(through the engagement in boundary spanning practices and in particular in face-to-face 
conversations) (Wenger, 1998) in order to integrate knowledge across knowledge 
boundaries. 
This result of the concurrent engagement in participation and reification most 
intrigued us and triggered further, more precise questions. In particular, we wanted to find 
out how the use of visual boundary objects impacts on the attempts to integrate knowledge 
in face-to-face conversations. By drawing on the literature, we further elaborated on the 
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findings from the case studies and developed a model for knowledge integration. 
Conceiving knowledge integration as a communication process we claimed that knowledge 
integration is reflected by the successful overcoming of the challenges of unequal 
participation (an element, which we introduced from the literature (Barge & Oliver, 2003; 
Beer & Eisenstat, 2004; Dixon, 1997; Eisenhardt et al., 2000; Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; von 
Krogh et al., 2000)), of the lack of the big picture, of the lack of common ground, and of 
the unconstructive dealing with conflict. Not only could we generally confirm the model, 
we could further show that the use of collaborative visual tools can take over the function 
of visual boundary objects and facilitate knowledge integration. In particular we found 
that without the visual support, experts and decision makers lack the common ground 
among them and the big picture of the issue, which is why they are more sensitive to 
procedural justice as balanced participation and rely in their integration efforts more on 
conflict. However, we found that they are not able to constructively deal with conflict, 
which is why their attempts to integrate knowledge are overall less effective. We could 
show that supporting conversations by a collaborative visual tool helps experts and 
decision makers to gain the big picture on an issue, establish a common ground, to deal 
more constructively with conflict and thus to more effectively integrate knowledge in 
decision making.  
Approaching the integration and communication of knowledge between experts and 
decision makers under these varied perspectives and reaching the presented findings, we 
hope to have been able to make a few contributions both to the scientific discourse and to 
practice. In the following, we will outline those contributions, that we consider most 
important, first for practice and then for research. 
2  Contributions to Practice 
Many findings of this research have direct implications for practice. Particularly the 
findings from the case studies show a variety of modes to manage the knowledge 
communication between experts and decision makers and to facilitate the integration of 
knowledge across knowledge boundaries. Rather than outlining the implications for 
practice of all findings, we would like to summarize two major implications, which we 
have discussed repeatedly throughout this thesis. 
A first learning for practice can be that in order to manage the knowledge integration 
between domain experts and decision makers, one has to manage the process of their 
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communication, which is cyclical in nature. This means that decision makers cannot expect 
to give a one time briefing to the experts and the latter will manage and do an analysis that 
precisely reflects the needs of the decision makers. The experts, on the other hand, cannot 
expect that the decision makers precisely define a clear request upfront. Knowing about the 
ASK-problem and the tight time constraints of decision makers, we found that it is best if 
experts manage an interactive process characterized by a combination of co-located, face-
to-face communication (e.g. meetings, workshops), standardized forms, doing first broad 
analyzes, engage again in face-to-face talk, refine the request, and sign a form of scope 
contract.  
Second, practitioners can learn from this research that, in order to effectively manage 
the knowledge integration between experts and decision makers, they have to engage in 
manifold means to develop the common ground among experts and decision makers. We 
have seen that the common ground not only has to be developed with regard to 
professional knowledge, but also has to be established on a personal level. To do so the 
experts and decision makers can engage in boundary-spanning practices. Experts can 
organize events, for example, during which they can engage with decision makers not only 
factually, but also have the possibility to socialize. Actively caring for this relational aspect 
is very important in order to allow knowledge integration to take place. If problematic 
relational issues nevertheless start to interfere during a single knowledge communication 
between experts and decision makers and a constructive handling of conflict is no longer 
possible, this research has shown that experts and decision makers are well advised to start 
supporting their interactions with collaborative visualizations (e.g. sketching). When 
communication partners start visualizing positions and give them visual realities, they are 
better able to constructively deal with conflict and do not mistake a critique, intended on a 
content level, as an attack to the person. This leads us to the second way to extend the 
common ground among experts and decision makers. Through the use of boundary 
objects, such as visuals, shared repositories, shared methods, metaphors, experts and 
decision makers have additional, object-like structures to which they can refer and which 
become part of their meaningful context. Finally, if the specialization of experts is such 
that there is particularly little common ground between experts and decision makers and 
the latter have a very hard time understanding their language and mode of reasoning, 
another advice is to use brokers or mediators who have double qualifications and who can 
translate meanings both in the direction of the experts and of the decision makers.  
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Next to these more pragmatic insights for practice, with this thesis, we aimed most of 
all to make contributions to the scientific discourse on the management of knowledge in 
organizations. 
3  Scientific Contributions, Limitations, 
and Suggestions for Future Research 
In the introduction (Chapter 1), we outlined the grand lines of the scientific 
contributions of this thesis. In particular, we stated that we intended to contribute to a 
communication perspective on issues of knowledge management. We argued that such a 
perspective refines the understanding why the co-construction of knowledge in situations 
of knowledge creation, transfer, integration, or application is a challenging activity. In fact, 
we outlined a whole set of challenges of the communication between experts and decision 
makers, which hinders this co-construction of knowledge. In the following, we will 
elucidate some of the more detailed contributions of this thesis for the scientific 
community, discuss its limitations, and – along this discussion – outline suggestions for 
future research. Rather than leading this discussion in different sections, we prefer to show 
directly for each specific contribution its limitations and implications for future research. 
1st Major Contribution, its Limitations and Implications: Refinement and Development of 
the Process of Knowledge Integration 
A central contribution of this thesis is that we have refined and further developed the 
understanding of the process of knowledge integration, a process, which, until today, has 
received only a moderate attention by scholars. Previous research did already discuss 
knowledge integration between occupational groups (between engineers technicians, and 
assemblers: Bechky, 2003; between radiologists, nurses, and physicians: Swan & 
Scarbrough, 2005), yet did not investigate into the expert-decision maker interaction from 
the standpoint of knowledge integration. We have argued for the importance of this 
context by showing that specialization becomes ever more important also in decision 
making. In the expert-decision maker interaction, we could confirm several findings of 
prior research conducted in other knowledge integration situations, particularly with 
regard to the challenges present in the knowledge integration process. For example, the 
lack of a sufficient common ground as a major problem when aiming at integrating 
knowledge across knowledge boundaries has already been discussed by Bechky (2003) but 
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also by Grant (1996). We found additional support for this finding both in the case studies 
and the experiment, and presented for the latter also a scale to quantitatively measure the 
level of common ground between communication partners. Next to supporting already 
existing findings, we have presented additional challenges characteristic for the knowledge 
integration process (in particular, the big picture challenge, the unconstructive handling of 
conflict, misrepresenting complexity, and the ASK-problem). With the synthetic model for 
knowledge integration presented in Chapter 4, we have contributed to a richer 
understanding of knowledge integration and have also paved the way for further research 
of this process by developing a more elaborate mode for its measurement.  
One limitation regarding the investigation of the concept of knowledge integration is, 
however, the way we have analyzed the second phase of the knowledge integration 
process. We have argued that the knowledge integration process consists of two phases. 
While we have been quite elaborate and precise regarding the first phase and showed what 
challenges and practices exist when individuals incorporate their specialized knowledge 
into some form of systemic situation-specific knowledge, we have been less elaborate 
regarding the second phase of the knowledge integration process (integrate knowledge in 
the actual decision making and action). This limitation became apparent, above all, in the 
experiment when we have found that the first phase integration explains only 25% of the 
second phase integration and that there are other factors which we have not considered 
and which determine the second phase of the knowledge integration process. From the case 
studies we gained insights of what these factors could be. We found that the ‘knowing-
doing’ gap, but also the external coercions in which the decision maker finds himself, and 
the decision makers’ fear of losing face, are important factors that impact the second phase 
of the knowledge integration process. However, we have not discussed communicational 
reasons why this passage from the first to the second phase of the knowledge integration 
process is so challenging.  
In part, this limitation is related to the communication approach that we have 
adapted. Our mere focus on the interactional dynamics of a duplet of communication 
partners has enabled us to shed light on the direct interactional challenges that inhibit the 
effective integration of knowledge. Yet, it allowed for less precision in analyzing the larger 
communication context.  
While this research could not provide in-depth insights on the second phase of the 
knowledge integration process because of a poor consideration of the larger 
communicative context, consequentially, future research could engage in qualitative social 
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network analysis for example by using ethnographic data (Scott, 2000) and analyze how 
an advice of an expert enters into the discourse about a decision to take, how the content 
of the advice changes during these interactions, in what form it is applied in the decision to 
take, or why it is discarded. Being aware of these networks of communications that change 
the original contribution of the expert, a Brookings’ scholar mentioned:  
“In the policy making process, there are many changes that can be decided upon. It is a whole area 
of bargaining and the successful bargainer is not going to give his bottom line. So very often, you as 
an expert don’t send off exactly what you want because you realize that it will be watered down or 
that it will be strengthened. So you never show your bottom line early. (..) If you start your 
argument with your best proposal, you have no argument to retreat. Intellectually and morally, this 
is very hard.” (C. Schultze). 
Our type of analysis did not allow us to shed light on such interactions between the 
expert-decision maker communication and the thick network of interactions taking place 
in the context of their communication. Such an analysis would have certainly contributed 
to a better understanding why the specialized individual knowledge of experts can indeed 
be integrated into situational group knowledge between the experts and the decision 
makers, but nevertheless not be integrated in the actual decision making.  
2nd Major Contribution, its Limitations and Implications: Development of a 
Knowledge Perspective for the Management of Co-located Conversations 
Next to investigating the process of knowledge integration, a second major 
contribution of this thesis is that it has contributed to the literature on the management of 
conversations in organizations by applying an explicit knowledge perspective to it. While 
we have shown that much of the literature in this field is limited to outline single 
prescriptions for conversational behavior that allows for knowledge sharing, creation, or 
integration, we have presented a framework that allows us to combine these single 
prescriptions into an integrative whole. In doing so, we were able to show the 
interrelationships among the single prescriptions and argued that attempts to manage a 
conversation by introducing a single rule are insufficient.  
One limitation of the validity of this framework for the management of conversations 
from a knowledge perspective is that we have not empirically tested the prescriptive 
framework as a whole, but have only picked three elements of it and have tested them in 
the experiment (Chapter 5). In particular, we have tested whether the recommendation for 
a balanced participation (on the process dimension), for a constructive handling of conflict 
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(on the level of the group dynamics), and for using an expansive message, for example, 
through the use of visuals (on the level of the message) actually contributes to the effective 
integration of knowledge in decision making.  
Future research should engage in providing additional empirical evidence for the 
prescriptive framework that we have presented and test how other elements of the 
framework (e.g. balancing between discovering and focusing) influence one specific 
knowledge process, such as knowledge integration. In fact, the review on conversations, 
presented in Chapter 3, lacks precision in that we simply viewed conversations from a 
knowledge perspective without more specifically distinguishing between the various 
knowledge processes such as knowledge creation, sharing, integration, or application. In 
the experiment, we then focused on one specific social knowledge process. Alternatively, or 
additionally to evaluating one or two further elements of the framework, future research 
could equally evaluate the framework as a whole, given that every prescription along the 
six dimensions forms a hypothesis to test. In this way, one could verify, also empirically, 
that there are connections between the single prescriptions of the various dimensions. 
This thesis contributes to the study of conversations in organizations also because it 
is not limited to the mere analysis of micro-interactional patterns, but analyzes, in 
addition, the larger communicational context in which conversations take place. In fact, 
we have outlined the various roles of conversations in the knowledge communication 
between experts and decision makers (see: Table 11 in Chapter 3) and have also shown 
when in the macro process of the knowledge communication, co-located, face-to-face 
conversations are of particular importance (e.g. in the ‘articulate need’ phase to assure a 
common understanding of the request) and when other communication formats (like 
written reports) are preferable. Only by approaching the issue in such a way, we were able 
to show that while the flexibility (in terms of the possibility to adapt to the characteristics 
of communication partners and to the issue) and richness (in terms of communicating 
verbal, para-verbal, and non-verbal signs) (Markus, 1994) of conversations are very 
important elements for a successful integration of knowledge, they have to be combined 
with other forms of communication – e.g. visual boundary objects – that allow for 
reification (Wenger, 1998). 
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3rd Major Contribution, its Limitations and Implications: Enrichment of the 
Discourse on Boundary Objects 
The last aspect on the necessary combination of participation, flexibility and 
reification leads us to pinpoint a further important contribution of this thesis, which is that 
we hope to have enhanced the discourse on boundary objects. First, we particularly 
discussed the manifold roles of visual boundary objects in the integration of knowledge 
and further showed why metaphors are also an important type of boundary objects. 
Second, we found support for prior findings on the necessary characteristics of objects in 
order to take over the function of boundary objects (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; Carlile, 
2002, 2004; Star & Griesemer, 1989) and contributed to this argumentation by linking it 
to our findings of the major communication challenges of the knowledge integration 
process. Star and Griesemer argued that boundary objects have to provide a loose structure 
that becomes highly structured in its specific use (Star & Griesemer, 1989). We could show 
that this characteristic is important, in particular, to represent in-between complexity, to 
elicit implicit knowledge embedded in practice, and in order to expand the common 
ground among communication partners by attaching individual, domain-specific 
knowledge to a common loose structure (e.g. metaphors). Providing an overall structure 
further helps experts and decision makers to view the big picture. Second, we could show 
that boundary objects have to enable representations that facilitate the recognition of 
differences and dependencies across knowledge boundaries not to engage in perspective 
taking (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; Carlile, 2002), but also to constructively deal with 
conflict, and to further develop common ground. While these aspects mainly serve the first 
phase of the knowledge integration process and the establishment of a shared 
understanding across knowledge boundaries, we have finally shown that boundary objects 
are important also for the second phase of the knowledge integration process in so far as 
they serve as mnemonic devices and help to activate knowledge and to actually apply it in 
decision making. These findings are – we believe – a necessary step to refine the 
understanding of the central characteristics of objects in order to become boundary 
objects.  
We suggest that future research continues in this direction and more precisely and 
systematically outlines what should characterize boundary objects in order to facilitate the 
knowledge integration across boundaries. One way to do so is to show what type of 
boundary objects – with which characteristics – are particularly useful along the different 
phases of the knowledge communication process that we have proposed in Chapter 2 
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(Figure 4). In fact, we did not analyze the boundary objects from the process perspective 
and were not able to outline the importance of the various objects for the different phases 
of the knowledge communication process. We believe that future research on boundary 
objects should close this gap of our research and could gain from a process perspective 
(see: Figure 31).  
 
 
 
Which communicative challenges have to be overcome when experts and decision 
makers attempt to integrate their knowledge in decision making and what practices do 
they have in place to address these challenges? 
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Figure 31: Necessity for a Process View on (Visual) Boundary Objects 
Employing a process perspective, one could elaborate a matrix with the process 
phases of our knowledge communication model on the x-axis and the necessary criteria for 
boundary objects on the y-axis and show when which criteria is of particular importance. 
Our research has shown, for example, that in the ‘articulate need’ phase, it is particularly 
important to actively collaborate, to elicit implicit knowledge embedded in practice, and to 
expand common ground by representing differences and dependencies. One could thus 
argue that the boundary objects’ characteristic to provide loose structures, like working 
with methods or metaphors, is particularly important in the early phases of the model 
(articulate need; analyze). On the other hand, in the ‘convey insights, suggestions, & 
solutions’ phase, the communication is more directional and boundary objects must be 
more strongly structured. A further benefit of such a process view on boundary objects is 
that one can outline which characteristics of a specific boundary object are of different 
importance along the knowledge communication process. In the beginning of the process, 
the metaphor, to retake the example, is a boundary object because of its loose structure 
that can become very concrete. Later in the process it is a boundary object because the 
image it suggests serves as a mnemonic device for the remembrance and activation of 
knowledge in the actual decision making. Elaborating criteria for boundary objects from a 
process perspective finally represents an important step in further developing the 
categorization of boundary objects that Carlile presented (2004).  
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Our analysis finally contributes to a refined understanding of the necessary interplay 
of boundary objects and co-located, face-to-face conversations, or in Wenger’s terms, of 
reification and participation (Wenger, 1998). We showed that if the aim of the 
collaboration across knowledge boundaries aims at developing shared understandings and 
the integration of knowledge (and not only the management of smooth interfaces between 
specialized collaborators on different sides of the knowledge boundary without necessarily 
requiring that the ones understand the work of the others), boundary objects alone cannot 
guarantee an effective integration of knowledge and there always needs to be rich, flexible 
forms of communication such as co-located conversations (participation), which structure 
around boundary objects (reification). 
Overall Limitations and Implications for Research: Broadness of Topic and Research 
Design 
In view of the various contributions of this thesis and the limitations that are related 
to them, we would like to point to two additional more general limitations of the present 
thesis and indicate, with the benefit of hindsight, what we would have liked to do 
differently: One limitation refers to the delimitation of the topic of research, the other to 
the research design and methods we have chosen.  
One major problem of this work with which we continuously struggled, is the 
broadness of the topic we have chosen. First, the breadth is due to the fact that we have 
not focused the analysis on one type of expert and decision maker, but have generally 
inquired into the knowledge communication between the two. Alternatively, we could have 
concentrated on one type of expert and decision maker, for example on engineers and 
managers. With such a choice, one could still have worked with a multiple case approach 
and analyze the engineer-manager interaction in various organizational settings. A second 
way to gain focus would have been to concentrate on one challenge in the knowledge 
communication – for example on the in-between-complexity issue - and discuss it in more 
depth, rather than striving for completeness and enumerating a whole set of challenges as 
we did. Methodologically, one could approach such a choice by conducting, first, two or 
more explorative and broad case studies and with their elaboration and reflection from 
theory, then come up with a refined research question and conduct two additional, more 
narrow and in-depth case studies. Qualitative interviews and the qualitative analysis of 
communication products could be complemented by participative observation where, for 
example, the researcher would attend meetings between experts and decision makers. 
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The second overall limitation of the presented research regards the method of the 
general research design. In the outset of this thesis (Chapter1), we have claimed to have 
triangulated methods. In effect, we have addressed the research questions (with the 
exception of the 1st sub-question: which communicative challenges and practices are of 
particular significance at which moment of the macro knowledge communication process?) 
both in the case studies and in the experiment. Yet, we have done so at different levels. For 
example, in the case studies, we have investigated in an explorative manner through the 2nd 
sub-question (see: Figure 1 in Chapter 1) by generally referring to the knowledge 
communication between experts and decision makers. Yet, in the experiments, we have 
addressed the question exclusively with regard to face-to-face conversations and analyzed 
whether we could observe the same knowledge communication challenges also in the face-
to-face context. The same is true for the visual boundary objects. While we analyzed them 
in the case studies for the knowledge communication in general, in the experiment, we 
exclusively focused on face-to-face conversations. In this way, to some extent, we have 
addressed different facts with the multiple sources and data, which is why it is not 
completely correct to talk of triangulation (Yin, 2003: 99). A real triangulation would have 
been to study face-to-face conversations between experts and decision makers in the case 
studies through participant observation, as well as analyzing face-to-face conversations in 
the experiments.  
A further minor limitation at the level of measurement is related to this general 
drawback of the methodology which we have employed in this thesis. For the analysis of 
the face-to-face communication in the case studies, we have exclusively relied on self-
reports in the interviews. In the experiment, however, we observed a certain mismatch 
between the self-reports in the questionnaires and the actual communicational behavior as 
perceived by the researcher when assisting the experiment or listening to the audio-
recordings. In Chapter 5, we have argued that this mismatch, in part, can be explained by 
the likely gap between the communication partners’ espoused theory of their 
communicational behavior (what they believe they do) versus the one in use (what they 
actually do) (Argyris & Schön, 1978). In other words, are often poorly aware of their own 
communicational behavior and do not realize that it might be problematic for an effective 
integration of knowledge in decision making. Thus, complementing qualitative interviews 
with observing actual communicational behavior would have certainly led to more precise 
insights on the communication partners’ theories in use. 
Chapter 6 - Concluding Discussion and Outlook 238 
 
 
In view of these limitations, we believe that future research should engage in the 
analysis of the process of knowledge integration between experts and decision makers by 
observing their face-to-face communications directly. In conjunction with the aim to 
analyze the role of visual boundary objects for co-located, face-to-face conversations, in 
particular, in order to better understand how visual tools are enacted (Orlikowski, 2000) 
and how they influence the micro-interaction and knowledge integration process, we 
would propose a longitudinal case study approach (Leonard-Barton, 1990). Such an 
approach would not only analyze macro communication processes, but include 
participatory observation of face-to-face conversations between experts and decision 
makers and do qualitative conversation analysis of the in-situ interaction. At best, such 
qualitative analysis would be further accompanied by the cyclical distribution of 
questionnaires to both experts and decision makers, which would ask questions both 
regarding the overall communication and the single face-to-face interactions. A 
longitudinal study of such a type would more truly live up to the request for triangulation 
and would permit to analyze how a small selection of the challenges of the knowledge 
integration process evolve over time and whether also the moderation effect of the use of 
visual boundary objects is subject to change.  
With these final reflections on accomplishments and limitations of the present work 
and the outlook towards new research undertakings and actions, we remain both confident 
and doubtful and fortunately remember Weick (2002) who says that it is this ambivalence 
which is the best condition for learning. We are therefore certain to have learned on how 
experts and decision makers integrate knowledge in communication and will continue to 
engage in the journey. 
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Appendix 1 
Case #1: The Knowledge Communication between the 
Scholars of the Brookings Institution and U.S. Policy 
Makers 
Overview on 
Brookings 
Organizational 
Structure & 
Areas of Activ-
ity 
• 4 research 
programs: 
− Foreign Pol-
icy 
− Governance 
Studies 
− Economic 
Studies 
− Metropolitan 
Policy 
• 9 policy cen-
ters 
• 40 projects 
• 62 areas of 
expertise 
• Brookings 
Institution 
Press 
• Executive 
Education 
Brookings is one of the oldest think tanks of the United States and as such 
conducts policy relevant research and provides advisory services to government. 
It was founded in 1927, has 281 employees and its experts are academics (mainly 
with a PhD) who also have longstanding experience in business, non-profit, and 
government. It is financed to more than 50% by grants and the support of phil-
anthropic foundations, corporations, and individuals. The other important pilas-
ter of Brookings’ income is given by the revenues of its endowment (30%). 
Brookings has a national and international focus and engages in four main 
research programs:  
Foreign Policy  
Under this research program, Brookings conducts analyses and advisory ser-
vices of world events and proposes policy ideas and recommendations, on topics 
such as, for example, the complex interactions of the U.S. with the Islamic 
world, global climate change, or rules in the use of international force 
(Brookings Institution, 2005b).  
Governance Studies 
The aim of this research program is to “explain how and why policymaking 
institutions in the United States and abroad perform as they do” (Brookings 
Institution, 2004: 18) and outline measures to improve this performance. Focal 
areas are - among others - national electoral systems, legislative politics, forms 
of federalism, local administration of educational institutions, the news media, 
and budgetary procedures.  
Economic Studies 
In the realm of the Economic Studies research program, the central aim is to 
re-examine national priorities, the functions that the federal government should 
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(not) assume, and the means how to finance such undertakings. Typical under-
takings in this realm concern issues like fiscal sanity, social security with respect 
to age, lifestyle and medicine, tax policy, or globalization in relation to U.S. 
employment (Brookings Institution, 2005b). 
Metropolitan Policy 
This research program has been launched in 1996 as the fourth of Brook-
ings’ major research programs and as such indicated a major shift in Brookings’ 
priorities. It deals with aspects close to the everyday lives of the U.S. population 
like traffic, sprawl, high housing prices, or low-paying jobs. All series targeted 
issues facing specific state, metropolitan, and local governments and were look-
ing for an active engagement with the communities (Brookings Institution, 
2005b).  
Within these four main research programs, Brookings has nine policy cen-
ters, many of which are joint-ventures with other institutions (e.g. Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center) and is active in more than 40 research and policy 
projects (e.g. the Environment and Development Initiative). Finally, under the 
Brookings Institution, there is also the Brookings Institution Press (publishing 
books and journals) and the Brookings Center for Executive Education (provid-
ing executives practical public policy and leadership education). In the media 
guide, the expertise of its scholars is grouped around 62 issues of geographical 
(e.g. Afghanistan, China) or thematic (e.g. Aging, Finance Banking, Congress) 
nature.  
Historical 
Background of 
Brookings 
The beginnings of the Brookings Institution trace back to 1916, when the 
Institute for Government Research (IGR) was formed. The founders of the insti-
tution shared the belief that political processes needed to be based more strongly 
on professionalism and expertise. They thought that a critical analysis of gov-
ernment administration and political processes was needed and that it should 
have been accompanied by specific suggestions for improvement. During World 
War I, IGR advised the U.S. government in modern accounting systems, filing 
systems and personnel manuals. After the war, the IGR advised the government 
in ways to reduce the huge Federal debt, which led to the Budget and Accounting 
Act of 1921.  
In 1922 and 1924, Robert Somers Brookings established two supporting 
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sister organizations: the Institute of Economics and the Brookings Graduate 
School of Economics and Government. In 1927, the three organizations were 
combined to form the Brookings Institution with Harold Glenn Moulton as 
Brookings’ first president (Critchlow, 1985).  
Facing the Great Depression, President Roosevelt called on the Brookings 
Institution for assistance. Even if Brookings was directly involved in the elabora-
tion of the National Industrial Recovery Act (as a part of the New Deal), Moul-
ton and his team of researchers strongly opposed the political interventionism of 
the New Deal. Despite this dispute, Brookings performed services for New Deal 
Agencies and, among others, helped to set up a vast accounting system for the 
Social Security System. In the aftermath of World War II, Brookings was engaged 
in developing the European Recovery Program, which assured that the Marshall 
Plan was run carefully (Brookings Institution, 2005a). 
In 1952, Robert Calkins became president of the Brookings Institution and 
the strong anti-interventionalist view of the state within the scholars of Brook-
ings made way to ideas closer to Keynesian fiscal policy (Critchlow, 1985). Cal-
kins reorganized the Institution around the Economic Studies, Government Stud-
ies, and Foreign Policy Programs, brought in first rate academics with govern-
ment experience and secured grants from the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. 
In the 1960s, Brookings strengthened its link to the policy makers in Capitol Hill 
and conducted research projects for government agencies as the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors, or the State Department. During that time, Brookings particu-
larly prepared the ground for ideas of deregulation (Brookings Institution, 
2005a).  
Kermit Gordon took over the presidency of Brookings in 1967. He sup-
ported the establishment of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity and ex-
panded the Foreign Policy Studies Program by including research on national 
security and defence. But after the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, the rela-
tionship between the Brookings Institution and the White House deteriorated. 
Brookings was perceived by many in the White House as the mouthpiece of the 
Democrats. The sharp stock market decline and the rapid inflation of the early 
1970's made foundation funding and endowment revenues dip (Brookings Insti-
tution, 2005a). 
In 1977, Bruce MacLaury became the new president of Brookings. He built 
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up stronger links with the business community and increased the amount of gov-
ernment contracts. In these years, competition began to grow: the federal gov-
ernment had strengthened its own capacity for research and analysis and other 
private think tanks emerged. Many of them followed clear ideological and politi-
cal goals and strived for a more short term impact on current policy issues. As a 
reaction, Brookings engaged in shorter and timelier communications as well as in 
outreach activities in order to better reach the press and the broader public with 
its research activities. In these years, Brookings was strongly involved in financial 
advisory services for the federal budget. In the ’80s, Brookings was involved in 
health care and tax policy and in the ’90s, it recommended new approaches to 
welfare, public service, and campaign finance. In 1995, Michael Armacost be-
came the fifth president of Brookings (Brookings Institution, 2005a). 
Positioning and 
Main Functions 
of Brookings: 
 
 
With these activities, Brookings aims to position itself within the market of 
expertise and the (U.S.) policy making context with the following mission:  
“Brookings is an independent, non partisan research organization (that) seeks to improve 
the quality of U.S. public policies. It addresses current and emerging policy challenges and 
offers practical recommendations for dealing with them, expressed in language that is ac-
cessible to policymakers and the general public alike"(Brookings Institution, 2005a).  
To Brookings, equally important than research is also the effective commu-
nication of research results and policy recommendations to policy makers. The 
mission statement entails both traditional values of Brookings – as non-
partisanship and thorough scholarship – and also newer commitments – as time-
liness, practicality and comprehensibility. As a direct consequence of these more 
recently included values, Brookings has reinforced alternative communicative 
means like conferences, policy briefs, and the Internet.  
Under the umbrella of this overall scope, Brookings’ scholars attribute four 
major roles to its institution. 
1. Building scien-
tific, policy 
relevant body 
of knowledge 
by conducting 
research:  
− developing 
ideas 
First, Brookings aims at conducting academic research that has policy impli-
cations: “The (..) role which is important is doing scholarly research. Congres-
sional staff is so busy, they don’t have the time to step back and really analyze 
something from a certain distance” (R. Nessen). Research is important to provide 
insights to the policy world and to reduce the work load of policy makers. Re-
search is also important for Brookings to distinguish itself from other, more ad-
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− proposing 
policy alter-
natives 
 
 
vocacy oriented organizations and to underpin the academic and non-partisan 
foundations of its expertise. “There are all sorts of think tanks in Washington. 
(..) There is a strong desire (at Brookings) to keep up the academic credentials, 
and not become an advocacy organization (..) that is just promoting opinions 
and not real research” (R. Nessen). Brookings’ research aims both at the concep-
tual block-building of a policy issue and elaborating concrete policy recommen-
dations for very specific topics. The more conceptual work is necessary in order 
to build a sort of repository of knowledge and to affirm a scholar’s expertise in a 
certain field. In case a policy issue gains suddenly in importance, Brookings is 
already prepared with the necessary expertise. In this work, Brookings sees its 
function not so much in proposing revolutionary new theories and ideas, rather 
in working these ideas out in specific policy contexts1:  
”We come up with a lot of ideas. But they are not some kind of brilliant development. (..) It 
is not like a Nobel prize winning chemist, who came up with a new way of isolating stem 
cells. In the 1960s and early 70s, for example, Brookings continuously got money on the 
question of regulation. The argument for more deregulation turned out in study after study, 
in airlines, trucking, and other areas. None of these were new ideas, but we worked them 
out in the various sectors” (C. Schultze). 
Related to this role of working out ideas in the concrete policy contexts, an-
other important function of Brookings is to present to government non-partisan 
alternatives, as outlined by Charles Schultze:  
”I started (..) an annual volume which is called ‘Studying National Priorities’. It was an at-
tempt to take an outside evaluation of the governments’ budget of each year (..) and to pro-
vide (..) alternatives. (..) The budget really encompasses and lies out what the President 
thinks the government ought to be doing. (..) The President presents the budget to Congress 
and, understandably, he has absolutely no interest in saying: ‘look there is another way to 
do this.’ (..) So we proposed alternatives and tried to be relatively neutral and not biased, 
but in fact, (smiling) I am sure there are some things I liked better than others” (C. 
Schultze). 
2. Disseminating 
research in-
sights and pol-
icy ideas  
 
Second, next to conducting research, an equally important function of 
Brookings is to convey its insights to policy makers, the media and the general 
public. It has to communicate its research results in a way that is understandable 
and meaningful to its audiences.  
                                                 
1 Diane Stone (2005: 136), by referring to Hayek (1967), therefore calls think tanks “second-hand dealers in ideas” 
as their role is to propagate and purvey ideas rather than thinking more radically about theoretically concepts. 
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“If you look at the mission statement of Brookings, you know research, analysis, non-
partisan, but then, it says to disseminate these ideas. So it’s equal, do the research and get it 
out there so that people can think about it. That’s where the communication comes in” (R. 
Nessen). 
3. Convening 
political parties 
and bringing 
academic ex-
perts closer to 
the  policy 
world 
 
Third, Brookings has an important convening function: “Washington works 
a lot better when people actually talk with each other. They don’t have to agree, 
but understanding what the other person is saying” (W. Gale). Brookings brings 
together people across partisan borders and makes them discuss policy issues, be 
that in a symposium of 250 people or in a smaller, private get together. Brook-
ings is a convener not only between divided (political) parties, but also between 
academia and the world of politics and organizes events where academic experts 
meet and interact with policy makers.  
4. Translating 
from scientific 
to policy world 
 
Finally, Brookings has an important role as a translator and knowledge bro-
ker.  
“The other thing that we can do is to translate works from the academic world to the pol-
icy world. If in the scientific domain, something is already known, but policy makers are 
not aware of it, it won’t affect their policy making. (..) So one of the things we do is to help 
breach the gap between the policy world and the research world” (W. Gale). 
Oftentimes, the policy maker expects from Brookings not to conduct new 
research, but asks for a synthetic overview on the already existing body of litera-
ture in a language that is accessible to the policy world. “The objective (of this 
project) was to hopefully bring the policy makers to speed on what the state of 
social science knowledge was. So the term is knowledge broker rather than 
knowledge creator” (K. Weaver).  
Up to this point, we have provided an overview on the organizational con-
text of the Brookings Institution and presented its mission and main roles. The 
following sections will focus on the knowledge intensive communication between 
Brookings’ experts and the policy making world. We will start with a closer de-
scription of the expert, decision maker situation. 
The Expert – 
Policy 
Maker 
Situation: 
Brookings’ experts are academically trained scholars and most of them pos-
sess a PhD, many in Economics or Political Science. Characteristic for Brookings’ 
scholars is also that they have a considerable experience in government, but also 
business, or non-profit organizations. Some scholars of Brookings have been 
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Experts: 
– academically 
trained (PhD), 
have govern-
ment experi-
ence, and are 
experts not 
only in one, but 
several policy 
areas 
 
 
 
 
 
quite important figures in the administration of the United States. Alice Rivlin, 
for example, spent about a third of her career at Brookings, a small part in aca-
demia and about half of it in government (for example as Vice Chair of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board (1996-99) or as the founding director of the Congressional 
Budget Office (1975-1983)).  
The gap between Brookings’ scholars and the policy makers is not insur-
mountable only because Brookings’ scholars have extensive experience as policy 
makers, it is also the case because their knowledge is not extremely specialized 
for that they would know “more and more about less and less” (W. Gale). 
Rather: “we are so much into real world issues, you find yourself pulled in all 
directions all the time” (W. Gale). As such, Brookings’ work sometimes is similar 
to the one of Congressional staffers. Charles Schultze’s “Studying National Pri-
orities” initiative, for example, which provided outside evaluations of the gov-
ernments’ yearly budget and presented alternatives, was downsized when the 
President, in the mid 1970s, established the Congressional Budget Office, who 
took over a very similar work.  
Policy Makers: 
– form a large, 
heterogeneous 
group 
– in part special-
ized in particu-
lar policy areas 
 
The policy makers are quite a fragmented group in the Congress of the 
United States (McGann & Weaver, 2000: 15) and are formed by the 435 repre-
sentatives of the house and the 100 senators, and also by the thousands staffers 
of congress. The Representatives of the House and the Senators form the legisla-
tive body of the United States (lower and upper house). They have the power, 
among others, to initiate revenue bills, impeach officials, and elect the President 
in electoral college deadlocks. The Houses use committees that consider, amend, 
and report bills in a specific field such as Finance or Armed Forces. Next to the 
members of the House of Representatives and the Senators, an important role in 
the policy formulation process also has the congressional staff. They assist mem-
bers of Congress and evaluate the outcome of legislative proposals, make rec-
ommendations regarding particular issues and are therefore often specialized in 
specific policy areas (e.g. health issues, environmental matters, taxes) (Capitol 
Advantage, 2005). 
The responsibilities and functions of the four organs (representatives, sena-
tors, committees, staffers) lead to a situation, in which many possible sources of 
policy formulation exist (Mc Gann & Weaver, 2000, p.15). An idea for a new 
policy is therefore certain to evolve until it becomes legislation. “Policy ideas are 
always changed in the political process. It is usually the interaction of different 
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ideas that produces a novel policy. A policy is almost always a compromise”, 
says Alice Rivlin. 
Another important target of Brookings’ communication are the media, aca-
demia, and the general public. All these audiences can be the source of a new 
policy or can influence, at least indirectly, policy makers and the policy making 
process. “Policy makers get their information through the media” and “the me-
dia, the policy makers, the Washington policy community, and the academics, 
(…) they all feed on each other. Policy makers read the newspaper, academics 
read the newspaper, and the people of the newspapers call other academics” (P. 
Orszag). Thus, the group of policy makers is large and heterogeneous and the 
mode of communication of Brookings’ experts slightly varies according to their 
characteristics. The congressional staffers for example are often trained econo-
mists, which is why the communication with these policy makers slightly varies 
from the one with Congressmen. William Gale: “When you talk to congressional 
staff, you want to give them the empirical evidence, the formal arguments. (..) 
That’s a more formed, technical discussion. When you talk to congressmen, they 
are busy decision makers”. But, the inherent challenge in the knowledge commu-
nication seems to remain the same as Gale formulates:  
“There are inherently differences between the way I communicate with media rather than 
with policy makers, but what remains the same is that, as an expert in policy issues, and in 
economics and in econometrics, my job is to distil the interest in economics and economet-
rics and convey them in non-technical ways in those circumstances.”  
In sum, we can say that there is a clear functional difference between the 
experts of Brookings and the policy makers in Congress (Brookings’ scholars 
advise, members of Congress decide). However, in terms of expertise, training 
and experience, the knowledge asymmetry is not insurmountably large. In fact, 
the description of the expert-decision maker situation has revealed a first fun-
damental strategy of Brookings in its knowledge-intensive communication with 
policy makers. To make the translation work less impossible and to guarantee a 
shared context between its experts and the policy makers at Congress, all its 
scholars need to have a certain experience in government for that there is an 
almost continuous in-and-out-flow between the administration and the think 
tank. 
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The Knowl-
edge Com-
munication 
Process be-
tween 
Brookings 
and the U.S. 
policy mak-
ers at Con-
gress: 
Identify Ex-
perts and Ex-
pertise 
 
In the following paragraphs, we will describe how the knowledge communica-
tion process between Brookings’ experts and the policy makers unfolds and will 
structure this description along the knowledge communication process presented 
in Chapter 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
The first important phase in the interaction between Brookings’s experts and 
the policy makers in Congress is the identification of the relevant experts and the 
ways to contact them (see: Figure 1). Brookings conducts research projects out of 
the scholars’ own initiatives and usually not out of a demand from Government. 
For this reason, in many instances, the knowledge exists somewhere, but the 
policy makers have to identify the one or two Brookings’ scholars or the particu-
lar product of Brookings as the pertinent source from which to gain insight for a 
current policy challenge.  
Brookings builds on the following practices to ease the identification of 
Brookings’s experts on behalf of the policy makers.  
Practices: 
– Manage a well 
functioning  
(in-) formal so-
cial network: 
geographical 
proximity & 
strong bounds 
with other or-
ganizations  
 
Prior studies have shown that geographical proximity plays an important 
role in the influence of think tanks on the policy making process. Washington 
based think tanks usually have a higher media visibility, as also more testimonies 
in front of Congress (Rich & Weaver, 1998). Kent Weaver mentions:  
“You know there is an advantage of being in Washington, they run into you, they have seen 
you at meetings, they sort of know who you are, whether you are good at communicating, 
whether you are good at answering questions, and sort of generally what your views are.” 
 Geographical proximity is therefore an important aspect for establishing an 
informal network between experts and policy makers as Alice Rivlin outlines: 
”Washington is an amazingly small town (..), people know each other. There is 
quite a lot of informal interaction, people are meeting over lunch or breakfast in 
a small group” (A. Rivlin). 
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Figure 1: The ‘Identify Experts & Expertise’-phase 
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A first idea of how the Brookings Institution deliberately strives to be well 
connected gives its choice of board members and how they are interconnected 
with other organizations (companies, universities, or governmental organiza-
tions) (see:  Figure 2). The representation of Figure 2 is limited to the level of 
Brookings’ board of directors and to the more formal ties of Brookings. On the 
level of the scholars, Brookings tries to guarantee a well-functioning informal 
social network by hiring mainly scholars who have served in government. In this 
way, there exist direct bonds between the experts and the policy makers.  
Figure 2:The Direct Links between the Brookings Institution and Companies, Universi-
ties, and Governmental Organizations at the Level of the Board of Directors  
(Source: www.theyrule.net) 
 
– Build on repu-
tation of ex-
perts: presence 
Many of the scholars of Brookings are famous for their expertise in particu-
lar policy issues as Ron Nessen outlines: “A lot of our experts are on TV a lot, 
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in media Michael O’Hanlon, who is our military expert, Isabel Sawhill, obviously, Ken-
neth Pollack on Iraq. They are known and get called directly” (R. Nessen). 
These scholars are affirmed experts in certain areas not only for their presence in 
the media, but also for the previously mentioned service in a presidential ad-
ministration. Alice Rivlin explains: “It is very useful to have been a policy maker 
because that gives you additional credibility, not as an expert, but as someone 
who is listened to” (A. Rivlin).  
– Propose multi-
ple means to 
identify rele-
vant experts: 
media guide & 
Internet 
Apart from relying on existing social networks and the already acquired rec-
ognition from the public, Brookings ascertains an easy identification of its rele-
vant policy experts in a variety of ways. Foremost, the institution developed a 
media guide, which allows the identification of the relevant experts through sev-
eral search paths. Experts are multiply listed according to the alphabetical order 
of their names, their geographical specializations, their thematic focuses (e.g. 
Immigration, Housing, Health Care, Globalization), the languages they speak, 
the administrations they have served, and the research programs with which they 
are associated. 
Another way is through Brookings’ website. Like for the media guide, also 
on the website, one can find the pertinent scholars in a variety of ways. For ex-
ample, one can pass through the current top stories in the U.S. policy environ-
ment and then click at related articles or experts on the topic, or one can search 
a scholar directly either by name, issue, or research program.  
– Include cross-
referencing to 
widen variety 
of access paths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brookings extensively practices cross-referencing both in the media guide as 
also in the website, that is, it indicates related material (such as events, papers, 
policy briefs, etc.) and experts. By looking at other projects to which a certain 
scholar has contributed, the cross-referencing allows the user a better under-
standing of whether the scholar is really the ideal expert for a certain policy is-
sue.  
“And the nice thing too is that you can get related material. I told you that Sarah Binder is 
an expert on filibuster, so I go on the website and want to get familiarized with her work. 
You see a list of her work with just one explanation line. So you work your way down in 
the areas that more interest you” (R.Nessen). 
As shown in Figure 3, cross-referencing gives the user also another modality 
how to find interesting and pertinent information. Rather than engaging in quite 
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a narrow, linear search by keyword, the policy maker is guided by associations 
which allow for discovery, opening up a discourse, and providing context. These 
are all important aspects if we move from an idea of transferring information to 
one of communicating and constructing knowledge. 
Figure 3: Example of Cross-referencing - a Project Presented at Brook-
ings' Website and the References to its Related Resources 
 
– Set up a com-
munications 
office as a bro-
ker and media-
tor 
Finally, Brookings’ communications office plays an important role as a bro-
ker and mediator between the scholars and the policy makers. It indicates ex-
perts, arranges meetings or interviews and organizes the necessary facilities.  
“They also call here, look we want to make a story on the CBNS evening news on filibus-
ter, you have any expert on this topic? And we would say, well Sarah Binder is the one who 
can help you. We can call her and make the arrangement: do you want to interview her in 
our studio?” (R. Nesson) 
– Augment con-
venience of ac-
Given the ever tighter time pressure, Brookings is engaging in practices that 
offer more convenient and less time consuming ways for media and policy mak-
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cess by reduc-
ing time in-
vestment (by 
organizing 
events at Capi-
tol Hill, and by 
providing own 
TV studio) 
 
 
ers to access Brookings’ experts and information products. A first example of this 
is that Brookings installed an in-house TV and radio studio that is linked in such 
a way to permit radio and television stations to directly transmit the signals 
through the fiber optic line to their TV and cable networks or stations 
(Brookings Institution, 2005b). Thanks to this facility, the media partners do not 
have to bring along all their equipment and they have a greater chance to get 
Brookings’ scholars on air. The scholar, on the other hand, does not need to 
invest hours of his/her time to give a 5 to 10 minute interview. 
A second way how Brookings offers policy makers more timesaving means 
to access its experts and information is by organizing events directly on Capitol 
Hill. Policy makers “not only do not have the time to read anything, they don’t 
have the time to take the cab and come here (to Brookings)” in order to attend 
conferences, seminars, or talks (R. Nessen). Brookings therefore started to organ-
ize events that take place just next door to where the policy makers do their daily 
work. “We had about five events on Capitol Hill. (..) We did one event with a 
group of other organizations and (..) that was quite a successful event. We had 
another event, with the chairs of the budget committee and the Congress on 
Capitol Hill. We had another one this year mostly with staff from Capitol Hill, 
and there was an article about in the Washington Post recently” (I. Sawhill). 
Such events have various functions as, for example, convening parties or gaining 
the attention for a topic. But the fact of organizing them on Capitol Hill itself is 
an important strategy to ease the access for policy makers to Brookings’ insights 
and to more strongly mark Brookings’ presence within the U.S. policy makers. 
Articulate 
Need: Defini-
tion of a Pro-
ject’s Parame-
ters 
Characteristics: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chapter 2, we have argued that once a decision maker has identified an 
expert to be pertinent for the decision at issue, he would try to articulate what 
kind of insight he needs (see Figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of Brookings, such a procedure is true only for a small part of the 
expertise that Brookings communicates to the policy makers. It is the case for 
Figure 4: The ‘Articulate Need’-phase (Definition of the Parameters of an 
Analysis) 
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congressional testimonies at hearings in front of Congress. The Congressional 
majority on a particular committee decides on which topics the Congress will 
have hearings and invites a scholar of Brookings to give a five-minute testimony. 
Around 80% of the witnesses will be called by the majority staff and 20 percent 
by the minority staff in order to have some ideological balance. Each testifier is 
asked to send his/her testimony in a written format to the Committee and there is 
some space for readjustments (K. Weaver). Here, there is a clear and very specific 
demand on behalf of the policy maker, which is communicated in a short and 
standardized form. Apart from testimonies, Brookings’ scholars usually work 
without a clear request from policy makers.  
Most of Brookings’ work is based on projects, for which Brookings does 
not have a clear request from the policy makers. While there are many ways 
how a project can be initiated, it usually is defined quite bottom-up by one or 
several senior fellows. In rare cases, the director of a research program, the 
president of Brookings himself, or external groups can have an influence on the 
definition of projects. The following aspects play an important role in the defini-
tion of projects. 
– (Re-)action to 
political 
agenda 
 
Many projects are defined in more or less direct relation to the political 
agenda.  
”Look at Isabel Sawhill’s project on Welfare Reform and Beyond. She started it at the be-
ginning of 2004, because sometime during 2004, the welfare reform bill was going to ex-
pire. It was the year when Congressmen had to face this issue: what is it in the bill that has 
worked well and should be extended, and what (..) should be changed and added in the re-
authorization (..)? The objective of this project was really determined by the legislative cal-
endar” (R. Nessen).  
Yet, frequently, the relation of a project to the political agenda is not as di-
rect. 
”Almost anything important is on the agenda of the policy maker even sometimes ignoring 
it. Better explanations of how the macro economy works, what determines the country’s 
exchange rate, what causes the current trade deficit; that is not something policy makers 
would have to know all about it, that is not on their agenda in such terms. Even though the 
issue is on the agenda” (Ch. Schultze).  
Brookings can reframe an issue, put it in a larger context and provide a big-
ger picture of a policy challenge. It can put attention to an issue, which is only 
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dormant in a policy makers’ mind and has been ignored for all too long. The 
latter is currently the case for example with regard to the fiscal sanity issue, as 
explains Isabel Sawhill: “The political system is not taking action on this front 
right now. They are bitterly divided, and so, outside of government, research 
organizations and think tanks are eager to make the people and the opinion 
leaders aware of the problem. 
– Agenda setting 
and conceptual 
block building 
Similar to projects that aim to create awareness for a current policy chal-
lenge are those that address issues, which probably will be of a growing impor-
tance in the future. On the one hand, it is a question of doing “the research and 
the conceptual block-building now in order to be ready when the policy maker is 
interested in them” (W. Gale). Such projects for example focus on future devel-
opments in India and South Asia, for example, by studying the consequences of 
the growing economic and military power of India, its implications for India’s 
relation with China and the consequences of these changes for the worldwide 
distribution of power. For Brookings, it is necessary to stay at the curve of po-
litical and economical developments in order to assure its expertise in the long 
term. “We don’t want to be focusing on last year’s issues. We want to talk about 
issues that are going to be important in the future, but which may not even be 
discussed in the present” (I. Sawhill). In this way, a particular challenge for 
Brookings is to sense upcoming developments and create awareness of problems 
of the future that need to be addressed today. “That’s what I would call the 
agenda setting challenge” (I. Sawhill). An example of such an agenda setting 
project was “Priorities 2000” that Brookings launched in the election year 2000. 
In the realm of this project, eight National Issues Forums were organized, in 
which experts of different viewpoints were brought together and discussed up-
coming paramount issues of the U.S. policy arena. These events were comple-
mented by the publication of the book “Setting National Priorities“, in which 15 
experts presented informative articles on these issues.  
– Personal inter-
est of scholars 
 
 
In other projects, the topic of a project is even less dependent on the political 
agenda and is more strongly determined by the personal interest of a (group of)
scholar(s) at Brookings. ”We have a small group of people who have taken up 
the subject of what is the relationship of economic wealth or income and happi-
ness. That is something which is not immediately policy oriented, although it has 
policy implications” (R. Nessen). Yet, in most cases, the orientation on the po-
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litical agenda or on political developments is quite interwoven with the personal 
interests of the researcher.  
“There is definitely a personal interest behind my projects (..), and there are components 
related to what is going on in the policy world. Hopefully, and one of the things that makes 
a project interesting to me, is that it has real world impact and implications, that it has 
some salience. That does not mean that these are issues which are decided right now” (W. 
Gale). 
 
– Disposition of 
foundation 
/philanthropic 
corporation or 
individual 
 
Normally, once the idea of a project is elaborated, a project proposal is 
worked out and the scholars look for funding in private organizations. In other 
rare cases, a foundation or philanthropic corporation comes to Brookings and 
has a more or less specific idea of a project they would like to support. Thanks to 
the fact that Brookings is financed by almost a third by its own endowment, it 
enjoys a pretty large independence in the definition of its projects. Nevertheless, 
the situation has partially changed in the last years.  
“For many years, (..) the agenda was very bottom up, set by individual scholars choosing 
projects they wanted to work on. And the institution (..) would then go out and look for 
funding. But if you couldn't find the funding you did the project anyway. In the recent 
years, the ability to raise funds has become more important for whether you can do projects 
or not. There's much more focus on fundability and on immediate policy impact” (K. 
Weaver).  
Usually, the foundations that sponsor a project do not intervene in the defi-
nition of the project. Yet, sometimes there is room for negotiations as explains 
Kent Weaver: 
“We did a big project on welfare reform with several of my colleagues and we raised about 
3 million dollars from foundations. But their interest was less on the original research that I 
wanted to do (..). They were interested more in synthesis and in what’s the best social sci-
ence knowledge rather than producing new knowledge.” 
− Government 
requests 
Only a very small minority of the projects is commissioned by policy makers 
as only 1% of Brookings’ income stems from government.  
To summarize, with the exception of testimonies, for which short and stan-
dardized requests from the policy makers exist, Brooking defines its projects 
rather independently from policy makers and from donor organizations. They 
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are very much driven by the interests of the individual scholars, but are also 
highly interwoven with the political landscape. They aim to present alternatives 
to current policy solutions, reframe a discourse or to put issues of the present 
and future on the agenda. The phase involving the articulation of the policy 
makers’ need is therefore only of limited importance in this particular case. 
Conduct 
Analysis of 
Issue and De-
velop Possible 
Courses of 
Action (Policy 
Recommenda-
tions) 
Main characteris-
tic: 
− Rather inde-
pendent from 
policy makers 
(except Pro-
gram for Met-
ropolitan Pol-
icy) 
In the knowledge communication process, as presented in Chapter 2, it is 
said that once the decision makers have specified their needs, the next phase in 
the knowledge-intensive interaction is the analysis phase (see Figure 5). Yet, in 
the case of Brookings, as there seldom is a clear request on behalf of the policy 
makers, there is only little interaction between policy makers and the experts in 
this phase and Brookings’ scholars work rather independently form policy mak-
ers. 
 
 
 
 
One research program – the Program for Metropolitan Policy - constitutes 
to some extent an exception to this general observation as explains Ron Nessen:  
“The program for Metropolitan Policy is somewhat different from the rest of Brookings. It 
is the most recent major research area of Brookings. The guy who runs it, Bruce Katz, (..) 
had the idea to have a think tank that dealt with urban issues and rather than producing 
books it worked directly with local officials. Its findings are very practical and very action 
oriented, you know the road system of Pittsburgh or whatever (..). This has much more 
direct policy impact in the sense that they are working together with policy officials on spe-
cific issues. (..) They do the whole process together, from the definition of the project, up to 
its implementation.”  
While the experts of the Program for Metropolitan Policy closely collabo-
rate in all phases with the policy makers, and do so also during the analysis of 
the issue and the development of solutions and suggestions, this is not generally 
the case for Brookings’ other Research Programs.  
 
Figure 5: The ‘Analyze Issue/Conduct Research & Develop Possible 
Courses of Action’-phase (Develop Policy Recommendations) 
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Convey In-
sights, Sugges-
tions, & Solu-
tions 
Characteristics: 
Three ‘Outreach’ 
strategies: 
1. Written Mate-
rial  
2. Face-to-Face 
Events & Oral 
Communica-
tions 
3. Website 
Once the scholars have completed a project, the next phase in the knowledge 
communication between experts and policy makers is to convey the gained in-
sights, the proposed suggestions and solutions to the policy makers (see Figure
6).  
 
 
 
 
Brookings conveys the insights and policy suggestions it gains from its re-
search activities through a variety of communication products and channels. 
Three major “outreach” activities can be identified: A) written materials and 
publications like articles, policy papers, opinion-pieces, etc. B) face-to-face events 
and oral communications like testimonies at congressional hearings, informal 
meetings, policy briefings, etc., and C) the website. The idea behind the intensive 
endeavors in communicating the insights through an interesting mix of commu-
nicative means is that “the world will not flock to the scholar’s idea once he has 
done his paper” (W. Gale). Rather, only by communicating through different 
channels and media formats and addressing a variety of audiences, the scholars’ 
ideas might get in circulation among policy makers. Peter Orszag outlines an 
example of a communication strategy of one of his projects:  
”We came out with this new study (..) on the effects of match rates on saving. We held a 
conference here to get it out to different offices (..) and the policy community of the differ-
ent think tanks. We held a conference call with reporters and had 20 or 25 reporters on the 
phone. I had conversations with specific reporters and there was a story in the Washington 
Post and the Wall Street Journal, as well as a big editorial in the New York Times. This, I 
believe, influences policy makers. Then, I brought it up again at a hearing before the Ways 
and Means Committee yesterday, which is yet another audience. At the same time, we are 
getting the paper out to the academic audience” (P. Orszag).  
By targeting different audiences – policy makers directly through testimo-
nies, journalists and the public opinion through major national newspapers, aca-
demia through scientific papers, etc. – Brookings strives to get its ideas into “cir-
culation”. The idea is not to directly get through with a specific idea, but to 
frame a policy discourse from a particular perspective. 
Brookings uses a variety of communication formats to bring their ideas into 
Figure 6: The ‘Convey Insights, Suggestions, & Solutions’-phase 
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the public policy discourse and inform the policy making processes. With regard 
to the written material, each year Brookings publishes around 50 books and 7 
periodic journals, writes 20 policy briefs (8-page long writings on current policy 
issues providing background information and policy recommendations, distrib-
uted online), around 180 op-eds (brief opinion pieces place opposite to the edito-
rial page of major national newspapers), writes 50 papers and articles, and 
elaborates equally many reports. With regard to oral forms of communication, 
most important are the testimonies at congressional hearings, the events Brook-
ings organizes on Capitol Hill, the informal meetings, the over 50 public brief-
ings a year, the interviews its scholars give for radio and television broadcasts, 
and finally the discussion series, in which journalists, government officials, and 
experts meet to discuss pressing and conflict-rich problems.  
Rather than outlining all these various communication formats in detail, we 
directly discuss the practices and challenges with which Brookings is faced in 
this phase of the knowledge communication and illustrate them with examples 
of single communication formats.  
Practices: 
− Use various 
communication 
formats along 
their functions 
 
− Draw on a mix 
of written 
communica-
tion formats to 
provide both 
in-depth con-
ceptualize-
tions of an is-
sue (books) 
and timely pol-
icy recom-
mendations 
(policy briefs, 
op-eds, etc.) 
 
Whereas Brookings previously used to place emphasis mainly on books and 
comprehensive, long term publications, today, it uses the various communication 
forms in relation to their specific characteristics and way of use (e.g. types of 
information to present, audience to reach, involvement with communication 
partner).  
Written communication, in Peter Orszags view, has the role to inform the 
political discourse and gradually (re-)frame the perspective on an issue:  
”There are all these sorts of Washington wisdoms that become engrained and once they are 
engrained, it is very hard to remove them and then they feed into policy views. That’s where 
I see the policy briefs and books and papers, it’s informing that.” 
Books remain an important written communication format in spite of an en-
vironment where policy makers have less and less time and there is a large pres-
sure to publish in brief cycles and in ever shorter formats. They help to maintain 
the academic credentials of the organization and distinguish the organization 
from more advocacy oriented think tanks and serve an audience that likes to be 
informed in a serious manner. Books allow for a conceptualization of a whole 
problem by outlining the casual links and indicating guidelines for possible (al-
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ternative) solutions. Finally, they are more long term oriented and manage to 
keep ideas alive within the policy stream. 
Next to books, there are a set of shorter and more quickly released formats, 
with which Brookings tries to exert a more direct influence on the policy process. 
Policy briefs, for example, are a standard structured outlet limited to 3000 words 
(8 pages). They provide more timely information on more detailed questions. In 
less time, policy makers gain the main insights on a topic. Not only the concise-
ness of the format, but also its standard structure (shown in Figure 7) is impor-
tant in this regard as it allows for a faster orientation and for a quicker retrieval 
of the relevant information.  
For all these shorter, more quickly released written communication formats, 
Brookings maintained procedures that help to guarantee the high quality and the 
academic standards, for which Brookings is known: “These go to the same aca-
demic reviews, the same academic style, and are sent out to outside experts for 
comments” (R. Nesson). 
Figure 7: Example of a Policy Brief, Added with Labels Indicating 
Some of the Standard Features of a Policy Brief of Brook-
ings  
 
− Draw on the 
Brookings’ 
website to:  
The vast majority of the written material is accessible free of charge over the 
Brookings’ website (www.brookings.edu). It is organized similar to a big portal 
or news website that gives access to more than 45000 documents. The website 
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− reach a 
broader au-
dience 
− release in-
formation 
quickly and 
make its ac-
cess inde-
pendent 
from time 
− allow the 
public a di-
rect and in-
teractive 
contact with 
scholars 
(chat, com-
ments) 
 
gives products like the policy briefs a much larger audience and a single docu-
ment may be downloaded up to 35’000 times (hardcopy version 3000-5000 
times). 
For the policy maker, one of the big advantages of the Internet is that he/she 
can access the piece of information the moment he/she really needs it. In this 
way, it remains alive much longer than it used to do: 
"We can send policy briefs to policy makers, but they probably will go right in the trash 
because policy makers in the United States are simply overwhelmed with information. So 
it's better to make them accessible when they want it and the easiest way to do that is 
through Internet in electronic pdf format.  In this way you can pull it up whenever it suits 
you, rather than digging you through massive files that are not pertinent for you" (K. 
Weaver). 
The media also allows for the distribution of other types of information like, for 
example, video and audio streams (e.g. of speeches, events, policy briefs), power 
point presentation, transcripts (e.g. of congressional testimonies).  
Next to being a distribution channel of Brookings’ products, the website 
also serves as a news channel, where current policy issues are pushed on the first 
page and events (like briefings, policy luncheons, conference calls) are an-
nounced. In the future, Brookings will strengthen this functionality of the web-
site.  
“I think we are going to – primarily through the website – anticipate events. What is the top 
story right now? The battle over the filibuster. We have got an expert, she has given a lot of 
interviews, she has done the research, and so forth. Let’s put that on the front page of the 
website. And what’s the second issue? Well, foreign policy, Iraq and North Korea” (R. Nes-
sen). 
The Internet further allows for a direct contact with scholars and a more 
personalized and interactive form of communication. Brookings organizes life 
Internet chats where users can interact with one of the experts of Brookings on a 
specific issue. Users can also post an opinion, suggestion, or critique next to an 
article. In this way, they can relate a piece of information to their context and 
ask questions, activities which are very central to sense-making and turning in-
formation to knowledge.  
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− Draw on face-
to-face com-
munication and 
events to: 
- gain the policy 
makers’ atten-
tion for an is-
sue 
- provide a 
quickly acces-
sible overview 
- nurture dia-
logue in-
between parti-
san borders 
Next to all the written products and the Internet, a major way how Brook-
ings addresses policy makers is through oral communication and face-to-face 
conversations. Next to classical oral communications like testimonies during 
congressional hearings, public briefings (at the occasion of book releases, celebra-
tion of a compact, or return from a journey in a politically interesting area) or 
interviews, Brookings organizes informal meeting like, for example, lunch or 
breakfast meetings, where congressional democrats or members of congressional 
staff work on a particular issue.  
We will first discuss why Brookings gives ever more weight to these orally 
based communications and then present three forms of oral communication more 
in depth: testimonies at congressional hearings and events on Capitol Hill. 
One reason is that Brookings has an important convening function and the 
best way to make different parties listen to each other and to bridge partisan 
debates, is to make them sit at the same table and start a dialogue:  
"Because the debate was very partisan, we wanted to bring in knowledge to bear that was 
useful. (..) I guess our objective was to find areas where there were agreements across parti-
san boundaries, so they could start to think of agreements for policies and not be bogged 
down by partisan debates. You know there are just some things people will continue to dis-
agree [on]; You can't do anything about that. But on others, you can. If there are 25 issues, 
you probably can find agreements on 10 of them. That's a start" (K. Weaver).  
Face-to-face encounters help to overcome polar views and develop a sense of 
belonging so that, eventually, new communities of practice or knowing emerge 
(K. Weaver). Next to these functions, events and face-to-face conversations are 
also important to gain the attention of the policy makers who are ever more 
overloaded with information.  
“There is an enormous amount of written information (..) and policy makers cannot possi-
bly assimilate it all. One way to do that is to hear it first, and then get some more informa-
tion with more depth that is in a written format. So one function of oral communication is 
shortcuts, to gain attention” (K. Weaver). 
Oftentimes, policy makers do not have the time to search for a solution, but once 
they stumble across an interesting idea that suits their objectives, they might pick 
it up. Events and other sorts of oral communications constitute such start-up 
moments as Kent Weaver’s example illustrates:  
” We came up with this idea in the form of a policy brief. But I guess the key thing was that 
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we had a lunch on the hill and fifteen key staffers of the Congress came, of those also some 
moderate Republicans who were looking for something that would make the bill less ag-
gressive. They essentially took our proposal, integrated it [into the bill] and it became law. 
That is really unusual.” 
In addition to that, conversations give room to the elaboration of a common 
understanding and an expert can give examples and make an idea really mean-
ingful to the context of the policy maker. “Explaining it face-to-face to a policy 
maker and hearing them: ‘Oh yeah, I get it and it makes sense’, that helps a 
whole lot” (W. Gale). 
Finally, an important reason why oral communication is an important way 
how to convey expertise to decision makers is because “Washington is an oral 
based culture and scholars have to adapt their communication style to the domi-
nant form of communication” (K. Weaver). 
Communication formats and their use by policy makers, the media and the 
general public are changing continuously. Therefore, Brookings has the credo to 
continuously rethink and change its communication strategy, as explained by 
Nessen:  
”One of the reasons why we did this focus group was to find out, whether we were dis-
seminating ideas properly, in the right format, in the right time. (..) You always have to 
keep changing and adapt yourself to the times. One of the slogans I have is doing things the 
same way as we did last year, is just an excuse for not thinking” (R. Nessen). 
Example 1 of a 
Face-to-Face 
Communication: 
− Testimonies at 
congressional 
hearings 
− Main character-
istic: indicator 
for the impact 
of a think tank 
 
Testimonies are oral presentations of experts during a congressional hearing. 
A congressional hearing is a meeting or session of a Senate, House, Joint, or Spe-
cial Committee of Congress, usually open to the public, to obtain information 
and opinions on a current policy issue, or, more specifically, on proposed legisla-
tion, conduct an investigation, or evaluate/oversee the activities of a government 
department or the implementation of a Federal law. A scholar usually is invited 
by a specific committee of the Senate (e.g. the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship) to 
outline the main causes and implications of a certain issue and outline possible 
solutions for the problem in a five-minute presentation. Members of Congress 
then have the possibility to ask questions. A scholar usually testifies next to other 
experts on the issue (Quarterly, 2005).  
Between the beginning of July 2003 and the End of June 2004, Brookings’ 
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scholars have testified 27 times. The impact of a think tank on a policy is often 
measured in terms of the number of congressional testimonies its scholars are 
able to hold because it is a possibility to directly meet members of Congress and 
have some sort of impact on their views. Some scholars of Brookings see testi-
monies as really important: “In general, they (Congressmen) don’t have time to 
read a book. But they may listen to a presentation and, quite likely, may Con-
gress read and listen to testimony. In my experience, testimonies are quite impor-
tant” (A. Rivlin). Yet, other scholars believe that they are mainly show, as out-
lines Peter Orszag: 
”Testimonies I view as type of a show. I don’t view anything real happening. (..) The prob-
lem is that testimonials are canalized and the interaction is so short. You have five minutes. 
It’s mostly sort of a debate. It’s not where people’s views are significantly persuaded. Most 
people go into the hearing and go out of the hearing thinking the same thing”  
To be invited to testify signals the recognition of a scholar’s expertise on a 
certain issue: “I don’t think it is just the book that leads to the testimony. (..) I 
think that the fact is that a number of our scholars at Brookings are well known 
for their expertise” (I. Sawhill) But this reputation is also bound to who is in 
power at the White House. Brookings ranked for many years as the think tank 
with most testimonies until Republicans took over power in Congress in 1995. 
From then on, Congress relied more on conservative think tanks and the Heri-
tage Foundation managed to have more testimonies than Brookings (Rich, 2004).
Challenges & 
Practices of Tes-
timonies: 
− Condensation 
& prioritization 
− Imagine ad-
dressee as in-
telligent lay-
person not ex-
pert 
− Talk (not read) 
in plain English 
For experts, a major challenges in hearings is to break down the whole com-
plexity of an issue in a five minutes talk, of which they would like congressmen 
to remember one or two points:  
“If you have five minutes, you have to make key points. You have to figure out, what is 
your main message you want to get across? (..) You just try to convey three core things and 
hope they would remember one of them. And then the written testimony gives more of the 
background.” (K. Weaver) 
A major challenge in testimonies is therefore to engage in a good prioritiza-
tion and condensation of the message. A guideline for this work of prioritization 
seems to be to cross out background information and come straight to the facts, 
problems, and solutions. Whether such an approach is favourable for the trans-
formation of the piece of information to knowledge (contextual information is 
key in this process, see: practices on message dimension) is questionable. Another 
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guideline for testimonials is to perceive and imagine the addressee not as an ex-
pert, but as an intelligent layperson: “I imagine saying that to a person who is 
intelligent but who is not trained in economics. What is the hindsight that I have 
to offer in plain English?” Another simple suggestion one of Brookings’ scholars 
mentions is also related to language: “I find it most helpful to talk rather than to 
read testimonies. Reading out loud testimonies is boring as hell” (W. Gale). 
Example 2 of a 
Face-to-Face 
Communication: 
Events (on Capi-
tol Hill) 
 
Functions: 
− Directly access 
policy makers 
to gain impact 
− Allow policy 
makers more 
convenient ac-
cess 
− Convene op-
posing parties 
and engage 
them in dia-
logue 
 
Practices:  
− Team up with 
other policy 
organizations 
− Involve policy 
makers in 
events to gain 
visibility and 
make them en-
gage in Brook-
ings’ ideas 
To strengthen direct access to policy makers at Congress, Brookings started 
to organize events on Capital Hill. For the Restoring Fiscal Sanity project, for 
example, Brookings’ scholars organized five events on Capitol Hill. One reason 
for organizing events as close to the Congressmen as possible is that, in view of 
Congressmen’s ever tighter time-constraints, they must be able to access Brook-
ings’ expertise very conveniently and without a lot of time requirements: 
“What we will be doing more of is organizing events up at Congress, because the other 
thing that came out of the focus group is that they don’t have any time to come off the hill. 
They don’t only not have the time to read anything, they don’t have the time to take the cab 
and come here“ (R. Nesson).  
For such events, Brookings teams up with other organizations like for ex-
ample the Committee for Economic Development or the Heritage Foundation. 
On the one hand, the inclusion of other organizations with different ideological 
standpoints is important to give the event more credibility and also allows for 
attracting a broader audience:  
“These collaborative efforts help to get more attention, to get more chance of influencing 
the debate, to reach a broader audience. (..) The way to get the word out is to combine 
forces because there is not a lot of disagreement outside the government that this (the fed-
eral budget deficit) is a major issue that needs to be addressed.” (I. Sawhill) 
For one of the events on Capitol Hill (regarding fiscal policy), Brookings in-
vited Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman to speak and comment on a 
paper. To include senators and policy makers themselves is important to have a 
larger media attention, but also to make them directly engage in the concepts. 
Alice Rivlin explains:  
“A standard format for Brookings is what we call a National Issues Forum. That means 
that there is a Brookings paper or book, then we invite several political people, from the 
administration or out of the Congress to comment on the book. And that gives them some 
exposure to the book, because they have to read it and comment on it. And it also gives 
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wider exposure to the concept itself. If you have an important member of Congress giving a 
speech, then C-Span or others will be willing to cover it.”  
This gives Brookings not only the possibility to be closer to the policy makers’ 
way of reasoning, but also to gain insights and feedback on their own work. 
– Time commu-
nication in rela-
tion to the cal-
endar of the 
public policy 
process 
Another more recent practice of Brookings’ communication strategy is to 
time the release of a book or report (and all the communicative events that go 
along with it) more closely with the policy calendar. An example of this is the 
communication of the Restoring Fiscal Sanity project which resulted in two 
books, and various events that accompanied the release of these books. The 
responsible for the project decided to publish the first book and organize the 
accompanying, publicizing events just ahead President Bushes State of the Union 
speech and the publication of the budget of the fiscal year 2005. With a “public-
ity blitz” including luncheons on Capitol Hill, testimonies in front of Congress, 
reports, interviews, etc., just ahead an important political event, Brookings 
aimed to more actively have an influence on the political discourse (Brookings 
Institution, 2004). In many instances, a close coordination of Brookings’ com-
munication with the political agenda and in this sense also the timeliness of its 
communication are crucial in order to augment the possibility to influence the 
policy making processes.  
– Scale informa-
tion within one 
and across 
various media 
- Within one 
media: pro-
vide informa-
tion in differ-
ent levels of 
detail and of-
fer several 
summaries 
varying in size 
- Across media: 
use oral media 
to give over-
view, books to 
inform in-
Throughout the variety of its products, Brookings adheres to the idea to pre-
sent information in a scalable manner. ‘Information scaling’ designates the idea 
that a piece of information, e.g. a conducted research and its results, is presented 
in a variety of lengths and media formats. The content is scaled in its length so 
that according to the specific needs of the audience, a different version can be 
chosen.  
” The logic is, policy makers don't read 500 page books, I like to write 500 pages books. So 
we can still write the 500 pages books but we write the conclusions of those in a format 
that is more accessible to them. So there is the 8 page version, the 30 page version and the 
500 page version. So you hope that the policy maker, or more likely the congressional staff 
members, read the 8 page version of a policy brief and go from there to more depth.” (K. 
Weaver) 
“We did fairly recently a survey asking congressional staff and serious reporters (..) on the 
form they would like to have our findings. (..) What is the ideal length of a Brookings’ pub-
lication that they could really use? Some said one page, some said two paragraphs, and 
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depth  some said bullet points. (..) So we (..) will probably (..) keep the policy briefs (..), but we 
will have a one page summary of that, a two paragraph summary, and a bullet point sum-
mary” (R. Nesson). 
Depending on the interests of the user, he/she can choose the degree of de-
tail, in which he/she wants to be informed. In this way, the busy congressmen 
takes the brief version that only outlines the conclusions and propositions, while 
the member of the congressional staff can look – in the longer version – at the 
numbers and facts that lead to the conclusions.  
In this way, Brookings scales its information both within one media and 
across medias. On the one hand, a lengthy report will have a variety of summa-
ries and the addressee can choose how detailed he/she would like to be in-
formed. On the other hand, a one hour Public Briefing can give a general out-
look of a problem and serve as a “summary” of a lengthy book. In addition, the 
same information can be consumed also by reading a policy brief that will pre-
sent the information with moderate details.  
Apply & Im-
plement In-
sights & Solu-
tions 
Characteristics: 
 
With all the various formats that Brookings employs to communicate its ex-
pertise, research insights and recommendations, it “seeks to improve the quality 
of U.S. public policies” (Brookings Institution, 2005a) and to have some sort of 
impact on the policy world. In the following, we consider the communication of 
when Brookings’ expertise is applied in the policy making process (see Figure 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
− Think tanks’ 
impact is diffi-
cult to measure 
It is difficult to measure the impact of think tanks (Stone, 2000; Weaver & 
Stares, 2001) and assess, which of the promoted ideas have had what type of 
impact. Policy choices are made in rather fluid processes and issues gain and 
loose the attention of policy makers. Also, the experts’ ideas, insights and rec-
ommendations can influence the policymaking process on various levels and 
moments. One advice is never sufficient to make a specific policy choice and a 
Figure 8: The ‘Apply & Implement Insights, & Solutions’-phase 
Identify Experts
& Expertise
Articulate Need
Analyze Issue &
Develop Possible
Courses of Action
Convey
Insights, 
Suggestions, 
& Solutions
Apply & 
Implement
Insights & 
Solutions
A BC D E
c
d
e h
Appendix 30 
 
 
policy proposal is certain to change within the policy making process. Finally, the 
influence takes place through multiple means (direct communication to politi-
cians, indirect access through media) (Weaver & Stares, 2001: 25) and one 
communication can elicit others and develop an interwoven network of commu-
nications, which is why it is difficult to determine clear causalities. For all these 
reasons it is particularly hard to clearly measure the impact of think tanks. 
− Classical im-
pact indicators: 
media visibility, 
testimonies at 
congressional 
hearings 
Given these difficulties, the two classical ways to measure the impact of 
think tanks are to look at their media visibility (number of media citations in 
major U.S. newspapers) and at the number of testimonies at congressional hear-
ings, as also Isabel Sawhill’s statement illustrates:  
“It is very difficult to measure (..) how much impact this particular study had in the policy 
making process. Last year, when we put out our first book it got quite a good attention. 
There were, I think, 12 major newspapers that mentioned the book by name. Many more 
editorials and articles talked about the substance of the book without citing it out right. We 
did many interviews with the press and with the media more generally. We had opportuni-
ties to testify before Congress and to meet with policy makers” (I. Sawhill)  
As far as media visibility is concerned, among all the think tanks in the U.S., 
the Brookings Institution is traditionally the most cited one by all U.S. newspa-
pers, except for the clearly conservative Washington Times, where it is the fifth 
most cited (Rich & Weaver, 2000). As already mentioned, with regard to testi-
monies in front of Congress, Brookings is leading off the ranking as well together 
with the Heritage Foundation (Brookings Institution, 2005a; Heritage Founda-
tion, 2005). Both media visibility and number of testimonies are indicators for
the access of the organization to policy makers and to the general public, but are 
not fully reliable indicators on how much impact the knowledge communication 
of the think tank had on the policy process. (Abelson & Lindquist, 2000) 
− Diffuse impact: 
shape the intel-
lectual envi-
ronment and 
context of dis-
cussions  
 
It is very seldom that that an idea or insight promoted by scholars of a think 
tank has a direct and tangible impact on the writing of a new legislation, on a 
funding decision, or a similar policy decision. Usually, an idea, insight, or pro-
posal shapes the policy making process in a much more diffuse way. On the long 
run it can, for example, influence the perception and mental model of the policy 
maker, shift the attention to another aspect of an issue, redefine implicit priori-
ties, reframe the discussion, activate informal networks and friendships across 
partisan borders, and many other fuzzy impacts more. In this rather diffuse way, 
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the published written materials and oral communications influence the intellec-
tual environment, in which the media, the policy community and policy makers 
are operating, as exemplifies Peter Orszag:  
“About two or three years ago, the administration started to heavily make the argument 
that the budget deficit would have no influence on the interest rates (..). That started to 
pervade the policy community and the press and they said things like the literature suggests 
that there is no evidence that ..; which is not really true. So we did this paper, which actu-
ally documented what the literature showed. (..) And gradually it did flip the conventional 
wisdom in town back to where it had been. (..) I think the paper changed the context in 
which discussions were held” (P. Orszag). 
− Advancement 
of broad ideas: 
example of de-
regulation 
 
Another type of impact a think tank can have is to promote a broad idea by 
working it out in various sectors. One of Brookings most influential ideas is the 
one of deregulation promoted in the 1970s. Brookings’ scholars showed in vari-
ous studies that deregulation would be the preferable choice for a variety of in-
dustries. Brookings became the intellectual reference for the idea of deregulation 
as states Charles Schultze: “When Carter came in, airline was first, because this 
was what Kennedy worked on. The next step was trucking. (..) The idea became 
so popular that Congress went beyond what we had ever intended. So it was a 
concatenation of various events”. Schultze adds that it is a very rare case that a 
think tank can so prominently propagate an idea: “Opposed to the deregulation 
where it all of a sudden clicked through, very often you won’t quite see the im-
pact” 
− Direct impact 
on legislation: 
a rare occasion 
 
In very rare cases though, the impact of Brookings’ activity is directly visible
and the recommendations and provided expertise have a direct impact on the 
writing of a new legislation.  
“Isabel Sawhill came up with this idea of a partially refundable child tax credit. 
We publicized the idea in the form of a policy brief. But I guess the key thing was that we 
had a lunch on Capitol Hill with the senators' staffers. About 15 staffers came, including 
some key staffers of some moderate Republicans came who were looking for something 
that would make the bill less aggressive. They essentially took this proposal, put it in the 
bill and it became law in about a month and a half. That is really unusual” (K. Weaver). 
Discussion of 
the Process 
Model 
Describing the process and means through which Brookings communicates 
its expertise to decision makers, we have seen that the process model of knowl-
edge communication can provide a useful structure to the presentation of the 
process. However, several reservations have to be made. First, we have seen that 
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in the case of Brookings - an independent think tank that aims to push its in-
sights and policy recommendations into the policy process - the phase of need 
articulation (on behalf of the decision maker) and the communication during the 
analysis phase do not really correspond to the way Brookings interacts with the 
policy makers at the Capitol Hill. Also the ‘apply & implement insights & solu-
tions’-phase is of minor importance in the case of Brookings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 With regard to the feed-forward and feedback loops we have presented in 
the knowledge communication model (Chapter 2), the case of Brookings does 
not allow us to identify very “thick” or institutionalized arrows. Yet, we have 
discussed instances where feed-forward and feedback arrows are of importance. 
Figure 9 gives an overview on these. We have mentioned, for example, that it is 
seldom that policy makers do a clear formulation of what expertise they need 
from policy makers and that there is a clear feed-forward (arrow “A”) between 
the Identification and the Articulation phase. We have also discussed the rather 
intensive communication process that comes into place when the scholars have 
finished a project (arrow ‘D’). Another feedback loop we mentioned is the one 
between the Implementation and the Analysis phases (arrow ‘d’): For certain high 
impact ideas, like the deregulation idea, Brookings became very famous for its 
insights. Once this endeavor was started in the aviation sector, Brookings did 
studies on deregulation for other sectors, such as the truck industry or electricity.
Rather than observing clear arrows leading from one phase to another, we 
Figure 9: Single Instances of Feed-Forward and Feedback Loops within the Interaction 
between Brookings and the Policy Makers 
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have seen that the connections are not so clear and that the arrows remain vague. 
This is the case because Brookings’ expertise has to “compete” within a whole 
market of expertise. Weaver and Stares (Weaver & Stares, 2001: 24), by refer-
ring to Kingdon, describe this process to be much closer to March’s “garbage-
can” idea of decision making: Problems, policies, and politics form more or less 
independent streams and policy expertise in the shape of information can linger 
along for quite a while until it is attached to a focal problem and used as a moti-
vation or solution for a particular problem (Kingdon, 1995: 165). 
Figure 10 gives an overview on the major practices along the knowledge 
communication process between Brookings’ experts and the policy makers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Summary of the Practices along the Knowledge Communication Process be-
tween Brookings and the Policy Makers 
•Use various communication formats strategically along their 
functions:
- written communication: books to conceptualize issues, to 
nurture academic credentials, and keep ideas alive; short & 
quickly released formats  (policy briefs, etc.) to provide concrete 
and timely policy recommendations
- face-to-face communication: events to gain attention for issue, 
provide overview, nurture dialogue in-between partisan borders
- Internet: reach broader audience, provide more convenient 
access to more up-to-date information, enable direct contact & 
interactivity
•Time communication in relation to the calendar of the public 
policy process
•Scale information within one and across various media: 
- within one media: provide information in different levels of 
detail, do several summaries varying in size
- across media: use oral media to give overview, books to inform 
in-depth 
•Team up with other think thanks and organizations to expand 
reach and attention and to manifest non-partisanship
•Involve policy makers in events to gain visibility and make them
engage in Brookings’ ideas 
Specific Practices for Events & Face-to-Face Communications:
•Distribute products online to reach a broader audience, to allow
policy makers pull the information in the moment of interest, and 
to provide more interactivity 
•Install formal and informal processes for quality assurance
•Loosely adhere to standard structure and format of single 
products 
Specific Practices for Written Material:
General Practices for Conveying Insights, Suggestions, & 
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government
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•Propose multiple means to identify relevant 
experts: Media Guide & Internet
•Include cross-referencing to widen variety of 
access paths to information
•Set up a communications office as a broker 
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•Augment convenience of access by reducing 
required time investment (by organizing 
events at Capitol Hill, and by providing own 
TV studio)
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Phase Un-
specific 
Challenges 
(& Prac-
tices) in the 
Knowledge 
Communi-
cation 
Challenges & 
Practices 
Bound to the 
Communicated 
Message 
Challenges: 
− Difficulty to 
adapt language 
and to avoid 
technical, do-
main specific 
language 
There are a set of the communicative challenges and some practices, which 
are not specific to one phase of the knowledge-intensive interaction between 
experts and decision makers, but which span several of these and deal with more 
micro issues of the communication. In the following, we will present these chal-
lenges through the framework for managing knowledge conversations, presented 
in Chapter 2. The framework shows five dimensions: 1. the message, 2. the proc-
ess, 3. the group dynamics, 4. the mental models, and the 5. outer context.  
A set of general problems in the knowledge-intensive communication be-
tween Brookings’ experts and the policy makers at Congress are bound to the 
presentation of the message. Brookings’ scholars have also reported some prac-
tices in order to better tackle with these challenges. 
First, a major challenge for the expert is to adapt his/her language to the one 
of the policy maker. On the surface, this problem is about vocabulary, genre and 
ways of talking. For example, certain concepts that are very common to Brook-
ings’ experts like “cross-elasticity of demand”, “multiplier effect”, or “present 
value” are difficult to understand for policy makers. If Brookings’ experts use 
such terms, the policy makers will concentrate on these and will divert their at-
tention from the central issue.  
The language difference cannot be grasped fully by the different use of se-
mantics. Language functions as a proxy for a whole set of differences that exist 
between Brookings’ experts and the policy makers at Congress and which are 
related to the differences in their knowledge, experiences, and perspectives. In 
other words, differences in perspectives on the mental model dimension are ex-
pressed by different language use, which shows an interrelationship between the 
message and the mental model dimension of the framework. Peter Orszag exem-
plifies this connection:  
 ”The language difference is often a proxy for a different set of experiences and back-
grounds. You have members of Congress who have been running for Congress for 15 or 20 
years and are used to a variety of activities that are not fundamentally based on economic 
research. (..) Economists talk in one type of way and, policy makers talk in a different way. 
Economists are almost naturally inclined to thinking: ‘all else being equal, the partial equa-
tion of changing this is changing that’. Members of Congress often are not thinking in that 
way. They see two things happening at the same time so they must be casually related. It’s 
much less theoretical. (..) There are often different languages involved. (..) The language 
difference is a proxy of a whole lot of other differences. Background and training really; 
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and that manifests itself in language” (P. Orszag) 
Since the policy maker does not have the time nor interest to learn the lan-
guage of the expert and appropriate the knowledge that goes with it, it is a main 
task of Brookings’ experts to know the ways of thinking of the policy makers 
and to be able to adapt their language and ways of expression.  
− Difficulty to 
present com-
plex issues in 
very concise 
and simple 
formats 
 
Another challenge related to the communicated message is it for Brookings’ 
scholars to synthesize their vast knowledge into very short communications. In 
view of the ever growing time pressure and the changed values and preferences of 
the media (linkage with outer context: Ever tighter time constraints lead to a 
request for extreme conciseness), this capability is central both for written and 
also for oral communications (earlier, we have discussed the necessity of shorter 
communication formats such as policy briefs, testimonies in congressional hear-
ings, or Brookings’ scaling strategy). Another situation, in which it is essential 
that Brookings’ scholars know how to synthesize and simplify a message is dur-
ing interviews and the participation at TV shows. Charles Schultze notes:  
“Every month, I do a business, stock market TV show (..) it’s the nightly business report on 
the public TV channel, it goes on for years and has a pretty wide audience. I only have one 
minute and a half to get something across. If it is a subject I know, I can write what I have 
to write in half an hour. But it always comes out 2 to 3 times too long and then I spend 
hours to get it shorter” (C. Schultze). 
It seems that even if the expert is very familiar with the topic, it is a particu-
lar challenge to outline a complex train of thought in a very concise manner. 
Practices: 
− Deemphasize 
academic 
terms and 
technical de-
tails 
Brookings’ experts must translate findings written in a scientific language to 
a language that is accessible to policy makers. ”When I am talking to an aca-
demic I am wearing a different hat than when I am taking to a policy maker. It 
happens subconsciously, you kind of switch mode” (P. Gale). One practice in 
doing so is to de-emphasize scientific terms.  
“If you start: ‘The present value of the social security deficit is 4 trillion dollars’, they ask 
what you intend with present value, and you go and say that it is the amount today that 
with interest will equal.. and it just puts them off. I will say ‘present value’, (..) to make sure 
it is accurate, but I kind of put it at the end so that (..) so it does not block the listeners 
mind. I would say: ‘Over the next 75 years the social security deficit is 4 trillion dollars in 
present value’” (W. Gale). 
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In this way, Brookings’ scholars aim to get rid of a too technical language 
and of technical details as explains William Gale: “It’s about conveying the im-
portant insights from economics in non-technical terms. (..) You don’t need to 
understand the formal calculations to understand” (W. Gale). 
− Reduce a text 
to its pure logi-
cal flow of ar-
gumentation 
One practice in order to turn a written or oral text concise, yet complete, is 
to outline its pure argumentative structure. For the sender, it forces him/her to 
verify whether his/her argumentation is logical and meaningful, whether it misses 
something, includes superfluous elements, or combines inconsistent categories. 
On the other hand, to communicate the logical skeleton upfront the actual article 
or speech gives the receiver a very synthetic overview on the argument, helps to 
orient him-/herself, to know how a single piece of information relates to the oth-
ers, and permits not to loose the big picture of a whole argument. Charles 
Schultze exemplifies:  
“I remember President Linden Johnson, apparently, when he was in the Senate had got 
news to have getting information presented to him in an outlined form, not paragraph after 
paragraph (..): Roman I, Roman I.I.a. And President Kennedy’s Chairman of the Economic 
Advisors (..) later became Johnson’s advisor and he soon discovered this. (..) It’s really use-
ful because you can see the logical structure with the outline. To a busy politician, just 
looking at a dense paragraph of text, it puts him off, but if he can see the structure, that 
helps very much” (C. Schultze) 
– Contextualize 
information 
through the 
use of analo-
gies and meta-
phors 
There is a final practice on the message level, into which Brookings engages: 
contextualization through the use of metaphors2: By looking at Brookings’ prod-
ucts, what is quite striking is the extensive use of metaphors and analogies. This 
is already noticeable in the titles such as “Sisyphus Revisited” (Closa, 2005), 
“Leaving Money (and Food) on the Table” (Fellowes & Berube, 2005), or “A 
Guns and Caviar Approach” (Gale & Orszag, 2002). In this latter example, in 
order to make a point on President Bushes politics of war spending and simulta-
neous tax cuts for high income-households, the authors call it “guns and caviar” 
approach and compares it to President Johnson’s “guns and butter” politics of 
the 1960s (when Johnson expanded war and domestic spending at the same 
time). In this way, Brookings’ scholars often use analogies or metaphors to con-
                                                 
2 Stone (2005) also points to the role of metaphors in the communication of think tanks. She claims that the me-
taphors are instrumental in turning abstract ideas usable for political usage as they help to simplify debates. She 
refers to the often used war, faith, and market metaphors, which often represent means to create allies and ene-
mies and to win acceptance for a cause by either praising it or vilifying alternatives.  
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vey the main idea of their reasoning and to anchor the idea with a commonly 
known situation or fact. William Gale outlines how he would communicate his 
idea of a pension system, in which people can opt out of pre-fabricated packages 
rather than needing to make the packages themselves:  
”The tag line would be, you don’t have to be a mechanic in order to drive your car, you 
don’t need to be a PhD in economics in order to get most out of your formal case system. 
(..) “It is important to use analogies, anchoring techniques, examples, sometimes even a 
story to illustrate a good point” (W. Gale).  
Gale gives another illustration of how he uses analogies. To illustrate the 
idea of alternative budget projections that subtract various retirement funds from 
the current CBO (Congressional Budget Office) baseline, he often uses the anal-
ogy of the firm:  
“I would tell Congressmen: ‘A firm that was running a current deficit, but that has a sur-
plus in the pension fund, you would not take the pension fund and use it for the operating 
business.’ Congressmen, they get that and that adjustment makes sense to them” (W. Gale). 
The practice to use known analogies and examples in order to favor the 
sense-making process of the policy maker, brings advantages also in terms of 
media awareness. If we look at the media clipping in the major U.S. newspapers. 
In the New York Times, Brookings’ scholar Peter Orszag is quoted with: “It's 
not a nest egg. It's a loan” (Krugman, 2005). In the Washington Times, a debate 
between the same scholar Peter Orszag and Robert Pozen is quoted as follows: 
“The accounts are not sugar; they're like trying to get your kid to eat the spin-
ach by offering a turnip for dessert" (a response of Peter Orszag during a con-
gressional hearing to Robert Pozen’s testimony, in which the latter claimed that 
“the personal accounts Bush advocates are the ‘desserts’ and that Social Secu-
rity's solvency is ‘the spinach’”, see: Milbank, 2005).  
Challenge 
Bound to the 
Group Dynam-
ics and the 
Socio-
Emotional 
Aspects be-
tween Experts 
& Decision 
On the level of the process, we have not identified any phase independent 
challenge or practices, which is why we directly discuss a challenges related to 
the group dynamics that become installed between experts and decision makers. 
For Brookings’ experts, it is sometimes difficult if a decision maker him-
/herself feels knowledgeable about a certain issue. Even if Brookings is one of the 
most renowned think tanks in the United States, expert status can never be taken 
for granted, especially in fields like economics or political science as outlines 
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Makers 
– Policy maker 
feels knowl-
edgeable him-
/herself and 
expert has to 
convince him 
of his expertise 
 
Charles Schultze:  
”Virtually every major politician figures that I am as good as this guy in what is going to 
happen in the economy. (..) Whereas when they deal with a physicist, even if he is not able 
to effectively communicate and sell his insights to a policy arena, everybody agrees he is a 
real expert and knows something I don’t.” 
This challenge of conveying not only the expertise, but at the same time also 
the expert status is less pressing if Brookings’ experts deal with issues that are 
more technical and less ideological like the example for cost estimates for medi-
cal care: “Here, you can get by on prior expertise. So even then, your estimates 
may not be expected, but the policy makers do not think that they know how to 
do it themselves and so they can’t really judge on that“ (C. Schultze). For this 
reason, in order to convince politicians how much expertise sticks within a cer-
tain recommendation, the expert has to show the effort in terms of research it 
contains and show also certain technical aspects:  
“For example, all the consequences of President Bushes policies on national saving and in-
vestment in the social security area, this is something you can’t pass by with being an expert 
on that, you got to convince people. It is not: he is an expert, he knows it. Whereas if I can 
say I have a team of 3 statisticians at disposition, and after two months of efforts and use of 
a large computer model, we come out with these numbers, we don’t say whether it’s good 
or bad, you will be treated as an expert, even though, at the end, they will still ignore your 
advice. But you carry some cache“ (C. Schultze). 
Challenges  
and Practice 
Bound to the 
Mental Models 
of Experts and 
Decision Mak-
ers: 
– Policy maker’s 
perspective dif-
fers from the 
one of the ex-
pert: 
- Experts’ in-
sights appear 
counter-
intuitive 
 
On the level of the mental models, another set of hurdles for the knowledge 
communication between experts and decision makers can be identified.  
First, policy makers often look at an issue from a very different perspective
than the experts, which is why the experts’ findings can be quite counterintuitive 
to the policy makers. William Gale exemplifies such a case:  
“There is an issue whether taxes that are not border adjustable affect the competitiveness of 
domestic firms. A value added tax is refundable at the border. The U.S. does not have a 
value added tax and there is a debate whether the U.S. should have one that is refundable at 
the border. The view that business people use is that this would make them more competi-
tive. From an economist’s point of view, we would say, no, it would not, because of the 
exchange rate. It would actually lead to 0 more competitiveness. (..) This finding is counter-
intuitive, it involves a thinking that is not related to their [the policy makers] daily business 
and their daily horizon.” 
In this way, it is often harder for Brookings’ experts to convey their insights 
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if the policy makers already have some knowledge and opinions on the issue. In 
this case, not only do they have to expose a complex argument, but they also 
have to convince policy makers why their current belief is not forcibly valid. In 
part, this challenge is related to the prior knowledge of the policy makers, but it 
is also related to the way, how both policy makers and experts frame an issue. 
“I always get people shaking their heads because they are refusing to believe it. It is a hard 
thing. It involves exchange rate adjustments and I think that business people are used to 
think of their world in their way and they tend to miss out the macro-economic conse-
quences” (W. Gale).  
- systemic think-
ing and multi-
ple inter-
relationships 
vs. bi-polar 
go/no-go 
thinking with-
out allowing 
uncertainty 
 
Another challenge is bound to the fact that, in the political environment, 
clear positions and yes-or-no answers are often needed since decisions have to be 
taken, laws have to be passed and policies need to go into a clear direction. The 
policy makers are trained to think in this frame of go versus no-go. In addition, 
in a bi-partisan political system, debates on political issues are often led by two 
polar opinions as if a problem has only two possible solutions. An academic, 
instead, is trained thinking: “it depends” for that an issue is interwoven with 
multiple other variables, that there are important feedback loops in such a sys-
tem, and so forth. He/she often has difficulties to break down the complexity of 
an issue and to convey it in simple terms. Charles Schultze gives an illustrative 
example to underline this point: 
”It’s particularly (difficult) if three or more things interact. You write in terms of, now what 
I am going to tell you is difficult to know, but for God’s sake, it is not enough. Therefore, I 
am going to tell you this. But, by the way, this is only true if.. (..) I just recently remember 
trying to do some consulting for an investment bank. It had to do with the U.S. trade deficit 
and what to do about it. For an economist, what really drives the deficit is the national sav-
ing and investment. If you invest more than you save, you got to borrow abroad. If you 
save more than you invest, it’s vice versa. However, it is also true, and that is driving the 
trade deficit in the long run, there are things happening in international trade itself which 
feed back to saving and investment. So the influences go both ways.” 
Given the complexity of issues and the experts’ difficulty in meaningfully re-
ducing this complexity, on the side of the policy makers, “there is a demand for 
clear-cutting answers where there really aren’t any. That’s hard” (P. Orszag).  
The different orientations of policy makers and experts are beneficial both 
for the decision makers - their discourse gets nurtured by richer thinking and 
additional evidence, which leads to an opening-up of perspectives – as for ex-
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perts – they risk less to fall into the “paralysis by analysis”-syndrome. Yet, one 
problem of the go versus no-go thinking of policy makers is that there is not 
really a space for uncertainties and it is difficult for experts to communicate the 
degree of confidence they have in a certain recommendation or conclusion (yet, 
these would often be important indications as they show the decision makers the 
risk related to a certain decision). ”You are doing a profession, your academic 
credentials are that if it is Y don’t tell them X. If you realize in the paper that 
you are not a 100% sure, there are some possibilities that you be wrong, you 
don’t tell them that, they will cease on it” (C. Schultze).  
Practice: 
− Put yourself in 
the perspective 
of the audience 
and imagine 
them to be in-
telligent lay-
people 
One practice of Brookings’ experts is that they try to imagine the perspective 
of the policy makers, to envision their needs, constraints, ways of reasoning, etc. 
Charles Schultze explains: “It’s an art, but if you can put yourself into some-
body’s mind who is listening… (..) Figure out why this is difficult for people to 
get and write to that. (..) Time and again, I think I can explain something better I 
had struggled with than something that is obvious. (..) In these cases, I can figure 
out with what somebody else will be struggling with as well” (C. Schultze). To 
do so, the scholars imagine their audience to be intelligent people, but that are 
usually not used to thinking the way the expert does. It is easier for the expert to 
put him-/herself in the perspective of someone else, if he/she has lived a reality 
similar to the one of the policy maker. This practice shows another instance of 
how the mental model dimension is connected to the message dimension, in so 
far as only by being able to imagine the mindset of the policy makers, the expert 
can effectively reduce the complexity of the message and de-emphasize scientific 
terms. It also shows an interconnection with the outer context dimension. If the 
expert, in the past, has taken over the role of the policy maker, he can more eas-
ily imagine their way of thinking. “I don’t know if it’s necessary to spend so 
much time in government, but it certainly increases your understanding of how 
to communicate” (A. Rivlin). 
 
Challenges and 
Practice Bound 
to the (Politi-
cal) Outer Con-
text: 
 
Finally, some of the challenges of the knowledge communication between 
Brookings and the policy makers are bound to larger contextual factors, in which 
the communication takes place.  
A general, but very important challenge for Brookings is how to deal with 
the ever tighter time constraints with which the policy makers are faced. Earlier 
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– Ever tighter 
time con-
straints  
on, we have discussed various implications of this development. On the level of 
the message, for example, we have discussed the growing need to present com-
plex issues in a very concise and simplified manner, be that in written communi-
cations (e.g. scaling strategy, move from extensive formats like books to short 
articles like policy briefs) or during oral presentations (such in the realm of tes-
timonies or the participation at TV shows). ”Often, it’s the problem that under-
lying research is more complicated than policy makers have time for. The cave-
ats get lost” (P. Orszag).  
– Issue touches 
power struc-
tures 
 
Another limitation in the possibility to successfully integrate Brookings’ ex-
pertise in the policy making process is given when existing power structures are 
touched or questioned by the topic at issue. Such issues often regard formula 
fights as Kent Weaver explains: 
”One of my policy briefs was on the distribution formula for grants that states use for low-
income families. It's based on how much the states would have spent historically: if they 
have spent less, they would get less. It is just grotesquely unfair. It is a formula that was 
inherited from the previous Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, and the 
formula made sense under the old program. But with my proposed changes, it would have 
meant that money would have taken away from some states. And Congress hates these 
types of issues. They are called formula fights. They are divisive because some people win, 
some people loose, zero sum battles in which Congress does not like to be involved in. I 
thought, this was so grotesquely unfair that it would be relatively easy to get Congress to 
fix it, but it turned out to go nowhere. They did not want to face it. It divides Republicans 
internally. It's not something the majority party can agree on. The status quo wins in such 
type of situations. Issues that divide parties are difficult, where power is at stake” (K. 
Weaver). 
In a situation, where the issue touches power structures and where no con-
sensus within the party exists so that policy makers pursue their own interests, it 
is particularly difficult for an expert to introduce his or her expertise in the po-
litical debate. 
– Discourse on 
an issue is very 
value-laden 
There are political issues that are discussed mainly on a moral level and that 
traditionally divide parties. Examples of such value-laden debates are the legisla-
tion on stem cell research, on abortion, or U.S. military interventions abroad. 
The more important moral values and ideology become in a political decision 
and the more partisan the discussion, the more difficult it is for Brookings’ ex-
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perts to nurture the political discourse with their expertise and knowledge.  
“If the conclusions happen to be very ideological or if they have a big impact on people’s 
ideology, your expertise may not carry very far. (..) Sometimes, these conclusions go against 
the deeply anchored beliefs of policy makers, which have nothing to do with science, like in 
the business of creationism. There are people with very firmly held ideas that you can’t 
shake. (..) The influence of the religious right makes that these people feel absolutely self 
confident. When I talk in front of Congress, I always have this 10% of worry inside me that 
this is something I am not a 100% sure of it. Partly because economics as a profession (..) 
you can be less certain. It’s a lot easier to have an informative debate and discussion with 
people who are ideologically not strongly belief driven” (C. Schultze). 
The growing tendency to lead political discussions on a moral level and “the 
fact that politics has become much more polarized in the last years, made it more 
difficult to be the neutral expert speaking truth to power” (K. Weaver). In such a 
situation, it is difficult to introduce expertise and factual arguments in the politi-
cal discourse. 
– Policy makers 
have already 
made com-
mitments 
 
Another contextual aspect, which impacts on the policy makers’ possibility 
to integrate the expertise provided by Brookings’ experts is the fact whether pol-
icy makers have already made commitments and/or have clearly exposed their 
opinion on an issue. In such situations, face-saving behavior and integrity is often 
deemed more important by the decision maker than accuracy of the decision. 
Kent Weaver gives an illustrative example:  
” One of the things I said when I testified (..) was that you cannot strengthen social security 
without an increase in the payroll tax (..). But the President had given a very clear direction 
to the Commission that it was not to consider a payroll tax increase. They completely 
agreed with me, you cannot do this. But they were given the mandate that the payroll tax 
was not to increase, period. So the commitment was so strong that no information saying 
how stupid it was to do what they were going to do, would convince them not to do it” (K. 
Weaver) 
Similarly, if the policy makers have already exposed their views on an issue 
and fear to loose their face if they accept an opposite recommendation of an 
expert, it is very difficult to bring in expertise into a policy making process: “If, 
as a consequence of your estimates, it makes a policy look stupid, which some-
one is pushing, they might agree, but they (..) won’t start arguing. (..) They 
would try to find another expert who gives them another answer” (C. Schultze). 
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– Policy propos-
als are washed 
out within the 
policy making 
process  
 
Another contextual aspect to consider when communicating expertise to 
policy makers is that, in the policy making process, original proposals are 
changed and often washed out. The expert knowing that his/her original recom-
mendation will be changed during the process, might decide to adapt his/her 
communication strategy: 
“If you start your argument with your best proposal, you have no argument to retreat. In-
tellectually and morally, this is very hard for an academic. You are supposed to show all the 
consequences. You don’t deliberately change the figures, but the assumptions you may have 
chosen are not your best. (..) Often, a big part of it is not revealing your uncertainties” 
(C.Schultze). 
So rather than outlining the best estimate or the best solution up front, the 
expert who is aware of the bargaining mechanisms that are involved in the pol-
icy making process, might decide not to present all the potential weaknesses and 
uncertainties related to the solution he proposes or to unveil his/her best recom-
mendation only later on in the process. Although this problem is more pressing 
if the expert is working within the administration and not for an independent 
think tank, it nevertheless represents a difficulty for experts in the political 
arena.  
– Competitive 
environment 
with many par-
tisan and non 
academic think 
tanks compet-
ing 
 
Another challenge given by the context in which Brookings is operating is 
the ever stronger competition from partisan, non-academic think tanks. In such 
an environment, the challenge is to gain the attention from the media and the 
policy makers and to be regarded as a neutral expert. Kent Weaver explains: 
“The world of think tanks has become much more competitive. 40 years ago, 
there were two think tanks, Brookings and the American Enterprise Institute. 
Now there are a hundred of think tanks in Washington and thousands of interest 
groups” (K. Weaver). These think tanks do not form a homogenous category, 
but differ considerably: some are specialized in a few specific policy domains and 
some are more advocacy than research oriented and aim to promote a particular 
agenda (Weaver, 1989). Politicians, on the other hand, are not always aware of 
these distinctions and therefore do not automatically relate the term “think tank” 
to organizations which give trustful advise. For this reason, it is harder for 
Brookings to be perceived as a non-partisan group of experts, even more so as 
the institution is often considered to be democratic. Therefore, the challenge is 
how to adapt to the successful communication strategy set by more advocacy 
oriented think tanks while maintaining its academic credentials. “The Heritage 
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Foundation really emphasized the means with which we communicate. Things 
are much more short term and are much more accessible” (K. Weaver). The me-
dia with its values have a preference for the shorter, quicker, and event-based 
communications, which are characteristic of the communication of the Heritage 
Foundation. The challenge for Brookings therefore is to continuously adapt its 
communication to these changes, but maintain its high standards of quality 
within its publications and other forms of communications (R. Lawrence).  
– Rapidly chang-
ing communi-
cation stan-
dards 
 
A final challenge in the outer context of the knowledge communication be-
tween Brookings’ experts and policy makers is given by professional values and 
communication standards of journalism: the consequences of such guidelines can 
restrain the successful communication of Brookings’ expertise. An example of 
this is the media’s value to always report in a balanced way. It can lead to a 
situation, in which an too much weight is given to marginal positions: 
”Partly it is because reporters don’t fully grasp the difference between, hard-core research 
and sort of repackaging. We see this in lots of different debates, be that climate change or 
whatever, you see that. You always have to say on the one hand and on the other in the 
media. So you get expert A and expert B. Often it is completely unbalanced. 99% of scien-
tists agree with person A and then the other is sort of a freak or a joke and then that person 
is given almost equal billing because journalists are almost so worried about being bal-
anced” (P. Orszag). 
Practice:  
− Employ schol-
ars with prior 
experience in 
Government 
An already mentioned and very important practice of Brookings, which con-
tributes to a favorable context of the knowledge communication, is that most 
scholars who are employed at Brookings have prior experience in Government. 
Ron Nesson explains that this practice not only guarantees a better access to 
policy makers because the scholars know the policy makers personally from their 
prior work (see: Identify Experts and Expertise), but it is also important for that 
Brookings’ scholars know the problems of the policy makers, can imagine their 
modes of reasoning, and therefore better address them in their writings and pres-
entations (see: Challenges and Practice Bound to the Mental Models of Experts 
and Decision Makers). Finally, the adherences to various departments and ad-
ministrations are important to mark the non-partisanship of Brookings. 
“We got people from the current administration, we got people from the Clinton Admini-
stration, we’ve got people from papa Bush, Reagan, Jimmy Carter, John Ford, Richard 
Nixon, and, believe it or not, we have got a guy who was in the Truman administration” 
(R. Nesson).  
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 After having described the communication process by which Brookings’ ex-
perts aim to propose their policy recommendations and expertise to policy mak-
ers, we have outlined a variety of (phase-unspecific challenges and some prac-
tices, which generally characterize the knowledge-intensive communication be-
tween the two. To provide more structure in this last discussion, we have catego-
rized the challenges and practices according to the five dimensions of the frame-
work for leading knowledge-intensive conversations (presented in Chapter 2). 
Figure 11 gives an overview on these phase-independent challenges and practices. 
Repeatedly, we gave examples of how the different dimensions are interrelated 
with each other. For instance, we have shown that the challenge to adapt to the 
policy makers’ language (message dimension) is related to the differences in per-
spectives and background knowledge of experts and policy makers, an aspect we 
have attributed to the mental model-dimension. In this context, we have also 
shown the positive connection between the practice of employing scholars with 
prior Government experience (outer context) and the differences in mental mod-
els. Another example is the repercussions of the growing time pressure (on the 
level of the outer context) on the urge for conciseness on the message dimension. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Phase Independent Challenges (and Practices) of the Knowledge 
Communication between Brookings' Experts and the Policy Makers 
Message
Process
Group
Dynamics
Mental 
Models
Outer
Context
•Difficulty to adapt language and to avoid technical, 
domain specific language
•Difficulty to present complex issues in very concise and 
simple formats
Challenges
•Policy maker’s perspective differs from the one of the 
expert 
•experts’ insights appear counter-intuitive 
•systemic thinking and multiple inter-relationships 
vs. bi-polar go/no-go thinking without allowing 
uncertainty
•Ever tighter time constraints
•Issue touches power structures
•Discourse on an issue is very value-laden
•Policy makers have already made commitments
•Policy proposals are washed out within the policy 
making process 
•Competitive environment with many partisan and non 
academic think tanks competing
•Rapidly changing communication standards
•Policy maker feels knowledgeable him-/herself and 
expert has to convince him of his expertise 
•Deemphasize academic terms and technical details 
•Reduce a text to its pure logical flow of argumentation 
•Contextualize information through the use of analogies 
and metaphors 
Practices
•Put yourself in the perspective of the audience and 
imagine them to be intelligent laypeople
•Employ scholars with prior experience in Government
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Conclusion 
 
We have presented a large set of communicative challenges and practices 
that define the knowledge-intensive interaction between Brookings’ scholars 
and the policy makers at Congress. Within the variety or richness of these char-
acterizations, the reader might have lost the sense for which practices are most 
central for Brookings’ endeavors in conveying their knowledge to policy mak-
ers. To conclude, we would like to synthesize the outlined variety by presenting 
five generic practices that best reflect the Brookings’ way of communicating its 
knowledge to policy makers. These are: ‘Active Cooperating’, ‘Information 
Scaling and Tuning’, ‘Validation: Affirming Quality and Credibility’, ‘Establish-
ing Common Ground’, and ‘Balancing Out Dilemmas’. 
Overall Prac-
tices: 
1. Active Cooper-
ating 
 
Brookings does not perceive its communication with the policy makers and 
with the media as a unilateral process where the think tank simply intends to 
push ideas. On the contrary, Brookings strives for active cooperation and 
knowledge networking with the policy makers, with the media, with other think 
tanks, and with policy organizations.  
First, active involvement of policy makers: When Brookings organizes 
events such as luncheons on Capitol Hill or briefings at the occasion of a book 
release, oftentimes, senators or other known politicians get actively involved in 
the event. Earlier on, we gave the example of an event regarding the Restoring 
Fiscal Sanity project where Brookings invited Senators John McCain and Joseph 
Lieberman to speak and comment on a paper. Such collaborations bring about 
various advantages at the same time. Senators enjoy a high visibility and by in-
volving them in Brookings’ events, the event itself will profit from a higher me-
dia visibility and reach a larger audience. Secondly, the fact that the senators 
comment on the book makes them engage with the subject quite intensively, 
which increases the probability that they will put forward some of the ideas in 
the Senate. By commenting, the senators also translate what was in the language 
of Brookings’ experts into the language of the policy makers and therewith make 
the content more accessible to the policy world. Finally, Brookings receives 
valuable feedback from the policy makers and can probably improve the quality 
of its contribution and idea.  
The second form of active cooperating is the involvement of other think 
tanks and policy organizations. Still in the aforementioned events at Capitol 
Hill, Brookings often teams up with other policy organizations. Brookings traces 
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various advantages from such collaborations. On the one hand, the event is pub-
licized among the communities of all the involved institutions and this permits a 
higher visibility, also across partisan boarders. In addition, media will be more 
attentive to such a joint and therefore bigger event, as Isabel Sawhill outlines: 
“The reason for these collaborative efforts is to get more attention, to get more 
chance of influencing the debate. To reach a broader audience” (I. Sawhill). 
Secondly, such collaboration also increases the perceived quality and the credi-
bility of the event. If Brookings would organize it on its own, many people and 
organizations would have a certain suspicion that Brookings simply aims to 
promote democratic values. Thanks to the collaboration with other organiza-
tions, Brookings strongly affirms the non-partisanship of the event and many 
politicians will listen more carefully and get themselves into the thought without 
a priori shutting themselves off partisan borders. A final minor point is that by 
doing collaborations with other policy organizations, Brookings can also share 
its economic expenses for the event. Yet, the main motives for such collabora-
tions are to gain a broader attention and a higher credibility. Such collabora-
tions work primarily when the topic is considered by all organizations to be 
highly important and the commitment and action of the policy makers is deemed 
to be necessary.  
“The political system is not taking action on this front right now (on fiscal sanity). They 
are bitterly divided, and so outside of government, research organizations and think tanks 
are eager to make the people and the opinion leaders aware of the problem. The way to get 
the word out is to combine forces because there is not a lot of disagreement outside the 
government that this is a major issue that needs to be addressed. (..) So it’s to bring com-
bined influence on the public and the elected officials. It is persuasion by education” (I. 
Sawhill). 
Brookings does not only collaborate with other organizations for the or-
ganization of events, there are also initiatives of joint projects like, for example, 
the “AEI-Brookings Project on the Independent Counsel Statute Yet”, a collabo-
ration with the American Enterprise Institute, or the maintenance of the Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center, A joint venture of the Urban Institute and the 
Brookings Institution (Tax Policy Center, 2005). 
Finally, Brookings pairs up also with Media Partners. Earlier on, we gave 
the example of a collaboration with the Washington Post, that hosts and ar-
chives all the Internet chats that take place between a Brookings’ scholar and the 
general public regarding a specific topic. The advantage for Brookings is again 
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to enlarge its typical audience and to gain the readers of the online version of the 
Washington Post. In addition, Brookings may also profit from the Washington 
Post’s promotion activities of their chat service. In this case, they might also 
benefit from the technological skills that are necessary for such a service.  
In sum, we can say that Brookings actively collaborates with policy mak-
ers, other policy organizations, and media partners. By doing so, the Institution 
profits from a variety of advantages such as gaining a larger audience and more 
credibility, improving the products’ quality, translating findings into the lan-
guage of the policy maker, and profiting from (technical) skills and financial 
resources. On a long run, such collaborations can even lead to real knowledge 
networks where more direct and personal knowledge exchange takes place in 
more informal communications, as we have seen, a very important aspect when 
aiming to integrate expertise into the policy making process.  
2. Information 
Scaling & Tun-
ing 
 
A major practice in the way how Brookings communicates its insights and 
expertise to policy makers is what we call ‘information scaling’ and ‘information 
tuning’. We have shown that Brookings scales the information both within one 
media and across several media. Within one media, Brookings does diversely 
long summaries of a product. Across media, Brookings scales the information by 
systematically using oral communications and events like public briefings, or 
radio-/TV shows as occasions where someone can quickly get a general look-out 
and become aware of a certain idea or approach that is discussed more in detail 
in a book or report.  
We have mentioned earlier on that the policy makers represent quite a frag-
mented target group. Congressmen usually don’t have an economical back-
ground, but have a lot of experience in the political world. Members of con-
gressional staff are oftentimes similar experts in economics or public policy than 
Brookings’ scholars themselves. In a context, where the audience’s knowledge 
and experience can be very diverse, it is particularly important to tune the in-
formation to the particularities of the different policy makers. Varying the 
length of a piece of information is only one way how to adapt and tune it to the 
various target groups. Choosing different media, communication modalities and 
styles is another way. The insights gained from a project might be communi-
cated in a book, in various articles, in a report, in policy briefs, op-eds, events, 
in testimonies at congressional hearings, in interviews for newspapers, and 
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when attending a radio or TV show. Distributing a piece of information in such 
a variety of forms, allows many different audiences to access it. Brookings’ 
scholars also have the chance to adapt the examples, analogies, and stories, they 
use to better illustrate their ideas to the context of the specific audience.  
3. Validation: 
Affirming Qual-
ity and Credibil-
ity 
One of the major challenges of an organization like Brookings is to renew 
and maintain the credibility and quality of its experts and of its knowledge-
intensive products and services. Brookings has several practices in place to vali-
date and affirm its quality and credibility in the short and long run.  
One of the most important aspects is that Brookings sticks to its non-
partisan and academic positioning. ”No one tells Brookings’ scholars what they 
should think about a specific issue. It’s institutional policy that the institution 
does not take position, only scholars do” (W. Gale). In this way, there is no 
institutionalized “Brookings’ view” or “Brookings’ approach”. From an outside 
perspective, nevertheless, Brookings as an institution has been identified with 
certain (ideological or theoretical) viewpoints. In its early years and up until the 
end of Moulton’s presidency in 1952, Brookings was said to share quite a liberal 
view and believed in the market’s capacity to correct economic and social mal-
adjustments (anti-interventionalist view on state). After Moulton, Brookings was 
said to be sympathetic to an economic view that leans against the Keynesian 
perspective (Critchlow, 1985). Today, there is certainly a suspicion about 
Brookings to be democratic and liberal. Finally, the centrist positioning -
“Brookings is the closest to centrist as you can get these days in Washington” 
(R. Nessen) - of Brookings is after all an institutional positioning. Yet, Brook-
ings seriously attempts to live and promote a diversity of ideas within the institu-
tion, even within the same research and book project or within the same event.  
”The different scholars working for this project (Restoring fiscal sanity) did not all share 
the same vision of how to resolve the problem of fiscal sanity. I do think it is a strength 
that Brookings does not have an institutionalized view. For this project, I deliberately 
chose authors that were well informed, that’s the most important criteria, and secondarily 
that would have somewhat diverse perspectives on whatever is the issue. (..) I think that if 
you have to work with someone who has a different view than you, but who is equally 
well informed, you get a better product. I think that’s a motivating factor and then, in my 
view, I think it leads to a more interesting book because it is not all people singing from 
the same hymnals” (I. Sawhill). 
One way to assure the non-partisanship and ideological balance is by care-
Appendix 50 
 
 
fully choosing the composition of the scholars working on a project. Next to this 
aspect, it is also important how projects are funded: ”One of the other rules is 
that no more than 50% of the funding of a project can come from one sponsor” 
(R. Nessen).  
Non-partisanship assures a higher quality of Brookings products. In addi-
tion, the non-partisanship is important in order to be considered a credible 
source for policy expertise and not simply an organ of a party.  
”Brookings is not partisan, is not viewed as being partisan. It’s not left or right, it is a seri-
ous academic organization. People say: ‘Oh Brookings, we pay attention to Brookings be-
cause they are non-partisan, they are not identified with any particular philosophy’. It is 
important that Brookings’ ideas are not painted by partisanship” (R. Nessen). 
Because of the commitment to being non-partisan, the ideas that come out 
of the Brookings Institution remain surprising and can even be contradictory. 
For this reason, it is harder for a politician to say: ‘Ah, I won’t listen to them 
anyway, they come from the other party’. Each scholar might have his/her own, 
surprising point of view as Isabel Sawhill explains: ”Individual scholars of 
Brookings might put forward interesting ideas. We are more like a university 
with different scholars and many of these scholars have strong points of view, 
but the institution does not” (I. Sawhill). 
The non-partisanship goes together with the adherence to academic stan-
dards in approaching work and both are also important aspects for Brookings in 
differentiating itself from other, more advocacy oriented think tanks. As op-
posed to such organizations, Brookings aims “to get the analysis right, rather 
than to push a particular agenda” (W. Gale). The following quote of Ron Nes-
sen coins this distinction quite clearly: ”The president of Brookings, who was at 
the time Michael Armacost, he had told me: ‘(..) at Brookings, we do the re-
search and the conclusions in that order’” (R. Nessen). For Brookings’ scholars
have in common to strive keeping up the academic credentials and not to be-
come an advocacy or shallow organization. ”I keep insisting that these (the pol-
icy briefs) really have to present research that you have been conducting and not 
simply something you have been writing on over the weekend” (C. Schultze). By 
adhering to the standards of social science Brookings can manifest the credibility 
of its information products, the single scholars, and the institution as a whole.  
Brookings assures the quality of its products in a variety of ways. First of 
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all, Brookings hires only scholars with high credentials. Most of them have a 
PhD from a prestigious university and have served for the administration. ”A lot 
of the quality assurance happens at the hiring level” (W. Gale). A second process 
to assure the quality of Brookings’ products is the internal approval procedure 
for research projects. “All the research projects have to be approved by the 
board of trustees. If someone has the idea that he wants to make a project on 
why George Bush was the stupidest president we have ever had, you know, you 
can’t do that” (R. Nessen). Third, continuous reviewing processes: Once a pro-
ject is approved and the first publications are being elaborated, there are several 
forms of internal, external, official and unofficial feedback and editing proce-
dures. For books this process is rather formal. All books are externally reviewed 
by three reviewers, a process similar to the one of the university press. For other 
products like the policy briefs, the reviewing process is much more informal.  
“For policy briefs it is a more haphazard review process. Everything gets reviewed inter-
nally, it goes to the director of the program, so economic studies or government studies, 
and then to the president of the institution, and then there is informal consultation as well” 
(K. Weaver). In general, the culture of continuous internal reviews is very important for the 
quality of the results. ”We read each other’s work all the time” (W. Gale).  
In sum, Brookings has various practices in place to assure the quality of the 
research and to affirm the credibility of its scholars and their expertise. Central 
is the adherence to the non-partisan and academic positioning and the therewith 
implicated recruitment, funding, project approval and reviewing practices. 
4. Establishing 
Common 
Ground 
A major challenge in the knowledge communication between domain ex-
perts and decision makers is that they need a sufficient common ground, a 
shared context and common knowledge base, in order to be able to embed the 
newly received information in a meaningful context. If there is not enough 
common ground between the two partners, the decision maker will not be able 
to make sense of the technical jargon of the expert and will not understand how 
a specific piece of information should possibly help him/her in his/her practical, 
daily problems. At the same time, the expert is not able to align his communica-
tion to the needs of the decision maker because he simply does not know his/her 
priorities and daily concerns. On the other hand, if there is a large overlap be-
tween the knowledge of the two parties, specialization is smaller and it might be 
questionable why the decision maker has to rely on the expert all together and 
their knowledge should be integrated (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2000). However, in 
Appendix 52 
 
 
most cases the bigger threat is the one not to share enough common ground 
rather than too much of it. 
To ascertain the necessary common ground between the politicians and its 
scholars, we have mentioned that Brookings has the practice to work with 
scholars who have working experience in the administration. This allows them 
to know the policy makers’ constraints, their ways of thinking, their priorities, 
and also their limitations and constraints within the political processes. Another 
way how Brookings gives its scholars the chance to better understand the con-
text of the policy makers and to adjust their language and way of reasoning is 
to organize events, in which scholars meet policy makers face-to-face. There, 
Brookings’ scholars have the possibility to personalize and finely tailor their 
communication. They get to know policy makers on a personal level and so 
establish further the common ground among them. The creation of a sufficient 
common ground is important for creating a successful communication and a 
shared understanding.  
5. Balancing Out 
Dilemmas (be-
tween academic 
comprehen-
siveness and 
concision and 
between proac-
tive agenda set-
ting and swift 
reaction to po-
litical changes) 
Finally, a last practice summarizing what we have discussed so far is that 
Brookings is to find balances within at least two important dilemmas. A first 
dilemma exists between the professional responsibility as researchers to do and 
present comprehensive research according to social science methods (which usu-
ally is time consuming) and conceptualize issues thoroughly, and, on the other 
hand, to have solutions ready the moment a problem pops up in the policy 
world and to present research results very swiftly and in a very concise manner. 
Part of this balancing dilemma is also to know how to simplify an idea and in-
sight, reduce unimportant complexity and represent it in a very brief format 
(challenge we have discussed on the message level), and, on the other, represent 
the issue or idea in a good quality and in a comprehensive and meaningful way, 
without leaving apart central aspects of it. A look back in history shows that this 
dilemma was emerging already in the 70s and that it became more apparent 
with the growing competition from more advocacy oriented think tanks, with 
the changing media environment, and with the ever tighter time constraints of 
policy makers, all of which pushed for ever shorter formats. According to 
Robert Lawrence, an example that well illustrates how Brookings copes with 
this stretch between academic comprehensiveness and concision is the founda-
tion of Brookings “Papers on Economic Activity” in 1970. The founders of this 
new format had the feeling that a lot of the research comes too late for policy 
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because of the extensive review processes. In order to be able to publish an arti-
cle within 3 months, they decided not to peer review the article, but in order to 
assure the quality, they published not only the paper, but invited also two dis-
cussants who wrote on the paper. Further, they brought very renowned people 
in the board of the senior advisors, which was important to signal expertise but 
also to really assure quality (R. Lawrence).  
Today, Brookings manages this first balancing dilemma in part also by pre-
senting the same piece of information in a variety of products and lengths (prac-
tice we have called information scaling for which a same information item is 
presented, more comprehensively, in the book format, and shorter and more 
accessibly, in policy briefs). 
A second balancing dilemma is the one between being proactive versus be-
ing reactive to the policy world. We have argued earlier that while advocacy 
organizations or organizations that are funded by government contracts mainly 
react to the political agenda, Brookings defines its activity very much bottom-up 
by the individual scholars and engages in agenda setting. Even if this is the case, 
there exists a dilemma for Brookings that if they define their projects too inde-
pendently from the policy world, they will not have the policy impact they are 
striving for. Yet, if they are just reacting to what already happens in the policy 
world, they will not have the time to do serious research on the issue and pro-
vide trustworthy insights. Only by developing a practice of balancing out both 
of these dilemmas, Brookings can successfully communicate its expertise to 
policy makers.  
 Brookings, as one of many think tanks in the U.S. market of policy exper-
tise, disposes of rich practices to nurture the political discourse with reliable and 
useful information. We have identified five such major practices that best define 
Brookings’ knowledge communication with the policy makers at Congress. 
These are the practices of active co-operating, information scaling and tuning, 
affirming quality and credibility, installing a necessary common ground between 
Brookings’ experts and the policy makers, and finally skilfully balancing out the 
dilemmas of academic comprehensiveness and concision and of pro-action and 
reaction. These practices are important for policy makers to make sense of the 
provided information and to be able to contextualize it in a setting that is mean-
ingful to them. In this way, Brookings manages to not only provide information 
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on a policy challenge, but to invite policy makers to create new meanings and 
interpretations of their policy world and from there, to newly shape possible 
solutions. By doing so, Brookings maximizes the potential to integrate its 
knowledge and expertise in the policy making process.  
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List of Interviewees for Brookings Case  
1) Interview with William G. Gale, The Arjay and Frances Fearing Miller Chair, Deputy Director 
and Senior Fellow of the research program Economic Studies, and Co-director of the Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, May 17, 2005 
2) Interview with Robert Lawrence, Albert L. Williams Professor of International Trade and 
Investment at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 
March 1, 2005 
3) Interview with Ron Nessen, Journalist in Residence at the Brookings Institution, Washington 
DC, May 17, 2005 
4) Interview with Peter R. Orszag, Joseph A.Pechman Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, at the 
Brookings Institution, Washington DC, May 20, 2005  
5) Interview with Alice M. Rivlin, Senior Fellow and Director, Greater Washington Research 
Program, Metropolitan Policy at the Brookings Institution, June 17, 2005  
6) Interview with Isabel V. Sawhill, Vice President and Director of the research program Eco-
nomic Studies at the Brookings Institution, The Cabot Family Chair, Co-Director of the pro-
ject Welfare Reform & Beyond, June 16, 2005  
7) Interview with Charles L. Schultze, Senior Fellow Emeritus, Economic Studies, at the Brook-
ings Institution, Washington DC, May 20, 2005 
8) Interview with R. Kent Weaver, Senior Fellow at the research program Government Studies at 
Brookings Institution, Washington DC, May 18, 2005 
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Appendix 3 
Case #2: The Knowledge Communication between Facil-
ity Management Consultants and their Clients (pom+) 
Overview on 
pom+ 
pom+ is a consultancy company active in the sectors of construction -, facil-
ity-, and portfolio management. In 2004, the company achieved a turnover of 
6.5 million Swiss Francs (4.2 million Euros). It employs 38 employees, and has 
offices in Zurich and Bern, Switzerland. The clients of pom+ are medium and 
large companies of industries such as the construction and real estate industry, 
the financial industry, the logistic industry, and the telecommunication industry. 
In addition, the Swiss Confederation and the cantons are also key customers of 
pom+.  
pom+ was founded in 1996 as a spin-off of the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology Zürich. Under the mission “we make companies, real properties, 
and projects fit!”3 (pom+, 2005a), pom+ offers a diversified set of consulting 
services. Next to project management it does consulting for organizational de-
velopment, for information and communication management, and supports 
companies in the design of processes and structures. The pom+Group comprises 
the pom+Consulting, the pom+Products, and the pom+i. Under 
pom+Consulting, the core business of the group, consulting services in the fields 
of portfolio management, facility management, and construction management 
are offered. The activities of pom+Products are limited to a few, highly special-
ized software applications, and pom+I designates the subsidiary of pom+ in Italy 
(MQ Management und Qualität, 2005). In the following, we will concentrate 
entirely on the services, products, and knowledge communication processes of 
pom+Consulting. 
 
Organizational 
Structure and 
Areas of Activ-
ity: 
4 service types: 
– organizational 
pom+Consulting structures its consulting offer in four main services: 1. or-
ganizational development, in which realm it does consulting for strategic proc-
esses, business models, and benchmarking; 2. process and structure design, 
where it supports clients in their process management, but also in their man-
agement of risk, knowledge, customer relationship, and supply chain manage-
                                                 
3 Wir machen Unternehmen, Immobilien und Projekte fit! 
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development 
– process and 
structure design 
– information and 
communication 
management 
– project man-
agement 
 
3 areas of applica-
tions: 
– construction 
management 
– facility man-
agement 
– portfolio man-
agement 
ment; 3. information and communication management, within its scope pom+ 
guides the conceptualization and implementation of solutions for mobile and 
pervasive computing, for process portals, for software solutions, and for data 
and document management systems. Finally, pom+ offers consulting services for 
project management, in particular for the organization and guidance of projects 
and for their quality management. The company offers these services in three 
main areas: construction management, facility management, and portfolio man-
agement. In the area of construction management, among other services, pom+ 
does feasibility studies for construction projects, risk analyses and risk strategies, 
identifies potentials of collaborations between constructors and investors, and 
evaluates and customizes software solutions for construction processes. In the 
realm of facility management (FM), pom+ elaborates, for example, performance 
figures of the use and control of buildings, does concepts for the internal billing 
of room costs and FM solutions, revisions the supply chain management of FM, 
and supports the implementation of SAP solutions for FM. Finally, with regard 
to portfolio management, pom+ develops and implements strategies for real 
estate portfolios and real estate funds, evaluates and customizes the introduction 
of software solutions for real estate portfolio management, identifies potentials 
for collaborations between portfolio managers and investors, and plans and 
conducts the data collection and analyses for single real estate objects and entire 
real estate portfolios (pom+, 2005b). 
pom+ provides consulting services mainly in the realm of real estate, con-
struction and facility management. Yet, in rare cases, it advises organizations in 
aspects of quality -, process -, or project management, which are not related to 
real estate. In these cases, the consulting is purely methodological: “We don’t 
know the processes, but we can help on a methodological level, to filter out the 
clients existing knowledge, to structure it systematically and provide a clear 
methodological approach”4 (G. Bilotta). 
 
The Expert – 
Decision 
Maker Situa-
tion 
Below, we will briefly describe the partners – the experts and decision mak-
ers - of the knowledge-intensive communication of this case. The experts are the 
consultants of pom+ while the decision makers are pom+’s clients, mainly pro-
                                                 
4 „Inhaltlich kenne wir deren Prozesse nicht, wir können aber methodisch helfen, und ihr Wissen herausbekommen 
und in eine Systematik und in eine Methodik hineinzupacken.“ 
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Experts: Con-
sultants  
– have mostly a 
technical back-
ground, a uni-
versity degree, 
few prior practi-
cal experience, 
and are consid-
ered to be 
“theoreticians 
from the univer-
sity” 
– have a rather 
broad, transver-
sal, and inter-
disciplinary 
knowledge  
 
ject mangers, heads of sections or members of the board.  
The consultants and senior consultants of pom+ - the experts of this case –
mostly have a university degree in engineering, informatics, or architecture. 
Some of them have an education in facility management from an advanced tech-
nical college. While almost all experts of pom+ have a rather technical back-
ground, some have completed secondary studies in management and business 
administration. A few consultants have a doctor degree. The rather academic 
background of pom+’s consultants can be both an advantage, but also a chal-
lenge in the knowledge-intensive communication with the client. While academic 
titles help to mark expertise, they can sometimes be an additional hurdle in the 
knowledge communication with the clients: “Often, we have the reputation of
being theoreticians from the university. ‘Now these theoreticians come and want 
to tell us practitioners how we should do things’. In the beginning, this often 
leads to some skepticism” (C. Kaufmann).5 As it is typical for a consulting com-
pany, most consultants of pom+ directly come from the university and have only
a limited prior professional experience.  
The consultants of pom+ distinguish themselves more through the breath 
rather than the depth of their knowledge.  
“My focus is transversal and includes knowledge in the fields of business administration, 
information technology, and facility management. In all these areas, I know something, 
but do not have an in-depth knowledge. This interdisciplinary knowledge gives me a very 
distinguished view.” (R. Becht).6  
In many instances, the expertise knowledge of pom+ is made of this par-
ticular view and specific methodological approach and thinking. 
Decision Makers 
– Clients: 
− are themselves 
knowledgeable 
on facility-, port-
folio, and con-
The decision makers of this case are the clients of pom+. Typically, clients 
are state organizations like universities or state departments, but also many pri-
vate companies from industries such as the insurance, the telecommunication, or 
the retail industry. These organizations ask for the support, assistance, and con-
sulting of pom+ with regard to their projects on facility, construction, or portfo-
                                                 
5 „Vielfach haftet an uns der Ruf, Theoretiker aus der Uni zu sein. ‚Jetzt kommen diese Theoretiker und wollen uns 
Praktiker sagen, wie wir das machen sollen.’ Dies führt am Anfang oft zu Skepsis.“ 
6 „Mein Fokus ist der Querschnitt und schliesst betriebswirtschaftliches, IT Wissen und den Fachbereich FM mit 
ein. Von allen diesen Bereichen weiss ich etwas, besitze aber kein vertieftes Wissen. Mit meiner interdis-
ziplinären Ausbildung habe ich eine sehr spezifische Sichtweise“ 
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struction man-
agement 
lio management. Typical decisions are: what type of facility management soft-
ware to implement, what strategy to pursue in the development of a real estate 
portfolio, or what business model to adopt for a specific construction project. 
“At the end, it is the client who has the responsibility on his/her project. We can 
only offer knowledge input and support them in his/her decisions“7 (B. Buser).  
The contact people on the client side are mainly project managers of, for 
example, quality management or facility management projects, heads of the real 
estate or of the internal services department. They include representatives across 
all levels of the hierarchy, from the simple caretaker, to referees, building man-
agers and up to members of the executive boards. At the beginning of pom+’s 
activity, the client had only a very limited know-how on facility -, construction -
, and portfolio management. Today, both the industry as also the single clients 
have become more professional and the knowledge asymmetry is no longer bla-
tant. Most contact people are themselves very familiar with the issues of facility, 
construction, portfolio, process, and quality management. “In eighty percent of 
the cases, we deal with people who already are familiar with the issues” (G. 
Bilotta).8 
Types of 
Knowledge 
Object of 
Communica-
tion: 
– Market knowl-
edge 
– Technical 
knowledge 
– Methodological 
and procedural 
knowledge 
– Abstract and 
theoretical 
knowledge 
One could argue that not all types of knowledge are equally difficult or easy 
to convey and communicate and not all types require the same means and 
modes of communication. We will not enter this discussion in particular, but we 
would like to indicate at least briefly what types of knowledge the consultants of 
pom+ are communicating to their clients. In most cases, clients ask for market 
knowledge, technical knowledge, and methodological knowledge. 
“The people believe that we know the market – and in fact, we do – and they want from 
pom+ that we do a state of the art project for process, portfolio, and facility management. 
Others ask our service because we have procedural knowledge, certainly, also technical 
knowledge is of importance, but they are really interested in our procedural knowledge, in 
the method.”9 (G. Bilotta) 
Since pom+ mainly has clients who themselves are specialized in facility and 
construction management, the methodological and procedural knowledge is 
                                                 
7 „Der Kunde hat letzten Endes die Verantwortung für sein Projekt, wir können nur Wissensinput liefern und den 
Kunden unterstützen.“ 
8 „Zu 80% haben wir mit Leuten zu tun, die fachlich schon eine Ahnung haben.“ 
9 “Die Leute glauben, dass wir den Markt kennen - und das ist auch so - und wollen von pom+, dass wir ein State 
of the Art Projekt Prozessablauf machen, ein Portfoliomanagement, ein FM umsetzten. Andere fragen uns an, 
weil wir Prozesswissen haben, natürlich auch Fachwissen, aber diese interessieren sich in erster Linie für das 
Prozesswissen, die Methodik.“ 
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about strategies 
 
more important than the technical one.  
“Often, we guide the client on a methodological level and not so much on technical as-
pects. We have a moderation task and mainly provide the client with methodological 
knowledge. Also (..) during the as-is analysis, in which we need the information from the 
client, we give away methodological knowledge”10 (R. Baumann). 
A second characteristic of the object of communication between pom+ and 
its clients is its abstractness. “Especially if one talks of strategies, one can try to 
make it simple, but in one way or the other, the discourse remains on a rather 
high, abstract level“11 (G. Bilotta). 
 
The Knowl-
edge Com-
munication 
Process be-
tween Ex-
perts and 
Decision 
Makers: 
 
Identification of 
Experts and 
Expertise 
In the following, we will describe the process of interaction between pom+ 
consultants and their clients and will give emphasis to the challenges and prac-
tices with which the consultants are confronted by attempting to convey their 
knowledge to their clients. For the description, we will use the process model for 
knowledge communication discussed in Chapter 2. We will see which of the 
conceptually proposed phases (and feedback-loops) are of particular importance 
in this context, and which are almost non-existent. In a further step, we will 
discuss the particular challenges and practices that arise and are implemented 
along the process of the interaction. 
The first important phase in the interaction between pom+’s experts and 
their clients is the way how potential clients identify pom+ as an organization 
that provides the relevant expertise for a current challenge they face (see: Figure 
12). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 “Oft leiten wir den Kunden methodisch und nicht so sehr fachlich. Wir haben eine Moderationsaufgabe und 
geben dem Kunden Methodenwissen weiter. Auch (..) während der Ist-Analyse, in der wir Informationen vom 
Kunden brauchen, geben wir Methodenwissen weiter.“ 
11 “Gerade wenn man von Strategien spricht, kann man schon versuchen, es einfach zu machen, aber irgendwie 
befindet man sich immer auf einer hohen Sphäre.“ 
Figure 12: The ‘Identify Experts and Expertise’-phase 
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Challenge: 
− Be perceived as 
an expert by po-
tential clients 
without giving 
away too much 
valuable knowl-
edge 
 
Meeting potential clients, a first challenge is how to convince him/her of the 
expertise of pom+. “At the beginning of a project, in the situation of a project 
acquisition, it is important to convey competence in order to create trust”12 (B. 
Buser). One can signal expertise by giving away part of one’s own knowledge, 
yet the challenge is not to give away too much valuable knowledge for free.  
"We have to be cautious with the way we deal with our knowledge. Again and again, we 
are asked: ‘Couldn’t you tell us quickly what goes on with this or that key figure of the 
Swiss market?’ Should we now give this information, would we like to sell the FM Moni-
tor to this person or would we even like to do a little report? We have to convey some of 
our knowledge in order to demonstrate that we know something. On the other hand, one 
should not unveil too much since we have elaborated our knowledge quite toughly”13 (G. 
Bilotta).  
pom+ deals with this challenge in a variety of ways. It signals expertise 
through the awards and certifications it continues to win (e.g. 2000: first Swiss 
consultancy that became ISA 9001 certified, 2004: decorated with GoodPrivacy 
by the European Foundation of Quality Management (EFQM), 2005: winner of 
the Swiss ESPRIX-Award for Business Excellence), but also through reference 
customers, the academic titles of the consultants (many are engineers graduated 
from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich), or through the publica-
tions. In the actual interaction with clients, consultants mark expertise by ap-
pearing rather self-confident (without being arrogant or unreceptive), by being 
well prepared, and by guiding the client with a clear and well structured ap-
proach. While in a first contact, the challenge for the consultant is to convince 
the client of one’s own and of the institution’s expertise, once a collaboration is 
started, the question is really to gain the trust of the client (see: Articulate need). 
In order to increase a positive awareness of pom+ and its services among 
potential clients, pom+ engages consistently in the following two practices.  
Practices: 
− Ascertain visibil-
ity and a well 
pom+ aims to strengthen its visibility by actively expanding its social net-
work and joining a variety of associations. The company is a member of around 
20 associations like the Association of Management Consultants Switzerland 
                                                 
12 "Zu Beginn des Projekts, in der Akquisesituation, ist es wichtig, Kompetenz zu vermitteln, um Vertrauen zu 
schaffen.” 
13 “Wir müssen vorsichtig mit unserem Wissen umgehen. Wir werden immer wieder angefragt: „Können Sie uns 
nicht schnell sagen, wie es mit dieser oder jener Kennzahl im Schweizer Markt steht?“ (..) Gibt man nun diese 
Information, möchten wir der Person den FM Monitor verkaufen oder möchten wir ihr sogar einen kleinen Be-
richt erstellen? (..) Wir müssen gewisse Sachen rüber bringen, um zu beweisen, dass wir etwas wissen. Auf der 
anderen Seite darf man nicht zuviel preisgeben, da wir das Wissen hart erarbeitet haben.“  
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functioning (in-) 
formal social 
network by join-
ing a variety of 
associations 
and collabora-
tions with uni-
versities 
(ASCO), the Total Quality Management (TQM) Forum Switzerland, the Ger-
man Facility Management Association (GEFMA), and many others more. Next 
to the involvement in such associations, pom+ is also actively related with uni-
versities, such as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich or the Insti-
tute for Technology Management of the University of St.Gallen. Such more or 
less formal networks are important not only to increase the company’s visibility 
and the possible paths through which a potential client will contact pom+, 
pom+ can also benefit form the trust in expertise and excellence, which is asso-
ciated to the brand of a particular association. Finally, theses networks are fun-
damental also for continuously renewing and affirming the company’s knowl-
edge14. In this way, pom+ is exposed to the most recent developments in its 
areas of activity, can build communities of practice, and engages in translating 
knowledge between academia and practice. 
− Organize events 
to establish and 
nurture a com-
munity of practi-
tioners and to 
promote own 
products and 
services 
In order to gain awareness and position itself as a knowledgeable partner, 
pom+ organizes events in the form of half-day seminars like a seminar for board 
members on real estate strategies, or “pom+Highlights 2005”, an event on the 
current trends in the facility management market. During such seminars, moder-
ated discussions and presentations take place involving collaborators of pom+, 
outside experts, and successful practitioners in the area. The aims of these events 
are various: get new people to know pom+, create a general awareness for the 
importance of the consultancy service provided by the company, promote the 
specific products of pom+ (as for example the FM Monitor 2005), as well as 
leading a thematic dialogue. To avoid that these seminars taste too much like 
marketing events where pom+ simply promotes its services and products, pom+ 
includes outside experts and allocates the time for substantive discussions. 
 
Articulate Need: 
Definition of a 
Project’s Pa-
rameters 
 
Once the relevant experts and expertise are identified, the decision makers 
usually have to outline the problem or decision they are facing and for which 
they need expertise. Clients brief pom+ about their needs, about the objectives 
they want to reach and the service they expect from pom+ (see Figure 13).  
 
                                                 
14 Evers and Menkhoff (2003), in their analysis of the role of expert knowledge of consultants in the new econo-
my, argue very similarly that professional associations have a double function with regard to expertise. They 
claim that the professionalization of an industry can be improved by the fact that similar organizations have a 
more frequent contact between them. Second, the clients will trust more in the expertise of these organizations 
as they are part of an association they already trust.  
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Challenges: 
– Overcome 
mistrust of cli-
ent  
 
In a new project, a first challenge for the consultants of pom+ is to gain the 
trust of the client and to overcome possible, negative prejudices of the client 
towards the involvement of external consultants. “The mistrust of the client is 
the biggest hurdle one has to overcome. There are people who do not do any-
thing else in a project than looking for mistakes: ‘But this you have done 
wrong!’”15 (R. Becht). Oftentimes, for employees, the fact that external consult-
ants are called in does not promise anything good. They perceive all kind of 
threats and fears (e.g. change old and approved habits, be involved in one reen-
gineering after the other, be laid-off) and are therefore reluctant to collaborate 
with pom+.  
“For the employees it was like: ‘Aha, now they take in an external collaborator who is 
moreover very young. What does he want here? If it concerns dismissals, resistance to give 
us the necessary information is certain.“16 (L. Schärer) 
Sometimes, this lacking trust is not only due to such real fears, but it is also 
the result of stereotypes clients have of consultants. They believe that consult-
ants are arrogant and think to be omniscient, whereas in a clients’ view, they are 
just very young, inexperienced and solely armed with theoretical knowledge.  
When such resistances and mistrust are less apparent and remain more hid-
den, it becomes even more difficult for pom+’s consultants to counteract them: 
“The worst is when the client pursues his own, private way. He might say, ‘yes, 
yes’ but then does something completely different.”17 (S. Jäggi). While the chal-
lenge is manifested mainly in the beginning of projects, we will show that the 
practices that aim to deal with it are not only relative to this phase, but are of a 
more general nature and are therefore discussed in the section: Practices relative 
                                                 
15 „Das Misstrauen des Kunden ist die grösste Hürde, die man überwinden muss. Es gibt Leute, die machen im 
Projekt nichts anderes als Fehler aufzusuchen. ’Das haben Sie jetzt aber falsch gemacht’.“ 
16 „Für die Mitarbeiter war es so, aha, jetzt kommt ein externer Mitarbeiter, das ist zudem noch ein sehr junger, 
was will denn der? Geht es um Entlassungen, und dort kommen Widerstände auf, überhaupt Informationen zu 
liefern.“ 
17 “Das Schlimmste ist, wenn der Kunde seinen eigenen kleinen Zug fährt. Er sagt zwar ja, macht dann aber etwas 
anderes.“ 
Figure 13: The ‘Articulation of Need’-phase (Definition of a Project's Pa-
rameters) 
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to the group dynamics.  
– Avoid a “just go 
ahead” ap-
proach and and 
reach shared 
understanding 
of a precise re-
quest 
In this phase, another important challenge for the consultants of pom+ is 
not settle for a rather open, unspecified request on behalf of the client, but to 
manage to define jointly a precise and specific request for the starting project. 
Often, it can be difficult for the client to clearly express and specify his/her de-
mand, and also to understand the enterprise proposed by the consultants of 
pom+. This is especially true if the knowledge of the client is rather limited. 
Stefan Jäggi explains: “Just right now I have a project where the client does not 
know a lot himself. He simply communicates his requests and says: just go 
ahead and do something”18 (S. Jäggi). In such instances, even if the consultants 
try to play-back and reformulate the requests and expectations exposed by the 
client, there is no guarantee that both parties have elaborated a common under-
standing of the main goals, outcomes, and requests for the project. In fact, mis-
understandings are very probable (see: Challenges related to the mental models). 
Often, it is very difficult for the client to clearly formulate a clear and concrete 
request all together.  
“I had the feeling that the client did not know very well what he wanted. He knew he 
wanted and could improve something with regard to the facility management of his real 
estates, but he was convinced that he could buy a tool and then it would work”19 (C. 
Kaufmann). 
This problem is more poignant in situations where there is a big knowledge 
asymmetry between the consultant and the client and fortunately, this is not 
usually the case with pom+’s clients. In most cases, they themselves are pretty 
knowledgeable on the issues of construction, real estate or facility management. 
Yet, the challenge remains of how to specify a request and to explicate a clear 
and concrete objective in a situation where one often simply knows that there is 
a problem and a potential to improve. For this reason, pom+ has elaborated 
quite a sophisticated process for the definition of a new project.  
“Today, in the beginning of a project, we try to clearly define the project and its goals in 
order to assure that we are talking about the same. We ask the client if this is really what 
                                                 
18 “Nur gerade jetzt habe ich einen Fall, wo der Kunde selber nicht viel weiss. Er gibt einfach seine Ansprüche 
bekannt und sagt: mach mal!“ 
19 Ich habe das Gefühl, der Kunde wusste nicht genau, was er wollte. Er wusste, er wollte und kann in dem Bereich 
(Gebäudebewirtschaftung) etwas verbessern, er hatte aber das Gefühl, er könne ein Tool kaufen, und dann 
würde es funktionieren. 
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he envisioned. Otherwise, it is possible to have almost concluded a project without having 
fulfilled the objectives of the client”20 (C. Kaufmann).  
After the classical customer request, pom+ often conducts a brainstorming 
session, meetings, and interviews with the customer in order to better under-
stand his requests. “In such situations, we present something to the client and 
then he says: ‘yes, but this and that aspect should be further taken into consid-
eration’. In this way, we can gradually adjust to each other”21 (B. Buser). 
Practices: 
− Engage in in-
tensive face-to-
face communi-
cation (meet-
ings and work-
shops) to elicit 
knowledge, cre-
ate common 
understanding, 
and to switch 
perspective 
For pom+, it is very important to engage in quite an extensive face-to-face 
communication during this second phase.  
“If you flood people with documents at the beginning of a project, it is very possible that 
they understand them differently than how they were actually intended. They believe that 
the consultant wants to go in a direction that they do not want to. Therefore, in the begin-
ning, interaction is key so that the client does not come too prejudiced into meetings”22 (C. 
Kaufmann). 
Such face-to-face communication can consist of interviews, meetings, and 
workshops. Interviews are good too elicit the client’s knowledge in quite a mir-
rored way. “With the experience you learn to ask better questions, to better 
disperse the questions in order to cover all aspects you need”23 (N. Merkt). 
Workshops are also important to elicit technical information, but, in addition, 
they are crucial to get to know the working mode of the client and to identify 
with his/her perspective (see: Challenges Related to the Mental Models). 
− Nail down a 
clear and con-
crete written re-
quest at the end 
of the ‘Articulate 
These interactive rapprochements and mutual adjustments are very impor-
tant in this second phase where the customer’s need is externalized and speci-
fied. Yet, it is equally important that this process does not get prolonged too 
long, but finds a clear end. Therefore, pom+ nails down a clear and concrete 
                                                 
20 “Am Anfang eines Projekts versuchen wir heute, das Projekt und seine Ziele klar zu definieren, damit wir auch 
vom Gleichen sprechen. Wir fragen den Kunden, ob es wirklich das ist, was er gerne möchte. Ansonsten kann es 
sein, dass man vor einem quasi abgeschlossenen Projekt steht und man eigentlich die Ziele des Kunden nicht er-
füllt hat.“ 
21 “Bei der Akquisesituation stellt man etwas vor, dann sagt der Kunde: ‚ja, aber es müsste doch dies und jenes 
rein’, so dass man das dann aufeinander abstimmen kann.“ 
22 „Wenn man Leute zum Beginn mit Dokumenten zudeckt, kann es sein, dass sie diese anders verstehen als sie 
eigentlich gemeint waren. Sie meinen, der Consultant möchte in eine Richtung, die sie selber gar nicht möchten. 
Am Anfang ist deshalb die Interaktion sehr wichtig, damit der Kunde nicht mit bestimmten Vorurteilen in das 
Gespräch hineinkommt.“ 
23 “Mit der Erfahrung lernt man, bessere Fragen zu stellen, die Fragen mehr zu streuen, so dass man alles ab-
deckt.“ 
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Need’-phase request in form of a written project definition or project scope. “Today, we do a 
written requirement specification that we can show to the client and ask him 
whether that is what he/she wants.”24 (C. Kaufmann). Finally, for many pro-
jects, the written project definition is presented orally so that last misunder-
standings can be eliminated and final readjustments can be taken into considera-
tion. 
 
Conduct Analy-
sis of Issue  
Main Characteris-
tic: 
Entanglement 
between ‘Articu-
late Need’-phase 
and ‘Analysis’-
phase 
 
Once the need and request are specified in an interactive manner, in the 
next phase, the analysis of the issue is conducted and possible solutions are 
elaborated (see: Figure 14). How does the interaction between pom+’s consult-
ants and their clients look like in this phase?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
We have outlined that, in the case of pom+, the phase of the Need Articula-
tion is quite extended so that part of the analysis takes place already in the sec-
ond phase (‘Articulate Need’). In fact, the various interactive means of commu-
nication permit various feedback loops from the third phase (‘Conduct Analysis 
of Issue’) and the second phase (arrow ‘e’).  
Practices: 
– Collaborate very 
closely with cli-
ents 
Apart from the relatively strong entanglement between the ‘need articula-
tion’- and the ‘analysis’ phase, this third analysis phase is quite particular in the 
case of pom+ because of another reason. While in many expert-decision maker 
interactions, the experts retreat for the analysis part, in the case of pom+, this 
phase is characterized by a high interactivity between the two parties.  
“During the project, there is an interactive exchange going on. The consultant has to learn 
from the client. One has to understand what exactly the problem is, why the problem ex-
                                                 
24 “Heute haben wir ein Pflichtenheft, das wir dem Kunden zeigen können und ihn fragen können, ob dies das ist, 
was er wolle.“ 
Figure 14:  The ‘Analyze Issue & Develop Possible Courses of Actions’-
phase 
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ists, and what the client’s situation is”25 (B. Buser). 
− Elicit and struc-
ture the client’s 
knowledge 
rather than pro-
posing com-
pletely new ap-
proaches 
The consultants of pom+ consider the client to be their major source of 
knowledge and the task is really to elicit all the relevant information for finding 
a reliable solution. In general, if the people are generally committed to the pro-
ject and have a basic trust in pom+’s consultants, then they usually share their 
knowledge and show what they all know about the company (B. Buser). In this 
way, pom+ does not „invent“ solutions for a problem of a client, rather, its 
consultants consolidate, structure, and bring together propositions for measures 
that have already lingered around somewhere in the company and that the col-
laborators actually desired.  
“In this way, we encounter fewer resistances - later in the implementation - because it is 
actually the collaborator who finally has the chance to express himself freely. Management 
gets information it would not get otherwise. It’s really all about compressing and process-
ing the existing knowledge. I have to decide what the important problems are and which 
ones we can address at a later stage”26 (L. Schaerer). 
In this phase, the contact with the client takes place in the form of emails, 
phone calls. Oftentimes, pom+’s consultants work with the client in his office. 
“We really try to work together with the client and thus get to know his way of 
working”27 (S. Jäggi). In this way, frequent interactions and a close collabora-
tion are not only important to elicit the client’s valuable knowledge, but also to 
allow the consultant to identify with the client and understand his/her way of 
thinking and perspective on the issue. 
 
Convey Insights, 
Suggestions, & 
Solutions 
Main Characteris-
tic: 
Entanglement be-
tween ‘Analysis’-
Once the analysis is conducted and the results of the research are elabo-
rated, the next phase in the knowledge communication between experts and 
decision makers is to convey the gained insights, the proposed suggestions and 
solutions to the decision makers (see: Figure 15).  
 
                                                 
25“Während dem Projekt ist es dann ein interaktiver Austausch. Der Berater muss auch vom Kunden lernen. Häu-
fig muss man erfassen, was das Problem ist, warum es ein Problem ist und wie die allgemeine Situation beim 
Kunden ist.“ 
26 „So erleben wir danach weniger Widerstände, weil es eigentlich der Mitarbeiter ist, der sich für einmal frei äus-
sern kann. Und die Geschäftsleitung bekommt Informationen, die sie sonst von ihren Mitarbeitenden so nicht 
bekommen würde. Es geht darum, Bestehendes zu komprimieren und aufzuarbeiten. Ich muss aber auch ent-
scheiden, was nun wichtige Probleme sind und welche man erst zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt angehen sollte.“  
27 “Wir (..) versuchen, mit dem Kunden mitzuarbeiten und so seine Arbeitsweise kennen zu lernen.“ 
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phase and ‘Convey 
Insights’-phase 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of pom+, the communication of results takes place not only at 
the end of the project, but also during the analysis phase. Especially when 
having reached milestones of consulting projects, first important insights are 
conveyed. For example, after the conclusion of the analysis of the actual state, 
first results are communicated to the client through presentations, meetings, 
and workshops and a common ground is established. On this basis, directions 
for the research of possible solutions are decided. There is therefore an impor-
tant feedback loop (arrow ‘h’) between the ‘convey insights’ and the ‘analysis’-
phase. 
Challenge: 
– Balance the 
request to pri-
oritize and 
compress 
with the one 
to live up to 
the complex-
ity and variety 
of an issue  
„In situations of milestones of projects, oftentimes, members of the board are present and 
important decisions are taken. It is our task to consolidate the various elements and ex-
periences and to steer the focus on the essential aspects. The members of the board can-
not know and do not want to know anything.” (B. Buser).28 
When results and insights have to be conveyed to the decision makers on 
the client side, the challenge is to prioritize and compress the large amount of 
information the consultant has gathered during the weeks of analysis.  
“The challenge is also that we got an enormous amount of information in these three 
weeks and we have to differentiate, what is relevant, what is not relevant? In the end, 
they get a report of 25 pages, in which they have to find the whole spectrum and variety 
of the issue”29 (L. Schärer).  
Consultants are confronted with the demanding balancing act between 
being both extremely concise and simple, and at the same time exhaustive 
                                                 
28 “Bei Meilensteinen von Projekten stossen oft die Leute aus der Geschäftsleitung hinzu und wichtige Entscheide 
werden gefällt. Hier geht es oft auch darum, die angesammelten Erfahrungen und Aspekte zu konsolidieren und 
sich auf das Wesentliche zu konzentrieren. Die Leute aus der Geschäftsleitung können und wollen nicht alles 
wissen.“ 
29 “Die Schwierigkeit ist auch, dass wir in diesen 3 Wochen sehr viele Informationen bekommen haben. Wir müs-
sen in einem internen Prozess abstrahieren, was ist relevant, was ist nicht relevant? Am Schluss gibt es einen Be-
richt von 25 Seiten, in welchen die ganze Informationsvielfalt wieder zu finden ist.“  
Figure 15: The ‘Convey Insights, Suggestions, & Solutions’-phase 
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enough to live up to the variety and complexity of the issue.   
Practices:  
– Communicate 
reasons and 
consequences 
to activate 
sense-making 
processes 
 
The information does not only have to be concise and short, it also has to 
be meaningful in the eyes and context of the client.  
“It is important that the client can recognize himself and this situation (in the informa-
tion we provide). We have to be descriptive so that the client does not have the feeling 
that just some external guys pop in and present a few theoretical approaches. Here again, 
conversations and the personal contact are hugely important”30 (B. Buser). 
It is important to contextualize the information in a setting that is mean-
ingful to the client, not only in order to facilitate the client’s interpretation 
processes and to make him understand, but also to convince him about the 
importance of a certain issue or measure.  
“The challenge is to convince the collaborator that the additional work and expenses, 
which he now has to do, will be worthwhile for the project. (..) It is therefore important 
to communicate very transparently. Usually, I say three things: What is approaching 
someone? What are the consequences? What are the reasons why we do something?“31 
(L. Schärer)  
In order to guarantee a better transition from the knowledge the client 
buys to the actual implementation of this knowledge into action (Apply & 
Implement Insights & Solutions), it is important not to communicate only 
what is up, but also, why it is up and what are its consequences. 
– Propose al-
ternatives and 
clear evalua-
tion criteria 
rather than 
Another important practice of pom+ in conveying its insights and sugges-
tions is not to present fixed solutions (e.g. for example software application 
products), but to provide a more comprehensive view, to outline the various 
alternatives at disposition, and to show clear criteria (and the weight of each 
criterion) by which the alternatives should be evaluated.  
                                                 
30 „Hier ist es wichtig, dass sich der Kunde wieder finden kann, dass es anschaulich ist und dass nicht einfach ein 
paar externe Leute aufkreuzen und mit einigen theoretischen Ansätzen auffahren. Hier ist wieder das Gespräch 
und der persönliche Kontakt sehr wichtig.“ 
31 „Es geht darum, den Mitarbeiter zu überzeugen, dass der Mehraufwand, den er jetzt machen muss, sich für das 
Projekt lohnen wird. (..) Wichtig ist, sehr transparent zu kommunizieren. Ich sage meistens drei Dinge: was 
kommt auf den Mitarbeiter zu? Welches sind die Konsequenzen? Welches sind die Gründe, wieso man etwas 
macht?“ 
32 “Wir schlagen dem Kunden nicht in erster Linie eine passende Software für sein CRFM vor, sondern präsentie-
ren Kriterien, die ich bei der Auswahl von Softwarelösungen beachten würde. Ich mache auch eine Bewertung: 
wie stark sollte er jedes einzelne Thema gewichten, damit man daraus eine Nutzwertanalyse daraus machen 
kann.“  
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fixed solu-
tions 
“In the first place, we do not propose to the client the suitable software for his CRFM. 
Rather, we present criteria that he/she should take into account when choosing between 
the various software packages. We also do an evaluation how every topic and criterion 
should be weighted in order to do a proper cost-benefit analysis” 32 (R. Becht). 
 
Apply & Imple-
ment Insights & 
Solutions 
 
In most cases, companies engage consulting firms not only with the objec-
tive to get a screening and analysis of a situation, but also to receive advice in 
how to change certain processes or structures in order to then be able to imple-
ment some of the given advice. In the following, we consider this final phase 
(see: Figure 16), in which the expertise and insights provided by pom+ are in 
some form applied and implemented by the client. We describe the challenges 
and practices in this transition phase between knowing and doing (Pfeffer & 
Sutton, 1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
Challenge:  
− Overcome gap 
between knowing 
and doing: make 
those people of 
client accept 
propositions who 
were not directly 
involved in pro-
ject 
In the description of the previous phases, we have already pointed to some 
aspects, which are important to facilitate the step from knowing to doing. In 
particular, we have said that there is a much better chance to implement solu-
tions where the collaborators on the client side have the impression to have pro-
posed them themselves and, secondly, we have mentioned how important it is 
for the collaborators not only to get to know the solution, but also the reason 
for this solution and the consequences to which it leads.  
Even if pom+ adheres to such practices, the passage between the transfer of 
the actual information and the integration and application of it in decisions and 
actions remains problematic. 
“Oftentimes, we propose interesting things, but the client is not ready yet to integrate 
them. He has to live, in some way or the other, the whole development he buys in through 
our service. We can’t speed him up from 0 to 100 in just one year. That can be frustrating 
since right after the project, the reports end up in a drawer and nobody really profits from 
Figure 16: The ‘Apply & Implement Insights, & Solutions’-phase 
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them”33 (C. Kaufmann). 
The risk that the result of a consultancy service – symbolized by the final 
report – ends up in a drawer, is bigger if powerful people on the client side have 
not been involved in the whole consultancy process and are exposed to the re-
sults only at the end. They lack the whole process that would help them to 
make these propositions meaningful. Furthermore, there might be relational 
challenges and non-clarified functions between the various people of a client 
(see: Challenges related to the group dynamics and socio-emotional aspects).  
Practice: 
− Actively involve 
clients early on in 
the project 
 
Given this challenge, pom+ tries to make the client collaborate on the solu-
tion as much as possible, use him as a source of knowledge, and give him/her the 
feeling that the solution is actually a product of the client him/herself. As we 
have outlined earlier, in this way, the client develops less resistances to change 
(see: Conduct analysis of issue).  
Even if this transition from knowing to doing is an extremely difficult one 
and many insights provided by pom+ are not immediately translated into action, 
there are happy instances, in which they get rediscovered and implemented 
much later. “It is beautiful if, after some years, the client takes our documents 
out of his drawer again”34 (C. Kaufmann). 
Discussion of the 
Process Model 
The discussion of how pom+’s consultants communicate their expertise to 
their clients has shown that the phase model provides quite an accurate structure 
for describing this process. We have seen that the three phases ‘articulate need’, 
‘analyze issue & develop possible courses of action’, as well as ‘convey insights, 
suggestions, & solutions’ are very close and interwoven with several refinement 
and realignment loops. Figure 17 gives and overview on this looping behavior
and shows instances of the various feed-forward and feedback loops.  
 
 
                                                 
33 „Oft kommen wir mit guten Dingen, aber der Kunde ist noch nicht bereit, diese aufzunehmen. Der Kunde muss 
die gesamte Entwicklung, die er bei uns einkauft, muss er irgendwie mitmachen. Man kann ihn nicht von 0 auf 
100 bringen innerhalb eines Jahres. Dies kann frustrierend sein, da unmittelbar die Sachen in ein Gestell getan 
werden und niemand wirklich einen Nutzen davon zieht.“ 
34 „Schön ist, wenn nach ein paar Jahren unsere Dokumente wieder aus dem Schaft herausgeholt werden.“ 
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e – refinement and 
alignment loop: after a 
first general need articu-
lation and analysis, the 
request needs to be 
formulated more precisely 
and understandings to be 
further aligned.
h – refinement loop:
after a milestone 
presentation, more 
in-depth analysis of a 
certain issue is 
necessary 
A – contact pom+ 
after attendance at 
a pom+ event
D – project report 
combined with pro-
ject presentation
E – resume project
report after several 
months for 
implementation of 
parts of it
C – definition of 
project scope
f – readjustment loop: communication of milestone 
results to project sponsors leads to a late reorientation 
of the project and to a new definition of the client‘s need
 
 In the description of the knowledge communication process, we have 
put attention on discussion the main challenges and practices that charac-
terize the communication process. Figure 18 resumes these various chal-
lenges and practices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Instances of Feed-Forward and Feedback Loops within the Interaction between 
pom+'s Consultants and their Clients 
Figure 18: Major Challenges and Practices along the Phases of the Knowledge-intensive 
Communication Between pom+'s Experts and their Clients 
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Phase Un-
specific 
Challenges & 
Practices in 
the Knowl-
edge Com-
munication 
Some of the challenges and practices of the knowledge communication be-
tween pom+ and its clients are not specific to one phase in the communication 
process, but are valid across the various phases.  
In the following, we will give an overview on these more generic and phase 
independent challenges, with which pom+’s experts’ are faced when communicat-
ing their expertise to decision makers. We will also outline the main practices with 
which pom+ shapes its communication in order to surmount some of these chal-
lenges.  
 
 We will categorize both challenges and practices along the framework for 
knowledge-intensive conversations presented in Chapter 2. The framework’s 
shows five dimensions – message, process, group dynamics, mental models, and 
outer context – communicators use when trying to make sense within their con-
versations. We will show whether the phase-unspecific communicative challenges 
and practices we present can be structured along these dimensions and will dis-
cuss how these dimensions are interconnected among each other. 
 
Challenges Re-
lated to the 
Communicated 
Message:  
– Information is 
too theoretical, 
technical, com-
plex, and ab-
stract 
 
The topics pom+’s consultants are dealing with are mostly complex, abstract 
and very domain specific. Dealing with strategies, processes, and systems always 
contains something abstract, which is often projected in the future and therefore 
quite intangible. It is therefore a particular challenge for the experts of pom+ to 
simplify the message and to make themselves understandable to their clients and 
not to overstrain them.  
„Sometimes, it happens that we do not adapt enough to the people, but run them over with 
what we explain. In a kick-off meeting we explain quickly what has happened until today 
and the client sits there, understands only half of it, and does not say a lot. (..) A the end, he 
takes up again the fundamental questions and we realize that we probably have been too 
quick or too complex“35 (S. Amsler). 
Oftentimes, it is very difficult for the consultants of pom+ to estimate which 
                                                 
35 „Es kommt hier und da vor, dass wir die Leute nicht richtig abholen und der Kunde überfahren wird mit dem, 
was wir erzählen. In einer Kick-off Sitzung erzählen wir schnell, was bis heute alles gelaufen ist und der Kunde 
sitzt da, versteht nur die Hälfte, und sagt nicht viel dazu. (..) Am Schluss kommt er dann nochmals mit den 
grundsätzlichen Fragen und so merken wir, dass es wohl zu schnell oder zu komplex war.“ 
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level of complexity is suitable fort he client (See: Practices Relative to the Com-
municated Message: Reduce Complexity in Ways that Suit the Characteristics of 
the Addressee). In particular, if the consultant does not know his client very well 
(how much does he know, how does he like to be informed?), he always risks to 
be too complex and too technical. 
“At the end we get the feedback: ‘These were two extremely interesting days, but I always 
was at my limit. Certain things were difficult, but I am happy I could go through this proc-
ess. Yet, in many instances I really got at my limits because of the complexity” 36 (G. Bilotta). 
 
– Difficulty to 
prioritize, se-
lect, and con-
densate large 
amount of in-
formation 
 
During the analysis phase of a project, pom+ spends much time at and with 
the client and collects a large amount of information. It is a particular challenge 
to understand, which information is important, how to do a good prioritization, 
how to compress it and communicate it in a way that is manageable and under-
standable for the client. “The difficulty in presentations is clearly (especially if 
you have been at the client’s for three weeks) to convey one’s know how in such 
a way that the management won’t be overstrained”37 (L. Schaerer). 
Practices Rela-
tive to the 
Communicated 
Message:  
– Give concrete 
examples and 
work with 
metaphors 
 
There are various ways how pom+ tries to surmount the challenge not to be 
too abstract or theoretical. First of all, giving examples from the context of the 
client is one simple way. “It is better to give concrete examples rather than loos-
ing oneself in technical theories”38 (A. Pesenti). Also, pom+’s consultants often 
use metaphors to clarify and convey a difficult, but important aspect. A recurring 
difficulty is, for example, to convince the client of the importance to pursue the 
longer, more cumbersome road proposed by pom+ (Oftentimes, pom+’s meth-
odological approach implies, at the first sight, a more laborious procedure). In 
such instances, the parking metaphor can be quite a useful one. The consultant 
explains the client why it makes sense to engage in the more demanding back-
wards-parking in order to then be able to depart more directly and more quickly. 
 
                                                 
36 “Am Schluss kommt das Feedback: ‚Es waren zwei total spannende Tage aber ich war immer am Anschlag. 
Gewisse Dinge waren schwierig, ich war froh, dass ich diesen Prozess mitmachen konnte, aber ich stiess an mei-
ne Grenzen wegen der Komplexität.’ 
37 „Die Schwierigkeit in Präsentationen ist ganz klar - vor allem wenn man 3 Wochen dort (beim Kunden) war - 
das Know how, welches man hat, so zu vermitteln, dass man damit das Management nicht überfordert.“ 
38 „Es ist besser, konkrete Beispiele zu geben als in Techniktheorie abzuschweifen.“ 
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– Work with 
visualizations 
Advantages: 
• Provide an 
additional, 
immediately 
and univer-
sally under-
standable 
language 
• Provide ac-
cess to the 
information 
in a way that 
is more con-
crete and re-
lated to the 
context of 
the ad-
dressee 
• Be concise 
and reduce 
complexity 
to the es-
sential 
• Augment 
mnemonic 
capability 
• Augment 
analytic ca-
pability  
• Mark com-
petence 
• Communi-
cate in a 
more infor-
mal and 
playful way 
 
 
Secondly, pom+ is quite sensitive to the importance of images, graphs, and 
other visual representations for their knowledge-intensive communication with 
the client. The communication with visuals brings a variety of advantages. First 
of all, visuals provide an additional, immediately understandable language. We 
have seen that the knowledge-intensive communication between pom+’s consult-
ants and their clients is made difficult by a number of challenges. Among these 
figures certainly also the fact that the two parties have quite different back-
grounds and everyday experiences and therefore often talk quite different lan-
guages (see: Challenges Related to the Mental Models). Often, the consultants of 
pom+ use different terms or understand the same terms differently than their 
clients. In such a situation, visuals can provide an additional language that, in its 
simplicity, might bridge strong knowledge asymmetries and provide a first, visual 
common ground.  
”I often use images, symbols, or pictograms. Everybody understands a pictogram, it is uni-
versally understandable. For clients, I usually work with simple pictograms that do not need 
superfluous information”39 (N. Merkt). 
Figure 19 shows an example of a visualization of pom+ that works with pic-
tograms and symbols.  
 
Figure 19: Visualization that Uses Pictograms to Reduce The Complexity 
of the Content and to Expand the Existing Common Ground 
                                                 
39 ”Ich verwende oft Bilder, Symbole, Piktogramme. Ein Piktogramm versteht jeder, es ist universell verständlich. 
Für den Kunden verwende ich die einfachen Piktogramme, die ohne überflüssige Informationen auskommen.” 
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Practices in 
using visuals: 
• Link some-
thing ab-
stract to 
concrete as-
sociations 
by using 
(visual) 
metaphors 
• Use picto-
grams 
• Use sketch-
ing in mo-
ments of 
conflict 
 
Visuals also have the function to give something abstract a concrete and tan-
gible reality. Figure 20 shows a visualization that depicts the areas of activity of 
pom+, in particular the core processes (in green), the support processes or func-
tional structure (in red) and the management processes (in grey). It is a typical 
type of visualization that helps the client to gain a more tangible idea of what 
pom+’s main activities are (it is less abstract as it has a visual reality). 
The metaphoric allusion of the visual to a football court confers certain 
qualities of a soccer game to the corporation pom+ and the services it provides. 
This can be, for example, a high commitment, enthusiasm and fun, team spirit. 
Metaphors are further useful to relate something abstract and difficult to some-
thing concrete and already meaningful. Symbols, visual metaphors, and visual 
representations in general give the possibility to express the essence of an issue in 
a very concise way and therefore represent another technique how pom+ can 
handle the challenge of providing too much and too abstract information.  
 
Figure 20: Visualization Makes Processes and Areas of Activity More Tangible: Ex-
tended Organigram of pom+ 
 
 In fact, the visual language is often more concrete and works with analogies, 
which is why it can help clients to express something that otherwise would be 
difficult to put in words. ”For presentations, I work with colors. One alternative 
gets colored in blue, the other in green, etc. The client often starts to talk in these 
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colours”40 (S. Jäggi). In this way, the concrete visual language can be resumed 
verbally and help to turn the verbal language more concrete as well. To support 
talk by instant sketching and drawing provides an additional language and some-
thing concrete to which one can refer. “I often visualize during conversations. (..) 
What is positive about this is that I can refer to it, one element gets green, the 
other red, the third blue. Everybody can see to what I am referring“41 (S. Jäggi). 
In this way, visuals provide an access to the information that is more con-
crete and tangible, and therefore more meaningful. 
“Whatever I want to convey, I try to relate it with associations. One creates another access 
than if one came up with big theories or analyses. (..) In this way, the client can imagine the 
aspect visually and he often becomes more open to the issue”42 (N. Merkt). 
By working with visual associations, the information not only gets a more 
concrete quality, but it also becomes anchored in the daily context of the ad-
dressee.  
”Once someone has explained something with LEGO bricks. One LEGO brick represented 
a module and with modules one could say what one needed and we then assembled the 
various modules”43 (N. Merkt). 
Another example of the use of a metaphoric visual is the case of the referring 
to the “Alinghi” sailing crew. The largest part of the Swiss population remembers 
with pride that the Swiss “Alinghi” sailing boat won the America’s Cup’s in 
2003. pom+ often works with this image and thus refers to a shared national 
experience. The consultants of pom+ can be certain that “Alinghi” constitutes
common ground between them even if they do not know each other yet and even 
if their perspectives might be very distant. In addition, the boat metaphor (“we 
are all in the same boat”) can be instrumental in addressing sensitive issues like 
group solidarity and spirit when faced with uncomfortable change. The “Al-
inghi”-image frames the issue from a positive perspective and helps to get the 
                                                 
40 “Ich arbeite auch in Präsentationen mit Farben. Die eine Variante wird dann blau, die andere grün, etc. Der 
Kunde beginnt dann auch, in diesen Farben zu sprechen.“ 
41 ”Ich visualisiere viel während Gesprächen. (..) Positiv daran ist, dass ich danach Bezug darauf nehmen kann, das 
eine Element wird grün, das andere rot, das dritte blau. Alle können es sehen und wissen, worauf ich Bezug neh-
me.“ 
42 Ich versuche, alles was ich vermitteln will, mit Assoziationen zu verbinden. Irgendwie schafft man einen anderen 
Zugang, als wenn man mit irgendwelchen grossen Theorien oder Analysen auffahren würde. (..) So kann sich 
der Kunde dies graphisch vorstellen. (..) Der Kunde war viel offener auf das, was auf ihn zukommt. 
43 “Einer bei uns hat einmal mit Legosteinen etwas erklärt. Mit Modulen konnte man sagen, was man brauchte. 
Das setzen wir dann zusammen.” 
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client “in the boat” for the project. Finally, such an image can also serve as a 
mnemonic device for an important concept or idea. The people involved in the 
project might continue to refer to it and the image can become the symbol for an 
idea, conviction, or motivation to which the team agreed. 
 “If one can first go through the methodology together and represent something visually, this 
is always a big help so that something gets remembered. Especially for consultants who 
work conceptually, it is extremely important to confront the people with images”44 (G. 
Bilotta). 
Yet, images and visualizations are important not only to remember some-
thing in the long run, but they help to retain certain aspects also within a single 
conversation. In this regard, Stefan Jäggi stated: “The idea is to retain what is 
discussed in order to put the different aspects in relation to each other.”45 To sort 
out variables, show relationships, and to make clear distinctions can be especially 
important also in situations of conflict.  
“Once I was in a meeting, in which a conflict arose and I did not know how to react. Fortu-
nately, someone else was there, he went to the flipchart and laid out who said what and 
which relations existed. This deeply impressed me since one could see that they said the 
same thing, but expressed it differently. As a matter of fact, both wanted to go along the 
same way, towards the same goal, just that the one a little bit slower than the other”46 (N. 
Merkt). 
Sketching during conversations shows analytic capability and thus helps to 
mark the expertise of a consultant. ”Ad hoc sketching and structuring often con-
veys more competence than a reference list of clients”47 (R. Baumann). 
A good example of a visualization, that was not the result of a ad hoc 
sketching, but that shows how visuals can increase the analytic capability and 
sort out differences in perspectives can be seen in Figure 21. 
                                                 
44 “Wenn man die Methodik zuerst miteinander durchgehen kann und vielleicht auch ein bisschen bildlich darstel-
len kann, ist das immer eine grosse Hilfe, damit etwas hängen bleibt. Gerade für Berater im konzeptionellen Be-
reich ist es extrem wichtig, die Leute mit Bildern zu konfrontieren.“ 
45 „Es geht darum, das fest zu halten, was diskutiert wird, um die einzelnen Teile in Beziehung zueinander zu 
setzen und Abhängigkeiten auf zu zeigen. Danach kann ich nachfragen, ob ich es so richtig verstanden habe.“ 
46 ”Ich war einmal in einer Sitzung, in der eine Konfliktsituation auftrat und ich wusste nicht, wie reagieren. Zum 
Glück war jemand anderer dabei, der nach vorne gegangen ist und aufgezeichnet hat, wer was sagt, welche Zu-
sammenhänge bestehen. Das hat mich sehr beeindruckt, weil man dadurch gemerkt hat, dass man das Gleiche 
sagt, es aber anders ausdrückt. Eigentlich möchte man auf den gleichen Weg, zum gleichen Ziel, nur möchte es 
der eine ein bisschen langsamer, der andere schneller, direkter.“ 
47 “Ad hoc skizzieren und strukturieren vermittelt oft mehr Kompetenz als eine Referenzliste.“ 
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Figure 21: Visualization Clarifying Different Perspectives of a Real Es-
tate Object 
 
A final advantage of the work with visuals is that they include also an emo-
tional element and lead to a more playful and cheerful communication.  
„Rather than representing a time chart in a rather vacuous way, I mix it up and relate the 
single mile stones with images. For instance, you then know to drive in a subway and get off 
at a milestone. Another track can represent another part of a project“48 (N. Merkt).  
− Reduce com-
plexity in ways 
that suit the 
characteristics 
of the ad-
dressee 
Another practice of pom+ in dealing with the challenge to reduce the com-
plexity of its communicated messages is to choose techniques that are adapted to 
the characteristics of the addressee. “Depending on the client, I try to reduce the 
complexity in a different manner. If it is a client, who is inclined to planning – 
and these are mostly architects - they like to work visually.”49 (N. Merkt) Thus, 
for clients who have an architectural background, working with visuals might be 
the most effective way to reduce complexity and communicate in a concise for-
mat. For clients who are more used to oral communication, a short oral presen-
tation might work better as a summary than a written two-page executive sum-
                                                 
48 “Bei einer Vorgehensweise, die man normalerweise mit einem Terminplan trocken darstellen würde, lockere ich 
dies auf und verknüpfe die einzelnen Meilensteine mit Bildern. Man weiss dann zum Beispiel, dass man in einer 
U-Bahn fährt und bei einem Meilenstein aussteigt. Eine andere Schiene kann ein anderes Teilprojekt darstellen.“ 
49 “Je nach Kunde versuche ich die Komplexität der Sache anders zu reduzieren. Ist es ein Planungskunde, dann 
sind dies meist Architekten, die gerne visuell arbeiten.“ 
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mary. “I have clients who stick to certain graphics, others stick to text, still oth-
ers do not want too much paper, but prefer oral communication“50 (R. 
Baumann). 
Challenge 
Related to the 
Communica-
tion Process 
– Lack of the big 
picture  
A major difficulty in the interaction between pom+ and its clients is the big 
picture challenge. The consultant, especially if a more technical, IT related expert, 
risks to communicate too much of the technical details of a solution or issue. 
These details are difficult for the client to understand and by focusing on them, 
he misses out how these details relate to the more general picture. Both the client 
and the expert have difficulties to figure out what the really relevant aspects of 
the issue are and how they relate to each other.  
“Our IT-specialist sometimes runs into the risk of digressing into technical details that the 
client cannot follow. Then you have to find a common language in order to make these 
technical aspects understandable. In other instances, explaining exactly how the technical 
aspects in the background work does not really serve the client, it rather confuses him. He 
lacks the connector pieces in order to understand.”51 (A. Pesenti) 
Practices Rela-
tive to the 
Communica-
tion Process  
– Retreat from 
group conver-
sation and en-
gage in bilat-
eral talks to 
clarify situa-
tions  
 
While the previously discussed practice to use visualizations might help to 
overcome the big picture challenge and keep in view the various main elements 
of a discourse, we could not identify another practice that explicitly responds to 
this challenge. Instead, we could separate out two other practices of pom+ that 
are related to the communication process. The first one concerns more macro 
aspects of the communication while the second concerns a single face-to-face 
interaction between experts of pom+ and their clients.  
Sometimes, during a meeting, the communication in the group does not flow 
because of the behavior of a single participant who might be generally skeptical 
about the project or does have other concerns. In such situations, it is a good 
practice to make a coffee break and talk the issue over in a bilateral talk with the 
respective person (L. Schärer). In this sense, it is important to alternate the group 
communication with more intimate bilateral talks. 
                                                 
50 ”Ich habe Kunden, die kleben an irgendwelchen Grafiken, andere kleben am Text, andere wollen nicht zuviel 
Papier sondern wollen lieber mündliche Kommunikation.” 
51„Bei unserem Informatiker ist eher die Gefahr, dass er in technische Details abschweift, wo der Kunde dann nicht 
mehr mitkommt. Dann muss man eine gemeinsame Sprache finden, um das (die Technik) begreiflich zu machen. 
Es gibt aber andere Situationen, wo dem Kunden die technischen Aspekte im Hintergrund nichts bringen und 
ihn eher verwirren. Dem Kunden fehlt dann das Verbindungsstück, um etwas zu verstehen.“ 
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− Engage in 
active listening 
by rephrasing 
(to verify the 
understanding) 
During a conversation, a meeting, or a workshop, a fundamental prerequi-
site for an effective communication is the capability to actively listen to what the 
interlocutor tells and to verify ones understanding. “I have to listen to the client, 
possess analytical capabilities, and play back what I have understood. It is im-
portant to pay attention to completeness and to the knowledge that is relevant 
for decisions“52 (R. Becht). It is not only the consultant who has to engage in 
active listening, it is important that also the client reflects what he has under-
stood. In this way, implicit misunderstandings are less probable and the two 
parties create a common understanding. “It is often useful if the client repeats 
again what he has understood. (..) Only by doing so, one understands where to 
explain something in more depth”53 (N. Merkt). 
Challenges 
Related to the 
Group Dynam-
ics and Socio-
Emotional 
Aspects 
How do relational and socio-emotional aspects (the group dynamics) influ-
ence the knowledge communication between pom+’s consultants and their cli-
ents? We have mentioned earlier how the formation of trust (see: Articulate 
Need) – certainly a socio-emotional aspect - is a major issue and precondition for 
any successful knowledge communication between pom+ and its clients. In the 
following, we will present other socio-emotional challenges that regard the group 
dynamics either between the consultants and the client or within the various 
contact people of the client.  
 
– Knowledge gap 
between client 
and consult-
ants create re-
lational ten-
sions  
 
A first aspect is that the knowledge gap between pom+’s experts and the 
client can create relational tensions. It is sometimes difficult for clients to admit 
their own ignorance with regard to a certain subject. They fear to loose face and 
feel attacked personally when corrected on a content level.  
“The ignorance of a client sometimes inhibits the knowledge transfer. Once I had to deal 
with an older, experienced manager who then realized that I – by that time I was still very 
young – knew a little more in this specific field than he did. And then, his ignorance really 
                                                 
52 “Ich muss dem Kunden zuhören und analytische Fähigkeiten besitzen und das, was ich verstanden habe, wieder 
zurückzuspiegeln. Wichtig ist es, auf Vollständigkeit und entscheidungsrelevantes Wissen zu achten.“ 
53 „Oft nützt es, wenn der Kunde nochmals wiederholt, was er verstanden hat. (..) Erst so versteht man oft, wo 
man noch tiefer etwas erklären muss.“ 
54 „Das eigene Unwissen des Kunden erschwert oft den Wissenstransfer. Ich hatte es einmal mit einem älteren, 
erfahrenen Manager zu tun, der dann aber merkte, dass ich (und da war ich noch sehr jung) in dem spezifischen 
Bereich doch ein bisschen mehr wusste als er. Sein eigenes Unwissen hat dann den Wissenstransfer blockiert.“ 
55 „Dies ist oft am Anfang beim oberen, mittleren Kader ein Problem. Sie fragen nicht, ‚wie muss ich das jetzt 
verstehen?’ (..) Oft ist es auch nicht jedermanns Sache, zu sagen, ‚das habe ich jetzt nicht verstanden’.“ 
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blocked the knowledge transfer”54 (R. Baumann).  
Issues of pride and power are often related to the knowledge differences be-
tween clients and consultants, and the fear to loose face can become a strong 
inhibitor to learning. “Oftentimes, this is a problem of the upper and middle 
management. They do not ask, ‘how should I understand this?’ (..) It’s not eve-
rybody’s thing to say: ‘This, I really haven’t understood.’”55 (A. Pesenti). 
 
– Counterpro-
ductive group 
dynamics 
within various 
contact people 
of a client  
Another set of relational aspects that are challenging for the knowledge-
intensive communication between pom+’s experts and their clients are related to 
the difficult group dynamics existing among the various contact persons of a 
client.  
“Often, in meetings, where six to ten people of a client organization participate who have 
different interests and responsibilities, I can see quickly that relatively strong group dynam-
ics emerge. IT people look from their side, business administrators from the management 
level, and then there are those who are concerned with the planning and execution of the 
project. These perspectives are often very far from each other, which causes difficulties if the 
participants should find shared solutions. They often really wear themselves down. Someone 
has the feeling, he has to appear dominant and then, the others don’t bring in their perspec-
tives any more, which though would be very important. There is rarely someone who fo-
cuses on the big picture.”56 (R. Becht) 
– Responsibili-
ties and func-
tions between 
the different 
contact people 
of a client are 
unclear 
 
The responsibilities and functions between the different contact people of a 
client are sometimes not clear. There are instances when the consultants of pom+ 
work with the project manager on the client. At a later stage, when first mile-
stone results are communicated and to the sponsor of the project is involved, it 
becomes apparent that the project manager and the sponsor did not really tune 
their expectations. As a result, a lot of work has been in vain and the project is 
getting behind schedule. 
 
                                                 
56 „Ich erlebe oft in Runden mit 6-10 Leuten, die unterschiedliche Interessen und Verantwortungen haben, dass 
relativ rasch starke Gruppendynamiken aufkommen. Die IT-Leute schauen aus ihrer Seite, die Ökonomen aus 
der Führungsseite und dann gibt es diejenigen von der operativen Seite, welche an der Planung und Ausführung 
des Projekts interessiert sind. Diese Perspektiven sind Lichtjahre voneinander entfernt. Wenn ich mit denen in 
einer Sitzung bin und gemeinsam eine Lösung finden soll, dann ist dies sehr, sehr schwierig. Sie machen sich 
häufig gegenseitig kaputt. Jemand hat das Gefühl, er muss dominant auftreten, die anderen bringen ihre Sicht-
weise dann nicht mehr richtig ins Spiel (die eigentlich jedoch wichtig wäre) und es gibt selten jemand, der das 
Gesamtbild im Auge hat.“ 
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Practice Rela-
tive to the 
Group Dynam-
ics and Socio-
Emotional As-
pects: 
– Establish a 
trustworthy and 
amicable rela-
tionship  
 
Function: 
• Create neces-
sary empathy 
for the exter-
nalization of 
tacit knowl-
edge, the 
communica-
tion of com-
plex issues, 
and the un-
veiling of 
problems 
 
One of the key practices of pom+ is to establish a real partnership with its 
clients and to engage in a very interactive, hands-on collaboration. The consult-
ants of pom+ try to establish a trustworthy and amicable relationship with their 
clients. „If you get to know the client better, things in the communication be-
come easier. He lets one explain to him what is exactly meant by something, 
what it is all about, what advantages it brings, and what consequences it has”57
(A. Pesenti). To know a person on a personal level increases the mutual empathy 
of the communicators. This is particularly important when communicating 
highly complex and domain specific knowledge and when trying to externalize 
tacit knowledge (von Krogh, 1998). In such situations, communicators have to 
put in words what is very hard to put in words, they are struggling in reducing 
the complexity and in estimating the knowledge of the interlocutor, and they 
have to ‘confess’ certain unpleasant problems of the company. “In the conversa-
tions with the clients, sometimes, one can read between the lines where the shoe 
pinches. (..) And maybe, the head of the facility management then all of a sud-
den says: ‘what I really can’t stand, is that..’“58 (B. Buser). These are all chal-
lenges for the communication that are much easier to surmount if the communi-
cator knows that the vis-à-vis tries to understand with a certain benevolence and 
empathy. Furthermore, knowing the client also on a personal level helps to bet-
ter ambient the information in the context of the client and to identify with 
his/her mode of thinking.  
“Knowing private issues of the client helps to make conclusions by analogy. What type of 
car does he have, how does he make decisions? It also helps in order to explain something 
technical with the help of his hobby”59 (S. Jäggi). 
Finally, it is also important to know the key people on the client side be-
cause of political reasons. In cases of problems and escalations, these people are 
very important to resolve conflicts and to successfully resume the project work.  
“One always needs friends on the other side, people who are sympathetic to us and who 
understand us. These have to be the key players because if there happened to be an escala-
tion, one would have to bring these people in and bring the project back on the right track. 
                                                 
57 „Wenn man den Kunden besser kennt, wird die Kommunikation einfacher, er lässt sich erklären, was genau 
gemeint ist, was es damit auf sich hat, was etwas genau bringt, welche Auswirkungen es hat.“  
58 „In den Gesprächen mit den Kunden kommt manchmal auch zwischen den Zeilen hindurch, wo der Schuh 
drückt. (..). Vielleicht sagt dann der Leiter des Facility Managements plötzlich: ‚was mich einfach total aufregt, 
ist…“ 
59 „Wissen über private Dinge des Kunden helfen, Analogieschlüsse zu ziehen. Was hat er für ein Auto, wie fällt er 
Entscheidungen? Es hilft auch, um etwas Fachliches mit Hilfe seines Hobby zu erklären.“ 
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(..) This is the interpersonal dimension. We really try to win the people for us “60 (G. 
Bilotta). 
pom+ does a variety of activities to nurture such a amicable and trustwor-
thy partnership between its consultants and their clients. As mentioned earlier, 
they engage in a lot of face-to-face communications (like meetings, workshop, 
etc.) rather than communicating formally through reports and other written 
formats (see: Articulate Need). They work on a daily basis with the client, they 
organize in-house seminars and events where people have the possibility for 
informal exchanges, and they do organize workshops and events in memorable 
locations (see: Practices Related to the Outer Context of the Communication). 
In all these occasions, clients and consultants have to get to know each other 
also on a personal level.  
“If we are two days out in the countryside, then this has a methodological relevance, but 
the other thing is that you get closer on a personal level. Maybe you start to address each 
other in an informal way and clap on each other’s shoulders. (..) It’s our aim that the peo-
ple are happy to work with us. This is not always the case in the consulting business: 
‘What do they want again?’ To make friends out of the clients so that one is happy to see 
each other again“61 (G. Bilotta). 
For pom+, the amicable and trustworthy partnership with its clients is one 
of the most important preconditions for that knowledge can be shared among 
the two parties and the client can really integrate in his/her decisions the exper-
tise that is conveyed by pom+’s consultants.  
“One of the most important conditions for a well functioning knowledge transfer between 
the consultant and the client is really that it works well on an interpersonal level”62 (B. 
Buser).  
 
 
                                                 
60 “Man braucht immer Freunde auf der anderen Seite, Leute, die einem gut gesinnt sind aber uns auch verstehen. 
Und diese müssen auch die Key Players sein. Denn sollte es irgendwann zur Eskalation kommen, müsste man 
diese wieder ins Spiel bringen, um das Projekt wieder auf den richtigen Weg zu bringen. (..) Das ist das Zwi-
schenmenschliche. Wir versuchen die Leute für uns zu gewinnen.“  
61 “Wenn wir zwei Tage im Grünen sind, dann hat das methodisch schon eine Relevanz, aber der andere Punkt ist, 
dass wir einander näher kommen, uns vielleicht duzen und uns gegenseitig auf die Schultern klopfen.(..) Es ist 
unser Ziel, dass sich die Leute freuen, mit uns zusammen zu arbeiten. Dies ist ja in der Beraterbranche nicht 
immer der Fall. ‚Was wollen die jetzt schon wieder?’, sich Kunden zu Freunden zu machen, so dass man sich 
freut, sich wieder zu sehen.“ 
62 „Eine wichtige Bedingung für einen gut funktionierenden Wissenstransfer zwischen dem Berater und dem Kun-
den ist wirklich, dass es auf der zwischenmenschlichen Ebene gut funktioniert.“ 
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Challenges Re-
lated to the 
Mental Models 
– Client is not 
familiar with an-
other perspec-
tive and ap-
proach (e.g. 
procedural think-
ing). Risk to rig-
idly impose own 
perspective  
• Orientation on 
practice vs. 
orientation on 
theory and 
method  
• Orientation on 
isolated as-
pects vs. 
overall per-
spective 
• Orientation on 
quick fixes vs. 
comprehen-
sive, inte-
grated solu-
tions 
 
Many of the communicative challenges that exist in the knowledge-
intensive interactions between the consultants of pom+ and their clients are 
related to the mental models of the two parties. The mental models are the in-
terpretive schemes with which we select and elaborate information and make it 
meaningful. To a large extent, they are formed of our previous experiences and 
the already acquired knowledge and do enclose not only rational but also emo-
tional and psychological aspects (Mengis & Eppler, 2005).  
A first very important challenge for the consultant with regard to this as-
pect is to make the client familiar with another approach to things. “The proce-
dural thinking is not very easy for the client. (..) A lot of persuasiveness is 
needed”63 (S. Amsler). The challenge for the consultant is to structure the think-
ing and approach of the client, but not to squeeze him into something he/she 
does not want.  
“I start to structure and visualize his (the client’s) thoughts and then the problems start. 
The client structures – if at all – very differently from me and he has difficulties to disen-
gage from his own structure“64 (S. Jäggi).   
There are at least three big differences in the orientations of the client with 
respect to the one of the consultant that are all highly dependent on the diverg-
ing day-to-day context of the two parties. One is the client’s orientation on 
practice as opposed to the consultants’ orientation on theory and method. Even 
if both views on an issue can bring their unique insights, it is difficult to com-
bine the two and to make both parties appreciate their reciprocal value. Clients 
often are skeptical about theoretical approaches and see them as disconnected 
from their practical problems. There are various ways how pom+’s consultants 
deal with this challenge: some prefer to stick to the clear methodological ap-
proach, but others prefer to be responsive to the client’s whish and take over –
at least for a little while - the more practical and less methodological or theo-
retical approach as outlines this quote by Natasha Merkt.  
“Sometimes, our approach is a little bit too theoretical for certain people. The theoretical 
path - that we need for the development of a concrete procedure – is for some people too 
long and too burdensome. (..) Most of the times I am responsive to the client’s whish to 
                                                 
63 „Das Prozessdenken ist für den Kunden oft nicht so einfach. (..) Hier braucht es viel Überzeugungskraft.“ 
64 „Ich beginne dann, seine Gedanken zu strukturieren und zu visualisieren und da beginnen die Probleme. Der 
Kunde strukturiert – wenn überhaupt – anders als ich und er hat Mühe, sich von seiner eigenen Struktur zu lö-
sen.“ 
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become more concrete. Then things start to go upside-down and become chaotic until the 
client realizes that the theoretical and methodological had its advantage”65 (N. Merkt). 
Another difference in orientation is that the client tends to be very focused 
on the quite punctual problem he/she lives at the moment whereas the consult-
ant has more distance and looks at an issue from a broader perspective. While it 
can be difficult for the consultant to take the client out of his perspective it is 
also his responsibility in his function to think of the bigger picture.  
“Maybe the assignment we have been given borders on other connections we should point 
out to the client. When dealing with a relocation, one always thinks about moving from A 
to B, but smaller things like reprinting business cards often get forgotten. My task is to 
take in this integrative viewpoint and show what the various implications of a decision 
are”66 (N. Merkt). 
 We have mentioned earlier on that one of the practices of pom+ in the way 
how its consultants convey their insights and suggestions to their clients, is to 
not simply propose a single solution (e.g. one software suite), but to embed it in 
a larger context and to give the clients the necessary information (e.g. evalua-
tion criteria and their importance) to choose among the possible alternatives. 
However, this general orientation of pom+ to provide comprehensive, inte-
grated solutions sometimes contrasts strongly with the orientation of the client 
to get quick fixes and ready-made solutions.  
“The client had the very strong idea that I would present a ready-made solution that he 
then could simply implement. I did not present such a ready-made solution because it did 
not exist. I could only show the various alternatives that would have to be adapted to the 
concrete context of application. For this reason, the client, mainly men aged between 40 
and 50, was wondering: ‘Does she really know what she is talking about? She cannot 
really show us what we wanted’”67 (S. Amsler).  
                                                 
65 “Manchmal geht man für gewisse Leute etwas zu theoretisch vor. Der theoretische Weg, den es braucht zum 
Erarbeiten des konkreten Plans, ist für einige zu lang oder zu mühsam. (..) Meistens gehe ich auf den Wunsch 
ein, konkreter zu werden. Es geht dann kreuz und quer und wird chaotisch, bis der Kunde merkt, dass das The-
oretische, Methodische einen Vorteil hatte.“ 
66 „Vielleicht hat der Auftrag, welcher der Kunde uns gibt, noch ganz andere Zusammenhänge, auf die man den 
Kunden hinweisen soll. Beim Umzug denkt man daran, sich von A nach B zu bewegen, aber kleinere Dinge ver-
gisst man gerne wie Visitenkarten nachdrucken. Meine Aufgabe ist der ganzheitliche Blickwinkel. Ich muss auf-
zeigen, dass ein Entscheid ganz verschiedene Auswirkungen haben kann.“ 
67 „Der Kunde hatten ganz stark das Bild, dass ich eine fertige Lösung präsentieren würde, die man in dieser Form 
umsetzten könnte. Da ich jedoch kein fixfertiges Produkt präsentierte, weil es dies gar nicht gibt, und ich dem 
Kunde nur verschiedene Varianten aufzeigen kann, die auf ihren konkreten Kontext angepasst werden müssen, 
fragten sich die Leute, meist Herren zwischen 40 und 50: ‚Kennt sie sich denn überhaupt aus? Die kann uns das 
ja gar nicht aufzeigen, wie wir wollen.’“ 
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– Difficulty to 
estimate knowl-
edge of ad-
dressee and to 
adapt to it 
 
Another problem for the communicator (both for the expert and the client) 
is to judge the addressee’s knowledge: what is common ground for both par-
ties?, what does he/she know, but would name and express it differently?, what 
does he/she not know and does he/she not need to know? 
“(It is difficult) to figure out what management should know of what I know, at which 
level can I start to present the analysis? The difficulty is to estimate the level of knowledge 
of the management”68 (L. Schärer). 
– Misunderstand-
dings of terms 
arise because of 
diverging back-
grounds and 
perspectives, 
but remain hid-
den until late in 
the process 
 
A challenge that has been mentioned by a considerable number of consult-
ants is the one of uncovered misunderstandings. Oftentimes, clients do under-
stand the same terms very differently from how do pom+’s consultants. In cer-
tain cases, not even the various contact people of a single client do share the 
same understanding of a specific concept. The following quote illustrate this 
aspect:  
“It often happens that someone from the construction industry uses the same term as 
someone from the IT industry, but understands something completely different. (..) For 
example: what is a building? From a microeconomic standpoint a building is understood 
as a utilization unit and as such it is also represented in SAP. Added to this definition are 
criteria like how to rent and charge for the building. From a legal point of view, it is all 
different. There is a cadastral register, in which the building is marked with a cadastral 
number, its borders are clearly circumscribed, and it has an insurance number. (..)”69 (R. 
Becht) 
Becht goes on with his example and shows that not only the micro-
economist and the lawyer do not share the same understanding of what a build-
ing is, there is, in addition, the view of the manager and finally the one of the 
State. On a practical level, the implication of such divergent understandings is 
that data bases are filled with key figures of which nobody knows to what ex-
actly they refer. 
Divergent understandings of the same terms can therefore have quite seri-
                                                 
68 „Zu abstrahieren: Was weiss ich, was sollte das Management wissen, und auf welcher Stufe kann ich überhaupt 
beginnen, die Analyse zu präsentieren? Die Schwierigkeit ist, den Wissenstand des Managements einzuschät-
zen.“ 
69 „Es gibt es häufig, dass jemand aus der Baubranche den gleichen Begriff verwendet wie jemand aus der Informa-
tikbranche und darunter aber etwas ganz anderes versteht. (..) Zum Beispiel was ist ein Gebäude? Aus einer be-
triebswirtschaftlichen Sicht wird es als eine Nutzungseinheit verstanden und ist auch so im SAP abgebildet. Da-
zu kommen Kriterien wie man das Gebäude vermietet und verrechtet, die dann in die Definition einfliessen. Von 
der Rechtseite sieht dies ganz anders aus. Da gibt es ein Grundbuch, in dem ein Grundstück mit einer Kataster-
nummer vermerkt ist und klar umschriebenen Grenzen und einer Versicherungsnummer.“ 
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ous consequences. Not only do expensive databases become useless, it can also 
be that a project starts in a direction which was not at all in the intention of the 
section leader.  
“The project leader and the section leader had a completely different understanding of 
certain concepts: ‚process management’ for example. Some understood it as a management 
process, others as a support process. The section leader saw it as the management of the 
project entrance, project execution, and project ending. On the other hand, the committee 
of the project asked much more: ‚Should we give partial tasks of the project to external 
people or not?’”70 (L. Schärer) 
Particularly problematic of such misunderstandings is if they get uncovered 
only at a very late stage of the project and a lot of efforts and intermediate re-
sults therefore went in a wrong direction. Yet, it is not always easy to realize 
that two interlocutors are about to misunderstand each other, as states Stefan 
Jäggi:  
„When a client picks up a term that he had already heard in another context, he switches 
to this context. For me, it is often difficult to find out that he now talks about a com-
pletely different context than the one we have just been talking about”71 (S. Jäggi).  
Finally, misunderstandings do not only refer to single concepts. It can also 
be that a whole outcome of a meeting is understood differently by the various 
participants:  
“I remember a project meeting during which we had quite a broad discussion and talked 
about important issues. (..) Then, we revised the meeting on the basis of the protocol and 
realized that the head of the section, who was not there in the beginning, must have had 
understood something completely different. He expected something quite different from 
the project than the project manager. This was a bigger misunderstanding between the 
head of the section and the project manager“72 (L. Schärer). 
                                                 
70 „Der Projektleiter und der Gruppenleiter hatten ein völlig unterschiedliches Verständnis von einigen Begriffen. 
Prozessauftragsmanagement zum Beispiel. Die einen verstanden darunter einen Supportprozess, die anderen ei-
nen Führungsprozess. Der Gruppenleiter verstand unter Prozessmanagement: Projekteingang, Projektverarbei-
tung und Projektabschluss. Der Projektausschuss verstand darunter viel mehr die Frage: Geben wir Teilaufgaben 
des Projekts extern oder nicht?“ 
71 „Wenn der Kunde einen Begriff aufschnappt, den er schon einmal in einem anderen Gebiet gehört hatte, wech-
selt er in dieses Gebiet. Für mich ist es schwierig herauszufinden, dass er jetzt von einem ganz anderen Gebiet 
spricht, als von dem, in welchem wir uns gerade bewegten. 
72 „Es handelt sich um eine Projektsitzung, in der man weit ausholte und wichtige Dinge besprach. (..) Danach 
wurde die Sitzung aufgearbeitet. Das Protokoll wurde zurückgestellt, danach hatten wir gemerkt, dass der Chef, 
der am Anfang nicht dabei war, etwas ganz anderes verstanden hatte. Er hatte etwas ganz anderes vom Projekt 
erwartet als der Projektleiter. Es handelte sich um ein grösseres Missverständnis zwischen Gruppenleiter und 
Teamleiter.“ 
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− Client is reluc-
tant to change  
The last two challenges we discuss on the level of the mental models are 
mainly due to the characteristics of the clients. The first challenge is that a few 
clients show a general aversion or hesitation to change current behavior or ways 
of thinking. “The knowledge transfer can be inhibited by the simple rejection of 
something that is new”73 (R. Baumann). In such a situation, it is particularly 
difficult for pom+’s experts to find open ears for their propositions, suggestions, 
and insights. 
− Client is better 
informed and 
often has con-
trary information 
at disposition 
We have mentioned earlier on (see: The Expert – Decision Maker Situation) 
that the knowledge gap between the consultants of pom+ and their clients has 
become less blatant in the last years and that this brings various advantages for 
the communication. Yet, the fact that the client is better informed today than he 
used to can also represent one challenge for the knowledge communication.  
“The client is better informed and more prejudiced today. He finds information in the 
Internet, at congresses (..). We therefore always have to convince the client and show him 
how our views are related to others. We have to clearly outline why our approach is con-
vincing” 74 (C. Kaufmann). 
In this way, if the client has no knowledge at all within the field, then the 
communication between consultant and client can be extremely difficult (e.g. 
client lacks the knowledge to give a concrete briefing of what he/she needs, uses 
a completely different language, etc.). On the other hand, if the client has a 
good amount of knowledge and feels confident that he is knowledgeable as 
well, this leads to other problems as is the positioning and selling of the con-
sultant’s knowledge with respect to alternative propositions. 
Practices Rela-
tive to the Men-
tal Models 
– Put oneself in 
situation of cli-
ent 
One crucial practice of pom+’s consultants on the level of the mental mod-
els is to be able to adopt the perspective of the client, see the problem from 
his/her context, and understand his/her hesitations and way of thinking. Only 
in this way, the consultant can adjust his communication to the client, both in 
content and form. “Ideally, I try to put myself in the position of the client, to 
grasp his background and feel what he can understand“75 (N. Merkt). The 
                                                 
73 „Der Wissenstransfer kann auch verhindert werden rein aus einer Ablehnung gegen Neuem.“ 
74 „Der Kunde ist heute informierter und voreingenommener. Er findet Informationen im Internet, an Kongressen 
(..) und deshalb müssen wir dauernd den Kunden überzeugen, wie sich unsere Vorstellungen gegenüber den an-
deren Vorstellungen positionieren. Wir müssen ihm aufzeigen, weshalb unser Vorgehen überzeugt.“ 
75 „Ich versuche mich idealerweise, in den Kunden hineinzuversetzen, zu spüren, welche Hintergründe er hat, was 
er versteht.“ 
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 consultant needs to estimate the level of knowledge of his client, his preferences 
in terms of communication formats and styles and tune his message along these 
lines. In fact, “the identification with the client is everything. I need to know 
how he reasons, what he desires, how he decides. In other words, I need to 
know what he wants to have covered and what his priorities are”76 (S. Jäggi). 
To be able to do so, we have discussed earlier on that pom+ tries to get to 
know the client on a personal level and to engage in face-to-face communica-
tion (see: Practice Relative to the Group Dynamics: Establish a trustworthy and 
amicable relationship) 
– Put own exper-
tise in perspec-
tive, question it 
critically, and 
use client as 
source of infor-
mation 
 
Another major practice of pom+ is to use the client as a prior source of in-
formation rather than imposing an own solution, theory, or approach. With this 
practice, it is less probable that the client shows too many resistances to imple-
ment a solution because he feels that he himself has developed it. The consult-
ants of pom+ have to be skilled in various techniques how to elicit the necessary 
information.  
“It is important, to ask the right questions. In order to do our work well, we need to re-
ceive the right information of the client. One can ask the questions in such a way to re-
ceive the answer one would like, but without the other noticing so. But not only. One can 
use questions to steer someone in a certain direction und make him favorable of a certain 
idea. The consultant needs to have in mind the direction in order to know what informa-
tion he/she needs from the client”77 (N. Merkt). 
On a cognitive side, the bigger challenge of such a practice is that the con-
sultants of pom+ need to be able to critically question their point of view, to put 
it into perspective, and not to see it as an absolute truth.  
“With my education I have a very specific point of view that differs from the one of fore-
stall engineers, politicians, and so on. It is therefore very important to not see one’s 
knowledge as absolute, but to classify it”78 (R. Becht). 
                                                 
76 „Die Identifikation mit dem Kunden ist alles. Ich muss wissen, wie er denkt, was er wünscht, wie er entscheidet. 
D.h. ich muss wissen, was er abgedeckt haben möchte, was seine Prioritäten sind.“ 
77 „Wichtig ist es, die richtigen Fragen zu stellen. Wir sind ja darauf angewiesen, die wichtigen Informationen vom 
Kunden zu bekommen, so dass unsere Arbeit auch gut wird. Wir brauchen ja den Input und das Wissen des 
Kunden. Man kann Fragen so stellen, dass man die Antwort bekommt, die man möchte, ohne dass es der andere 
merkt, aber natürlich nicht nur. Man kann auch Fragen brauchen, um jemanden in eine Richtung zu steuern 
und ihn für eine Idee zu gewinnen. Der Berater muss die Richtung kennen, damit er weiss, ich muss noch dies 
und jenes wissen.“ 
78 „Mit meiner Ausbildung habe ich eine sehr spezifische Sichtweise, die anders ist als diejenige der Forstingenieu-
re, Politiker, etc. Deswegen ist es wichtig, sein Wissen nicht als absolut zu sehen, sondern einzuordnen.“  
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Next to the challenges and practices that are directly related to the com-
munication between pom+ and its clients and that we have discussed until now, 
there are some further contextual issues of the communication, which favor or 
hinder the knowledge integration between the two parties. These are related to 
time, physical space, history, structural constellations, and specific questions of 
quality. 
Challenges Re-
lated to the 
Outer Context of 
the Communica-
tion 
– Time pressure 
The strong time pressure, to which clients are exposed, represents a con-
tinuous challenge for pom+ and constitutes one of the most important contex-
tual factors of the knowledge-intensive communication between the consultants 
and their clients. In the briefing phase, clients do not want to take the time, to 
explain in detail what their problems are, and what type of solution they envi-
sion.  
“Often I can see that the people in the higher positions do not want to take the time to 
really deal with a problem. They just want a solution: ‘just start doing something and pre-
sent something“ (A. Pesenti).79  
Later in the project, when results have to be conveyed, the increasing time 
pressure leads to ever more concise communication formats.  
− History of previ-
ously failed pro-
jects 
Finally, an important contextual factor is also the history of an issue within 
the organization of the client. In some areas, there have been already various 
unsuccessful attempts to solve a problem, so that people have become really 
cautious and prefer not to do any further attempts because they fear other fail-
ures. “There is always some resistance. ‘We have tried that already 10 years 
ago. That did not work already then so it won’t work today, neither’”80 (L. 
Schärer). Related to such project failures are also relational tensions that have 
been established between the collaborators in the past. 
“There are projects, in which field the client has done already a lot earlier on and has been 
punished since the actions did not reach the intended goal. There are single people who 
are marked by the preceding history. They have a problem with someone, want to do 
                                                 
79 „Oft stelle ich bei Leuten in höheren Positionen fest, dass man sich zeitlich nicht mit den Problemen auseinander 
setzen, sondern einfach eine Lösung möchte „macht mal irgendwie, bringt mal etwas.“ 
80 „Es gibt immer wieder Widerstand. ‚Das haben wir schon vor 10 Jahren einmal probiert. Das funktionierte 
damals schon nicht, also wird es auch heute nicht gehen.’ 
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things all on their own”81 (C. Kaufmann). 
Time and history are contextual factors that cannot be changed as such, 
but we have shown earlier how pom+ has practices in place on other dimen-
sions of the presented framework that take his contextual factors into account 
and provide solutions for these challenges. For example, on the message dimen-
sion, pom+ systematically engages in activities of prioritizing, compressing, and 
using visuals, in order to reach a quicker and less time-consuming communica-
tion. Even if certain contextual factors are difficult to shape, pom+ does take 
action on others, as we will outline in the following. 
Practices Rela-
tive to the Outer 
Context of the 
Communication 
– Assure quality 
and credibility  
As a purely service based company, it is determinant for pom+ to assure 
the quality and expertise of its collaborators and of the content of its commu-
nications. In fact, we have mentioned earlier the big challenges of signaling 
expertise and creating trust (see: Articulate Need: Definition of a Project’s Pa-
rameters; Mistrust of client). How does pom+ assure the quality of its service in 
order to make sure to be perceived in the long term as a trustful and knowl-
edgeable partner? First of all, pom+ has a recruiting policy that already assures 
a good quality of its collaborators. Only people with a degree from a university 
are employed, many of them come from the prestigious Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology Zurich, and some even have double degrees, one in a technical 
domain and the other in the one of business administration. Once the people 
are employed as consultants, pom+ invests in their development through a tu-
toring system and by offering them continuous education. New consultants are 
supported in their project work by disposing at a more experienced internal 
coach. This procedure also assures continuity in the quality of the service. Next 
to such individual training, pom+ also engages in the development of the or-
ganization as a whole. Each year, pom+ organizes three one-day workshops to 
form the whole crew on issues that are particularly important for the company. 
In addition, once a year, they make a one-day leisure excursion and a skiing 
weekend to strengthen personal ties between the collaborators and to develop a 
pleasant and friendly company environment. All these measures are intended, 
at the end, to assure the quality of the service provided. Finally, pom+ is very 
actively engaged in networks of professional associations, which is important 
                                                 
81 „Es gibt Projekte, in denen der Kunde schon viel im Voraus in diesem Gebiet versucht hat und aufs Dach be-
kommen hat, weil die Handlungen nicht zum Ziel führten. Es gibt einzelne Leute, die sind gebrannt von der 
Vorgeschichte, haben ein Problem mit jemand anderem, wollen Dinge an sich reissen.“ 
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to mark one’s own credibility within the communities and the markets of activ-
ity.  
– Limit translation 
function of ex-
pert (between 
client and third 
parties) and put 
technicians, IT-
specialists in di-
rect contact with 
client 
Usually, there are not one but various collaborators from pom+ who are 
working on a project for a client. Rather than using the consultant as a transla-
tor who communicates internally what he/she has discussed earlier with the 
client, it is general practice of pom+ to put technicians or IT-specialists in direct 
contact with the client.  
“If the programmer never sees the client, then the interface is much more difficult. In pro-
jects of pom+, the programmer always comes along to the client. (..) I believe that this is 
really useful. In this way, we decide together what the tasks are. It is not that I would 
translate something and he would again understand it differently“82 (A. Pesenti). 
By allowing technical experts like IT-specialists a direct contact with the 
client, pom+ minders the chance of possible misunderstandings and helps these 
specialized collaborators to better understand the context of their work. 
− Organize events 
in memorable 
and pleasant lo-
cations that in-
clude also in-
formal encoun-
ters 
For pom+, it is further important to choose a pleasant physical surrounding 
for the encounters with their clients. Workshops take place in special settings, 
like for example in the center for culture and congresses (KKL) in Lucerne, the 
newly opened center of Paul Klee in Bern, or a minimalist retreat center in the 
mountains.  
“The experience is important. A workshop entails a lot of symbolism. It is not only a 
question of transmitting knowledge, but also of communicating a specific imagery. After-
wards, you like to remember how we were in Lucerne two years ago. The experience is 
always important to convey knowledge“83 (G. Bilotta).   
In this way, pom+ carefully chooses the physical locations of its workshops 
so that people live an experience and create a strong mnemonic anchor for the 
knowledge that is communicated during these workshops. Another advantage 
of choosing such locations is that people are invited to get to know each other 
                                                 
82 „Wenn der Programmierer den Kunden nie sieht, ist die Schnittstelle natürlich viel schwieriger. In den Projekten 
bei pom+ kommt der Programmierer immer mit. (..) Ich finde das hilfreich. So bestimmen wir gemeinsam die 
Aufgaben, welche zu tun sind. Es ist nicht, dass ich etwas übersetzten würde und er versteht es dann wieder an-
ders.“ 
83 „So ist auch das Erlebnis wichtig. Ein Workshop hat so viel Symbolik dahinter, es geht nicht nur um die Ver-
mittlung von Wissen, sondern eine Symbolik zu kommunizieren. Man erinnert sich dann immer gern daran, 
dass man vor zwei Jahren in Luzern war. Das Erlebnis ist immer wichtig, um das Wissen zu vermitteln.“ 
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better and to build informal and emotional bonds. This helps the consultants of 
pom+ to understand the client’s needs, his/her personality and way of thinking 
and to build a real partnership with the customer (see: Practice Relative to the 
Group Dynamics; Establish a trustworthy and amicable relationship).  
Conclusion We have described the process of the knowledge intensive communication 
between pom+’s consultants and their clients and structured this description 
with the help of a phase framework. We have argued that knowledge is not only 
shared and integrated once the consultants have conducted their analysis and 
present their results and suggestions to their clients. In fact, the idea of the con-
sultants that walk in an organization, do some analysis and hand out a final 
report that nobody will read anyway, is not what we could find in the case of 
pom+. Rather, the knowledge intensive communication starts with the identifi-
cation of the relevant experts and expertise and when the client’s need is con-
veyed and the briefing communicated. It goes on in a collaborative working 
mode during the phase of analysis and finally takes place when communicating 
the results and propositions and while implementing them in decision making 
and action. We have discussed the challenges and practices specific to these 
various phases. Then, we have outlined further challenges and practices that are 
not specific to one particular phase, but that are more general to the knowledge 
intensive communication between pom+ and its clients. 
Figure 22 gives a summary overview on these phase-independent, more 
general challenges and practices of the knowledge communication. Since they 
are manifold, we would like to summarize them with three overarching prac-
tices that are most characteristic and of pom+’s communication and relation 
with their clients.  
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Overall Prac-
tices: 
– Active collabo-
rating & partner-
ing 
 
 
We have highlighted in various instances that a major characteristic of 
pom+’s interaction with its clients is partnership and active collaboration. “Of-
ten, it is a partnership. The consultant shall not appear as a know-it-all who 
simply wants everything to turn inside out”84 (B. Buser). pom+ tries to build up 
a partnership with its clients and an active collaboration by engaging in face-to-
face communication (workshops, presentations, meetings, etc.), by hands-on 
collaboration throughout the various phases of interaction, by getting to know 
each other on a personal level, and finally, by creating community-building 
experiences (e.g. organizing events in memorable locations). We have shown 
that partnership and active collaboration are important to build a relationship 
of trust, to be able to identify with the position of the client, to build a shared 
understanding, to avoid resistances to change (because they are perceived to be 
                                                 
84 „Häufig ist es eine Partnerschaft. Der Berater soll nicht als Alleswisser auftreten, der einfach Sachen umkrem-
peln will.“ 
Figure 22: Major Challenges and Practices in the Knowledge Communication of pom+ 
•Give concrete examples and work with metaphors
•Work with visualizations
•Reduce complexity in ways that suit the characteristics of 
the addressee
Message
•Retreat from group conversation and engage in bilateral 
talks to clarify situations 
•Engage active listening by rephrasing (to verify the 
understanding)
Process
•Establish a trustworthy and amicable relationship 
•Put oneself in situation of client
•Put own expertise in perspective, question it critically, 
and use client as source of information
Mental 
Models
•Assure quality and credibility
•Limit translation function of expert (between client and third 
parties) and involve technicians, IT-specialists directly
•Organize events in memorable and pleasant locations that 
also include informal encounters
Outer
Context
•Information is too theoretical, technical, and abstract 
•Difficulty to prioritize, select, and condensate large 
amount of information
•Lack of the big picture
•Knowledge gap between client and consultants create 
relational tensions 
•Counterproductive group dynamics between various 
contact people of a client
•Responsibilities and functions between various contact 
people of a client are not clear 
•Client is not familiar with another perspective and approach on 
things (e.g. procedural thinking). Risk to rigidly impose own 
perspective
• orientation on practice vs. orientation on theory and 
method 
• orientation on isolated aspects vs. overall perspective
• orientation on quick fixes vs. comprehensive, integrated 
solutions
•Difficulty to estimate knowledge of addressee and to adapt to it
•Misunderstandings of terms arise because of diverging 
backgrounds and perspectives,  but remain hidden until late in 
the process
•Client is reluctant to change 
•Client is better informed and often has contrary information at 
disposition
•Time pressure
•Client is not motivated to take on time and effort required 
for the development & implementation of a new solution
•History of previous, unsuccessful undertakings and 
projects
Challenges Practices
Group
Dynamics
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imposed from outside), and to have the necessary alliances and commitment to 
implement certain solutions. All these are preconditions for an effective knowl-
edge communication. Bettina Buser outlines: “One of the most important con-
ditions for a well functioning knowledge transfer between the consultant and 
the client is really that it works well on an interpersonal level”85. 
− Method as 
mediating and 
integrating arte-
fact 
 
A second important particularity of pom+’s communication is what type of 
knowledge they communicate and how they do communicate it. Rather than 
conveying purely domain specific insights and market knowledge, pom+ believes 
to communicate, in the first hand, methodological knowledge. Such knowledge 
includes, for example, approaches how to manage processes in order to guaran-
tee their quality or how to proceed in front of a facility management challenge, 
i.e. how to move from the analysis of the problem to the development of the 
solution, and to its application. We have shown that the communication of this 
methodological knowledge is particularly challenging because it implies different 
ways of thinking about issues and different ways of approaching them (see: 
Challenges Related to the Mental Models). At the same time, pom+ considers it 
to be more important to counsel the client in the method how to approach a 
facility or construction management issue, rather than proposing time the final 
solution for their current facility management problem.  
From pom+’s standpoint, having a clear methodological approach is impor-
tant for the client to understand the objective of a project and to see the way 
that leads to this objective.  
“In the beginning, we always try to outline the method and show the client where he finds 
himself in the journey. It is not always easy to have everybody in the boat. One has to say: 
‘trust us, it will turn out fine, now we are here. We need this element because we need to 
do this and that later on’”86 (G. Bilotta). 
We have outlined that pom+’s methodological approach also permits to sys-
tematically use the client as a source of knowledge, to structure the information 
he/she provides and to play it back in this more systematic form. “There exists a 
lot of internal knowledge already. In part, it is only a matter of opening up a 
                                                 
85 „Eine wichtige Bedingung für einen gut funktionierenden Wissenstransfer zwischen dem Berater und dem Kun-
den ist wirklich, dass es auf der zwischenmenschlichen Ebene gut funktioniert.“  
86 „Wir versuchen zuerst immer, die Methodik aufzuzeigen und dem Kunden aufzumalen, wo er sich auf dem Weg 
befindet. Es ist nicht immer einfach, alle gleich im Boot zu haben. Man muss sagen: ‚Vertrauen, es kommt gut, 
wir sind jetzt da. Wir brauchen dieses Element, weil wir später doch dies und das machen müssen.’“ 
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problem and better structuring the knowledge”87 (B. Buser). In this way, the 
strong focus on the method permits pom+ to solicit already existing knowledge, 
to make it more explicit, and to integrate it along a theoretical framework. It is 
a structure that permits to collect, reorganize and combine already existing, but 
diffuse and often more tacit knowledge. In this way, the method serves as an 
integrating artefact88. It has an integrating function because it allows the con-
sultants to elicit the client’s knowledge that is embedded in practice, it structures 
this knowledge and combines it with more abstract and theoretical knowledge 
of the consultant. From the perspective of the client, the method provides a 
structure into which he/she can model his problems. The method provides a 
shared platform thanks to which the consultant can grasp the clients’ practices 
and concerns and the client, on his side, sees a direct application in his context 
of the consultants’ ideas and knowledge.  
Next to the various advantages of the use of a clear methodological ap-
proach, we have also outlined that a too rigid imposition of a methodological 
approach causes various difficulties.  
“I hadn’t understood the client. I had started in a too complex, too difficult way. (..) With 
the method I did not hit exactly what the client actually wanted. (..) Maybe, I came too 
quickly with our method, without exactly knowing his requirements. He might have been 
a person who preferred to approach the issue from a pragmatic and not a theoretical view-
point. (..) As a consultant, you must be flexible enough and present a method as a proposi-
tion and leave room for other possibilities”89 (R. Baumann). 
It remains a difficult balancing challenge to know how strictly one has to 
impose the methodological approach, since getting rid completely of the meth-
odological structure would quickly lead to a chaotic situation, in which the cli-
                                                 
87 „Es ist ja schon so viel internes Wissen vorhanden. Zum Teil fehlt es einfach nur, einen Knopf zu lösen und das 
Wissen besser zu strukturieren.“ 
88 Carlile and Star see methods as a boundary object (objects that are shared and sharable across different problem 
solving contexts), which allows for the integration of knowledge across knowledge boundaries, such as across 
the differing knowledge of consultants and clients (Carlile, 2002; Star, 1989). 
89 „Ich hatte den Kunden nicht begriffen. Ich hatte für ihn zu komplex, zu schwierig angefangen. (..) Ich traf von 
der Methode her nicht genau das, was er eigentlich wollte. Gleichzeitig stimmte es auch nicht von der Chemie 
her. Vielleicht kam ich auch zu schnell mit unserer Methode, ohne seine Anforderungen genau zu erkennen. Er 
war vielleicht eine Person, die eine Sache eher pragmatisch und nicht theoretisch angehen möchte. (..) Als Bera-
ter müsste man so flexibel sein und eine Methode als Vorschlag zu präsentieren und andere Möglichkeiten offen 
zu lassen.“ 
90 „Ich beginne nicht damit, jemandem Methoden aufzudrücken und verwende sie nur im Hintergrund, um das 
Wichtige zu Erfahren. (..) Man braucht ein Vorgehen auch, damit der Kunde weiss, wohin die Reise hingeht. (..) 
Ich lasse die Leute zuerst einmal reden und stelle ihnen Fragen. Der Nachteil an diesem Vorgehen ist vielleicht, 
dass es viel Zeit braucht. Es ist aber auch vertrauensbildend, dass man zuhört, dass man sie versteht.“ 
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ent would loose any sense of orientation.  
“I do not start by imprinting someone certain methods. I use them only in the background, 
to get to know what is important. (..) One needs an approach also so that the client knows 
the aim of the journey. (..) I first let the people talk and ask some questions. The disadvan-
tage of this approach is that it needs a lot of time. But it also creates the trust that one lis-
tens and tries to understand“90 (C. Kaufmann).  
In this way, operating with a clear methodological approach often implies 
additional work and more time requirements, and pom+ needs to convince the 
clients of its advantages and use and has to motivate then to invest the extra 
time. Next to the mentioned advantages of soliciting knowledge, giving struc-
ture, creating trust and signaling expertise, educating the client on a method 
and approach also brings the advantage for the client that he/she can apply the 
same method in other instances and contexts in the future.  
− Face-to-face 
interaction for 
building trust, 
eliciting knowl-
edge, switching 
perspectives, 
and creating 
shared under-
standings 
 
Functions: 
− to build a suf-
ficient com-
mon ground 
(e.g. identify 
with the 
thinking of 
the vis-à-vis ) 
and avoid 
mis-
understand-
ings  
− to elicit and 
structure 
knowledge 
− to reduce re-
sistances to 
A final central characteristic of pom+’s knowledge intensive communication 
is the emphasis on face-to-face formats (i.e. meetings, oral presentations). 
Throughout the description of the communication phases, we have worked out 
the various functions that can be attributed to the face-to-face communication. 
First, in the beginning of projects, it is important to signal a collaborative work-
ing mode and to avoid misunderstandings. The interactive mode communicates 
to the client that the consultant does not intend to superimpose his already-
made solution, but is interested in developing a solution in a collaborative way. 
In fact, pom+ sees its clients as the most valuable source of knowledge. By en-
gaging in interactive means of communication and participating in the client’s 
work environment, pom+’s consultants try to understand the clients’ preferences 
and convictions, to document the client’s experiences and to elicit knowledge
that is embedded in the practices of the client. By doing so, the client has the 
feeling that the final solution is, at least in part, his idea and therefore develops 
fewer resistances to implement them. Another advantage of engaging in interac-
tive means of communication is that the communicators have the possibility to 
rephrase what one has understood, to ambient ones message in the specific con-
text of the addressee and therewith to develop a shared understanding. Spending 
time together, grasping a lot of non-verbal cues, being exposed to the other’s 
thinking, and getting to know each other on a more personal basis, these are all 
important elements for establishing a common ground sufficient for creating a 
shared understanding between the consultant and the client. The common 
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change 
− to establish a 
trustful, ami-
cable rela-
tionship and 
partnership 
− in situation of 
crisis, to clar-
ify issues and 
to manifest 
your com-
mitment 
 
ground implies aspects as being able to put oneself in the position of the other 
party, to understand his/her preoccupations, and the reasons of one’s thinking. 
We have further shown that the stress on face to face conversations allows for 
building up a trustful and amicable relationship. We mentioned that trust is 
especially important when one has to externalize tacit knowledge, when one has 
to find words for what is cloudy and not well defined, when something is com-
plex, and when one has to explain something he/she feels embarrassed about 
(e.g. admitting errors). Finally, in situations of crisis, the physical presence is 
important to show commitment and to clarify issues.  
“The moments of crisis of a project are those instances that can have large consequences. 
Here, the personal contact, being present on the spot, and being knowledgeable how to 
communicate are really central”91  (R. Becht).   
In summary, the case on pom+ has put some light on how consultants spe-
cialized in the real estate, construction, and facility management sector commu-
nicate their expertise and insights to their clients. We particularly focused on the 
challenges that make this communication a difficult one and we showed which 
practices this particular consultancy has in place to overcome at least some of 
these challenges. Most characteristic for pom+ is that it uses the method as a 
mediating and integrating artefact, that it engages in an active collaboration and 
partnership with the client (rather than sporadic, formal interactions), and that 
it therefore focuses on interactive, face-to-face modes of communication. In 
doing so, pom+ aims with all means to establish a sufficient common ground 
among them and the client, which includes not simply a shared understanding of 
terms, but an appreciation and understanding of the reciprocal perspectives, as 
well as aligned objectives. With this, pom+ also aims to overcome many barriers 
to change and to assure a sufficient commitment by the client. pom+ does not 
view the knowledge communication as being unilateral; rather, knowledge inte-
gration takes place in both ways. The solution that, at the end, is more likely to 
be implemented cannot be anything else than the integration of the methodo-
logical, theoretically informed knowledge of the consultant with the concrete, 
specific, every-day experiences of the client. 
 
                                                 
91 „In Krisensituationen sind diejenigen Momente des Projekts, die sehr schwierig sind und grosse Konsequenzen 
haben können. Hier ist der persönliche Kontakt, das Präsent-Sein vor Ort und das Kommunikationswissen aus-
schlaggebend.“  
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List of Interviewees for pom+ Case  
(1) Interview with Sarah Amsler, dipl. Betriebsökonomin FH in Facility Management, consultant at 
pom+, Zürich, March 29, 2004 
(2) Interview with Roger Baumann, former senior consultat at pom+, Zürich, March 30, 2004 
(3) Interview with Ralf Becht, consultat at pom+, Zürich, March 29, 2004 
(4) Interview with Giuseppe Bilotta, member of the executive board of pom+, Zürich, March 29, 2004 
(5) Interview with Bettina Buser, consultat at pom+, Zürich, March 30, 2004 
(6) Interview with Stefan Jäggi, Dr. sc. techn., dipl. Ing. ETH, Senior Consultant at pom+, March 29, 
2004 
(7) Interview with Christian Kaufmann, former senior consultat at pom+, Zürich, March 30, 2004 
(8) Interview with Natasha Merkt, architect ETH and consultat at pom+, Zürich, March 30, 2004 
(9) Interview with Andreas Pesenti, architect ETH and consultat at pom+, Zürich, March 30, 2004 
(10) Interview with Lukas Schärer, dipl. Ing. ETH, senior consultant and Executive Master of Services 
Marketing at pom+, Zürich, March 29, 2004 
Appendix 101 
 
 
Appendix 5 
Case #3: The Knowledge Communication between IT-
specialists and Business Managers (InSure) 
Overview 
on the 
InSure 
In this case study, we analyze, in the context of the insurance company In-
Sure92, how the knowledge-intensive communication between the company in-
ternal IT-experts and the managers of the business line unfolds. Aim of their 
interactions is to take informed decisions with regard to changes and develop-
ments of IT-applications, which support insurance officials in their daily work.  
InSure is part of one of the leading financial services companies worldwide. 
It employs around 20’000 employees and has a business volume of CHF 30 bil-
lion. The group is active in Europe, North America, and Asia. It has close to 15 
million clients worldwide, which are composed both of private individuals and 
small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Activities are divided into two main units: The smaller Non-Life segment 
and the more important Life & Pensions segment. The Non-Life segment offers 
insurance products that cover the range of health and accident insurance, motor 
vehicle, property, fire, and general liability insurance. The Life & Pensions seg-
ment offers 1) retirement pension and saving solutions (voluntary & mandatory), 
2) life and disability insurance and 3) investment products.  
The IT department encloses three application development units (one for the 
Life segment, the other for the Non-Life segment, and the third “Common Ap-
plications” deals with applications that are general and cannot be allocated to 
one segment). Another part of the IT deals with the infrastructure and provides 
and manages all physical IT means. Finally, there is an area called “Management 
Support”, which deals with typical staff functions like strategy development. In 
total, the IT department engages 200 people and relies also on close to 50 exter-
nal specialists. 
The IT section Life & Pensions Applications (which constitutes the narrower 
context or this investigation) is responsible for the development of applications 
                                                 
92 For privacy reasons, we omit the name of the corporation, as well as the characteristics that make its identifica-
tion definite. 
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for the business in Switzerland. 70 people work in this department. As Figure 23 
outlines, it is structured in four sectors: Individual Life Applications, Group Life 
Applications, Channel Applications, and Business Support Applications. Each 
sector engages between 15 and 25 employees and is made of various develop-
ment teams, each of a size of around five IT specialists. 
 
 
 
 
The Expert 
– Decision 
Maker 
Situation 
Triplet: 
− IT techni-
cians (ex-
perts) 
− IT managers 
(experts and 
decision 
makers ac-
cordingly) 
− Business line 
managers 
(decision 
makers) 
 
The knowledge communication of this case deals with the communication 
around decisions that concern the development and remodeling of IT applications 
and IT systems. These IT applications have to be developed or changed in order to
better support business workflows and processes such as, among many others,
compiling offers, managing customer information, consulting clients, managing
remunerations, calculating risks, verifying costumer claims, handling the back-
office tasks, or analyzing and reporting financial numbers to the CFO. Since the IT
applications define the working mode of the whole business line, such decisions 
can have considerable implications. The issues of these decisions are mostly com-
plex since one IT-application is highly connected to the whole IT system. “We
cannot position a new application on a virgin meadow. We have an existing sys-
tem with a plurality of applications that are working. With the new application, 
we must be most certain not to endanger the fully running production”93. In order 
to take knowledgeable decisions on these issues, the communication takes place 
not merely among a duplet, but a triplet of experts and decision makers. In fact, 
the expert – decision maker situation exists first between the IT technicians and
the IT management and second between the IT (both technicians and managers) 
and the business line managers.  
The IT technicians have a variety of professional backgrounds (e.g. teachers, 
electricians, etc.) and most of them completed, in addition, the informatics school 
internal to the organization. They do the actual programming of the software 
                                                 
93 „Wir können nicht einfach eine neue Applikation auf eine grüne Wiese positionieren. Wir haben ein bestehendes 
System mit vielen Applikationen, die laufen. Wir kommen von der Seite und wollen was Neues reinstellen, müs-
sen aber sicherstellen, dass damit die Produktion, die voll am laufen ist, nicht gefährden.“ 
Figure 23: Organization of the IT Department Life & Pensions Ap-
plications: 4 Main Sectors 
Life & Pensions
Applications
Individual Life
Applications
Group Life
Applications
Channel
Applications
Business Support
Applications
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applications, have clearly defined tasks and know for each task who is the contact 
person from the business.  
The IT managers mostly have a master in informatics or in related topics 
such as electrical engineering and many of them completed a postgraduate in 
management sciences as, for example, an executive MBA. The IT managers desig-
nate the employees who work as leaders of IT development teams, of IT sectors, 
and of the entire IT department. Each team leader is responsible for the manage-
ment of four to five IT technicians, for the general coordination with the business 
and with that also for the smooth passage from the business concept to the tech-
nical concept. Section leaders deal with the large lines of projects, worry mainly 
about the allocation of resources (time, personnel, etc.), and are determinant for 
the yearly planning of the larger IT projects, which is decided mainly in the steer-
ing committee. Four to five team leaders directly report to the sector leader. Sector 
leaders interact with the managers on the business side, which are mostly part of 
the executive board. Such interactions take place both in formal (the monthly 
steering committee) and informal (ad-hoc meetings) formats.  
The business line managers, finally, are the team managers, project managers, 
up to members of the executive board of the business line of the market unit Swit-
zerland. They are specialized in business, finance, and insurance issues and con-
duct the daily activities of an insurance corporation.  
The IT technicians are in the role of executing (programming the applica-
tions) and of counselling both the IT managers and business line mangers. The IT 
field is very heterogeneous and rapidly changing and each IT technician brings in 
his/her specific expertise on technologies and IT approaches and the IT manager 
needs to rely on this specialized knowledge in the design or architecture decisions 
at issue, as mentions one section leader:  
“Since I am a career changer and my co-workers have more knowledge than me, the ques-
tion is more of how to bring about a decision (rather than deciding myself). My job is to 
bring together the various aspects and to find a decision jointly”94.  
The IT managers such as the IT team leaders or sector leaders, on their hand, have
                                                 
94 „Da ich eigentlich ein Quereinsteiger bin und die Mitarbeiter ein grösseres Wissen haben, ist es viel mehr eine 
Frage, einen Entscheid herbeizuführen. Ich muss es zusammentragen und dann finden wir den Entscheid zu-
sammen.“ 
95 “Ein Grossteil der Entscheide sind Businessentscheide, wo ich einfach die Grundlagen für die Entscheide liefere.“ 
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to counsel the business line managers in their decisions which technological solu-
tion can best meet their business requirements. As such, the case represents the 
classical expert – decision maker situation where „a big part of the decisions are 
business decisions and I [the IT manager] can only provide a basis for the deci-
sions”95 as mentions the leader of the IT application department. 
 
Catalysts for 
the Knowledge 
Communica-
tion 
a) Short term 
requests from 
business line 
b) Larger projects 
derive from 
business strategy 
and are defined 
mid-term in IT 
strategy  
c) Projects that 
grow internally of 
IT department as 
a result of tech-
nological devel-
opment 
There are basically three ways how the decision situation upon the devel-
opment or modification of an application comes about.  
First, it can be a request from the business line and be initiated by a change 
in the law or by wishes from the business line regarding the automation of a 
process that has been carried out manually until today. Such a request can be 
rather short term and small or have a mid-time horizon and involve a pretty big 
project. The business collects every month a list of such requests regarding 
smaller changes. Mid-term and bigger projects are planned in the yearly steering 
committee where the IT-strategy is defined. The business can communicate its 
wishes and visions and the IT-strategy is aligned to the business strategy. Yet, the 
IT is not passively waiting for input, but proactively proposes themes.  
“It is not a classical relation where the business says what we (from the IT) have to do. Of-
ten I see myself where a change is needed. For example, regarding the BVG revision [the 
changes in the Swiss law on retirement, beneficiary, and invalidity provision], I address the 
business upfront and say that we should deal with this issue and define who takes over 
which responsibilities”96 (IT sector leader).  
Next to the projects that are commissioned short-term or mid-term by the 
business, there are projects that grow internally of the IT. For example, there can 
be a need to migrate an old system or to do the upgrade to the newest Windows 
edition or to mend an error that someone tracked in the system. These IT-
internal projects are rather rare and normally, the business line is the main con-
tractor of IT projects.  
Depending on the type of requests, the process how knowledge is communi-
cated and integrated slightly differs. It is most articulate and structured for big-
ger projects and change requests, which arise in the business and become either 
                                                 
96 „Es ist kein klassisches Verhältnis wo das Business sagt, was wir machen müssen. Ich sehe oft selber, wo Bedarf 
besteht und kann darauf hinweisen. Bei der BVG Revision beispielsweise, da gehe ich auf das Business zu und 
sage, das kommt jetzt, kümmert ihr euch drum oder wer macht da etwas.“ 
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part of the mid-term planning of the IT unit or are articulated as bigger projects 
during the year. For smaller projects, the process of knowledge communication is 
less formalized and articulate.  
The Knowl-
edge Com-
munication 
Process be-
tween Ex-
perts and 
Decision 
Makers and 
its Main 
Challenges 
and Prac-
tices 
In the following, we will describe the knowledge communication between IT 
experts and the decision makers on the business side. We will use the conceptual 
structure of the knowledge communication process model presented in Chapter 2 
for structuring the description of the actual case. We will see whether the actual 
case fits into the general phase model for knowledge communication, which 
weight the various phases carry, and how they and the feedback-loops are con-
figured.  
An IT manager describes the overall process of the carrying out of an IT-
project and the interaction between the IT and the business side as follows:  
“In my view, there is first a phase of analysis, then one of procurement, then of transfer, 
and finally one of application. In the phase of analysis, one first has to understand, what 
the project is about. Then, we have to comprehend where to make decisions and where 
knowledge deficits exist. If those exist, we move to the procurement phase where one tries 
to acquire the lacking knowledge. Then one elaborates and organizes the knowledge follow-
ing the organizational functions. Finally, the knowledge transfer and the integration of the 
singular pieces of knowledge into a whole.”97 
 In comparison with the theoretical process we have proposed, this manager 
identifies similar phases, even though in a different order: A phase of analysis, 
one of the procurement of the necessary expertise (we call it identification), one 
of transfer and integration into the actual decision (we call it conveying insights, 
solutions, and suggestions). Yet, as we have claimed in Chapter 2, the knowledge 
communication process has various feedback loops (e.g. from analysis to identifi-
cation) and does not necessarily need to start with the identification of experts 
and expertise. 
Discrepancy 
Between the 
Planned and 
Before describing the process of interaction between the IT-experts and the 
decision makers on the business side in more detail, we would like to pinpoint to 
                                                 
97 „Für mich gibt es eine Analysephase, dann eine Beschaffungsphase, dann eine Transferphase und dann schliess-
lich eine Anwendungsphase. In der Analysephase geht es zuerst einmal darum zu verstehen, worum es sich beim 
Projekt dreht. Wo muss man überhaupt einen Entscheid fällen? Man muss verstehen, wo Wissensdefizite beste-
hen. Falls solche Wissensdefizite bestehen, kommen wir in die Beschaffungsphase, d.h. man versucht, das feh-
lende Wissen zu beschaffen. Dann braucht es ein stufengerechtes Aufbereiten und Organisieren von Wissen. 
Schliesslich kommt der Wissenstransfer. Und schliesslich das Abrufen vom Wissen, das heisst die Integration 
von dem einzelnen Wissen zu einem Ganzen.“  
Appendix 106 
 
 
Carried-out 
Knowledge 
Communication 
Process 
 
one limitation of this process description. There is some discrepancy between the 
way the process is planned and how it is actually carried out. This is mainly due 
to the recent development towards a stronger formalization of the processes for 
that the well-established routines and informal processes have to be replaced by 
the newer formal processes. Especially for the smaller projects (Figure 24), which 
are planned and conducted in a pretty short timeframe processes are still more 
characterized by the informal rather than the formal processes. One IT technician 
mentions in this regard: 
“With the exception of larger projects, there are not many formal processes. The mandate, 
for example, can arrive in many possible ways, orally, written. (..) In effect, we have never 
worked with business concepts, which actually would be necessary to implement something 
correctly. I have to do a resource planning and I can do this well only if I exactly know the 
requirements from the business. Otherwise, it remains too vague”98. 
The result of the poor formalization of the process of how the business line 
communicates its need to the IT and how the IT translates it to formal require-
ments, has repeatedly led to unsatisfactory results such as delays or misunder-
standings that were discovered only late in the process. 
“Over and over again, we were confronted with the fact, that we had received an assign-
ment from the business and the IT-technician took it as such and started to process it the 
way he had understood it. He then tested it and sent it to the production. As a result, the 
people from the business line were exasperated and said: ‘No, only in this one particular 
case, we want it this way. For all the other cases, we want it completely differently.’ We had 
too many mistakes and misunderstandings”99.  
Out of these experiences, the IT application unit - in collaboration with the 
business - started to define more formal processes. They were quite rigorously 
implemented for larger projects, but less so for the smaller, short-term projects. 
Overall Charac-
teristics of the 
Figure 24 and Figure 25 show the knowledge communication processes be-
tween the IT technicians, the IT managers, and the business line managers as they 
                                                 
98 „Mit Ausnahme von grösseren Projekten gibt es hier nicht viele formelle Prozesse. Zum Beispiel, wie der Auftrag 
reinkommt, das kann in ganz verschiedenen Formen sein, das kann mündlich sein, schriftlich. (..) Wir haben ei-
gentlich noch nie mit Fachkonzepten gearbeitet, die eigentlich notwendig wären, um die fachlichen Kenntnisse 
zu besitzen, um etwas korrekt umsetzen zu können. Ich muss ja dann auch noch eine Ressourcenplanung ma-
chen und eine solche kann man eigentlich nur gut machen, wenn man die Fachanforderungen kennt. Sonst 
bleibt sie einfach vage.“ 
99 “Es hat sich immer wieder gezeigt, dass wir einen Auftrag vom Business bekommen haben, der Informatiker 
diesen entgegen genommen hat und ihn so bearbeitet hat, wie er ihn verstanden hat. Dann hat er ihn getestet 
und in die Produktion gegeben. Der Fachbereich hat dann die Hände verworfen und gemeint: ‚Ja nein, nur in 
dem einen Fall möchten wir es so, nicht in dem anderen, dort möchten wir es ganz anders.’ Fehler und Missver-
ständnisquote war zu hoch.“ 
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Knowledge 
Communication 
Process: 
• The phases 
‘articulate 
need’ and ‘con-
vey insights, 
suggestions, & 
solutions’ carry 
most weight 
• Repeated 
refinement cy-
cle between 
the phases 
‘analyze prob-
lem’ and ‘con-
vey insights, 
suggestions, & 
solutions’ 
• Larger projects 
have slightly 
more articu-
lated processes 
for phases ‘ar-
ticulate need , 
‘analyze prob-
lem’, and ‘con-
vey insights, 
suggestions, & 
solutions’ 
 
 
are formally planned for smaller and for larger IT application projects. Overall, 
the figures show, first, that the IT and the business departments of InSure allo-
cate much attention to the second (‘articulate need’) and fifth phase (‘apply & 
implement insights & solutions’). Second, there is an important refinement cycle 
designed into the process for a clearer and more specific articulation of the need. 
Third, the small and large projects differ with regard to the phases ‘articulate 
need’, ‘analyze problem’, and ‘convey insights, suggestions, and solutions’. These 
three phases are more articulated for the larger mid-term projects.  
In the following, we outline very briefly the characteristics for smaller pro-
jects and will then describe in more detail the knowledge communication process 
for larger IT projects.  
For smaller projects, the process is planned in the following way. The vari-
ous sections and teams of the business line have clearly defined contact people of 
the IT application department (point 1 in Figure 24). Each section of the busi-
ness continuously collects their modification wishes. With the help of an account 
system, they describe each request briefly and send this list to their respective IT 
team (point 2). The IT specialists do a rough resource estimation (time required, 
number of programmers, additional costs, etc.) for each request (point 3). Since 
the total amount of requests usually surmount the available resources, the busi-
ness team does, on this basis of the first estimation of the IT, a prioritization of 
its modification requests (point 4). Then, members of the IT team and of the 
business team meet and the various requests are discussed. Next to these meet-
ings where all applications are discussed jointly, bilateral meetings between the 
two team leaders are necessary and each single request has to be discussed in 
detail (point 5). On the basis of these discussions, the IT team can write down 
the technical requirements (point 6). Sometimes, with this written document at 
hand, the business refines its request and further discussions are necessary (go 
back to point 5, several such feedback cycles (arrow ‘e’) are possible). Once the 
two parties have established a shared understanding, they sign a scope contract, 
where they clearly circumscribe the parameters of the solution to implement and 
define the needed resources in terms of time and personnel (point 7). The task is 
then subdivided in clear chunks of work and assigned to the programmers who 
start to develop the application. In this phase, the interaction with the business is 
less intense, only if the programmer does not understand a requirement, he/she 
will address his/her interaction partner from the business side (point 8). Some-
times, with the development ongoing, the original request can be changed 
Appendix 108 
 
 
slightly through formal modification requests (point 9). The people from the 
business realize that they would like some aspects to be resolved differently or 
the IT specialists recognize that a solution technically can not be conducted in 
the envisioned way. Once the application is developed, the IT tracks possible 
errors and then sends the reviewed version to the business, which also checks for 
errors. Both parties define which final changes still need to be done (point 10). 
At last, the application is implemented into the existing IT system (point 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 For larger IT application projects, the knowledge communication process is 
characterized as shown in Figure 25. In the following, we will describe it phase 
by phase. 
Figure 24: The Knowledge Communication Process for Smaller Changes and Developments 
in IT Applications as It Is Formally Planned 
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Develop Possible
Courses of Action
Convey Insights, 
Suggestions, 
& Solutions
Apply & 
Implement 
Insights & Solutions
2.Each month, business 
line collects 
modification wishes, 
describes and defines 
them and then sends 
them to IT unit
4.Business line prioritizes 
its requests and sends 
IT its final list
5.Bilateral talks between 
IT team leader and 
contact person of 
business line to discuss 
each modification 
request in-depth
7.Scope contract: a 
written and signed 
document, which 
defines the solution to 
implement, the costs 
involved, as well as the 
times of delivery
1.Role of experts and 
decision makers and 
reciprocal interaction 
partners are 
institutionally defined: 
the various teams of 
IT experts of IT Life & 
Pensions Applications 
unit are designated to 
specific areas in the 
business 
3.IT estimates time 
effort for each request
6.IT specialists 
elaborate and 
document technical 
requirements and 
verify them with 
business
8.Develop application: 
Limited interaction 
between business and 
IT, mainly to clarify 
emerging questions
9.Possible modification 
requests both from 
business and from IT
10.System test (by IT) 
and user-acceptance 
test (by business) to 
track the errors of the 
application and to 
define the final 
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11.Release and 
implementation of the 
application in existing 
soft- and hardware 
structure
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Identify Ex-
perts and Ex-
pertise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics: 
• Experts and 
decision mak-
ers are institu-
tionally defined 
• Phase is of low 
importance 
The identification of the relevant experts and expertise (see: Figure 26) is 
not extremely critical or challenging in the context of this case. Expertise is in-
house and contact partners are defined by the organizational structure and the 
formal processes. Along the different levels of the hierarchy, business line man-
agers have clearly designated contact people on the IT side and IT experts also 
know very well who to contact when they need information on the business 
Figure 25: The Knowledge Integration Process for Larger Changes and Developments in  
IT Applications as it Is Formally Planned 
Figure 26: The ‘Identify Experts and Expertise’-phase 
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Challenges: 
− Identify infor-
mal experts 
and grey emi-
nences within 
the large or-
ganizational 
context 
− Deal with 
relational ten-
sions that arise 
due to the in-
clusion of ex-
ternal experts 
 
issues (point 1, Figure 25). Even if these contact people are formally defined, 
because of the size of the organization, it is not always obvious – especially for 
newcomers - to discover who is the responsible of a certain function or task. 
Next to the formally defined functions and designated interaction partners be-
tween the business and the IT, informal networks within the organization are 
important for the inclusion of single internal experts into projects (e.g. IT archi-
tects) (point 2, Figure 25). “When the business writes a business concept for the 
IT department, they often call me because they know that I have worked on 
many similar projects and that I know their processes pretty well”100. Informal 
networks are important also to know the people who have a lot of informal 
power and who can impact on decisions quite substantively: “Sometimes, the 
one right or left to the decision maker knows more than he himself and you 
would have to try to influence these people. It is often as you know, knowledge 
is power“101. 
External experts play a certain role in the development of new IT applica-
tion systems (point 3, Figure 25). Such experts can be temporarily needed for 
their specialized expertise regarding a particular application, a programming 
language, etc. To a smaller extent, the IT department also relies on external 
business consultants. Yet, in the last years, their role has diminished in view of 
tighter financial resources and the obtained results that were not always optimal 
as states one IT expert:  
“For some time, our management acquired the intelligence and know-how from outside, 
from Gartner Group or McKinsey. (..) Sometimes, it would have been better to rely on ex-
isting systems and internal people. In these occasions, the communication did not work 
very well between the people from the strategy and those who have some knowledge of the 
daily business and the system”102. 
By drawing on external experts, the organization risks not to utilize existing 
internal knowledge at its best. It seems that the external experts are sometimes
viewed as threats to the existing organizational reality and can create a problem-
                                                 
100 “Deswegen kommt der Fachbereich auch auf mich zu. Sie erstellen ein Fachkonzept und holen mich, weil sie 
wissen, dass ich schon in vielen Projekten mitgearbeitet habe und mich in den Prozessen sehr gut auskenne.“ 
101 „Manchmal weiss der links und rechts mehr als der eigentliche Entscheidungsträger und man müsste diesen 
stärker bearbeiten. Sie kennen ja den Ausspruch, Wissen ist Macht.“ 
102 „Eine Zeit lang holte unser Management die Intelligenz und das Know-how von aussen, von Gartner Group 
und McKinsey. (..) Es wäre besser gewesen, man hätte mehr auf das bestehende System und die internen Leute 
geschaut. Dort hat die Kommunikation nicht gut funktioniert zwischen denen, die ein bisschen eine Ahnung ha-
ben vom Tagesgeschäft und vom System und dem Strategiebereich.“ 
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atic context for sharing and integrating knowledge. 
 
Practice in the 
Phase ‘Identify 
Experts & Exper-
tise’: 
− Open the 
informal com-
munication 
channels to a 
new employee  
In view of the importance of informal networks in order to assure the fluid-
ity of the knowledge communication and the integration of expertise in decision 
making, one practice is that the direct superior opens a lot of formal and infor-
mal communication channels for his/her employee.  
“I try, for example, to introduce each employee, who receives a new role, to the people 
from the business line so that he gets to know at least the 10 most important people from 
the business”103. 
 
Articulate 
Need: Defini-
tion of a Pro-
ject’s Parame-
ters 
Entanglement 
with  the two 
following phases 
(‘Analyze  Issue’, 
‘Convey Insights, 
Suggestions, & 
Solutions’) 
 
Former Chal-
lenges: 
• Unnoticed 
misunder-
standings of 
(parts of) busi-
ness request 
due to formerly 
loose articula-
tion of this 
phase 
Once the relevant experts and expertise are identified, the business line man-
agers outline the problem they are facing and for which solution they need the 
expertise and skills of the IT experts (see Figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
The people from the business cannot articulate their need and define their 
requirements clear enough if they just communicate them in a written document 
or call the responsible IT team by phone. Prior experience showed that the loose 
articulation and formalization of this second phase in the process led to too 
many misunderstandings.  
“I remember, for example, the case of the tax announcements. The business wanted to 
change the moment when a tax announcement had to be written. In its request, the busi-
ness did not write down one specific aspect, which we then did not take into account when 
changing the application. At the end, the business was not pleased; the tax announcements 
still came in the wrong moments. ‘But why wrong, we did exactly, what you had said’. 
‘Well no, this is true not only for these cases, but you would have to see that globally.’ 
Then, as an urgency measure, we had to undo the changes, sit together and elaborate a very 
clear and explicit change request”104. 
                                                 
103 “Ich versuche z.B. jeden Mitarbeiter, der in eine neue Rolle kommt, möglichst rasch mit den Leuten auf der 
Businessseite in Kontakt zu bringen, so dass er mindestens die 10 wichtigsten Leute im Business kennen lernt.“ 
Figure 27:  The ‘Articulate Need & Define Project's Parameters’-phase 
Identify Experts
& Expertise
Articulate Need
Analyze Issue &
Develop Possible
Courses of Action
Convey
Insights, 
Suggestions, 
& Solutions
Apply & 
Implement
Insights & 
Solutions
b
e
f
g
h
A C D E
Appendix 112 
 
 
This example shows that the misunderstandings that happened in this phase 
were often uncovered only much later in the process (when the changed applica-
tion is already implemented in the system) and can therefore be very costly. Pro-
ject delays and ineffective work are the result.  
 
 
For this reason, the IT managers have started to give a lot of weight to this 
second phase of the need articulation. Most of all, they realized that they had to 
actively involve the decision makers from early on in the project.  
“We try to more actively engage the client from the beginning. The business has to tell us 
clearly what they want from us and, of course, we help it in this process. This process is 
sometimes difficult, also because the trees cannot grow into the sky. (..) We want to avoid 
that the client can come in the middle of the project and say: ‘Oh, I now want it another 
way’”105.  
The decision makers from the business line need to understand the impor-
tance of this second phase in the process and the responsibility they have in it. 
Therefore, the IT unit tries to involve the decision makers by organizing various 
face-to-face meetings between the two parties (point 4, Figure 25).  
“We usually start the project with a series of workshops. We try to define the business 
process. Usually with the help of existing process descriptions and conjointly with the 
business, we start to document, what exactly is done at which moment and how”106.  
Thanks to these face-to-face encounters it is possible for the business line 
managers and the IT-specialists to establish a common understanding of what 
the project exactly is about and to define clear project parameters. Another and 
similar mean through which the IT aims to gain a deeper understanding of the 
actual request of the business, is that they conduct interviews with several people 
from the business (point 5). With the notes of the interviews, workshops, and 
meetings at hand, the IT team then helps the people from the business line to 
                                                 
104 „Ich erinnere mich beispielsweise and den Fall mit den Steuermeldungen. Vom Business ist da eine Änderung 
gekommen, wann eine Steuermeldung geschrieben werden muss. In diesem Auftrag hatte das Business eine Än-
derung nicht aufgeschrieben und diese ist dann auch nicht realisiert worden. Dann waren sie zum Schluss nicht 
zufrieden, denn die Steuermeldungen kämen immer noch falsch. Ja wieso falsch, wir haben genau das gemacht, 
was ihr gesagt habt. Ja nein, das gilt eben nicht nur für die, sondern man müsste es gesamthaft sehen. Dann 
mussten wir die Änderung rückgängig machen so als Notfalllösung, wir sassen dann zusammen und erarbeiteten 
einen neuen, klareren und sehr expliziten Änderungsauftrag.“ 
105 „Wir versuchen, den Kunden von Beginn an stärker einzubinden. Das Business muss uns klar sagen, was es von 
uns will. Natürlich helfen wir ihm dabei. Dieser Prozess ist manchmal schwierig, auch weil die Bäume nicht in 
den Himmel wachsen können. (..) Wir wollen verhindern, dass der Kunde inmitten des Projekts kommen kann 
und sagen kann: ‚Ah, ich will es nun doch anders’.“ 
106 „Wir beginnen das Projekt meist mit einer Serie von Workshops. Erstens versuchen wir, den Businessprozess zu 
definieren. Anhand per bestehenden Prozessbeschreibung beginnen wir, in enger Zusammenarbeit mit dem 
Fachbereich, im Detail zu beschreiben, was wann wie genau gemacht wird.“ 
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formulate their written business concept (point 6). The development of the busi-
ness concept is an interactive process between the business and the IT, as states 
one IT-technician: 
“It would be a task of the business to write down the business requirements, but in general, 
they don’t do it in a way we can then translate the requirements to an IT-language and de-
sign. (..) This is why we actually describe what the business exactly wants and then go back 
to the business with this document to verify whether we have understood them correctly. 
(..) Oftentimes, the people from the business only know what they want exactly once it is 
written down. (..) Then we have three or four such interactions until we fully agree with the 
business what they actually want from us”107108. 
 From the learning of prior experiences, the IT-department has developed the 
practice to become a very active part even in the phase of the articulation of the 
need. It helps to solicit the ideas, problems, and wishes of the business by doing 
interviews and engaging in workshops and meetings. The active involvement in 
this phase on behalf of the IT is most extreme in the cases when the IT literally 
writes the business requests for the business. They do so because, although the 
business has difficulties in writing down what they actually need, they can rec-
ognize it once they have seen it109.  
What makes this second phase of the knowledge communication process so 
difficult? Why has the business such a hard time in articulating its needs well and 
precisely enough so that the IT can develop the technical concept and the IT 
application? There are various reasons responsible for this fact. 
 
                                                 
107 „Es ist im Grunde eine Businessaufgabe, die Anforderungen zu formulieren. Das Business macht es aber in der 
Regel nicht so, damit wir es dann umsetzten können in eine IT-Sprache und in ein Design. (..)So beschreiben wir 
eigentlich, was das Business genau will und gehen damit zurück zum Business um sicher zu sein, dass wir das 
Business richtig verstanden haben. Da gibt es so drei, vier Interaktionen, bis man sich mit dem Business einig ist, 
was sie eigentlich genau wollen. (..) Oft kommen die Leute vom Business erst dann darauf, was sie wirklich wol-
len, wenn es einmal niedergeschrieben ist.“  
108The re-elaboration of business requirement documents as technical requirements can be viewed as an exemplifi-
cation of Wenger’s conceptualization of boundary objects and reification processes. Boundary objects such as 
forms, documents, monuments, instruments, etc. can be used as shared objects between groups or individuals to 
coordinate divergent perspectives for some purpose (Star, 1989; Wenger, 1998). In the case of ‚business re-
quirements’ and ‚technical requirements’, it is shown that boundary objects not only serve to connect various 
practices among each other, but that also meanings can be negotiated and shared understandings elaborated. It 
further becomes apparent that transformation processes (Carlile, 2004) sometimes need to be formed around 
various boundary objects in order to turn the transformation explicit. 
109 The difficulty in articulating something, but recognizing it when one sees it (‘I know it when I see it’) is a phe-
nomenon that arises when people have to deal with knowledge with a strong tacit dimension. It is hard to ex-
ternalize tacit knowledge through words, but it is easier to recognize it once we see it. As Weick claims, this dif-
ficulty has to do with the way, we make sense of our actions and the world around us. He refers to Wallas’ sen-
tence ‘How can I know what I think until I see what I say’ to argue that our sense-making process is mainly ret-
rospective and that only after having done or said something, we can actually be more sure of what we think 
(Wallas, 1926: 10; Weick, 1995: 12).  
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Challenges in the 
Need Articulation 
Phase:  
− Difficulty to 
make a specific 
question about 
something of 
which one has 
quite limited 
knowledge  
 
One major aspect of the difficulty is that it is hard for the people from the 
business line to make a precise question on something of which they have no or 
only little knowledge. One IT manager coins this problem very poignantly as 
follows: “Information is something, of which you have yet no knowledge of110. 
And I really can’t pose the right questions on something of which I do not know 
that it exists”111. In other words, the business might be able to phrase very 
roughly the problems or changes they encounter, but has difficulties in articulat-
ing precisely what it needs. One IT manager mentions: “The assignment from the 
business department is quite blurry. They know that they want more or less this 
and that. But they do not know enough to expose on five pages what we need to 
do”112. Similarly, another IT-technician states: “In general, their ideas are quite 
mazy and they just say: ‚Here we need something, there also.. (..)”113. 
In this way, people from the business line who are confronted with a prob-
lem and who recognize that a specific IT-application team can help them to solve 
this problem, they might not be capable to circumscribe neither the problem nor 
its implications precisely. Even less so, they can specify exactly what solution is 
required and adequate to solve the problem114.  
 
 
− Difficulty to 
define general 
rules from eve-
ryday experi-
ence 
Another reason why it is difficult for the business to articulate business re-
quirements is that it has to define general rules on the basis of the daily experi-
ence of single cases. The people from the business line live in their processes, they 
know what to do when, and can recall instances when they had problems with 
                                                 
110 This understanding of information goes along with Bateson’s famous definition of information as a difference 
which makes a difference (Bateson, 1972) and which must always represent a novelty to the person who re-
ceives the piece of information. (Bateson gives the example of a coin that drops in a person’s palm. It is first un-
derstood as information, but with the time being in the palm, stops being news and as such information).  
111 „Information ist ja etwas, was ich noch nicht weiss. Und ich kann ja gar nicht die richtigen Fragen stellen über 
etwas, von dem ich gar nicht weiss, dass es dies gibt.“ 
112 „Der Auftrag des Business ist relativ schwammig. Sie wissen, dass sie vermutlich ungefähr dies und jenes wol-
len. Aber sie wissen zu wenig, um auf fünf Seiten genau darzulegen, was wir spezifisch machen sollen.“ 
113 “Die haben ihre Ideen relativ wirr im Kopf, ‚hier brauchen wir noch etwas und da…’“ 
114 Belkin and his colleagues presented exactly this problem and called it the ASK-Problem (Anamolous State of 
Knowledge), yet in the context of information retrieval systems: “The ASK hypothesis is that an information 
need arises from a recognized anomaly [insufficiency] in the user’s state of knowledge concerning some topic or 
situation and that, in general, the user is unable to specify precisely what is needed to resolve that anomaly” 
(Belkin et al., 1982: 62). The manager from the business line has the difficult task to formulate a precise ques-
tion on something he/she has no knowledge about. He/she can formulate his/her request only with his/her cur-
rent knowledge and this might allow only for a rough and imprecise definition of the problem and the require-
ments for a solution. 
115 „Wir brauchen ein Regelwerk, das dann für sämtliche Steuermeldungen gilt. Der Fachbereich konnte uns das 
nicht liefern. Diese Person war fachlich sehr kompetent. Sie konnte uns für jeden Fall sagen, ob es eine Steuer-
meldung braucht oder nicht. Und ich musste dann daraus ein Regelwerk erstellen. Man muss sehr präzise sein, 
denn der Computer ist dann sehr pingelig.“ 
115  Appendix 5 - Case #3: The Knowledge Communication between IT-specialists and 
Business Managers (InSure) 
 
 the application. Yet, in order to write software, one has to translate the single 
instances into general rules of the type: ‘when X then Y, else Z’. All exceptions 
have to be considered meticulously. This passage from the single instances to the 
general rules is quite challenging as illustrates this quote of an IT-manager:  
“We need a body of rules, which are valid, for example, for all tax announcements. The 
business could not come up with such a general set of rules. My contact person on the 
business side was professionally very competent. She could tell us for each case, if we 
need a tax announcement or not and I then had to do the translation into a body of 
general rules. One has to be very precise because the computer is really nitpicking“115. 
 
 
− Lacking moti-
vation and time 
to engage in a 
detailed defini-
tion of the re-
quest 
A still other aspect to consider is also a motivational one. For the people 
from the business, their main focus is to get their insurance work done, establish 
new contracts, handle claims, etc. For them, the IT-application is merely an in-
strument that supports them in conducting their actual work. “The business 
wears other trousers and has a completely different focus. They don’t care how, 
they just want that we solve them a problem”116. In this way, the business has 
other priorities, lacks time and, at best, would like to delegate the whole resolu-
tion of the problem to the IT, even the often rather tiring process that leads to an 
unambiguous and specific definition of their request. Yet, the IT must insist in a 
well articulated definition of the business requirements.  
 
− Fear of delay 
and eagerness 
to start right 
away 
 
In some occasions, a final aspect might contribute to a diffuse definition of 
the business request. If the general request from the business is very urgent, and 
IT technicians feel pressured to quickly start the project in order to get it done in 
time. They fear delays and are tempted to start from spot even if the assignment 
of the business is not really clear yet. In such occasions, the team leader has the 
important role to provide the people of the team with the necessary security that 
they will not be delayed with the project if they first spend a considerable 
amount of time in defining clearly its parameters, but that quite the contrary is 
the case.  
− Translate 
business lan-
guage into 
technical lan-
A major challenge in the knowledge-intensive communication between the 
IT-specialists and the people from the business line is that they are talking differ-
ent languages.  
                                                 
116 „Der Fachbereich trägt andere Hosen und hat einen ganz anderen Fokus. Denen ist es eigentlich egal wie, sie 
wollen einfach, dass wir ihnen ein Problem lösen.“ 
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guage and vice 
versa 
 
“The difficult part is really the transformation, the language. The language is the cen-
tral point really. The business talks another language than the IT-specialist and the IT-
specialist speaks another language than the IT-management“117.  
This aspect has been mentioned over and over again in the interviews. It 
seems to be a general challenge in the knowledge communication, yet, it is accen-
tuated mainly in the phase, when the business communicates its needs to the IT, 
as illustrates significantly the following quote of an IT-manager: 
“The businessman views the problem at a different level and speaks a different language 
than us. In order to make the communication work, it is our task to understand their 
language. If someone from the business department comes and says: ‘Regarding the pre-
mium reserve for external saving processes in the principality of Lichtenstein, next year, 
you have to give 1 percent of extra interests.’ The typical IT-specialist can only shrug 
his shoulders and ask: ‘What did he mean with that?’ A team leader is not allowed to 
shrug his shoulders”118. 
The business itself has quite a thick expert jargon, which is hardly accessible 
to the IT. “They always lash about with insurance specific, technical terms, this 
is even worse than IT-specialists”119. It would certainly be ideal that the business 
tried as well to speak a less specialist language and adapt its communication in 
such a way that also a layperson can understand it. Yet, at the same time, the 
managers from the business line are the clients of the IT-specialists and the IT 
cannot expect from them to formulate their needs in a language close to the logic 
of the functioning of the application.  
“The client has difficulties saying: ‘In this and that module, you have to read the fol-
lowing constants from the database and multiply them with the value X, which is saved 
in another place’. We cannot expect from the client to know such internal aspects of the 
application”120. 
                                                 
117 „Das Schwierige ist die Transformation, die Sprache. Die Sprache ist wirklich der wesentliche Punkt. Das 
Business spricht eine andere Sprache als der IT-Spezialist, der IT-Spezialist spricht eine andere Sprache als das 
IT-Management“. 
118 „Der Fachbereich schaut das Problem auf einem anderen Level an und spricht eine andere Sprache als wir und 
wir müssen deren Sprache verstehen damit es funktionieren kann. Wenn einer vom Fachbereich kommt und 
sagt: ‚Beim Spardeckungskapital für externe Sparprozesse im Fürstentum Lichtenstein, da müsst ihr nächstes 
Jahr ein Prozent Zusatzverzinsung geben’. Der normale Informatiker kann da nur noch mit den Schultern zu-
cken und sagen: ‚was hat er jetzt da gemeint?’. Der Teamleader darf nicht mit den Schultern zucken.“ 
119 „Die schmeissen einem immer lebensversicherungstechnische Ausdrücke an den Kopf und das ist noch schlim-
mer als mit den Informatikern.“ 
120 „Der Kunde hat Schwierigkeiten zu sagen: ‚Ihr müsst in diesem und jenem Modul die folgenden Konstanten 
aus der Datenbank lesen und dann multiplizieren mit dem Wert X, der woanders abgespeichert ist. Wir können 
nicht verlangen, dass der Kunde solche Interna der Applikation kennt.“  
121 „Auch der Informatiker kann nicht im Programmcode sprechen. Ich hatte ganz konkret einmal den Fall eines 
Informatikers, der hat Programmcode in eine Mail für den Fachbereich kopiert, hat dann beschrieben, was der 
Code meint und dann eine Frage gestellt. Dies ist zum Teil bedingt durch die Tatsache, dass jeder sehr konzent-
riert in seinem Bereich arbeitet.“ 
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It is the duty of the IT people to learn the language of the business and to 
gain an understanding for the reality of their clients, the business line. This has 
implications also for the way the IT should address management:  
“The IT specialist cannot talk in programming code. I very specifically had a case when an 
IT-technician simply copied programming code in a mail for the business line, then ex-
plained what the code meant and finally asked a question. This, in part, is the result of the 
fact that everybody works very concentrated in his field”121. 
The difference in the language use represents one of the biggest challenges in 
the IT-specialist-management interaction and a continuous translation is needed. 
In the last years, the IT unit has undertaken different measures to enlarge 
this translator capability. In fact, most of the practices we are going to discuss in 
the following address this challenge of overcoming the differences in language 
that exist.  
 
 
Practices in the 
Need Articulation 
Phase: 
− Stepwise 
refinement of 
request (busi-
ness request, 
technical re-
quest) 
− Actively in-
volve decision 
makers early 
on and ask 
them to write 
clear business 
requests 
− IT experts 
themselves 
write down 
business re-
quirements or 
collaborates 
In order to tackle this difficult challenge of defining a clear request and as-
signment on behalf of the business, the IT and the business unit have developed 
together a variety of practices, some which we have already mentioned and we 
will only briefly resume.  
As a first practice (and this spans the three phases of ‘need articulation’, 
‘problem analysis’, and ‘apply & implement insights & solutions’), they have 
broken down the definition of the request into various steps in order to allow for 
a gradual elaboration of the exact requirements, as says one IT-manager: “We 
need a very interactive process, in which we approximate our understanding in 
two, three cycles and this mainly happens in small meetings”122 The final defini-
tion of the request leads through the phases of analysis and conveying insights 
and only then is it defined definitely in the scope contract. In particular, the divi-
sion between a business request and, then, a technical request (that in larger 
projects takes the form of preparatory study) is very important. If the IT people 
have at hand a clear business request, it is easier for them to translate it into the 
technical dimension and write the requirements from an IT-perspective. Part of 
this practice is also that The IT-experts actively involve decision makers in the 
                                                 
122 „Es braucht einen interaktiven Prozess, in dem man in zwei, drei Durchgängen sich annähert und dies findet 
meistens in kleinen Meetings statt.“ 
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closely with 
business for 
them to write it 
early moments of the project. The business has the responsibility to write an 
explicit and specific business request. Yet, as this task is particularly difficult (in 
view, for example, of the discussed ASK-problem or the challenging task to ab-
stract general rules from everyday experiences), the IT interacts frequently with 
the business and takes over a very interactive role. In some cases, even, the IT 
writes down business requirements itself.  
− Focus on face-
to-face conver-
sations 
 
Another aspect which facilitates the definition of a clear and understandable 
request is that the interaction between the two parties mainly takes place in the 
form of interactive types of communication, be that interviews, meetings, or 
workshops. These face-to-face encounters, allow for a gradual approximation of 
the two parties in their common understanding (for a more detailed discussion 
on the role of face-to-face conversations, see: Practices relative to the communi-
cative process. Extensive use of face-to-face conversations).  
 
− Very active 
role of mid-
dlemen in 
translating in 
both activities 
In order to define a business request that is understandable to the IT and to 
translate it into a technical one, the managers from the business side need to have 
a little understanding of the way the IT-expert reasons and, vice versa, the IT-
expert has to have a considerable knowledge of the processes and problems of 
the business side.   
To meet this challenge, the IT unit strategically positions middlemen, who are 
people with a duplex qualification in both business issues and IT. In the context 
of the definition of the requirement, the support-desk plays a first important 
middleman function as mentions one IT-technician. “We have a support-desk, 
which is the interface between us, the IT-specialists, and the client, the people 
from the business. They support both us and the business”123. The people from 
the support-desk have previously been working in the business line, but have 
done an additional education in IT management or programming.  
 
                                                 
123 “Wir haben einen Support, der steht als Schnittstelle zwischen uns, den Informatikern, und dem Kunden, den 
Leuten aus dem Business und dieser Support bringt sehr viel Input rein. Diese Leute bieten sowohl uns als auch 
dem Business Unterstützung.“ 
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 “We need a contact person closely associated to the business line who also has a technical 
background. This person can more easily comprehend this abstraction from the various 
cases to the general body of rules”124.  
 
                                                 
124 „Wir brauchen eine Kontaktperson, die eng mit dem Business verbunden ist, welche aber auch einen techni-
schen Hintergrund hat. Dann kann sie dieses Abstrahieren von mehreren Fällen auf ein allgemeines Regelwerk 
besser nachvollziehen.“  
 The support-desk with his middleman function has to translate from one 
language to the other and helps to bridge between different views and back-
ground knowledge. The ‘support’ is especially important in the need definition, 
as shows this quote from an IT-technician: “These are the people who support us 
in the definition of the request and who, at the end, also approve this request as 
they do the acceptance test”125.  
 The IT-management also holds a middleman function and has to translate 
back and forth between the business line and the IT-technicians. Their educa-
tional background (mainly these people have a double education in both infor-
matics and business administration) and their daily work, which engages them 
more actively in the business decisions, helps them to have a better understanding 
of the business’ context. They can better understand and adapt their way of 
thinking and talking and enlarge the common ground among them, as mentions 
one IT-manager: 
“A big challenge is really the comprehension between the IT-people and the people from the 
business line. In this regard, I play an important interface role: the communications of the 
IT needs to be well aligned to the specs of the business line. But this is true also the other 
way round: When the business develops strategies, I have to be able to translate them so 
that my people can understand them. ‘What does that mean for our company, what does it 
mean for me as a programmer?’ (..) I am sort of a translator and only in this way can I ef-
fectively create sense.”126 
One role of the IT-managers as middlemen and translators is to specifically 
formulate the implications of a piece of information, which stems from one con-
text, for the other organizational reality. They also have to make the reasons of a 
certain decision more explicit, as they are often implicitly understood in the origi-
nal context, but hard to understand from another perspective. As translators, 
they have to make a piece of information meaningful in another context.  
Middlemen not only have an important translation function, their double 
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− Nail down a 
clear and spe-
cific written 
scope contract 
to fix terms 
and conditions 
and define 
clear rules for 
later change 
requests 
 
Above, we have shown that in order to define a clear request, the IT and 
the business departments have put in place an interactive process, which is ex-
tended to the analysis and conveying insights phase and the request is gradually 
refined. Most important in this process is, next to an active participation of 
both parties and a clear definition of their respective responsibilities, the focus 
on face-to-face as the main form of communication. Yet, oral communication 
has to be accompanied by written forms of communication. There needs to be a 
formal document, which defines the request of the business and the technologi-
cal solution to it in cold print. The InSure calls this document a ‘scope’, as ex-
plains one IT-manager: 
“I always held the opinion that, before starting with the programming, we need a clear 
contract. (..) After this scope, each change – whether it comes from our side or from the 
business – needs a ‚change request’“128. 
By defining clearly the terms and conditions of the request from the busi-
ness, reciprocal expectations are nailed down explicitly and there is fewer room 
for misunderstandings. The business is asked to commit itself to a specific re-
quest and knows that it cannot change its requirements continuously. In this 
way, there is a lower risk for the IT department that the business will continu-
ously change its request later on in the project. 
                                                 
125 „Das sind Leute, die uns unterstützen beim Definieren der Anforderungen, die nehmen uns dann auch zum 
Schluss die Anforderungen ab. Die machen dann den Abnahmetest.“ 
126 Ein grosses Thema ist wirklich die Verständigung der IT-Leute und der Leute des Fachbereichs. Ich spiele dort 
eine wichtige Schnittstellenrolle, so dass das, was von der IT kommuniziert wird, auch adressatengerecht beim 
Business angelangt. Dies gilt aber auch umgekehrt: Wenn im Business Strategien entwickelt werden, muss ich es 
so übersetzen können, dass es meine Leute auch verstehen können. ‚Was heisst jetzt das für unsere Firma, was 
heisst jetzt das für mich als Programmierer?’ (..) Ich bin eine Art Übersetzer und nur so kann ich auch effektiv 
Sinn erlangen.“ 
127 „Dank meiner Erfahrung und dem grösseren Abstand von der täglichen Programmierarbeit, ist es mir eher 
möglich, den Tunnelblick und den Fokus auf Details aufzubrechen und andere Möglichkeiten aufzuzeigen.“  
128 „Ich war immer der Meinung, dass wir, bevor wir uns ans Programmieren machen, einen klaren Vertrag brau-
chen. (..) Ab diesem Scope braucht jede Änderung, ob sie von uns oder vom Business kommt, einen ‚Change 
Request’.“ 
qualification allows them also to introduce some lateral thinking, which is par-
ticularly important in the phases when the big lines of the project are defined 
(‘articulate need’, ‘analyze issue & develop possible courses of action’).  
“Thanks to my experience and to the fact that I am more distant from the daily program-
ming, it makes it more possible for me to break up the tunnel view and the focus on details, 
and to show other possibilities”127. 
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Analyze Issue & 
Develop Possi-
ble Courses of 
Action 
Main Characteris-
tic: 
Entanglement 
with the previous 
(‘Articulate Need’) 
and following  
(‘Conduct Analy-
sis of Issue’) 
phases 
 
Once the business has managed to formulate its request in a short document 
(business concept), the IT-specialists start analyzing the issue from the IT per-
spective (see Figure 28).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the basis of the business concept, the IT team conducts a high level tech-
nical analysis of the issue (point 7 in Figure 25). They analyze the present situa-
tion, such as the software environment of the panned application. They inquire 
roughly into the technological options (and their impact into the existing sys-
tem), which are possible in order to satisfy the requests posed by the business. 
Finally, they also do a feasibility analysis and can give first time-cost indications 
for the various options. In this phase, interaction among the people of the IT 
team and with the business is lively and informal. If the IT needs further infor-
mation on business aspects, they contact their respective people on the side of the 
business line simply via email, telephone, or by passing by their office. Emerging 
results of this first analysis and of the technical options are discussed and the 
latter are readjusted depending on the considerations of the business (feedback 
arrow ‘e’). In this way, the IT and the business do a first approach of the project 
from a technological perspective, align gradually their prospects and understand-
ings and envision the general lines of the technical solution.  
If these general lines of the situation and the solution are clear, the IT team 
does a more detailed analysis and elaborates three possible technological solu-
tions (point 8 in Figure 25). These three options are made of one quite economic 
solution, one state-of-the-art solution, and a middle way solution. For each op-
tion, they define the exact technical requirements. IT-teams sometimes call-in an 
IT architect to review the technical concept and to verify whether it makes sense 
also from an architectonical standpoint (feedback loop to ‘identify experts & 
expertise’, arrow ‘b’). 
Figure 28: The ‘Analyze Issue & Develop Possible Courses of Action’-
phase 
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Challenges in the 
‘Analyze Issue & 
Develop Possible 
Courses of Ac-
tion’ Phase: 
− Move between 
various levels 
of abstraction  
One major challenge in this stage of the process is to move from quite a gen-
eral to a pretty specific definition of the issue and so to move between various 
levels of abstraction. While the business request outlines the general objectives to 
be pursued with the application, the IT specialist has to translate from the very 
broad definition of the objective and problem, to the very specific requirements 
for the technical system. The requirements must be very specific so that the pro-
grammer can deduct from them the computing code.  
− Inter-team, 
inter-sector 
barriers within 
IT unit 
 
Another communicative challenge during this phase is the rather poor inter-
team and inter-sector exchange within the IT unit. The problem is that „if I do 
not know at all that this colleague has done this, I cannot really ask him about 
it“129. This leads to a situation where there is internal expertise on a specific 
aspect of the field, but only a few people within the IT-department know and the 
own resources are not utilized in an optimal way.   
“We have realized that we have to abandon the internal barriers. Somewhere we have a 
sector, garden X, which looks after itself, then we have garden Y, which looks also after 
itself. That does not work. We are so short of labor that we have to think over the borders 
of the sectors”130.  
Requests for higher efficiency pressures the IT-department to engage in stronger 
cross-boarder collaboration. Such collaboration is important to more speedily 
resolve upcoming problems, develop more innovative solutions, and more effec-
tively use the potential of the specialized expertise of each IT-specialist. 
  
Practices in the 
‘Analyze Issue & 
Develop Possible 
Courses of Ac-
tion’ Phase: 
− Fight status 
quo orientation 
by proposing 
three options 
for solution 
(economic, 
middle way, 
In order not to be stuck on status-quo-solutions and to better advise deci-
sion makers, the IT-management decided that its collaborators have to think 
through and propose not only one solution, but always three feasible technical 
options. It would also give a recommendation, which of these three options 
would be most appropriate and why.  
„I had a beautiful experience with a team that had a rather conservative orientation and 
often claimed: ‘We always did it this way and that this is the perfect solution.’ I asked them 
to work with options and to always elaborate three alternatives: a cheap solution, a state-
of-the-art solution, and a middle way. All of a sudden, the team became more dynamic and 
had to break away from its deadlocked solutions. The key is to open up to some extent the 
                                                 
129 “Wenn ich gar nicht weiss, dass der Kollege das gemacht hat, kann ich ihn auch nicht fragen darüber.“ 
130 “Was wir gemerkt haben, ist, dass wir von unseren internen Grenzen wegkommen müssen. Wir haben irgend-
wo einen Sektor, Garten X, der schaut für sich, Garten Y, der schaut für sich. Und das funktioniert einfach 
nicht. Wir sind so knapp an Leuten, wir müssen über die Sektorgrenzen hinaus zusammenarbeiten.“ 
123  Appendix 5 - Case #3: The Knowledge Communication between IT-specialists and 
Business Managers (InSure) 
 
and state of 
art) 
 
horizon of the own employees”131. 
In this way, the decision makers have a real choice to make. They can - if they
find the time – evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each option, but 
otherwise still have the possibility to simply rely on the recommendations of the 
IT experts. If time is particularly scarce, the detailed elaboration of the variants 
is, of course, rather limited.  
 
− Organize regu-
lar sector-wide 
information 
events to en-
hance knowl-
edge sharing 
and innovative 
problem solv-
ing across 
teams 
To address the challenge of a too strong in-group orientation and to en-
hance the knowledge communication between the different IT-teams, each IT 
application sector has started to organize sector-wide information events. The 
IT-specialists of the sector have the possibility to expose to their colleagues what 
they are currently working on. They then also have the possibility to present and 
discuss the challenges they are currently facing. In this way, a more innovative 
and effective problem solving is possible.  
 
Convey In-
sights, Sugges-
tions, & Solu-
tions 
 
Once the high-level and detailed technical analyses are conducted, the next 
phase in the knowledge communication between experts and decision makers is 
to convey the gained insights and the proposed options to the business (see: 
Figure 29)  
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis is presented in a preparatory study (point 9 in Figure 25). The 
draft of this study is discussed in various instances with the IT-management, 
which sometimes advises that additional analysis is necessary (feedback-arrow 
‘h’). The final preparatory study shows on around 30 pages the following ele-
ments: an executive summary, an outline of the general benefits of the IT appli-
                                                 
131 „Ich hatte ein schönes Erlebnis mit einem Team, das eher ein bisschen konservativ orientiert war und oft mein-
te: ‚das machten wir schon immer so und das ist die perfekte Lösung’. Wir haben dann angefangen mit Varian-
ten zu arbeiten. Und da kam plötzlich Schwung rein und sie mussten sich lösen von ihren festgefahrenen Vor-
stellungen. Der Schlüssel ist, den Horizont ein bisschen aufzubrechen bei den eigenen Mitarbeitern.“ 
Figure 29:  The ‚Convey Insights, Suggestions, & Solutions’-phase 
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cation project, an overview on the objectives as they were formulated by the 
business, an analysis of the starting position, an overview on the identified meas-
ures and the possible options plus a recommendation of the IT for one of these 
options. The preparatory study is usually concluded with a final chapter on how 
the envisioned application integrates into the overall IT architecture and how it 
fits with the IT strategy. This study reflects a strong collaborative effort between 
the IT and the business, even if finally written by the IT. Both parties frequently 
interact with each other to express their preferences, suggestions, and reserva-
tions so that the study is really carried by both of them.  
Once the preparatory study is approved by the head of IT applications, it is 
communicated to the steering committee. The steering committee is formed of 
the most important IT managers and the managers from the business line. The 
responsible IT manager presents orally the proposal that is put forward in the 
study. The steering committee (point 10 in Figure 25) discusses the proposal and 
decides whether to go forward with the recommended option or whether further 
modifications and analysis are necessary. At this stage, it is most unlikely that the 
proposal is declined completely, as many members of the committee were in-
volved earlier on in the project and already agreed on the general utility of a 
technical solution and the business already clarified the overall budgetary possi-
bilities. Yet, the steering committee might ask for minor revisions and the pro-
posal has to be re-examined and analyzed by the IT specialists (feedback loop to 
analysis, arrow ‘f’). If the steering committee approves the proposal completely 
(without revisions), the project goes into the design phase. 
After this “go” decision, the IT draws up a scope contract (point 11 in 
Figure 25). In this contract, both parties agree on the type of solution to develop 
and define its exact technical characteristics. They also agree on delivery times 
and price. This contract is, in effect, part of the need articulation phase so that 
there is another important back-loop to the need articulation phase. In this way, 
the need articulation phase is only concluded once the issue has been analyzed 
and the insights, suggestions, and solutions conveyed.  
 
Challenge: 
− Pressure for 
conciseness 
and flexible 
scalability in 
level of detail 
An important challenge which experts have to tackle particularly when writ-
ing the preparatory study is how to communicate the complexity of an issue in a 
concise, yet maintainable and complete manner. The expert must present the 
pieces of information in such a way that they become meaningful to the reader. 
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 One IT-managers coins the problem as follows:  
„A big challenge today is to represent knowledge in a compressed manner. In the past, 
people wrote big books, reports. Today, nobody reads this anymore. There was a move to 
the one-pagers, these executive summaries. It is also a mentality of PowerPoint, that is, no 
more documents, just slides. The challenge really is how to communicate something in a 
meaningful way in such a short space“132.  
For written communication, the challenge is particularly demanding also be-
cause, depending on the characteristics of the single reader and the current situa-
tion he or she is in, different aspects of the issue have to be emphasized and 
longer elaborated, as illustrates this quote:  
“How can I represent knowledge in a well structured manner? I would like to convey some-
thing to a client or to a decision maker. I have to do this on a few pages and here is the first 
problem: how can I present complex issues in a simple manner and give the reader the pos-
sibility to deepen certain aspects? (..) I think of a possible way of presentation that allows 
each reader to be informed himself on his level and exactly at the level of detail, which in-
terests him”133. 
Whenever the communication is not purely dyadic – which is true in most 
cases - the audience is to some extent always heterogeneous and each decision 
maker has slightly different interests, concerns, and background knowledge. In a 
world without time and cost constraints, the expert would adapt his/her com-
munication to the particularities of each decision maker and prioritize the infor-
mation items accordingly. As a complete personalized communication is not 
possible, the challenge is to find modes of presentation, which permit a flexible 
scaling of the information items and give the receiver the possibility to decide on 
which level of detail he/she would like to be informed on a specific topic. 
Practice in the 
‘Convey Insights, 
Suggestions & 
Solutions’ Phase: 
− Establish stan-
An important practice in this phase regards the way how insights are struc-
tured and presented to management. The IT-unit has decided that reports like the 
preparatory studies follow a standard structure (as discussed above) and some 
basic principles of presentation.  
                                                 
132 “Eine grosse Herausforderung heute ist das Wissen komprimiert darzustellen. Früher hat man dicke Bücher 
geschrieben, Reports. Heute liesst das niemand mehr. Und man ging über auf diese Einseiter, diese Executive 
Summaries. Es ist auch eine Powerpoint-Mentalität, d.h. keine Dokumente mehr, nur noch Folien. Die Heraus-
forderung ist wirklich, wie ich etwas – auf so engem Raum – sinnvoll kommunizieren kann.“ 
133 „Wie kann ich Wissen gut strukturiert darstellen? Ich möchte einem Kunden oder einem Entscheidungsträger 
etwas vermitteln. Ich muss dies auf wenigen Seiten tun und hier ist das erste Problem: Wie kann ich komplexe 
Sachverhalte einfach darstellen und dem Leser gleichzeitig die Möglichkeit geben, bestimmte Aspekte zu vertie-
fen. (..) Ich denke an eine Möglichkeit der Darstellung, die es jedem Leser ermöglicht, auf seinem Niveau zu in-
formieren und genau in der Detailtiefe, die ihn interessiert.“ 
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dard structures 
and presenta-
tion principles 
for reports 
Principles of presentations are, for example, the use of as little text as possi-
ble, but on the other hand, an extensive use of tables and a considerable use of 
visualization (e.g overview figures). Another practice is that all important terms 
are defined at least verbally and the more complex ones also visually  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, another standard information item entailed in each document is the 
meta-information on the status of the study (e.g. proposed), the names of the 
authors, the person in charge, the date of the last revision, and the name of the 
document.  
 
Apply & Im-
plement In-
sights & Solu-
tions 
 
After the important “go“-decision by the steering committee, IT experts, the 
managers on the IT side, and the managers from the business line enter their final 
phase of the knowledge communication process. They apply and implement the 
insights and requirements elaborated in the previous phases by developing the 
application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: The ‘Apply & Implement Insights, & Solutions’-phase 
Identify Experts
& Expertise
Articulate Need
Analyze Issue &
Develop Possible
Courses of Action
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Insights, 
Suggestions, 
& Solutions
Apply & 
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Figure 30: Example of a Definition of a Concept Using Visual Represen-
tation for Illustration (Translated from German) 
Access layer of data
Application with 
pop-up window for 
user
Administration 
console
Administration-console
An administration-console is a dialogue, which 
enables selected people to change the central 
services.
From a technical perspective, the access mode 
does not differ from a „normal“ pop-up window 
of an application. 
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 This final phase is very important and lasts, on average, two months. The IT 
unit starts to develop the application as the single IT specialists work on small 
and specific jobs. For each task they know who their contact person from the 
business line is. There is a lot of communication going on between the various IT 
specialists. With the business, the interaction is less frequent and is limited to 
specific questions to ascertain, for example, what the business would do in a very 
specific case. Each week, the IT team leader meets with the manager from the 
business line for a coordination meeting and the current state of the development 
is discussed (see: point 10 Figure 25). If during the development phase the people 
from the business realize that they would actually want the application to have 
other characteristics then the one defined in the scope contract, they need to do a 
formal modification request (see: point 11 Figure 25). The same is possible from 
the IT side if the IT-specialists should realize that the technical solution cannot 
look exactly the way they envisioned it. Each request is examined concerning its 
validity and necessity (feedback- arrow ‘g’ to ‘articulate need’).  
Usually, an application is developed by building various components and 
then by assembling these components. Once the whole application is composed, 
the IT starts to test the application and to track its errors. To do this system test, 
they use a System Investigation Request (SIR) tool and usually find a lot of er-
rors. The tool helps the programmers also for the coordination within the team, 
as mentions one IT-expert:  
„It’s a hub for the information exchange. Every developer can add his notes: ‘Something 
doesn’t work here’ and receives feedback from his team mates. If someone finds an error, he 
records it and defines an owner who has to tackle the problem“134.  
A good coordination among the team is central in this final phase of the pro-
ject since time becomes ever shorter. The IT-technicians then prioritize which 
errors to handle first and start to work them off. This testing phase is very de-
manding and lasts quite as long as the actual development of the application. 
Only if the application works perfectly, the IT calls in the business, which 
then does the user-acceptance test. The business tests functionalities of the appli-
cation to see whether if fulfils the business requests and allows for a perfect exe-
cution of the daily insurance work. During this test, the communication between 
                                                 
134 “Das ist eine Drehscheibe für den Informationsaustausch: Jeder kann eintragen: ‚Da stimmt was nicht’ und er 
kriegt dann auch von seinem Team Feedback. Wenn jemand einen Fehler findet, trägt er das dort ein und defi-
niert einen Owner, der sich um das Problem kümmern muss.“ 
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the business and the IT-team is again intensified (see: point 12 Figure 25).  
Finally, the support, together with the IT manager and the business, decide 
whether to release the application in the current form into the IT system. It has 
to be completely assured that the new application does not threaten the daily 
application work (see: point 13 Figure 25). Training activities organized by the 
business accompany the final implementation of the application (see: point 14 
Figure 25).  
 
Former Chal-
lenges in the 
‘Apply & Imple-
ment Insights & 
Solutions’:  
− Continuous 
change re-
quests from 
the business  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before today’s interaction process was formalized, a major problem in the 
implementation phase was that the business continued to bring in its change 
requests. “Oftentimes, the people from the business only realized that they want 
something different when we already are in the implementation phase”135. In 
view of the different challenges related to the need articulation phase, it seems 
that the business, in some ways, postponed a clear definition of its request to the 
development phase: Only when the business could finally see how the applica-
tion would look like, they could express precisely what they wanted or not 
wanted and were able to define a clear request. In other words, there was a con-
tinuous feedback loop going on between the phases ‘apply & implement insights 
and solutions’ and ‘articulate need’ (see: feedback loop in Figure 32). This fact 
led to eternal modifications of the application and to large project delays. Still 
today, there are cases where, during the user-acceptance test, the people from the 
business realize that the application does not work according to their needs so 
that the IT has to reanalyze the issue (see: feedback loop in Figure 32). 
− Late stage 
uncovering of 
misunder-
standings 
Another problem in this stage was that until this moment uncovered misun-
derstandings all of a sudden became apparent. It happened often, for example, 
that the business and the IT had agreed on a certain type of application in the 
need definition phase and both parties had thought that they had understood 
each other. When in the phase ‘apply & implement insights & solutions’ the 
application became tangible, the business realized that this was not at all what it 
had wanted and that, apparently, the IT had misunderstood their request.   
Practice in the 
Phase ‘Apply & 
Implement In-
With the formalization of the end of the need articulation phase through the 
scope contract, the business formally commits to what exactly is its request. To 
                                                 
135 “Oft merkten die Leute vom Business erst, dass sie etwas anders haben möchten, wenn wir bereits in der Um-
setzung sind.“ 
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sights & Solu-
tions’: 
− Change re-
quests are 
standardized 
as a formal 
process 
strengthen this commitment and to avoid continuous change requests later on in 
the process, both parties have agreed in formalizing the process of applying fur-
ther changes, as mentions on IT-technician:  
“Today we can ask for a formal change request since we have clearly documented what the 
business wanted. We have to refer very firmly to the rules of the game and insist that one 
cannot change things and due dates at discretion”136. 
With this more formal process for submitting a change request, both parties 
are encouraged to think clearly about the requirements on the new application 
early on in the project and avoid project delays due to continues changes late in 
the process.  
Discussion of 
the Process 
Model 
From the description of the process and means through which InSure’s IT-
specialists and the middle-managers from the business line interact with each 
other, we have seen that the process model of knowledge communication pro-
vides a fairly accurate structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Particularly interesting in the case of InSure is that the three processes ‘articulate 
need’, ‘analyze issue & develop possible courses of action’, and ‘convey insights, 
                                                 
136 „Heute können wir einen „change request“ verlangen, denn es wurde klar festgehalten, wie das Business was 
wollte. Dann muss man einfach fest auf die Spielregeln verweisen, dass man nicht nach Belieben Dinge ändern 
kann und Termine herumschieben kann.“ 
Figure 32: Instances of Feed-Forward and Feedback Loops within the Interaction be-
tween InSure’s IT-specialists and the Managers from the Business Line 
Identify Experts
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Articulate Need
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e – after a first general 
analysis of technical 
environment and general 
options, business refines 
its prospects
A – first workshops 
with designated IT 
team to define 
project parameters
D – elaboration of 
preparatory study
E – after signing of 
scope contract, 
start building 
application
f – steering committee discusses the proposal of 
preparatory study and asks for minor realignments
C – business 
established 
business concept
g – during the user acceptance test, the business line realizes that there 
apparently must have been some misunderstandings since the application 
does not satisfy some of its needs and a new request is necessary
h – discussing first 
results  with IT-mana-
gers, IT specialists 
realize that additional 
analysis is needed
b – calling in of an IT architect for the 
reviewing of a technical concept
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suggestions, & solutions’ are very strongly interconnected through various feed-
back and feed-forward loops. An overview of these loops providing single in-
stances of them can be seen in Figure 32. Characteristic for these phases is both a 
strong focus on informal, face-to-face communication that allows for fluidity and 
quick and flexible alignments (e.g. meetings, workshops), as well as a focus on 
formal communication that holds track of fix agreements for that the looping 
behavior moves towards a clear direction (e.g. list with modification wishes, 
business concept, technical concept).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: Overview on all Phase-specific Communicative Challenges and Practices 
along the Knowledge Integration Process 
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Challenges 
Related to the 
Communicated 
Message:  
− Lack the big 
picture of an 
issue 
 
One of the inherent challenges of the knowledge communication process be-
tween the IT-experts and managers on the business side is their ability to gain 
and sustain the big picture. The following quote hits the mark of the issue:  
“One cannot always construct a complex image at first go. Everybody contributes some 
tesserae. That is often the problem: When can one be sure enough to know what is going 
on so that one can really make a reliable decision?”137. 
The big picture challenge is related both to the type of issue, with which 
communicators are dealing (content of their messages) and to the conversation 
process. Regarding the process, people might have difficulties in gaining the big 
picture “from spot” or they might have it in the beginning, but then loose them-
selves in (technical) details. Regarding the issue, complexity adds to the difficulty 
to gain the big picture. For example, if a change in an application has repercus-
sions not only within the whole IT-infrastructure, but impacts also on a variety 
of business processes, then it is hard to see the big picture. In the discussion on a 
decision to take, each IT-expert brings in his/her very specific expertise and each 
                                                 
137 „Man kann sich nicht immer auf Anhieb ein komplexes Bild machen. Jeder trägt ein paar Mosaiksteinchen bei. 
Das ist häufig das Problem. Wann kann man genug sicher sein, dass man weiss, was läuft, so dass man einen si-
cheren Entscheid treffen kann?“ 
 Figure 33 resumes all the challenges (in red) and practices (in green) along 
the knowledge communication process between IT-experts and decision makers, 
which we have discussed so far. Three of these challenges (explicitly marked) 
were big obstacles before the latest reorganization activities, but today, with a 
stronger formalization of the interaction processes, are less severe. 
General (and 
Phase Unre-
lated) Chal-
lenges & Prac-
tices in the 
Knowledge 
Communication  
Next to the phase-specific challenges and practices we have discussed so far, 
there are also more general challenges and practices, which exist in the knowl-
edge communication between experts and decision makers and which are not 
specific to one phase or another. We will discuss these more general challenges 
and practices in the following. 
We present them following the five dimensions – message, process, group 
dynamics, mental models, and outer context – of the conversation framework 
discussed in Chapter 2. In addition, we will exemplify how these dimensions are 
interconnected among each other. 
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manager introduces his/her concerns, priorities and points of view. The complex-
ity and the ambiguity of the issue is often such that no one alone can overview 
the whole issue, but only as a collective the group can grasp the big picture of it. 
“Informatics is a very heterogeneous area. There are so many technologies, so many types 
of informatics. (..) This makes it very difficult to gain an eagle’s view and understand what 
actually is at stake”138. 
Only by pooling and interrelating the different types of expertise, the IT-
specialists and the decision makers have the possibility to see the big picture.  
Not only is it challenging to collaboratively gain and sustain the big picture 
of an issue, it is also difficult to convey the big picture to someone else.  
“The interconnections among the various business processes and the technical systems are 
very high and the communication is difficult if someone does not have a broad knowledge 
and does not know the interconnections. It is as if you were to explain a very small part out 
of a ball of wool. This tiny part often has so many influencing factors and larger connec-
tions that it is often difficult to explain something without going very far afield. (..) If 
someone would not only do, but also understand, we would have to invest a lot of time”139.  
The quote shows at least two reasons why it is challenging to communicate 
the big picture of an issue. First, understanding the big picture has to do with 
seeing and explaining the multiple connections, for example, between a specific 
fact and the overall context. It is difficult to juggle simultaneously a multitude of 
causes, (indirect) implications and contextual factors and to engage in a system 
thinking mode inquiring into circular causalities and indirect effects140. In this 
view, the challenge of creating the big picture is also related to the mental model 
dimension of the framework we present here. Another reason why it is difficult 
to create the big picture is that a communicator has to choose a few aspects from 
the multitude of connections of the issue, which are most pertinent and meaning-
                                                 
138 „Die Informatik ist ein sehr heterogenes Gebiet, es gibt so verschiedene Technologien, so viele Arten der In-
formatik. (..) Dies macht es sehr schwierig, den Überblick zu gewinnen, um was es überhaupt geht.“ 
139 „Die Vernetztheit von den Fachprozessen und den technischen Systemen ist sehr hoch und es ist schwierig, 
jemandem etwas zu erklären, wenn diese Person nicht ein breites Wissen hat und die Zusammenhänge versteht. 
Das ist, wie wenn man jemandem ein ganz kleines Teilchen aus einem Wollknäuel erklären muss. Es hat meist 
so viele Einflussfaktoren und weitere Zusammenhänge, dass es wirklich schwierig ist, etwas zu erklären ohne 
extrem weit ausholen zu müssen. (..) Wenn jemand nicht nur einfach machen sondern auch verstehen sollte, 
dann müsste mach ein x-faches an Zeit investieren.“ 
140 Harkins claims that the ability to see the big picture is related to the ability of systemic thinking. He defines 
“big-picture thinking” as the “ability to conceptualize underlying or systemic causes driving a problem or issue” 
(Harkins, 1999: 34). Exponents of the systems thinking approach believe that people are mainly used to single 
out fragments and aspects of an issue and to identify linear cause-effect relationships, but are less trained in 
thinking of feedback loops, indirect effects, networks of causes and the development of such structures over 
time (Senge, 1990). 
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ful to the vis-à-vis. It is difficult to do such a prioritization especially if he/she has 
a poor knowledge of the context and knowledge needs of his interlocutor. 
− Difficulty to 
externalize 
knowledge and 
bring it in a 
form that is 
easily under-
standable, but 
lives up to the 
complexity of 
the issue 
From a knowledge perspective, one challenge is particularly interesting and 
is related to the communication sender. He/she encounters difficulties in putting 
his/her expertise in an easily understandable message to communicate. To some 
degree, this challenge has to do with the difficulty, to abstract from one’s own 
knowledge of an issue, which might comprise a lot of complexity, an easily un-
derstandable discourse. One IT-technician mentions: “It is difficult to describe 
one complex issue in such a way that the other can understand”141 and another 
says on this regard: “I cannot simply display the whole complexity at once. I do 
not have this knowledge continuously present. It somewhere dozes within me 
and only if I engage in it more profoundly, it comes to light”142.  
This quote shows that the challenge to reduce the complexity of a message 
and to structure one’s thoughts in such a way that they become understandable 
to the vis-à-vis, is strongly related the mental model dimension. In fact, the chal-
lenge of representing complexity in an adequate way is related to the expert’s 
difficulty to activate his/her knowledge and to find a way how to access it. The 
quote seems to allude to the difficulty to externalize part of one’s knowledge into 
a well articulated message. It is a type of knowledge of which the person know-
ing is not even completely aware, the knowledge ‘dozes’ in her/him. The knowl-
edge has a strong tacit dimension (and is not fully explicit) and is hard to com-
municate143, as this final quote illustrates:  
“In the detail-specifications, we have clearly defined how one has to handle the application. 
Yet, you never manage to bring to a 100% on paper. Even the one who designed the tool, 
afterwards, he does not really manage to bring it on paper”144. 
 
 Thus, a major challenge in the communication is how the experts can access 
and structure their knowledge, how they can break down its complexity and find 
words for it that are easily understandable.  
                                                 
141 „Es ist schwierig, einen komplexen Sachverhalt so zu beschreiben, dass dann der andere drauskommt.“ 
142 “Ich kann auch nicht einfach so die ganze Komplexität auf einen Schlag ausbreiten. Ich habe dieses Wissen 
auch nicht ständig präsent, das schlummert irgendwo und erst, wenn man sich tiefer damit beschäftigt, kommt 
es zum Vorschein.“ 
143 See: (Nonaka, 1994) 
144 „Wir haben in den Detailspezifikationen genau definiert, wie man mit der Applikation umgehen muss. Aber, 
das kriegt man nie 100%ig auf das Papier. Auch derjenige, der das Tool gestaltet hat, kriegt es nachher nicht 
wirklich aufs Papier.“  
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Practices Rela-
tive to the 
Communicated 
Message:  
– Scale informa-
tion across 
media and rep-
resentation for-
mats: Combine 
visuals (for 
overview) with 
short text (in-
depth, struc-
tured, and ex-
plicit informa-
tion) and oral 
communication 
(commitment, 
context, shared 
Understanding) 
 
One important practice in the knowledge-intensive communication between 
the IT department and the business line is to combine different media and forms 
of representation (visual versus written texts) in order to convey a same idea, 
information or insight. “The communication is most effective if it is a mixture 
between a graphical elaboration, a possibly very short description and then a 
meeting”145. The different media and types of presentation help to meet different 
challenges related to the communication of knowledge and a clever combination 
of them might be most effective. While the face-to-face communication is par-
ticularly suited to convey the context of an information, show its implications, 
give an overview and elaborate jointly new ideas and insights, the written format
allows for clearer structure, more in-depth information, and gives the reader the 
possibility to change the linear flow of the text, jump within the document and 
focus only on the aspects, which are most pertinent to him/her. The visual for-
mat has still other advantages as it provides an additional language and facili-
tates a shared understanding. By combining these three forms of communication, 
an IT-expert or decision maker can profit from the advantages of each one and 
overcome their respective weaknesses.  
„At the same time, it is important that a figure and figurative representation is not only 
empty air and that behind it there is a document where details are discussed. Then, also 
a personal communication is needed, which accompanies this image and document. 
You cannot just send them, but you have to jointly sit behind and explain them”146. 
In this way, the oral communication can add to the written one by contextualiz-
ing and exemplifying what the written information item means in the specific 
context of a team or for the development of a given application. 
“To some extent, I am also the organ of the strategy. You can find most IT-strategies in the 
intranet, but they are not thought for self-study. They have to be elaborated according to 
the target and there needs to be people who can interpret them correctly and bring them in 
into project work”147.  
                                                 
145 „Am Wirkungsvollsten ist sicher eine Mischung zwischen einer graphischen Aufbereitung, einem möglichst 
kurzen Beschrieb und dann einem Meeting.“  
146 „Gleichzeitig ist es aber auch wichtig, dass hinter einer Figur und einer bildlichen Darstellung ein Dokument 
steht, wo Details beschrieben werden, damit es nicht nur warme Luft ist. Dann braucht es auch noch die persön-
liche Kommunikation, die dieses Bild und dieses Dokument begleitet. Man kann diese nicht einfach so verschi-
cken, sondern muss sich gemeinsam daran setzten und sie erklären.“ 
147 „Ich bin auch ein bisschen das Sprachrohr der Strategie. Diese Strategien liegen zwar im Intranet auf, sie sind 
aber nicht fürs Selbststudium gedacht. Sie müssen adressatengerecht aufgearbeitet werden und es braucht Leute, 
die das richtig interpretieren und in Projekte einbinden können.“  
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We call this practice of combining different media to convey an idea or insight to 
“scale” information across media and representation formats. A same content 
can be accessed in a variety of ways and an addressee has the possibility, depend-
ing on his affinities, needs, and interests, to focus on the format he/she prefers.  
– Work with 
visualizations 
Advantages: 
1. Fosters own 
and others’ 
understanding 
by:  
• Making ab-
stract issues 
tangible 
• Activating 
imagination  
• Structuring 
and simplify-
ing issues 
• Facilitating 
the creation 
of the big 
picture 
 
One important practice in how IT-experts and decision makers try to com-
municate their expertise is by making extensive use of different forms of visuali-
zation. They use ad-hoc visualization during formal and informal meetings and 
more thought-out visualizations in their written communication (i.e. reports). On 
the one hand, IT-specialists claim that visualizations help to turn abstract issues 
more tangible and therewith facilitate the imagination and the understanding of 
the issue: “I often need metaphors or images so that one can better envisage 
what I am talking about. Also, my thinking is oftentimes visual and in front of 
my inner eye, I see loops that twinkle shortly”148. Working with visualizations 
also fosters understanding because it helps to structure an issue and to communi-
cate this structure in an easy and understandable manner. “A few colored com-
ments help to see it visually. I use rectangles, circles, and clouds to represent 
processes or logical dependencies. I try to simplify and structure”149. Thanks to 
its capacity of structuring, the use of visualization also helps to gain the big pic-
ture of an issue. The head of the IT department mentions on this regard: 
“That is why I have brought to you this [a poster, see: Figure 34] as a possible idea on how 
to discuss and elaborate a topic with the help of a graphical object. It shows interests that 
have to be distributed quickly. There is a location, where the interest rates are defined. One 
makes a fixed package and distributes it all over. It is the case that everybody has to test 
these when one incorporates the package in the application. Nobody had the overall pic-
ture of the sum of the places to where the package was distributed. That is why we elabo-
rated this figure and it shows all that is needed in order to change the interest rates within 
one day. This representation turned to be a powerful communication instrument, first to 
elaborate the issue, but now also to communicate with the business line. Before, there were 
so many misunderstandings around this process and with a good figure you can really 
achieve a lot. And as we have such a limited space and time for our communications, the 
way we package our information is really central”150.   
                                                 
148 „Ich brauche oft Metaphern oder Bilder, damit man sich vorstellen kann, worum es da geht. Auch mein Den-
ken ist visuell. Vor meinem inneren Auge sehe ich Schlaufen, die nur kurz aufblitzen.“ 
149 „Ein paar farbige Kommentare helfen, damit man es bildlich sieht. Ich brauche Vierecke, Kreise und Wolken, 
um Abläufe darzustellen, oder logische Abhängigkeiten aufzuzeichnen. Ich versuche, zu vereinfachen und zu 
strukturieren.“ 
150 „Deswegen habe ich das hier mitgebracht als eine mögliche Idee, anhand eines grafischen Objekts ein Thema 
zu diskutieren und zu bearbeiten. Es zeigt die Zinsen, die in kurzer Zeit verteilt werden müssen. Es gibt eine 
Schaltstelle, wo die Zinsen festgelegt werden. Man macht da ein festes Paket und verteilt es überall. Es ist so, 
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 The quote illustrates how by assembling the various aspects relevant to an 
issue and relating them with each other, a figure or image can help to gain the 
big picture of an issue. Yet, there is another aspect why the visual form can help 
to gain, or better to maintain the big picture. „In our meetings, I sometimes use 
the ‘MindManager’ tool and this works very well. One is concerned more with 
developing ideas rather than dealing with technical details”151. Apparently, the 
collaborative visualization helps to stay on the more conceptual level of the dis-
                                                 
dass es alle wieder testen müssen, wenn sie es in ihre Applikationen eingebaut haben. Niemand hatte das Ge-
samtbild, wohin das Paket überall verteilt wird. So erarbeiteten wir ein Bild und zeigten auf, was es alles 
braucht, damit man innerhalb eines Tages die Zinsen umstellen kann. Diese Darstellung wurde zu einem sehr 
mächtigen Kommunikationsinstrument, einerseits um das Thema zu erarbeiten, aber jetzt auch mit dem Busi-
ness. Wir konnten ihnen mit Hilfe dieses einen Bildes aufzeigen, was alles abläuft. Es gab ganz, ganz viele Miss-
verständnisse rund um diesen Prozess und mit einem guten Bild kann man wirklich ganz viel erreichen. Und da 
der Platz und die Zeit für unsere Kommunikationen so beschränkt ist, ist es wirklich wichtig, wie wir unsere In-
formationen verpacken.“  
151 „In unseren Sitzungen verwende ich manchmal das ‚Mindmanager’ Tool und das funktioniert sehr gut. Man ist 
dann mehr damit beschäftigt, Ideen zu entwickeln und kümmert sich weniger um technische Details.“ 
Figure 34: Example of a Visual Overview on the Applications Involved and the Techni-
cal Process for the Calculation of Interests (real designations changed) 
137  Appendix 5 - Case #3: The Knowledge Communication between IT-specialists and 
Business Managers (InSure) 
 
course and not to get lost in a too detailed discussion on technology. In this way,
with the support of the visual tool152, it seems that the risk of loosing the big 
picture and of getting lost in a sea of technical details is lowered. 
2. Fosters in-
novative solu-
tions by: 
 Activating 
collective 
participation 
 
Visualization does not only help to structure an issue and to gain and main-
tain the big picture. Visualization also has a social function as it helps to activate 
collaboration.  
“I have realized over and over again that whenever someone in a meeting starts drawing an 
image, on a writing pad or anywhere, then people start talking around this drawing. It 
really helps to isolate the important aspects and to concretize the conversation topic”153.  
Not all visualization forms foster collaboration in the same way. Spontane-
ous paper and pencil sketching is often preferable than well designed PowerPoint 
slides, which often seem to be so complete that active collaboration and a joint 
development of an issue is hindered. 
“I believe that they do not have to be such super ingenious PowerPoint presentations. It can 
equally be a flipchart and four colors. There, you can draw gradually and you can also 
cross something out. I believe that this is more important to develop something. It incites 
everybody to collaborate actively. If I just show a slide and ask: ’Do you agree with that?’, 
then everybody says: ‘yes, yes’”154. 
3. Fosters 
mnemonic ca-
pacity 
Visualizations also serve as an anchoring and mnemonic device as illustrates 
the following quote of an IT-manager:  
“When I use visualizations, it is often not the topic, but an image, a mental anchor, 
which is referenced in a conversation. ‘You showed an image at that point, didn’t you?’ 
and therewith, the people mean a whole topic. (..) Once I tried to show the complexity 
of our business, which exists because of the variety of products and sales channels we 
have. I first showed a surface area of one color and said: ‘this is our business seen from 
afar’. Then I started to show distinctions and divided the area ever further in colored 
sub-areas. In the end, this became a very heterogeneous patchwork. (..) This image very 
                                                 
152 As the visualization effort here is supported by a software tool, the visualization can be more flexibly handled: 
“I always have the chance to develop the mindmap exactly in the direction, where I then don’t find any more 
space on the paper or flipchart. This is way I very much like such tools“ („Ich habe immer genau das Glück, das 
Mindmap in die Richtung zu entwickeln, wo ich dann auf dem Blatt oder Flipchart kein Platz mehr habe. Des-
wegen kommen mir solche Tools sehr gelegen.“)  
153 “Ich habe immer wieder festgestellt, dass wenn immer jemand in einem Meeting eine Zeichnung macht, auf 
einem Block oder irgendwo, dann beginnen die Leute, um diese Zeichnung herumzureden. Es hilft wirklich, das 
Gesprächsthema einzukreisen und zu konkretisieren“. 
154 „Ich finde, es müssen nicht so super geniale Powerpoint-Präsentationen sein. Es können genau so ein Flipchart 
und vier Farben sein. Dort malt man Schritt für Schritt und kann auch was durchstreichen. Dies finde ich wich-
tiger, um etwas erarbeiten zu können. Es regt alle an, aktiv mitzuarbeiten. Wenn ich hingegen einfach eine Folie 
auflege und frage: ‚Ist es so?’, dann sagen alle: ‚Ja, ja’.“ 
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much impressed the people and became a fixed reference point”155. 
An image can be more easily remembered than an abstract and complex 
idea156. In addition, the interaction with a visual often implicates also an emo-
tional involvement, which increases on its part the mnemonic capacity. Finally, 
also the facilitated active participation leads to a better remembering of the is-
sues. An image can function than functions as the visual anchor of that collabo-
rative event.  
A final advantage of visualizations is that they can be used for concise documentation 
of a conversation or of a main idea that emerged in a discussion. An IT-expert men-
tions: “I often ask people at the end of a meeting to bring me the next time a sketch of 
this specific aspect we elaborated today”157.  
 
Disadvantage 
of work with 
visuals: 
 Leads to 
misunder-
standings 
because of 
poor explicit 
agreement 
on seman-
tics of visual 
language 
 
Next to the considerable potential of visualization for knowledge communi-
cation, one major difficulty with visuals is that conversation partners do not 
explicitly agree on a clear semantic for the visual language they use, which is 
why misunderstandings can emerge. The following quote illustrates this problem:
“One goes to the flipchart and starts drawing boxes, arrows... But behind each symbol one 
draws there is also a semantic. And this semantic is not standardized, each one interprets 
an arrow a little bit differently. I have two systems, system A and system B and I draw an 
arrow between the two. What does that mean? Does the data flow in this direction or does 
the system A call up system B? One has to clarify semantics. Of course, if I know the per-
son next to me, I know that he draws principally in this way and I in that way. But if one 
does not know each other so well yet, it is hard to find out these semantics. An unambigu-
ous notation is very important”158. 
                                                 
155 „Häufig wird dann nicht das Thema, sondern irgendein Bild, ein geistiger Aufhänger referenziert in einem 
Gespräch: ‚Du hast doch dort ein Bild gezeigt‘ und damit meinen die Leute dann ein ganzes Thema.(..) Ich habe 
zum Beispiel versucht, die Komplexität unseres Geschäfts aufzuzeigen, die entsteht durch die hohe Vielfalt an 
Produkten und Vertriebskanälen. (..) Zuerst zeigte ich eine Fläche, eine einfarbige und sagte, das ist von weitem 
unser Geschäft. Und habe dann angefangen, Unterscheidungen aufzuzeigen und habe die Fläche immer weiter 
aufgeteilt in farbige Teilflächen. Am Schluss wurde das ein sehr heterogener Flickenteppich. Das hat die Leute 
sehr beeindruckt und wird jetzt häufig referenziert.“ 
156 The mnemonic capacity is enhanced both if people need to engage into a deep semantic processing or if they 
are involved emotionally. Images have both qualities. See also Pavio’s (1971, 1986) argumentation on visual 
imagery where he claims that recalls from images (in relation to verbal text) are more rapid, happen more holis-
tically and allow for freer associations (an image “offers a complex set of spacial arrangements at a glance, 
showing both the object and its relationship to its surrounding” (Opdahl, 2002: 47)) 
157 “Ich frage meine Leute oft, mir auf das nächste Mal eine Skizze über diesen spezifischen Aspekt mitzubringen.” 
158 „Man geht dann zum Flipchart und fängt an, Boxen zu zeichnen, Pfeile... Aber hinter jedem Symbol, das Sie 
zeichnen, liegt ja auch eine Semantik. Und diese Semantik ist nicht normiert, ein Pfeil interpretiert jeder bisschen 
anders. Ich habe zwei Systeme, System A und B und macht ein Pfeil dazwischen. Was heisst das? Fliessen die 
Daten in die Richtung oder ruft das System A einfach das System B auf? Man muss diese Semantiken erklären. 
Klar, wenn ich das Gegenüber kenne, weiss ich, er zeichnet das prinzipiell so, ich zeichne das so. Wenn man sich 
aber noch nicht so genau kennt, ist es schwierig, diese Semantiken aufzudecken. Eine einheitliche Notation ist 
sehr wichtig.“ 
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On the one hand, the visual language is useful for the knowledge-intensive 
communication because it is less rigidly defined than the verbal one. The loose 
semantics can be advantageous for experts and decision makers if they want to 
turn tacit knowledge explicit or to jointly develop new knowledge. People can 
express something, of which they have more of an intuition, with an image that 
serves them as an analogy. They can express relationships of various pieces of 
information by positioning them on a visual that acts as a fussy category.  
Yet, loose or no semantics where the colours chosen have no informative, 
but just a decorative purpose and where shapes have different meanings, leaves 
room to a multitude of interpretations and with that to a variety of misunder-
standings.  
 
o Work with 
metaphors & 
quotes 
Advantages: 
• Facilitates 
understand-
ing 
• Enhances 
mnemonic 
capacity 
Metaphors and quotes can be used to gain some similar benefits in the 
knowledge-intensive communication than the ones we have discussed for the use 
of visuals: metaphors and quotes facilitate the understanding of an issue and 
enhance the mnemonic capacity of the communication partners.  
“It is important that the counterpart in the communication can recall the few important 
aspects of one’s communication. This is why I often work with images, establish analo-
gies, and use my quote library. For example, to illustrate the importance of mainte-
nance work within the total tasks of an IT-specialist, I often use the image of brushing 
one’s teeth. If one does not brush one’s teeth every day – and that costs five minutes 
each time – it can be that 10 years later, the teeth fall out. Then the costs and the pains 
are much more substantial”159.  
Another metaphor that became part of the organization’s myths is the 
awakening of the sleeping beauty to illustrate how the organization and the 
whole insurance industry work today at much faster speed. To point up the same 
idea, other IT-managers referred to the image of a driver who used to stroll in 
the streets with his Renault 4 and who now has to run formula one races. His-
toric is also the image of the elk test of the Mercedes A class to illustrate the 
importance of quality controls and of their meticulous execution. In all these 
examples, metaphors are used as mnemonic anchors. By linking an issue to an 
imaginary world, its importance can be underlined and more easily be remem-
                                                 
159 „Wichtig ist, dass das wenig Wichtige, das man sagt, beim Gegenüber hängen bleibt. Ich arbeite oft mit Bil-
dern, versuche Analogien herzustellen und verwende oft auch meine Zitatensammlung. Um zum Beispiel zu un-
terstreichen, wie wichtig Unterhaltsarbeiten im Rahmen der Arbeiten eines Informatikers sind, verwende ich oft 
das Bild des Zähneputzens. Wenn man nicht jeden Tag Zähne putzt, das braucht zwar jeweils nur 5 Minuten, 
dann kann es sein, dass in 10 Jahren die Zähne ausfallen. Dies kostet dann viel mehr und schmerzt auch deut-
lich mehr.“ 
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bered.  
A second advantage of the use of metaphors is that they help to simplify an 
issue and to focus just on the one core aspect of it. 
“One has to simplify and cannot be afraid of explaining something in such simple terms 
that also an infant from nursery school could understand. Pictorial language is very use-
ful to make to business understand”160. 
One difficulty with metaphors is that the analogy is suited only to illustrate 
part of the issue and is problematic for other aspects of the same issue. In addi-
tion, people might focus too much on the metaphor rather than on the issue for 
whose illustration the metaphor was used. “The stupid thing with metaphors is 
that I mostly find the error in the metaphor and not in the problem”161.  
 
− Define terms 
explicitly & de-
velop glossa-
ries 
 
In view of the frequent misunderstandings of terms (see later on: Challenges 
related to the mental models), some IT teams have started to develop glossaries 
with definitions of terms that are related to the team’s area of expertise. The 
head of the workflow team states: 
„We started to do a glossary to define the concepts with which we work so that every-
body who works with us knows what we conceive of a ‘task’, a ‘process’, or a ‘work 
step’. It is important that our interaction partners share the same understanding and 
speak the same language”162. 
 
− Define small 
audience cir-
cles to better 
align the com-
munication 
 
Another way to avoid misunderstandings and to best align one’s communi-
cation to the characteristics of the audience, both IT-experts and decision makers 
try to choose quite a small target audience for one’s communication. In this way, 
one can better tailor the content and form of the message to the specific charac-
teristics of the interlocutor.  
„The communication works best when the target audience is small. Then, I know the 
profile of the people I am writing to and I can tailor my message very precisely. If it is a 
                                                 
160 „Man muss vereinfachen und darf sich nicht scheuen, etwas so einfach zu erklären, dass es auch einem Kinder-
gärtner eingängig wäre. Bildhafte Kommunikation ist mit dem Business wirklich sehr zentral.“ 
161 „Das Dumme mit Metaphern ist, ich meist die Fehler in der Metapher und nicht im Problem sehe.“ 
162 „Wir machen deswegen ein Glossar, damit die Arbeitsbegriffe definiert werden und damit alle, die mit uns 
zusammenarbeiten, wissen, was wir unter einer Aufgabe verstehen, was ein Prozess ist, was ein Arbeitsschritt, 
etc. Es ist wichtig, dass unsere Interaktionspartner das gleiche Verständnis haben wie wir und dass wir die glei-
che Sprache sprechen.“ 
163 “Am Besten funktioniert die Kommunikation, wenn der Empfängerkreis klein ist. Dann kenne ich das Profil 
der Leute und kann sehr adressatengerecht schreiben. Wenn es ein Techniker ist, kann ich technisch schreiben 
und muss nicht versuchen, umgangssprachlich zu kommunizieren. Mit dem Management muss man Schwer-
punkte anders setzen, mehr strategische Punkte betonen.“ 
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technician, I can use technical terms and do not have to try to use colloquial speech. 
With managers, you have to choose other focal points and stress strategic aspects”163.  
 
 
Practices Rela-
tive to the 
Communica-
tion Process  
 
− Extensive use 
of face-to-face 
conversations 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of InSure, the most important modality of the knowledge com-
munication between IT-technicians, the IT-managers, and the managers from the 
business line, is the face-to face conversation. This is true both across hierarchi-
cal levels as among peers. The head of the IT unit, for example, has scheduled a 
weekly meeting with his five direct reports jointly, a bilateral weekly meeting 
with each one of them, a monthly meeting with each project leader, a monthly 
meeting with the managers on the business side, called the steering committee, 
and a monthly bilateral meeting with each important client from the business 
side. In addition, a lot of ad hoc communication and meetings take place. Face-
to-face communication is equally important also for IT-technicians: „We are 
three people who deal with the projects on a conceptual level and all sit in the 
same room. All is very spontaneous and a lot of ad-hoc communication takes 
place. I prefer it when communication is direct”164. 
Why is the face-to-face interaction the preferred way how IT-specialists and 
managers interact? 
Functions: 
 
− Assures shared 
understanding 
 
 
First, the face-to-face communication allows for a stepwise approximation 
towards a common understanding. In a conversation, people can immediately 
perceive the reactions of their conversation partners and on the basis of their 
feedback, they can readjust and specify their mode of expression. “If you make 
everybody sit around a table (..), you can simply be more certain that there won’t 
be any misunderstandings”165. 
In part, the understanding is enhanced because face-to-face-conversations al-
low for contextualizing a piece of information and outlining what its reasons or 
implications are. 
                                                 
164 “Wir sind drei Leute, die sich konzeptionell mit dem Projekt beschäftigen und sitzen im gleichen Zimmer und 
es ist alles ziemlich spontan und es findet sehr viel ad hoc Kommunikation statt. Ich habe es lieber, wenn die 
Kommunikation direkt ist.“  
165 „Wenn man aber alle an einen Tisch setzt (..), kann man einfach sicherer sein, dass es keine Missverständnisse 
gibt.“  
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“If the topic is complex, a meeting is good so that everybody receives a basis and un-
derstands what the issue is about. It is also possible to very specifically outline what are 
the implications of a project”166. 
People can give an overall view on an issue and can show why it is impor-
tant at this point in time to deal with it and what, for example, are the business 
implications of the technical solution or how ones own working procedures are 
affected by a certain decision. This contextual information is important in order 
to have a basis for the interpretation of further information. 
 
− Fosters coinci-
dental contact 
with new in-
formation 
 
Second, conversations are central to the knowledge communication because 
they foster coincidental contact with new information.  
“I believe that communication is something chaotic, but one always tries to 
structure it. (..) Something that I have forgotten, I will only think about it if I 
grasp the word by coincidence during a break. ‘What are you talking about?’ 
Then it is also the right moment. The piece of information has to reach me at the 
right moment in order to be able to anchor it”167. 
 The organization has to provide such free spaces (in terms of time and 
physical spaces) where knowledge can – but does not have to - be shared and 
developed and employees can have types of conversations, which otherwise 
would not be possible. Some interviewees mentioned the famous coffee talks 
during breaks, others that they very consciously arranged lunches with employ-
ees. In a coffee break or lunch, the IT expert breaks out for a moment from his 
rather narrowly defined tasks and is exposed to pieces of information, which are 
either new or already known to him, but because of the particular context he is 
working in at this moment in time, lead to a new meaning. Exposing employees 
to such ‘free spaces’, is a form of ‘managing’ conversations in a loose way, which 
gives voice to the chaotic aspect of the communication of knowledge.  
− Nurtures inter-
personal well-
being 
Third, conversations are an important condition for the integration of 
knowledge between IT-specialists and managers because they nurture the inter-
personal contact and wellbeing.  
                                                 
166 „Bei komplexen Themen ist eine Sitzung gut, damit alle eine Grundlage erhalten und verstehen, worum es geht. 
Auch um wirklich konkret aufzuzeigen, was für Auswirkungen ein Projekt hat.“ 
167 „Ich glaube, Kommunikation ist etwas Chaotisches und man versucht immer, sie zu strukturieren. (..)Etwas 
was ich vergesse, dann denke ich nur daran, wenn ich das Wort zufällig in einer Pause aufschnappe. „Wovon 
sprecht ihr da?“ Dann ist es auch der richtige Zeitpunkt. Die Information muss zum richtigen Zeitpunkt eintref-
fen, damit man sie verorten kann.“ 
143  Appendix 5 - Case #3: The Knowledge Communication between IT-specialists and 
Business Managers (InSure) 
 
“It is the personal contact in the coffee break or in meetings, which accounts for the com-
munication to flow. (..) It is important to get to know the people personally in order to bet-
ter understand the other side. This helps to limit the misunderstandings and also to use the 
time more effectively”168. 
− Assembles all 
the pertinent 
expertise 
around a table 
Forth, face-to-face interaction is important to pool the various specialized 
expertise, which is necessary in order to take a decision.  
“Issues deal often around technical aspects, which I personally cannot and do not want to 
evaluate. In such occasions, I normally assemble all the people from my sector or from 
other sectors around a table and we start discussing the issue. I have realized that this is 
much more efficient than if each one prepares a preparatory study in his on cubby-hole”169.  
− Allows to deal 
with delicate 
issues  
A final reason why face-to-face interactions are preferred to other forms of 
communication is less related to the communication of knowledge: Conversa-
tions are most suited to communicate delicate issues. When a person has to ad-
dress an issue where opinions differ quite strongly or when he/she has to tackle a 
difficult and delicate subject, face-to-face communication is almost always the 
preferred mode of communication. The communicator can express the impor-
tance of the issue and his/her own engagement in it by standing there personally. 
In addition, in the interactive mode he/she can name the issue very carefully and 
misunderstandings can be retrieved quickly.  
“We speak of reorganization and not of re-dimensioning. For the employees this is an im-
portant difference because they know that nobody gets laid-off. These are types of informa-
tion, which one prefers to communicate orally. The spoken word is more ephemeral than 
the written text”170.  
The quote shows also that because of the ephemeral nature of conversations, 
some people have the illusion that their word is less binding and that by using 
this form of communication, they can shirk their own responsibility.  
Limitations of This last remark leads us from the long argumentation why conversations 
                                                 
168 „Es ist der persönliche Kontakt in einer Kaffeepause oder in einer Teamsitzung, die es ausmacht, dass die 
Kommunikation fliesst. Wichtig ist, die Leute persönlich kennen zu lernen, um die andere Seite besser zu verste-
hen. (..) Das persönliche Kennen lernen hilft einem, die Missverständnisse zu beschränken und auch, um die Zeit 
effektiver zu nutzen.“  
169 „Oft geht es um technische Dinge, die ich selber nicht beurteilen kann und will. In solchen Fällen mache ich es 
im Normalfall so, dass ich alle Leute von meinem Sektor aber auch von anderen Sektoren an einen Tisch zu-
sammenziehe und dass man das Thema dann zusammen durchdiskutiert. Ich habe gemerkt, das ist irgendwie ef-
fizienter als wenn man da jeder für sich in seinem Kämmerchen ein Grundlagenpapier erstellt.“ 
170 „Man spricht von einer Umstrukturierung und nicht von einer Redimensionierung. Das ist für die Mitarbeiter 
ein wichtiger Unterschied, denn so wissen sie, es wird niemand entlassen. Das sind Arten von Informationen, die 
man lieber mündlich kommuniziert. Das gesprochene Wort ist flüchtiger als einem schriftlichen Text.“ 
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Face-to-Face: 
 
− Ephemeral 
nature and 
non-
persistence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
are so important for knowledge communication to the discussion of some limita-
tions of face-to-face conversations.  
The one important disadvantage is that conversations are ephemeral and 
that insights, decisions, agreements are not recorded systematically. 
“If one does a lot in a spontaneous way, then only a little is documented and this can lead 
to misunderstandings. (..) A conversation… it emerges and then disappears again. One has 
to retain it in some way. Otherwise, you go out of the meeting, one person has understood 
it in this way, the other in another. And both have the idea that the other is in charge of the 
issue”171. 
In view of the ephemeral nature of conversations, and the risks of misunder-
standings, forgetting of important issues, and the unclear definition of responsi-
bilities, the different IT-teams use some forms of meeting minutes. In some cases, 
they not only serve to record a conversation, but also to structure it.  
“After each meeting I do a protocol… well basically (laughs). For team meetings I don’t do 
it. There we just record the open issues on a flipchart and tick them one after the other. In 
this way, it serves us also to structure the meeting” 172. 
There is no standard form or process for such protocols, but within some 
teams there are clear agreements. In one team, for example, each protocol needs 
to show the tasks, the status of the tasks and who is responsible for it. The same 
day of the meeting, the protocol is sent to all participants who are asked to give 
feedback and if they do not react, they silently agree to content of the protocol. 
− Limited struc-
tural precision 
Another smaller limitation of conversations is they are loosely structured. 
Earlier, we have mentioned (see: Practices in the need articulation phase / Focus 
on face-to-face conversations) that the flexibility of conversations is important 
for the two parties to gradually converge into a shared understanding and to 
externalize tacit knowledge. Yet, after a first flexible approach to the issue, a 
clearer, more persistent structure is necessary.  
“The conversation is only the beginning, like the draft for an essay. From there a structure 
                                                 
171 „Wenn man sehr viel spontan macht, wird auch wenig dokumentiert und dies kann dann zu Missverständnis-
sen führen. (..) Ein Gespräch... es entsteht und verschwindet wieder. Man muss es auf eine bestimmte Weise 
festhalten. Sonst geht man aus einer Sitzung heraus und der eine hat es so verstanden und der andere so und 
dann gehen zwei Leute mit absolut unterschiedlichen Vorstellungen heraus und beide haben eigentlich das Ge-
fühl, der andere ist dafür verantwortlich. “ 
172 „Nach jeder Sitzung mache ich ein Protokoll… so grundsätzlich (lacht). Bei Teamsitzungen machen wir das 
nicht. Dort halten wir einfach die Pendenzen mittels des Flipcharts fest und haken diese dann nacheinander ab. 
Auf diese Weise dient es uns auch zur Strukturierung des Meetings.“ 
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has to be developed and it has to be defined; how exactly will I proceed?”173 
Next to the ephemeral nature and its non-persistence, face-to-face interac-
tions represent a major modality how knowledge is integrated between the IT-
experts and the decision makers. 
− Invite business 
to selected IT 
meetings 
 
One major concern of IT-specialists and the managers from the business line 
is how to increase the common ground among them. We have mentioned, for 
example, the role of middlemen, of internships and of face-to-face interactions 
on regard. 
Another practice that facilitates the creation of a common ground is to in-
vite the managers from the business line to selected IT meetings and so to sensi-
tize them with the concerns and reality of the IT teams.  
“We also invite the people from the business to us. What we cannot do is that the people 
from the business do internships in our unit. That would be much too specific. But what we 
can do is to invite them to a team meeting or to other events of the IT where we say what is 
technologically on going, with what we will be confronted in the upcoming months or 
years, etc.”174. 
 
Challenges 
Related to the 
Group Dynam-
ics and Socio-
Emotional 
Aspects 
 
Socio-emotional aspects are essential to the successful integration of knowl-
edge between IT-specialists and managers. Oftentimes, people speak only on the 
surface of technical facts, managerial considerations, or economical arguments. 
But what they most worry about are informal alliances, allegations, and power 
constellations among their colleagues, and they will interpret others’ factual ar-
guments with the suspicion of a political motivation and serve themselves of 
apparent factual considerations in order to reach their political objectives.  
“There are cases where emotions play a larger role than the factual circumstances. People 
can block certain decisions because they have not understood each other or because they 
suspect something else, politics, innuendos… Then a lot deals with the personal position of 
                                                 
173 „Das Gespräch ist nur der Anfang, wie ein Entwurf für den Aufsatz. Daraus muss dann eine Struktur entste-
hen: Wie gehe ich vor.“  
174 „Wir laden die Leute vom Fach auch einmal bei uns ein. Was man sicher nicht machen kann, ist, dass die Leute 
vom Business bei uns einen Stage machen würden. Das wäre schon viel zu spezifisch. Aber wir können sie zu ei-
ner Teamsitzung einladen oder zu einer anderen Veranstaltung, wo wir sagen, was technisch am Laufen ist, was 
in den nächsten paar Monaten oder Jahren auf uns zukommt, etc.“ 
175 „Es gibt manchmal Fälle, wo Emotionen eine grössere Rolle spielen als der Sachverhalt. Man kann gewisse 
Entscheide blockieren weil man sich nicht verstanden hat und weil man irgendetwas anderes vermutet, Politik, 
Unterstellungen… Dann geht es sehr viel um das persönliche Machtverhältnis, obwohl ich dies gar nicht so ge-
meint habe.“ 
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power even if I have not intended it this way”175.  
In the following, we will outline some more specific challenges and practices 
related to the group dynamics that tend to emerge in the IT-specialist-manager 
constellation. 
− Relational 
tensions: Lack 
of trust and 
consideration  
 
In the interviews, a few IT-technicians mentioned that relational tensions 
complicated the communication, not so much with the business line, as more 
with the IT-management. 
“The managers can be quite detached. (..) They don’t know the concerns of the employee 
and they [..] show little comprehension for his problems. Sometimes I feel that what I say 
does not really reach them even if it has been understood. (..) One gets the impression that 
a problem is considered only because it limits the productivity or because some specific ob-
jectives cannot be obtained and not really because it bothers the employee in his work. Yet, 
the comprehension is an important precondition for a fruitful discussion”176.  
The basis for a collaborative communication is threatened by a low com-
prehension of management for the concerns of the employees and a feeling of not 
being considered as a person, but just as a source of production, upon which can 
be executed measures for improving productivity. This latter concern is illus-
trated by the following quote of an IT-technician: 
„One would like to squeeze the same performance with ever less people. I have, for exam-
ple, a new superior and he has to show to be with right in his new position. There are ex-
pectations he wants to fulfill and we, on the lowest level, have to pay for it”177.  
Finally, another cause of relational tensions can be the perception of lacking 
trust from the superior.  
“Management should have more trust. We always have to document everything, justify, 
and make things transparent. This takes a lot of time. In the end, the result is the same. We 
say we need that much time and this with or without a document outlining the exact evi-
dence. They always require a detailed documentation in order to take decisions and this is 
                                                 
176 „Das Management kann ziemlich abgehoben sein. Es versteht zu wenig, was den Mitarbeiter bewegt. Das 
Verständnis für Probleme des Mitarbeiters ist nicht vorhanden oder wird nicht gezeigt. Mein Empfinden ist oft, 
dass das, was ich sage, nicht ankommt, obwohl es eigentlich verstanden wird. (..) Ein Problem wird zur Kennt-
nis genommen, aber man hat fast das Gefühl, es ärgert, weil die Produktivität eingeschränkt ist und irgendwel-
che Ziele nicht erreicht werden können und nicht, weil es den Mitarbeiter in seiner Arbeit behindert. Das Ver-
ständnis ist jedoch eine wichtige Voraussetzung für eine fruchtbare Diskussion.“  
177 „Man möchte mit immer weniger Leuten immer noch die gleiche Leistung rauspressen. Ich habe beispielsweise 
einen neuen Chef und er muss zeigen, dass er zu Recht auf der neuen Position sitzt. Es sind Erwartungen da, die 
er erreichen möchte und auf der untersten Stufe müssen wir das dann ausbaden.“  
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quite difficult”178.  
Most of the times, such relational tensions do not become explicit topics of 
discussion. Yet, they build a context, within which it is difficult to criticize con-
structively, to share and develop knowledge, and to reach new solutions, as ex-
presses one IT-technician: “Sometimes, one is so absorbed by the emotional is-
sues that it is a double challenge to talk about the same, even just business-
wise”179.  
In part, these relational tensions, as mentioned only by a few interview part-
ners, are reflections of larger organizational developments (see: Challenges re-
lated to the outer context of the communication: Organizational reorganization). 
InSure lived through a large reengineering process, which led to lay-offs, redistri-
bution of existing job-functions, a more formal definition and execution of proc-
esses as well as the carrying over of a new, almost exclusively in universities edu-
cated IT-specialist generation. In times of such transformations, uncertainties, 
fears, and resentments are lived intensely and managers are often (mis-)perceived 
as the promoters and the people in charge of these organizational changes. In 
this way, corporate incidents can have repercussions on the group dynamics, 
which reigns between the IT-technicians, the IT-managers and the managers 
from the business line.  
 
− Feel intimi-
dated by for-
mal hierarchy 
 
Formal hierarchical levels can lead to informal dynamics between experts 
and decision makers, which are problematic for the sharing of knowledge. On 
IT-manager recalls from her experience:  
“Often there is an inhibition threshold ‚from down to top in the communication between 
IT technicians and IT managers or also between IT technicians and the managers from the 
business department. ‚How should I talk with him?’ And there it is my task to inquire with 
the right questions and to try not to use a too strong technical language. And if the IT-
technicians know that they can do it with me then they can also do it with the managers 
from the business line“180.  
                                                 
178 “Das Management müsste mehr Vertrauen haben. Man muss ihnen alles belegen, begründen und Dinge trans-
parent machen. Das braucht sehr viel Zeit. Am Schluss ist das Resultat das Gleiche. Wir sagen, wir brauchen so 
und so lange, mit oder ohne genauen Beleg und Begründung. Sie wollen immer alles genau dokumentiert haben, 
damit sie entscheiden können und das ist dann relativ schwierig.“ 
179 „Manchmal hat man mit dem Emotionalen genug zu tun und es ist eine doppelte Herausforderung, dass man 
wenigstens auf der fachlichen Ebene vom Gleichen spricht.“ 
180 „Oft ist in der Kommunikation von den IT Technikern mit den IT Managern oder mit dem Business ein biss-
chen eine Hemmschwelle ‚von unten nach oben’ da: ‚Wie rede ich mit dem?’ Und da ist es meine Aufgabe, mit 
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Practice Rela-
tive to the 
Group Dynam-
ics and Socio-
Emotional 
Aspects 
− Cultivate per-
sonal contact  
 
Over and over again, interviewees mentioned that a very central aspect of 
the knowledge communication between the IT-specialists and the managers is a 
well working interpersonal relationship. 
“Central for a successful knowledge transfer is a positive comity with the interlocutor, 
to whom one wants to convey knowledge. One has to talk on the same level and not to 
condescend or stress the differences between specialist and non-specialist. The inter-
locutor should feel the respect and that the other has a big interest to understand. One 
has to care for a relationship that is characterized by mutual respect, personally and 
professionally. Trust is a very important precondition”181.  
The relationship between experts and decision makers has to be character-
ized by mutual respect, trust, and care. As IT-experts often intervene in the daily 
working processes of the business, the risk is high that the business feels threat-
ened or offended by the suggestions of the IT and that it starts blocking the col-
laboration.  
“We have to convey that we do not want to take away anything from the business, but that 
we want to help the business so that it can carry out its work more quickly and more effi-
ciently. But here, we already have to be cautious because, implicitly, we say that today they 
do not work quickly or efficiently. (..) If the business does not collaborate, we simply can-
not display the process. I know a lot of examples where projects failed because of such is-
sues”182.  
In order to cultivate good interpersonal relationships, much of the commu-
nication takes place in face-to-face conversations (see: Practices relative to the 
communicative process / Extensive use of face-to-face conversations). In this 
way, with each business-related communication, the employees get to know each 
other also on a personal level.  
− Communicate 
in a transparent 
To build up mutual trust and respect, important guidelines in the communi-
                                                 
den richtigen Fragen zu bohren und darauf zu pochen, eine nicht allzu starke Technikersprache zu verwenden. 
Und wenn IT Techniker erfahren, dass sie das mit mir können, dann können sie das auch mit dem Business.“  
181 „Ein Aspekt, der den Wissenstransfer überhaupt erst möglich macht, ist ein wirklich gutes Einvernehmen mit 
dem Gegenüber, dem man das Wissen vermitteln möchte. Man muss auf der gleichen Ebene miteinander spre-
chen, nicht von oben nach unten oder von Spezialist zu Nichtspezialist. Man darf nicht unterstreichen, dass die-
se Unterschiede wichtig sind. Im Gegenteil, das Gegenüber sollte den Respekt spüren, dass es ein grosses Anlie-
gen ist, dass man verstanden wird. Man muss eine Beziehung pflegen, die sich auszeichnet von einem gegenseiti-
gen Respekt, persönlich und fachlich. Vertrauen ist eine ganz wichtige Voraussetzung“.  
182 “Man muss vermitteln, dass man dem anderen nichts wegnehmen möchte, dass man helfen möchte, dass das 
Business seine Arbeit schneller und effizienter machen kann. Aber da muss man schon wieder aufpassen, man 
sagt dann implizit ja auch, dass sie es heute nicht schnell und nicht effizient machen. Wenn das Business nicht 
mehr mitmacht, können wir schlicht die Prozesse nicht abbilden. Ich kenne viele Beispiele, wo Projekte nur an 
solchen Dingen gescheitert sind.“  
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and open way 
in order to 
convey authen-
ticity and trust 
 
cation are to engage in frequent and open communication, to address own mis-
takes as well as difficult issues.  
“For the mutual trust, it is very important to communicate openly where one stands and 
which issues are problematic. If a person has made an error he/she should say: ‘Sorry, I did 
not know it better’. In this way, one remains authentic. (..) One should also have the cour-
age to address difficult issues”183.  
Building on a trustful relationship also means to start with having trust in 
the colleagues as well as believing in the reciprocity of this trust.  
 
Challenges 
Related to the 
Mental Models 
− Differences in 
orientations ( 
technical – 
cost, desired – 
feasible, 
planned-from 
day-to-day) 
lack of com-
mon ground 
 
The mental orientations of IT-specialists can differ quite substantially from 
the ones of managers and this might hinder a successful communication. To 
sketch these differences in a stereotypical manner, we can say that the technical 
orientation of the IT-specialist is confronted with the rigid cost orientation of the 
manager; the IT-technician is close-lipped, the manager instead is outgoing and 
client-oriented manager; the IT-technician is oriented on processes-in-use (proc-
esses as they are lived on a day-to-day basis) while the manager is oriented by 
exposed processes (the way processes are said to be)184. Finally, IT-technicians 
have insight knowledge on the technical possibilities and are therefore oriented 
on what is feasible or reasonable; whereas the managers on the client slide are 
oriented on what they need and on hypothetical technical possibilities. One IT-
technician mentions an example on how differences in orientation can hinder 
communication: “The upward communication is almost more difficult since 
there, the topics are different: strategies, new products, orientations. I am techni-
cally oriented, not cost oriented. Here, the discrepancies are sometimes pretty 
high”185. Another one mentions: “They [the managers] orient themselves on 
theoretical processes or models and these do not really fit with the praxis”186. 
These diverging orientations result in different ways of approaching a new pro-
ject or of assessing a situation and solution.  
                                                 
183 „Für das gegenseitige Vertrauen und den Respekt ist sehr wichtig, dass man einander offen legt, wo man steht 
und welche Dinge problematisch sind.  Wenn man einen Fehler gemacht hat, sollte man sagen: Sorry, ich habe 
es nicht besser gewusst’. Auf diese Weise bleibt man authentisch. (..) Man muss auch den Mut haben, schwierige 
Themen anzuschneiden.“ 
184 For a more elaborate distinction between ‘espoused theories’ (written or oral self-descriptions of one’s/an or-
ganization’s behavior, values, beliefs) and ‘theories-in-use’ (those more implicit values, beliefs, and assumptions 
manifested in personal/organizational practice) (Argyris & Schön, 1978). 
185 “Die Kommunikation nach oben ist fast noch schwieriger weil deren Themen ganz anders sind: Strategien, 
neue Produkte, Ausrichtungen. Ich bin technisch orientiert und nicht sehr kostenorientiert. Hier sind die Diskre-
panzen manchmal noch gross.“ 
186 „Sie orientieren sich an theoretischen Prozessen oder Modellen und diese passen nicht wirklich auf die Praxis.“ 
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“Everybody has his view and assesses facts from his professional context and his experi-
ences. The IT-technician weights issues differently than the IT-manager and also differently 
than someone from the business line”187.  
 In a situation where values, practices, background knowledge and perspec-
tives differ quite substantially and the two parties do not speak the same lan-
guage, the big challenge is “to find a common understanding or consensus of 
what is really necessary and important”188. One IT-manager illustrates this prob-
lem in the following way:  
“Imagine an IT-person who is introverted and likes to brood with bits and bytes. Now, he 
is in a situation with a client, who is not at all interested in technology and simply says: 
‘My guts’ feeling tells me that here I need something. Just go ahead’. Of course, the IT-
specialist thinks in a whole different paradigm and the question is, will they ever be able to 
understand each other?’”189. 
The communication between people with such different orientations rarely 
moves on a level where a deep understanding can be established. Knowledge is 
presumed, which actually is not present. Equally, interests might be very differ-
ent so that an IT-technician is very fascinated by an aspect, which the manager 
finds impertinent and boring. “It is most important not to talk with a person 
about something she/he is hardly interested and only listens with half an ear”190. 
The challenge in this constellation is to find a common ground that connects 
these diverging orientations: “The intersection of the two understandings of the 
piece of information is relatively small and this is really the central point”191. 
Experts and decision makers have to identify this intersection and build on in it 
in order to further increase it. This does not mean that differences have to be 
eliminated. On the contrary. It is important to stand in for the own perspective, 
to keep the differences in orientation, but try to make one’s own perspective 
                                                 
187 „Jeder hat eine andere Sicht und gewichtet den Sachverhalt aus seinem beruflichen Umfeld, aus seinen Erfah-
rungen. Das ist ein relativ schwieriges Gebiet. Der IT-Techniker gewichtet Dinge anders als der IT-Manager und 
nochmals anders als jemand aus dem Fachbereich“. 
188 „Es ist sicher auch eine Herausforderung, ein gemeinsames Verständnis oder einen gemeinsamen Konsens zu 
finden über das, was wirklich notwendig und wichtig ist“. 
189 „Stellen Sie sich einen IT-Menschen vor, der ein bisschen introvertiert ist und mit Bits und Bytes vor sich hin-
wurstelt. Er trifft nun auf eine Situation mit einem Kunden, der sich überhaupt nicht interessiert für Technik 
und einfach nur sagt: ‚Irgendwie habe ich ein Bauchgefühl, das mir sagt, hier brauche ich was. Mach mal!’. Der 
Informatiker denkt natürlich auf einer ganz anderen Schiene und die Frage ist, werden sich die beiden jemals 
verstehen können?“ 
190 „Es ist aber auch wichtig, dass man mit der Person nicht über etwas spricht, was sie gar nicht interessiert und 
nur halb zuhört.“ 
191 „Die Schnittmenge der beiden Verständnisse der Informationen ist schon relativ klein und das ist wirklich der 
wesentliche Punkt.“ 
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accessible and interesting to the interlocutor.  
“Sometimes when I meet a representative of the business line, I am confronted with a lot of 
wishes and of course, the client is the king. On the other side, the challenge is to turn the 
feasible into the reasonable. Sometimes one has to say that it is better not to do something 
because it would mess up something else and we always work with a mortgage that lasts 
for the next 20 years”192.  
 The same is true also for the process how to define a clear request, which 
was once much less formal and articulated and today has become a process with 
clear deliverables and phases. It is important to stick very clearly to the new for-
mal process in order that all too well established patterns of behavior slowly can 
be changed.  
“We still have different time horizons, a vision of a well-defined and ordered process and 
one of a ‘I-would-like-to-live-into-the day’. At the moment, it is a very difficult process to 
get used to the new rules of the game. But we have to be very clear on that if we want to 
increase our efficiency”193.  
The stereotypical view of the differences in orientation between experts and 
decision makers and the lack of common ground have to be relativized. In the 
communication between the business line and the IT there is a strong shared 
interest due to the reciprocal dependence of both parties. The business can only 
work with well functioning IT-applications and the IT can only work in collabo-
ration with the business. From there follows a continuous interaction between 
the two parties and at the end also a common object (the IT-application). All 
these aspects very much favor the creation of a common ground. In fact, an IT-
manager states:  
“The communication with the business works pretty well. We produce something, with 
which they will work afterwards. In spite of all the difficulties, we still talk about the 
same”194.  
The IT application is the object around which both parties are communicat-
                                                 
192 „Wenn ich mich mit dem Fachbereichsvertreter treffe, da treffen Wünsche auf mich und natürlich, der Kunde 
ist der König. Auf der anderen Seite ist die Herausforderung diese, die Wünsche auf das Machbare und das 
Sinnvolle hinunter zu brechen. Manchmal muss man sagen, dass man etwas besser nicht macht, weil man etwas 
verbockt oder weil man mit einer Hypothek arbeitet, die einem für die nächsten 20 Jahre bleibt.“ 
193 „Wir haben immer noch unterschiedliche Zeithorizonte, von einer Vorstellung einer well-defined und geordne-
ten Zeit bis zu einer ‚möchte-gern-in-den-Tag-hinein-leben’. Das ist im Moment ein schwieriger Prozess, sich an 
diese neue Spielregeln zu gewöhnen. Wir müssen aber da hindurch, damit wir eine Effizienzsteigerung heran-
bringen können.“ 
194 „Die Kommunikation mit dem Fachbereich geht eigentlich gut. Wir produzieren etwas, womit sie danach 
arbeiten. Trotz allen Schwierigkeiten sprechen wir noch vom Gleichen.“ 
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ing and it is the focus of attention for both parties195. It serves as a shared arte-
fact to create common ground196 and around which to organize collaboration. 
 
− Hidden misun-
derstandings 
 
Another general challenge in the knowledge-intensive communication be-
tween experts and decision makers that can be located on the level of the mental 
models is the one of uncovering implicit misunderstandings. Misunderstandings 
can arise because of differences in use of terms by either using the same term 
meaning different issues or by using different terms meaning though the same197. 
“Even the business line and us, we often work together, but still often use very different 
terms for expressing the same or for something else (laughs). That is really a difficulty. 
Management speaks yet another language. We have to work everything out in details, cir-
cumscribe it and we are not allowed to use abbreviations”198.  
Misunderstandings typically arise in relation to words such as ‘workflow’, 
‘software production’, ‘admin-console’, or regard, for example, the difference 
between ‘software’ and ‘application’. The risk of such misunderstandings is par-
ticularly high if the interaction partners rarely know each other.  
“You can see that with new sector leaders to which you are not yet completely used. I 
suspect we talk of the same, but name it differently. (..) We start discussing, almost be-
come emotional and a little agitated. But then we realize that we speak of the same, but 
name it differently”199. 
                                                 
195 Bechky (2003) made a similar point in an ethnographic study of a production floor, in which she analyzed the 
communication of knowledge between different occupational communities. While a shared understanding be-
tween two communities was difficult because of different conceptualizations and loci of practice, it was facili-
tated through the fact that both communities had a same work objective (e.g. creating a same product). 
196 See: (Kraut et al., 2003; Olson & Olson, 2000) 
197 Bechky (2003) discussed the same phenomenon and showed how misunderstandings across occupational 
communities arise because of „decontextualization“, a use of language that one community assumes to be uni-
versal, but that is incomprehensible to another occupational community, which is not sharing the same context. 
Specifically, Bechky showed how engineers attribute different meanings to the same word than assemblers to 
designate a machine or work process to designate different things or they use different words to represent the 
same objects. While engineers have a more conceptual, schematic understanding, assemblers tend to have a 
more spacio-temporal and procedural understanding. The misunderstandings that derive are either readily dis-
covered or remain unknown for a considerable amount of time. Bechky made the interesting argument that 
these misunderstandings can be reconciled through the use of „tangible definitions“, that is the use of physical 
objects (such as machines) for illustrating one’s understanding in a very tangible way. She claimed that ma-
chines, for example, serve as ‚boundary objects’ and help to create a common ground among the occupational 
groups. On the other hand, she found that technical drawings from the engineers were not suited to create 
common ground as they were too abstract and unfamiliar and did not invoke „the loci of practice and concep-
tualization of the product that each group had“ (p.325).  
198 „Bereits der Fachbereich und wir, die wir ja oft zusammenarbeiten, verwenden oft sehr unterschiedliche Begrif-
fe für das Gleiche oder eben für etwas anderes (lacht). Das ist oft eine Schwierigkeit. Das Management spricht 
nochmals eine andere Sprache. Da muss man alles ausführen, alles umschreiben, man darf nicht Abkürzungen 
verwenden.“ 
199 „Man sieht das beispielsweise bei neuen Sektorleitern, an die man sich noch nicht so ganz gewöhnt hat. Ich 
vermute, wir sprechen vom Gleichen, drücken uns aber anders aus.(..) Man diskutiert dann, wird fast emotio-
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− Difficulty to 
convey the 
know-why of a 
proposed 
measure and 
to gain the 
other’s under-
standing for 
one’s perspec-
tive 
 
A final challenge related to the different mental models of IT-specialists and 
managers is that, in the communication, one not only has to convey what is at 
issue, but also why it is at issue. In other words, not only the ‘know-that’ is im-
portant, but also the ‘know-why’.  
„My biggest challenge is to show why we actually want to know something in specific. 
Otherwise, they have the feeling: ‘Ahh, now there comes the manager again and needs 
to know some idiocy to justify something’. This is really my biggest communicative 
challenge. I have to make it clear to the people why I need something and in this way I 
have to bring in the management perspective”200. 
Without the ‘know-why’, the other has difficulties in understanding the im-
portance or necessity of something or the implications it has for the organiza-
tion. With the need to share the ‘know-why’, the communicators have to convey 
part of their perspective on issues and this is a much more difficult task than 
simply sharing a ‘know-what’.  
 
Challenges 
Related to the 
Outer Context 
of the Commu-
nication 
− General uncer-
tainty due to 
recent reor-
ganization 
The challenges and practices we have so far discussed are very closely re-
lated to the single interactions and the different means of communications. While 
the characteristics of these communications and the routine interaction patterns 
contribute to the structure of larger social entities such as the organization as a 
whole, on the other hand, each interaction is embedded in a larger (organiza-
tional) context and influenced by it201. A last set of challenges therefore is related 
to the outer context, in which the knowledge communication takes place.  
A major contextual aspect of the knowledge communication between IT-
technicians, IT-managers, and the managers from the business line is that InSure 
passed through a major reorganization recently. People had to be laid off, others 
reallocated or had to take over additional functions. Employees lived through a 
period of larger instability, feared to loose their jobs, and had to adjust to other 
forms of working (e.g. more formally defined processes and procedures). In such 
a context, relational conflicts are in the air and emotional aspects are more im-
portant than the sharing and integration of knowledge. It is interesting also that 
                                                 
nal, echauffiert sich ein bisschen. Man stellt dann aber fest, dass man vom Gleichen spricht, es jedoch anders 
darstellt.“ 
200 „Meine Herausforderung ist es, aufzuzeigen, warum wir etwas eigentlich genau wissen wollen. Sonst haben die 
das Gefühl, ahh, jetzt kommt da wieder der Manager und muss da jetzt wieder irgendeinen Blödsinn wissen, um 
etwas rechtfertigen zu können. Das ist wirklich meine grösste Kommunikationsherausforderung. Man muss den 
Leuten klar machen, warum man etwas braucht und auf diese Weise, die Managersichtweise hineinzubringen.“ 
201 This reciprocal relationship between the single interactions and the larger social context refers to the historic 
discourse of sociologists between structure and agency (see for example: Giddens, 1984: xxvi). 
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a very strict division between experts and decision makers, at least in the IT de-
partment, is no longer feasible.  
“This year, we had a huge reduction of staff in the IT and we cannot afford pure managers 
who just take decisions. Everyone in my position needs a certain IT know-how and needs 
to understand what is going on among his people”202. 
 
−  Time pres-
sure: Lack of 
time for com-
munication 
leads to mis-
understand-
ings 
 
A final and very important contextual constraint is time. In the last years, 
time became an ever rarer resource. Leading an effective communication, on the 
other hand, is seen as an objective, which requires very much time. Sometimes, 
tradeoffs have to be made with other activities, which are more closely related to 
production. One IT-technician explains to which extent time pressure increased 
in the last years. 
 “We all have to react very quickly. For example, policy project interests. They used to be 
adjusted once a year or every second year and we had three to four months for the decision 
process. Today, we have to decide within one day”203.   
Within this setting of very tight timeframes, time for communication is often 
very limited as mentions this IT-manager: 
“I only give minimal information. I don’t have the time to educate the people as pro-
fusely and as in-depth as I would like. This is another problematic point. (..) I just say 
what the task is and briefly explain the larger context, but just what is absolutely neces-
sary”204. 
If time lacks even for explaining in little bit more detail the context of a pro-
ject or IT-undertaking, then the time for less directly functional communication 
is even scarcer. Another IT-manager adds:  
                                                 
202 „Wir hatten einen massiven Stellenabbau in der IT in diesem Jahr und können uns eigentlich nicht mehr reine 
Manager leisten, die nur noch Entscheide fällen. Jeder, der in meiner Position ist, braucht ein gewisses IT Know-
how und muss verstehen können, was bei seinen Leuten vorgeht.“  
203 „Wir müssen jetzt sehr schnell reagieren. Beispiel Offertenzinsen. Die wurden früher alle Jahr, alle zwei Jahre 
einmal angepasst und man hatte 3-4 Monate für den Entscheidungsprozess Zeit. Heute muss man das innerhalb 
eines Tages entscheiden.“ 
204 „Ich gebe ihnen nur die minimalsten Informationen. Ich habe gar nicht die Zeit, die Leute so breit und so tief 
auszubilden. Dies ist ein weiterer Problempunkt. (..) Ich sage nur, das ist die Aufgabe und erkläre kurz, was die 
grösseren Zusammenhänge sind, aber nur das, was gerade nötig ist.“ 
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“My major problem is time. I would love to spend more time with my people and try to 
understand what they do in detail. In this way, they could receive feedback and input 
from outside”205. 
Such type of communication would be important to increase the learning 
processes and IT-specialists could learn from past experiences, but also collabo-
ratively find novel solutions to known problems. Yet, as the time is scarce, the 
communication is limited to those aspects, which are absolutely indispensable.   
 
Practices Rela-
tive to the 
Outer Context 
of the Commu-
nication 
− Organize in-
ternships for IT 
specialists in 
business to 
create com-
mon ground 
A very important practice of the IT department, which provides the context 
in which the knowledge communication can take place, is that it organizes in-
ternships for their IT-specialists in the business line. The people in charge con-
sider it to be a major practice how they can address challenges as the ones re-
lated to the lack of common ground or to the differences in language and orien-
tation.  
“I consider everything that regards education as extremely important, not in the form 
of courses, but of internships in the business. There, my people really learn how the 
business works. For two, three, or four weeks they go to the business line and work to-
gether with the people there. They might not be a 100% productive, but they see very 
specifically on what the people from the business are working. That is really a very im-
portant key success factor for the comprehension”206. 
The IT department invests a great deal in such a form of education. The 
heads of the IT department hope that by sending their IT-specialists to the busi-
ness, their people can grasp not only some basics on the insurance business, but 
get to know also the business’ mode of working, its people main concerns, the 
issues, which put them off, the stories that turned to local myths, and the lan-
guage they talk amongst each other207. By knowing these aspects, it is easier for 
them to enhance the mutual understanding between the two parties. 
                                                 
205 „Mein grösstes Problem ist die Zeit. Ich würde sehr gerne bei meinen Leuten sitzen und versuchen zu verste-
hen, was sie im Detail machen. So bekämen sie auch einmal ein Feedback von aussen oder auch Impulse be-
kommen.“ 
206 „Alles was Ausbildung angeht, nicht in der Form von Kursen sondern von Praktika in den Fachbereichen, 
erachte ich als sehr wichtig. Dort lernen meine Leute wirklich, wie das Business funktioniert. Sie gehen dann für 
zwei, drei, vier Wochen in den Fachbereich und arbeiten dort mit. Sie sind vielleicht nicht 100% produktiv, se-
hen aber sehr konkret, woran der Fachbereich arbeitet. Das ist wirklich ein sehr wichtiger Erfolgsfaktor für das 
Verständnis.“ 
207 Nonaka and his colleagues make a similar point when underlining the importance of direct and shared experi-
ence for the sharing of tacit knowledge. They claim that since this type of knowledge is very hard to put in 
words, people can mainly share it by engaging in personal observation and doing (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & 
Konno, 1998; Nonaka & Toyama, 2002).  
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It is most important that we have people in the IT who are very close to the business. 
One way to enable this is to send IT-specialists to the business in internships. (..) In this 
way, they learn to interact with their clients on a high level”208. 
− Invite all peo-
ple who bring 
in the neces-
sary knowl-
edge into a 
meeting 
 
A final important aspect of the context of interactions regards the selection 
of people who are invited to participate at a communication, and in particular, 
at a meeting. An IT-manager mentions in this regard: “It is extremely important 
that the right people sit together at the right moment in time”209 and another 
adds: 
“If it becomes really important, two or three people have to sit around a same table. If I 
have a question and the other says that he goes to verify a specific aspect, then I will 
never get an answer to my original question”210.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 35 gives a synthetic overview on both the challenges and practices 
unspecific to the communication phases, which we have discussed and catego-
rized through the presented framework for knowledge conversations. The circu-
lar flow depicted among the various dimensions of the communication refers to 
the strong interconnections between the five dimensions. We have discussed such 
                                                 
208 „Es ist wirklich sehr wichtig, dass man innerhalb der IT Leute hat, die sehr businessnah sind. Eine Art, um dies 
zu ermöglichen, ist, dass man Informatikern Praktika im Fachbereich organisiert. (..) Auf diese Art lernen sie, 
mit den Kunden auf einem hohen Niveau zu sprechen.“ 
209 „Es ist extrem wichtig, dass die richtigen Leute zum richtigen Zeitpunkt zusammensitzen.“ 
210 „Wenn es wirklich wichtig wird, müssen zwei oder drei an den gleichen Tisch sitzen. Wenn ich eine Frage habe 
und der andere sagt, er gehe das abklären, geht das vom einen zum anderen und ich bekomme nie die Antwort 
auf meine ursprüngliche Frage.“  
Figure 35: Phase-unspecific Challenges and Practices of the Knowledge Communication 
 Scale information across media and representation formats: 
Combine visuals (for overview) with short text (in-depth, 
structured, and explicit information) and oral communication 
(commitment, context, shared understanding)
Work with visualizations
Work with metaphors & quotes
 Define terms explicitly & develop glossaries
•Define small audience circles to better align the 
communication
•Extensive use of face-to-face
•Invite managers from business line to selected IT-meetings
•Cultivate personal contact 
•Communicate in a transparent and open way in order to 
convey authenticity and trust
•Organize internships for IT-specialists in business to create
common ground
•Invite all people who bring in the necessary knowledge into 
a meeting
•Lack the big picture of an issue
•Difficulty to externalize knowledge and bring it in a form that
is easily understandable, but lives up to the complexity of the
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•Feel intimidated because of formal hierarchy
•Differences in orientations (technical – cost orientation) and 
lack of common ground
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interrelations for example when showing that aspects of the outer context (e.g. 
the organizational reorganization) as they are perceived by the IT-experts have 
an impact on the group dynamics that are installed between them and the man-
agers.  
 
Conclusion 
Overall Practices: 
− Define Clear 
Knowledge 
Communica-
tion Phases 
and Manage 
Looping Be-
havior 
In the organizational context of InSure, we have analyzed how IT-
specialists, IT-managers, and the managers from the business line integrate their 
domain-specific expertise in the decision processes leading to a new/changed IT 
application. The business needs these IT applications for the execution of its 
insurance work. We have described the knowledge-intensive interactions be-
tween these three parties along IT-application development projects and have 
structured this description with the help of a phase model for knowledge com-
munication. We have discussed the more general, phase unspecific challenges and 
practices of the process of knowledge communication with the help of the 
framework for managing knowledge-intensive conversations. 
In view of the method of inquiry on which we mainly relied– qualitative in-
terviews – our description of the knowledge integration process has been limited 
to the exposed theories of the interviewees, and we have almost no knowledge 
on how the knowledge communication actually takes place. Yet, we have some 
indications on how the process is said to take place and on how the process is 
said to should take place.  
We have seen that while traditionally, the knowledge communication proc-
ess was not managed along clear phases, in the last years, InSure started to define 
and manage the knowledge communication process along different phases and to 
introduce more formalization. The different phases had to become well-crafted 
and had to show clear markers that define the end of a specific phase. The ‘need-
articulation’ phase, for example, is no longer a one-shot activity, but the organi-
zation realized that a continuous refinement of the demand is necessary. In addi-
tion, the phase finds today a clear formal end in the scope contract signed by 
both IT-experts and decision makers on the business side (without such an end, 
the phase was ‘exported’ up to the decision implementation phase and led to 
significant project delays). At the same time, the attempts to more strongly for-
malize the knowledge communication process, show that the knowledge com-
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munication process cannot be seen as a purely linear process211. Feedback circles 
are one of the most important characteristics of the process. Resuming the ex-
ample from the ‘Articulate need’ phase (phase II), the requirements for the IT-
application cannot be defined clearly in the scope contract without the IT-
experts first conducting the high-level and detail analysis (phase III: Analyze 
issue), then conveying their insights through a written study (phase IV: Convey 
insights, suggestions, & solutions), and then going back to the analysis phase. 
We illustrated the importance of the circling or looping practice also with regard 
to the uncovering of misunderstandings. If the process is completely linear and 
the need articulation is a one shot activity, there are few possibilities to uncover 
a misunderstanding of terms and the risk is high that they will be uncovered only 
at the moment when the final application is implemented. On the other hand, if 
the business uses a certain term in its business request, the IT people take it as 
they understand it (and understand it differently), do a first high-level analysis 
and then present their results to the business, the chance is high that the business 
will uncover the misunderstanding and remediate the problem. These two exam-
ples show how important the practice of circling is for the successful integration 
of knowledge. 
 
 
 
The subdivision of the knowledge communication process into clear linear 
phases and feedback circles represents, often, not the way how the process is 
actually taking place, but more the way management would like it to be charac-
terized. IT-experts still start to develop the IT-application without a clear scope 
contract signed. In this way, the more recently introduced formal process and the 
more engrained informal processes continue to coexist. The phase model of the 
knowledge integration process we have presented can grasp most of all this more 
formally imposed structure, but stands in some contrast to the more informal 
routinized processes of how the knowledge is integrated between the IT-experts 
and the decision makers from the business line. Finally, we have seen that the 
single phases of the knowledge communication process are not of the exclusive 
responsibility of either the experts or the decision makers. Rather, both parties 
have responsibilities in each phase of the process. For example, one could think 
that it is the task of the decision maker to define clear requirements for the 
wanted IT application. Yet, we have seen that for the decision makers, it is an 
                                                 
211 This goes in line with the observation of Sommerville (2001) that because of the impossibility to specify all 
requirements in advance, the software-design process cannot be conceived as a simple linear progression of the 
phases ‘requirement analysis’, ‘software design’, ‘programming’, ‘testing’, ‘debugging’ 
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impossible job to clearly define their need on their own (e.g. because of the men-
tioned ASK-problem or the difficulty to abstract general rules out of the everyday 
experience). An active collaboration with the IT-experts is therefore central in 
this phase of the interaction. In the same vein, the analysis phase can not be con-
ducted by the IT-experts alone, but requires also some engagement of the busi-
ness.  
 
− Assure a Suffi-
cient Common 
Ground and a 
Shared Under-
standing by 
Engaging in a 
Type of Com-
munication that 
is: 
− Collaborative 
(Through Face-
to-Face) 
− Flexible 
(Through 
Scaled Infor-
mation) 
− In-situ 
(Through In-
ternships), and 
− Mediated 
(Through Mid-
dlemen) 
In the description of the knowledge communication process, we have fo-
cused our attention particularly on the role of face-to-face interactions, the use of 
visualization, and on the communicative challenges and practices, which threaten 
or enable the knowledge integration. Some of these challenges and practices are 
specific to a particular phase of the knowledge communication process (see: 
Figure 33), others are present across the various phases and of more general 
nature (see: Figure 35). As these are a large amount of challenges and practices, 
we will briefly resume those practices, which were mentioned most frequently in 
the interviews and emerged as the core practices in the knowledge integration 
attempts between IT-experts and decision makers.  
We could show that the face-to-face interactions play a central role in the 
way how IT-experts and decision makers integrate their knowledge. In effect, the 
systematic use of face-to-face conversations, in the form of workshops, inter-
views, meetings, and bilateral talks has revealed to be a major practice for an 
effective integration of knowledge. Especially in the need articulation phase, 
face-to-face interactions are key, as they allow for a gradual approximation of 
the understandings of both IT-experts and decision makers. An elaboration of 
such a shared understanding is facilitated because of the face-to-face’s character-
istics of interactivity and physical co-presence. With each conversation, the 
communication partners get to know each other a little better and can also ex-
tend their reciprocal personal knowledge. Conversations therewith help to ex-
tend the common ground among the interlocutors and foster interpersonal well-
being. In addition, IT-technicians and managers mentioned that conversations 
foster a coincidental contact with new information, make it more possible to 
deal with delicate issues, and finally, create a situation, in which the expertise 
necessary for taking a decision is assembled around a same table. 
On the other hand, the communicational form of face-to-face conversations 
also entails some limitations for the successful integration of knowledge. Conver-
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sations are volatile and it is challenging to retain the knowledge created, shared, 
and integrated through and within this form of interaction. We have further 
shown that conversations put limits to the structural precision in so far as their 
flexible form usually goes at the expense of a clear structuring of the issue with 
which conversers are dealing. Conversers jump from one aspect to the other, 
follow immediate associations, and do not structure the issue in a thought-out 
manner.  
In view of these limitations of conversations, we have discussed a second 
major practice in the communication between the IT-experts and the decision 
makers from the business line: a systematic combination of different forms of 
communication in order to convey a specific issue. We have called this the scal-
ing of a topic across various media and representation formats. The practice is to 
communicate an issue through a variety of media and representation formats and 
to overcome the limits of one by the strengths and advantages of another one. In 
particular, the IT usually communicates an issue by a combination of a short 
verbal text, a visual representation, and a face-to-face communication. We have 
discussed that the visuals are used to facilitate the understanding process by 
making abstract issues more tangible, by activating imagination, and by structur-
ing and simplifying an issue, the latter an important aspect when needing to gain 
the big picture of an issue. An image further facilitates the remembering of an 
idea or aspect. Yet, the semantics of a visual text is oft looser defined than the 
one of a verbal text and its meaning remains more open to varied interpretation. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, the practice is to give the visuals a clearer 
interpretative direction by accompanying them with text. In a context where 
most organizations are confronted with the challenge of information overload, 
mentioning the same piece of information also in face-to-face conversations as-
sures that the intended target will actually be exposed to it, will better under-
stand its importance and the implications of it for his daily working reality. The 
scaling of information not only helps to overcome the drawbacks of the single 
communication formats, it is also useful to address the big-picture challenge we 
have discussed. Providing the same information in overview through the visual 
summary and through the face-to-face communication and in detail through the 
written text, the receiver can navigate in a flexible manner across these various 
levels of detail and deepen his knowledge only with regard to those aspects, 
which particularly interest him. 
Across the various communication formats, there persists a challenge, which 
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stands at the very core of the knowledge integration efforts between IT experts 
and decision makers from the business line and two explicit, structural practices 
InSure has developed in order to better tackle them. The challenge consists of a 
dilemma of how to deal with the concomitant, but polar need for specialization 
and common ground. We have shown that specialized knowledge and skills are 
necessary to take and implement a decision regarding an IT-application and that 
in view of the implications of these decisions on the workflows and processes of 
the business line, the business needs to be in power of the decision making. In 
this way, there is a need to functionally separate expertise and decision power. 
On the other hand, IT-experts and the decision makers from the business line 
must share some common ground in order to have a sufficient understanding of 
the other’s language, perspective, and mode of reasoning, and be able to effec-
tively communicate.  
InSure has developed two structural practices, which address this challenge 
very directly. The first practice we have discussed is to position middlemen, who 
have a duplex qualification and who can function as translators between the 
pure IT-specialists and the managers with no knowledge at all of IT-issues. A 
first such middlemen position is hold by the “business support”, a unit which 
supports both the people from the business and the IT-people in IT-application 
projects. These people usually have an education in informatics, but have profes-
sional experience in the business line. A second type of middlemen are the IT-
managers, who usually have a duplex educational background in informatics 
and business administration and, due to their work, are much more engaged in 
business processes and therefore have a better understanding for their perspective 
and concerns. The second practice of InSure to better handle the problem of a 
lacking common ground is that it is widespread custom to send IT-specialists for 
some weeks in the business line to work as a trainee. In these internships, the IT-
experts have the possibility to get to know better the daily work, concerns, and 
modes of reasoning of the business.  
To conclude, the analysis of the knowledge communication between IT-
experts and decision makers from the business line of InSure Ltd. has shown that 
a knowledge management approach from a communicative perspective has to 
address macro process issues, as well as aspects, which sustain across the differ-
ent phases of the knowledge integration process. In fact, we have seen that there 
is a need to define clear knowledge integration phases, but not to manage them 
in a purely linear way. Feedback loops are a key issue from a process perspective 
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and they need to be well managed in order to address challenges as the ASK-
problem (difficulty to make a specific question about something of which one 
has quite limited knowledge). With regard to the challenges, with which cannot 
be dealt by managing macro-process issues, we have discussed that InSure placed 
a major emphasis on a collaborative (through face-to-face communication), 
flexible (through the scaling of information), in-situ (through the organization of 
internships for IT-experts), and mediated (through the positioning of middlemen) 
type of communication. With these practices, the corporation aims to overcome 
the challenges inherently bound to the expert – decision maker situation – such 
as common ground and big picture – and creates an enabling context for the 
integration of knowledge.  
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Appendix 6 
List of Interviewees for the InSure Case  
1) Interview with the head of an IT development project (leads 16 people), Switzerland, Novem-
ber 03, 2003 
2) Interview with the head of an IT applications developing team (leads 7 people), Switzerland, 
November 03, 2003 
3) Interview with the group leader in workflow and electronic archiving (leads 7 people), Switzer-
land, November 03, 2003 
4) Interview with the leader of the sector Channel Applications (leads 40 people), Switzerland, 
November 03, 2003 
5) Interview with an IT architect (within a team of 7 people) 
6) Interview with the head of department of Life Application IT, (leads 70 people) 
7) Interview with the head of an IT applications team (leads 10 people), Switzerland, November 
03, 2003 
8) Interview with the head of the department Life & Pensions applications (leads 180 people), 
Switzerland, November 03, 2003 
9) Interview with the leader of a team for business support for CFO Applications (leads 25 peo-
ple), Switzerland, November 03, 2003 
10) Interview with an IT specialist of stand-alone applications (member of a team of 10 people), 
Switzerland, November 03, 2003 
11) Interview with the head of Customer Applications, Switzerland, November 03, 2003 
12) Interview with an IT-specialist in Individual Life Applications, Switzerland, November 03, 
2003 
13) Interview with a project leader for a business platform within the Life & Pension Application 
(heads two teams), Switzerland, November 03, 2003 
14) Interview with the head of Group Life Administration (leads 30 people), Switzerland, Novem-
ber 03, 2003 
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Appendix 7 
The Decision Maker Version of the Case Study Used for 
the Experiment 
The Pragmatic Development and Use of Know-how: Knowledge Management 
Light at Securitech Ltd. 
 
“Knowledge is not only a decisive competitive factor for research-intensive, multinational corpora-
tions, but also for a smaller, know-how-dependent firm such as ourselves, which is now expected to 
win market share in supra-regional competition.”  Managing Director of Securitech Ltd. 
. 
A The Business Context 
Securitech Ltd. is a limited liability company headquartered in Zurich, which has been active in 
the areas of fire protection, break-in protection and corporate security for approximately 25 
years. It was originally founded as an unincorporated company, and led by the company’s founder 
for approximately ten years, until he sold it to the management team, which helped to expand the 
company from around eight to, now, over ninety permanent employees. For fifteen years, a team 
of six managers has led the firm, although half of these had been with the company for less than 
five years. Of Securitech’s 95 employees, around 80 were directly involved in client projects. Secu-
ritech’s client portfolio is centred around medium-sized and large industrial companies throughout 
the greater Zurich area, as well as in the neighbouring regions. These required advice and prod-
ucts for security systems in warehouses, production sites and offices. The range of services offered 
by Securitech runs from the simple installation of a fire alarm system or a security system to the 
integrated planning of a company security concept for crucial annex buildings or the handling of 
dangerous materials.  
 
Securitech is organised into three profit-centre like sectors, i.e. fire protection and prevention, 
break-in protection and alarm systems, as well as integrated corporate security. In terms of turn-
over, the two first sectors each accounted for approximately 40 percent of the total. The remain-
ing 20 percent from corporate security consulting, however, accounted for almost half of Securi-
tech’s profit. For this reason, the company’s management had decided to more strongly accelerate 
growth in the area of integrated corporate security, not merely to continue as supplier and in-
staller of security products, but to increasingly present itself as a competent corporate security 
consultant in the (supra-regional) market. A major obstacle in the pursuit of this strategy is, never-
theless, the relatively rigid profit-centre orientation of the majority of the employees, which is 
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especially harmful to the sector-overreaching activities in the context of integrated corporate secu-
rity. In addition Meyer, the technical director, had several times critically reflected on Securitech’s 
learning capacity of the management, and ironically noted that “we call experience what we have 
been doing wrong for the last ten years – we don’t really learn from our successes and failures.” 
Most members of project teams, according to Meyer, “rush from one project to the next without 
looking right or left.” 
 
In addition to all this, it is just in the sector of integrated corporate security where the main know-
how is concentrated in a few engineers, who are in great demand in the job market. Several depar-
tures of highly qualified employees in the past year hurt all three business sectors. One had the 
feeling that a large mass of project experience and technological knowledge has been lost in one 
go. At the same time, technological change is sweeping the security industry faster than ever be-
fore, and many employees expressed their difficulties in keeping up with the newest product de-
velopments (to say nothing of the reserve shown in the use of computers and related applications). 
On the client side, this occasionally leads to a lack of respect for the know-how of the Securitech 
security consultants, probably also because Securitech finds it difficult to properly show and mar-
ket their wide range of knowledge regarding security concepts and technologies. Facing these chal-
lenges, Securitech has developed the vision to be a knowledge-based, learning organisation that is 
active on a supra-regional level and deals with significantly more complex projects. 
 
*         *         * 
 
B The Five Proposed Knowledge Management Activities 
On the basis of this state of affairs, the managing director of Securitech decided that Furrer, an 
experienced project-manager of Securitech who already had developed various knowledge man-
agement activities in his former job, should work out – together with an expert in the field of 
knowledge management - five light but specific knowledge management measures. Furrer and the 
external expert would then discuss these measures with the two responsible members of the man-
agement. Together, they would decide, which three of the five measures they should actually im-
plement. The following five proposals are under discussion: 
 
1. Knowledge Architecture 
This project envisions the creation of a knowledge architecture of the areas of Securitech’s core 
competencies, for an improved positioning and marketing of the company’s knowledge for client 
acquisition, but also for the recruitment of new employees. The planned graphic illustration aims 
to show how the different competencies of Securitech worked in unison, and how they were dis-
tributed within the firm (which sector has which know-how).  
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2. Know-how Organizational Chart 
The know-how organizational chart sets up a type of “knowledge shadow organisation” that aims 
to improve the network of competencies within Securitech and to overcome profit-centre-based 
thinking. In addition, this measure is intended to determine responsibilities for certain technology 
areas (“who is a specialist and contact person in what area and documents it accordingly.”). Addi-
tionally, this initiative is also intended to foster the concept of “communities of practice” within 
Securitech.  
 
3. Knowledge Fair 
The third proposed knowledge management measure consists of the organisation of a semi-annual 
knowledge fair with posters in the local cafeteria regarding important client projects, technologies 
and problems.  
 
4. The Knowledge-Cockpit 
The forth proposed knowledge management measure is a regular gathering of a knowledge cock-
pit by means of various indicators, for the unitary assessment (and early warning) of the state of 
Securitech’s knowledge.  
 
5. The Learning Curve  
The learning curve project plans the organisation of regular lessons learned workshops for all 
large-project teams, to make the learning capital of the finished projects accessible to other em-
ployees. 
 
*         *         * 
C Your Assignment 
In a one hour meeting, Furrer and the external knowledge management expert have to present the 
five knowledge management measures they have elaborated to two members of the management. 
Furrer and his expert already know that there is a lack of funding for all five initiatives and only 
three of them will be pursued further. At the end of this meeting, the three most convincing pro-
jects will be determined and the action steps to implement them will be decided.  
Imagine being part of this meeting: You take over the role of being a member of the management 
to whom the projects are presented. Your conversation partners are 1. another manager like you; 
2. Furrer and; 3. the external knowledge management expert. During the one hour discussion you 
will complete the three assignments described below. Furrer and the external expert can inform 
you on how the five knowledge measures look like. On the other hand, you have the feeling that 
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they still lack some important corporate information, you should share with them. As final result 
of the one hour discussion, hand in the 4 evaluation criteria, and the 3 chosen projects.  
1. During the first 30 minutes, define four criteria by which you will evaluate the knowledge 
management measures. To do so, share with the two experts your information, insights 
and suppositions on the Securitech’s vision and objectives, but also on its internal and ex-
ternal problems and challenges. Remember, you as the mangers have deep insights into 
the corporate situation of Securitech (its structure, problems and objectives). Actively 
share this corporate information with the experts, since it is very important in order to 
decide with what criteria you will evaluate the knowledge management measures. Thus, 
in order to define the assessment criteria for the knowledge management measures, con-
sider the overall situation of Securitech, but also of what you have learned until now on 
knowledge or project management either in class or through you previous internships or 
working experiences. 
2. During the next 30 minutes, discuss the five planned knowledge management measures, 
evaluate them and decide which three of the five you actually want to implement. Ask the 
experts to give you and overview on all five elaborated knowledge management measures, 
since you are informed on them on a very superficial level. Evaluate the proposed knowl-
edge management measures on the basis of the four assessment criteria you have defined 
in the previous 30 minutes and decide which three you actually want to pursue further.  
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Appendix 8 
The Expert Version of the Case Study Used for the Ex-
periment 
The Pragmatic Development and Use of Know-how: Knowledge Management 
Light at Securitech Ltd. 
 
 “Knowledge is not only a decisive competitive factor for research-intensive, multinational corpora-
tions, but also for a smaller, know-how-dependent firm such as ourselves, which is now expected to 
win market share in supra-regional competition.”  Managing Director of Securi-
tech Ltd. 
 
 
A The Business Context 
Securitech Ltd. is a company headquartered in Zurich, which has been trading in the areas of fire 
protection, break-in protection and corporate security for approximately 25 years. Securitech’s 
clients require advice and products for security systems in warehouses, production sites and of-
fices. The range of services offered by Securitech runs from the simple installation of a fire alarm 
system or a security system to the integrated planning of a company security concept for crucial 
annex buildings or the handling of dangerous materials. In the last years, the security industry is 
experiencing a technological change that is faster than ever before, and many employees have 
difficulties in keeping up with the newest product developments. For fifteen years, a team of six 
managers has led the firm, although half of these had been with the company for less than five 
years. Securitech has 95 employees and experienced quite a high employee turnover in the last 
years. Given the current situation, Securitech aims to be a knowledge-based, learning organisation 
that deals with significantly more complex projects. 
*         *         * 
 
B The Five Proposed Knowledge Management Activities 
On the basis of this state of affairs, the managing director of Securitech decided that Furrer, an 
experienced project-manager of Securitech who already had developed various knowledge man-
agement activities in his former job, should work out – together with an expert in the field of 
knowledge management - five light but specific knowledge management measures. Furrer and the 
external expert would then discuss these measures with the two responsible members of the man-
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agement. Together, they would decide, which three of the five measures they should actually im-
plement. The following five proposals are under discussion: 
 
1 Knowledge Architecture 
This project envisions the creation of a knowledge architecture of the areas of Securitech’s core 
competencies, for an improved positioning and marketing of the company’s knowledge for client 
acquisition, but also for the recruitment of new employees. The planned graphic illustration aims 
to show how the different competencies of Securitech worked in unison, and how they were dis-
tributed within the firm (which sector has which know-how).  
 
1. Knowledge Architecture 
Logo: Benefit: Costs: 
The visual depiction of our core 
competencies and their interaction 
enables clients and new as well as 
potential employees to understand our 
know-how better. In addition, it will aid 
us in structuring the know-how 
organization chart (see 2). 
One-off  drafting by core team and 
graphic artist:           
approx. CHF 25,000 
Execution: 
 Will be prepared/reviewed max. once per year  
Target group: 
All (potential and current) employees and clients 
Process: 
1. Determination of our core competencies (integrated security planning, fire prevention, break-in protection, 
labour and production safety) during the next business management meeting with the participation of important 
experts (Frei, Sutter, Gerhardt) 
2. Working out of interdependent and sub-know how areas 
3. Presentation of competencies as an attractive map 
4. Printing of respective posters, flyers 
5. Notification of employees by superiors 
6. presentation of the map in recruitment and sales discussions 
7. Annual updating of the map as appropriate 
Documentation 
Posters and flyers will be filed in the L:/Knowledge/Architecture directory. 
Person(s) responsible: 
Anton Furrer 
Check: 
Measurement though poster distribution in canteen and presentation in every team. Use in sales situations. 
 
Furrer and the knowledge management expert plan to accommodate around twenty different sec-
tors and sub-sectors of know-how with some measure of clarity in a diagrammatic depiction. 
Based on this arrangement, the aim is to create practice groups. Furrer is convinced that such a 
diagram of the knowledge architecture would make a notable impression at client meetings or 
recruitment sessions and that clients and competitors assessed it as professional, innovative or 
maybe even enlightening (in part because it could create a common context whereby it is possible 
to orient oneself in conversations and meetings). Yet, one fear of Furrer is that nobody in the Se-
curitech Ltd would have the technical skills to actually draw the diagram. For this reason, they 
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probably would have to work with an informational graphics specialist. Next to the rather high 
costs of such a person, the problem would be that this person, after drafting the knowledge archi-
tecture, most likely would know more about the know-how of Securitech AG than many employ-
ees, but would then leave the company with all its acquired knowledge. 
 
2 Know-how Organizational Chart 
The know-how organizational chart sets up a type of “knowledge shadow organisation” that aims 
to improve the network of competencies within Securitech and to overcome profit-centre-based 
thinking. In addition, this measure has the aim to determine responsibilities for certain technology 
areas (“who is a specialist and contact person in what area and documents it accordingly.”). Addi-
tionally, this initiative is also intended to foster the concept of “communities of practice” within 
Securitech.  
 
2. Know-how Organization Chart 
Logo: Benefit: Costs: 
Allocation of responsibility for specific 
technologies or processes to 
designated employees ensures a 
secure basis for the building up of 
knowledge. 
No quantifiable cash investment. Time 
investment of around 20 know-how 
area specialists: approx. 5 hours per 
week = approx. CHF 10,000 per week. 
(imputed costs) 
Execution: 
Securitech 
Know-how 
 
Regular screening of relevant trends as well as periodic briefings and reports to 
all employees by means of the employee newsletter or documents made 
accessible on the Server.  
Target group: 
Technology and process specialists of Securitech AG, as well as key account managers and project leaders. 
Process: 
1. Extracting approx. 20 know-how areas from our knowledge architecture 
2. Identification of relevant experts 
3. Allocation of tasks and responsibilities among the experts 
4. Experts organise practice groups and send initial orientation E-mail 
5. Experts set up area on server 
6. Five group leaders will present their area at the first knowledge fair (see point 3)  
Documentation 
The experts will set up their areas under L:/Knowledge/Groups. 
Person(s) responsible: 
Gregory Meyer: Head of production and technology 
Check: 
At least one technology report per know-how expert and year. At least two briefings to employees. At least two 
practice group meetings per year. Know-how-Organigram is available in the company presentation. Updates with 
Meyer. 
 
To draw up a knowledge structure and the relevant responsibilities would be relatively easily. 
However, Furrer’s biggest concern with this initiative is that the specific actions would depend 
heavily on the individual expert leader so that, at the end, no actions actually would take place. 
Because of this risk, Furrer and his knowledge management expert are not quite sure whether it 
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would be better to identify the “hot topics” and build on existing informal groups, instead of 
insisting on practice groups.  
 
 
3 Knowledge Fair 
The third proposed knowledge management measure consists of the organisation of a semi-annual 
knowledge fair with posters in the local cafeteria regarding important client projects, technologies 
and problems.  
 
3. Knowledge Fair 
Logo: Benefit: Costs: 
Systematic and global knowledge 
transfer between the various project 
teams of all Securitech sectors. 
Hall rental: CHF 700 
Approx. 30 educational units: CHF 
40,000  
Other costs: CHF1,300. 
Total : approx. CHF 42,000 per year 
Execution: 
 1-2 times per year, in the form of a half-day event coupled with technical reports and case studies. 
Target group: 
All project leaders and project staff. 
Process: 
1. Preparation of posters by  project teams to introduce their area of expertise 
2. Submission of  topics and clustering through Hurter => exhibition layout plan 
3. Set-up of booths by operations department, invitations per memo by Furrer 
4. Start: 8:30 am, two technical reports and subsequent holding of fair until 1:00 pm 
5. Individual informational briefings in booths the whole morning. Short presentations in booths possible 
6. Report on fair in employee newsletter by Hurter  
Documentation 
The posters of the project teams will be filed under L:/KnowledgeFair/ Year/Poster. The two introductory reports 
will be filed under L:/KnowledgeFair/Year/Reports. 
Person(s) responsible: 
Hans Hurter: assistant / project management support. 
Check: 
At least one general company meeting per year with attendance by at least 70 percent of project staff.  At least 
one partial meeting with attendance by at least 40 percent of project staff. 
Crucial for the success of the knowledge fair is the committed participation of the employees. For 
this reason, one of the challenging questions of this measure is how to ensure that all project 
teams actually produce a poster, that at least 70 percent of the project staff takes part in the 
knowledge fair and that the feedback questionnaire is completed by about two thirds of the par-
ticipants. To have the necessary commitment of the employees, it is crucial that this measure 
would be well communicated. Furrer therefore thinks to create logos not only for this particular 
measure, but for all the knowledge management initiatives they will implement. Another impor-
tant issue is also of how to organize the fair so that it becomes an event that not only is a tool to 
invite people to share their project experiences, but also increases the identification with Securi-
tech as an organization and motivates the employees in their daily work. 
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4 The Knowledge-Cockpit 
The forth proposed knowledge management measure is a regular gathering of a knowledge cock-
pit by means of various indicators, for the unitary assessment (and early warning) of the state of 
Securitech’s knowledge.  
 
4. Knowledge-Cockpit 
Logo: Benefit: Costs: 
Periodic success and risk vetting 
through a core set of meaningful 
indicators of knowledge increase and 
decrease, respectively knowledge 
use/development, at Securitech. 
Data collection costs: 4 hours per 
department semi-annually: approx. CHF 
15,000 
Execution: 
 
Semi-annually through all levels (from teams through departments and whole-
business) 
Target group: 
All project leaders and project staff. 
Process: 
1. Identification of critical knowledge areas (= target-determining) 
2. Compiling indicators – modeled on ‘balanced scorecard’ – in business management meeting  
3. Initial collection of  indicator data and linking to Cockpit 
4. Periodic data collection and analysis 
5. Fine tuning and annual comparisons as the occasion arises 
Documentation 
Indicators will be maintained in the access database. 
Person(s) responsible: 
Max Baumer (CFO) 
Check: 
At least one semi-annual run with 8 indicators from the areas of technology-know-how, client knowledge, 
profitability and processes.  
 
When Furrer elaborated the proposal for this measure, he found it quite challenging to develop an 
adequate set of indicators. Too few indicators would not cover the various aspects, fields and uses 
of knowledge. On the other hand, too many indicators would be difficult to manage. Also, since 
the employees would be responsible for the data collection in their sector, Furrer fears that it 
would mean to ask them too much effort for this particular initiative. Therefore, the biggest chal-
lenge to implement this measure successfully probably is to develop a clever system of manageable 
indicators that might be structured along two dimensions. Two possible dimensions could be in-
novation and efficiency. The three indicators in the area of innovation could then be the so-called 
rookie ratio (the percentage of new employees, who had been with the company for less than one 
year), the new client ratio (percentage of new clients) and the new product ratio (percentage of 
new products on offer, i.e. which have been available for less than six months). The indicators in 
the area of efficiency could be the winning ratio (number of won clients in relation to submitted 
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the area of efficiency could be the winning ratio (number of won clients in relation to submitted 
offers), the training ratio (number of diplomas received per professional examination taken) and 
the consulting ratio (percentage of consulting projects). 
 
5 The Learning Curve  
The learning curve project plans the organisation of regular lessons learned workshops for all 
large-project teams, to make the learning capital of the finished projects accessible to other em-
ployees. 
5. Learning Curve 
Logo: Benefit: Costs: 
This systematic milestone-analysis will 
help the team to avoid repeating 
mistakes, improve processes and 
reduce unnecessary work/expenditure, 
as well as preserving important findings 
for the future. 
Team meeting room, meta-planning 
tools and room. 
=> Approx. 3 half-day workshops per 
year and team: no quantifiable cash 
costs, imputed costs approx. CHF 
80,000 (to be charged to project 
budget) 
Execution: 
 
 
 
Approx. three times per year as a half-day event with presenter from another 
project group. 
Target group: 
All project leaders and project staff. 
Process: 
1. Stakeholder analysis of the project  
2. Survey of the most common questions, mistakes, successes, experiences with external contractors etc. 
3. Process review (what went well, what didn’t work => findings and actualisation) 
4. Plan of measures to be taken 
5. Looking forward 
6. Documentation saved on L server 
Documentation 
The metaplan working papers of the project teams will be filed under the path name L:/Knowledge/Learningcurve. 
Where projects have been completed, a short case study will be produced and filed in the same directory. 
Person(s) responsible: 
Large-project leaders. Project management support Hans Hurter 
Check: 
At least one completely documented learning curve workshop per year / large-project team. 
 
Furrer and the knowledge management expert are quite confident that this project would become 
a success. What they still do not have clearly in mind is the way how they want to document the 
‘lessons learned’. A very handy appraisal format would be determinant whether people who did 
not assist the workshops could actually learn from the lesson.  
*         *         * 
C Your Assignment 
In a one hour meeting, Furrer and the external knowledge management expert have to present the 
five knowledge management measures they have elaborated to two members of the management. 
Furrer and his expert already know that there is a lack of funding for all five initiatives and only 
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three of them will be pursued further. At the end of this meeting, the three most convincing pro-
jects will be determined and the action steps to implement them will be decided.  
Imagine being part of this meeting: You will take over the role of either Furrer or the knowledge 
management expert. You will talk to two managers of Securitech Ltd., who only have a very lim-
ited knowledge on your initiatives. You as the experts are the ones who have deep insights on how 
the five knowledge measures look like. On the other hand, while you were elaborating the five 
knowledge management measures, you realised that you still lack some important corporate in-
formation. The mangers can provide you with that information. During the one hour discussion 
you will complete the two assignments described below. As a final result of the one hour discus-
sion, hand in the 4 evaluation criteria, and the 3 chosen projects. 
 
3. During the first 30 minutes, define four criteria by which you will evaluate the knowledge 
management measures. To do so, share with the two managers your information, insights 
and suppositions on the Securitech’s vision and objectives, but also on its internal and ex-
ternal problems and challenges. Since you still lack some important information on these 
corporate issues, actively ask the managers to give you more insights on the specifics, 
problems and goals of Securitech. This information is important in order to decide with 
what criteria you will evaluate the knowledge management measures. Thus, in order to 
define the assessment criteria for the knowledge management measures consider the over-
all situation of Securitech, but also of what you have learned until now on knowledge or 
project management either in class or through you previous internships or working ex-
periences.  
4. During the next 30 minutes, discuss the five planned knowledge management measures 
and evaluate them so that the two managers can decide which three of the five to actually 
implement. Give the managers an overview on all five elaborated knowledge management 
measures. Remember, you as the experts have spent a lot of time developing these meas-
ures and know much more on the issue. You can contribute valuable insights and sugges-
tions, but the decisions, which ones to pursue further are then taken by the two managers. 
For the evaluation of the measures, use the four assessment criteria you have defined in 
the previous 30 minutes. Let the two managers decide, which three knowledge manage-
ment measures to pursue further. 
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Appendix 9 
The Information Cues of the Expert and Decision Maker 
Versions of the Case Study 
Information Cues Expert 
Decision 
Maker 
Corporate Information Cues   
General   
• medium sized company (90 employees) x x 
• new management team  x 
Organizational Structure:   
• profit center: fire (40%), break in (40%), corp. Sec (20%)  x 
Strategy:   
• grow in corporate security segment  x 
• enlarge action scope from regional to supra-regional level  x 
• establish vision to be a knowledge-based, learning organization that deals with 
significantly more complex projects. 
x x 
Problems and Challenges:   
• learn few from past experiences (successes / failures)  x 
• knowledge concentration in a few employees particularly in the corporate security 
business 
 x 
• knowledge amnesia due to employee turnover (x) x 
• profit center orientation -> particularly problematic for corporate security busi-
ness 
 x 
• poor marketing of expertise -> poor valuing of expertise on client side  x 
• keeping up with fast technological change and quick product development x x 
Project Information Cues   
Knowledge Architecture   
Logo x  
Benefits:    
• improved positioning and marketing of the Securitech’s knowledge for client ac-
quisition, but also for the recruitment of new employees 
x x 
• practice groups elaborating knowledge areas -> sensitization, coming together (x)  
Drawbacks:   
• don't have skills within Securitech x  
• hire expensive external person    
• loose knowledge when that external person has finished the job   
Cost: CHF 25'000 x  
Target: all employees   
Linkage to Other Initiatives: know-how org chart x  
Implementation Process x  
Documentation   x  
Person Responsible x  
Output/Year: posters with graphical representation of knowledge architecture (elec-
tronic, physical) 
x (x) 
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Information Cues Expert 
Decision 
Maker 
Know-how Organizational Chart   
Logo x  
Benefits:    
• improve the network of competencies within Securitech and overcome profit-
centre-based thinking 
x x 
• determine responsibilities for certain technology areas x x 
• foster the concept of “communities of practice” and building a knowledge base x x 
Drawbacks:   
• specific actions would depend heavily on the individual expert leader so that, at the 
end, no actions actually would take place 
x  
Cost: CHF 10,000 per week (work hours) x  
Target: Technology and process specialists, key account managers and project lead-
ers 
x  
Linkage to Other Initiatives: (knowledge architecture) x  
Implementation Process x  
Documentation   x  
Person Responsible x  
Output/Year: A knowledge shadow organization. Regular screening of relevant trends 
as well as periodic briefings and reports to all employees by means of the employee 
newsletter or documents made accessible on the Server.  
x (x) 
Knowledge Fair   
Logo x  
Benefits:    
• systematic and global knowledge transfer between the various project teams x  
Drawbacks:   
• commitment of the employees -> good communication needed x  
Cost: CHF 42,000  x  
Target: All project leaders and project staff x  
Implementation Process x  
Documentation   x  
Person Responsible x  
Output/Year: semi-annual knowledge fair with posters in the local cafeteria regarding 
important client projects, technologies and problems 
x x 
Knowledge-Cockpit   
Logo x  
Benefits:    
• periodic success and risk vetting through a core set of meaningful indicators of 
knowledge increase and decrease, respectively knowledge use/development 
x  
Drawbacks:   
• develop an adequate set of indicators x  
• much effort asked from staff x  
Cost: CHF 15,000  x  
Target: All project leaders and project staff x  
Process x  
Documentation   x  
Person Responsible x  
Output/Year: set of meaningful indicators of knowledge increase and decrease, re-
spectively knowledge use/development 
x x 
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Information Cues Expert 
Decision 
Maker 
Learning Curve    
Logo x  
Benefits:    
• make the learning capital of the finished projects accessible to other employees x x 
Drawbacks:   
• documentation of lessons learned x  
Cost: CHF 80,000  x  
Target: All project leaders and project staff x x 
Process x  
Documentation   x  
Person Responsible x  
Output/Year: regular lessons learned workshop (3xyear) x x 
 
Notes:  
x: information cue is fully and clearly available to the person with the specific role 
(x): information is cue only indirectly and less explicitly available to the person with the specific role 
text: information cue that is completely unimportant for the decision making process 
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Appendix 10 
Overview on the let’s focus Suite 
The let’s focus Timeliner is a tool that is thought to systematically structure conversations that 
aim at planning, documenting or reviewing processes. It contains four parallel time lines which can 
vary in their size and description. These streams can be structured into daily, weekly or monthly 
segments, and then filled with activities and events (let's-focus, 2006). Is suited for planning tasks 
(DeSanctis, 1987).  
The let’s focus Ruler supports tasks, in which teams or individuals have to undertake and 
compare evaluations along several dimensions (e.g. client- or competitor evaluations). The ruler 
makes it possible to discuss and take into consideration over forty decision variables concurrently. 
In this stance, the tool can also be used to develop scenarios or strategies. (let's-focus, 2006).  
The let’s focus Tracker supports the planning, moderation, and real-time documentation of 
workshops or meetings. Through the tool, participants can visualize the meeting goals and the 
agenda steps that are needed to achieve them. Main contributions of the meeting or workshop can 
be positioned along the track. The main idea behind the let’s focus Tracker is to graphically depict 
the course of the current meeting. In this way, meetings can be better structured and it can be eas-
ily uncovered if a conversation digresses into side tracks. At the end of a meeting, the completed 
track can serve as synthetic minutes. Contrary to the other tools of the let’s focus suite, the let’s 
focus Tracker is not bound to a specific task, but can be an instrument to structure the communi-
cation process of all sorts of meetings (let's-focus, 2006). 
The particularity of the let’s focus Positioner is a large library of interactive and in part ani-
mated templates of diagrams and visual metaphors that a user can load as a background and use 
as a loose or more strict structuring device on which to position his/her content. As the Positioner 
is the tool with which we conducted the experiment, we describe it in more detail in Appendix 11. 
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Appendix 11 
Functionalities of the let’s focus Positioner 2.1 
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In the following, we describe the functionalities of the let’s focus Positioner and discuss briefly its 
intention and supposed use. 
Select a Background 
A distinguishing feature of let’s focus Positioner is that its user (e.g. the moderator of a meet-
ing) can choose between a variety of backgrounds. These are either diagrams (i.e. Ishikawa, Bal-
anced Scorecard, Five Forces, Expert Web, Value Chain, or Ansoff Matrix) or visual metaphors 
(i.e. a radar, an iceberg, a bridge, geographical maps, a ladder, a pyramid, a wheel, or a funnel), 
some of which are discretely animated. Users can also load personal backgrounds (e.g. photo-
graphs). Users are free to choose whether they would like to use just one image or diagram for the 
whole conversation or whether they would like to work with two or three visuals that support 
specific phases of the conversation process. The suggestion is that a trained facilitator would real-
ize when a group is stuck in a certain approach and could propose a different image 
The idea is that the individual or group selects a visual guideline or cognitive and communica-
tive frame with which to approach and structure an issue or conversation. The frame is cognitive 
in so far as it shapes the way people view and structure a problem or task. These diagrams and 
metaphors comprehend also a communicative aspect since they provide a common ground and 
language to all the participants of a conversation. By providing content-specific visualizations and 
structuring methods (as opposed to content-unspecific visualization like a simple mapping tech-
nique) (Fischer et al., 2002), the tool facilitates collaborative processes and outcomes.  
Select a (Pre-configured) Template  
let’s focus Positioner provides a set of prefabricated templates to structure a meeting that 
aims, for example, at a stakeholder analysis, or at the evaluation of an merger. The templates 
combine a background image (diagram, visual metaphor) with some default text-fields and ob-
jects. The idea is similar to the one of the background functionality. In this case, however, the 
provided structure is more tightly guiding.  
Place Objects 
Users can drag and drop objects that have the form of a circle or of a square with a textbox 
next to them. Each (important) contribution and thought can be documented as an object. The 
color and size of both object and text can be changed.  
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Place Text Fields 
Users can place textboxes that have no adjacent object to them. Visually, they can be used for 
aspects, which do not represent a major “point” or statement in the discussion. For example, they 
can be used as descriptions for the various parts of the diagrams and metaphors. 
Place Arrows 
Users can draw arrows that show the interrelationships (causalities, flows, developments, ori-
gins, etc.) between various objects.  
Place Icons 
Users can select from a large array of icons (flash, target, bulb, bomb, green/red traffic lights, 
etc.) and place them next to textboxes or objects. In this way, they can emphasize a certain aspect 
and give it a visual indication of the type of information that is displayed (e.g. “idea”, “danger”). 
Delete 
Users can put objects, text fields, icons, arrows, etc. in the trashcan by dragging the elements 
over the trashcan. It is not possible to delete the objects by pressing the delete key. The developers 
believe that, from a communicative perspective, it is important to actually throw an idea away 
and not simply to make it disappear by the push of the button, as if it had never existed.  
Board  
The board is the space on the left hand side of the software window. Users have the possibility 
to deposit an idea or aspect in this area. It can be used as a “parking lot”, on which people can 
park an aspect and come back later on, in order to first finish the current argument. Also, it can 
be used to deposit aspects, of which conversers do not know where to put them along the diagram 
or metaphor.  
Comments  
The users of the let’s focus Positioner have the possibility to deposit comments. They can use 
the comments to document why they have positioned a certain aspect or issue at a certain level of 
the diagram or metaphor, what are the facts behind a specific evaluation, or what are the caveats 
behind a certain consensus. In that comment field, users can also add a specific URL or a link to a 
document (e.g. an Excell sheet) for further information or facts.  
While the main interface of the Positioner aims to show the major (discussion) points and de-
cisions made on an all-integrating visual, the comments give the groups or individuals the possibil-
ity to provide more detailed and background information. The user can show or print all the 
comments that appear as pop-up boxes and which outline the more detailed information (e.g. 
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facts, reasons why). If the person is interested merely in a summary, he/she can also hide the 
comments so that only the high level information is visible. The producers believe it to be impor-
tant to make it possible to “scale” information, i.e. to document and retrieve information at vari-
ous levels of detail and to easily link the summary view to the more detailed information.   
Print 
At any stage of the conversation, users can print out the Positioner interface and view inter-
mediate or final results on paper. Producers believe that the print-out functionality comprises 
various important functions. First, the change in the output media allows for subtle changes in 
fluidity and flexibility as they are perceived by the conversation partners. While the electronic 
media suggests that the documentation of the conversation is highly flexible and can be very easily 
changed, the cold print on paper implies more stability and participants can ‘freeze’ the intermedi-
ary results of a conversation and sense a feeling of security and progress. The printed media sug-
gests that official decisions have been taken (Mengis & Eppler, 2005). Second, with the printouts 
at hand, conversers can conduct comparisons more easily since screen sizes have tight limits in 
juxtaposing various Positioner interfaces simultaneously. In the case of a client assessment meet-
ing, for example, conversers can use the Positioner to structure the assessment of each client. The 
print-out function makes it then possible to compare the various client assessments. Finally, the 
media change from the electronic to the physical media is also important to include haptic and 
tactile senses that foster innovation and knowledge creation (Hatwell et al., 2003).  
Save 
Users can save the Positioner document.  
Make a Screenshot 
Users can make a screenshot of (preliminary) results or of the current state of their discus-
sion/thinking. The function of the Screenshot is necessary to include the let’s focus Positioner 
document in textfiles, presentations, etc. In addition, similar to the print-out function, it serves to 
“freeze” a (preliminary) result of a conversation and to create a sense of stability and accountabil-
ity.  
Compare two Screenshots  
Users have the possibility to make comparisons with a previously made screenshot. They can, 
for example, use one template to assess a past situation, make a screenshot, then make an assess-
ment of the current situation, and then load the previously made screenshot. The screenshot will 
appear semi-transparently so that the image of the assessment of the present is overlapping the 
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one of the past. In this way, comparisons between two time periods or between two clients, ob-
jects, etc. are possible.  
Change Size of Objects and Fonts 
With the size ruler, users can change the size of objects, icons, and fonts.   
Change Color of Objects and Fonts 
With the color palette, users can change the color of text fields, objects, and arrows.  
Clear 
Users can clear all objects, text fields, icons, arrows, etc., which are placed on the Positioner 
so that only the initial background image remains.  
Sign 
Users can document the author and the day of the file and give a brief description of its con-
tent. 
Undo 
Users can undo any action they have done (placing objects, selecting backgrounds, etc.). 
Languages 
User can switch between a German, English, Italian, and a French version of the software. 
Replay Function / Pause / Fast Forward / Stop 
The replay function permits users to review the process, through which the final image, e.g. 
the result of a discussion, has been created. One can envision the whole process (from the initial 
template/background to the final image) through which the group went through. Objects and 
textboxes will pop-up one after the other. The idea behind this functionality is that often, people 
forget or have never known (since they have not been present) how or why a certain conclusion or 
agreement has come about. This feature permits persistence i.e. traceability (Bregman & Hay-
thornthwaite, 2001) in the process of the conversation. One can see, for example, that a certain 
concept was renamed or first positioned at another level of the diagram. As in a video or audio 
recorder, the replay of the development process of a Positioner image can be paused or stopped 
and users have the possibility to do a fast forward.  
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Delete Replay Function 
The recording of the process through which the image got developed can be deleted. This 
functionality is interesting for example when one creates a template and isn’t interested in the 
process that lead to the creation of the template, but rather on the processes of the following in-
teractions.  
Import  
Users can import Excell-sheets or another positioner document.  
Export  
The software provides the functionality to export a Positioner document as excell-file (to fur-
ther use the text within the various categories) or as .jpg picture.  
Help 
let’s focus Positioner has a small help function, which includes also a guided tour and that 
explains how to use the software.  
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Appendix 12 
Distribution of Items - Tests of Normality 
Factor Item Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness 
(St.Error) 
Kurtosis 
(St.Error) 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (sig.) 
Shapiro-Wilk 
(sig.) 
EP 1.    .6875   .73193 1.822 (.299) 6.470 (.590) .288 (.000) .678 (.000) 
 2.  2.3214    .86297  -.330 (.441)  -.939 (.858) .284 (.000) .831 (.000) 
 3.    .7656   .92139 1.245 (.299)   .895 (.590) .266 (.000) .744 (.000) 
BP 1.  1.2813   .89918 1.433 (.299) 2.510 (.590) .373 (.000) .748 (.000) 
 2.  1.6094 1.09279   .464 (.299)  -.352 (.590) .272 (.000) .899 (.000) 
 3.  1.5000   .85449   .394 (.299)  -.561 (.590) .299 (.000) .841 (.000) 
 4. 1.2295    .58860    .418 (.306)   .637 (.604) .373 (.000) .751 (.000) 
 5.    .8594   .75313   .700 (.299)   .488 (.590) .341 (.000) .698 (.000) 
 6.   .8906   .66945 1.439 (.299) 6.456 (.590) .270 (.000) .809 (.000) 
CG 1.    .9531   .57541   .511 (.299) 2.241 (.590) .361 (.000) .714 (.000) 
 2.    .9531   .69988   .638 (.299) 1.006 (.590) .317 (.000) .791 (.000) 
CC 1.  1.4688   .61641   .122 (.299)  -.236 (.590) .308 (.000) .780 (.000) 
 2.  1.3750   .70147  -.392 (.299)  -.484 (.590) .282 (.000) .807 (.000) 
 3.  1.3906   .76878   .272 (.299)  -.168 (.590) .288 (.000) .847 (.000) 
RC 1.    .3015   .63842 5.488 (.302) 2.331 (.595) .459 (.000) .536 (.000) 
 2.    .4688   .90797 2.197 (.299) 4.513 (.595) .416 (.000) .584(.000) 
 3.    .3750   .65465 1.883 (.299) 3.656 (.595) .420 (.000) .616 (.000) 
DC 1.   .9219   .62500   .456 (.299) 1.225 (.595) .331 (.000) .762 (.000) 
SGP 1.    .7969   .73850 1.565 (.299) 5.283 (.595) .314 (.000) .714 (.000) 
 2.    .8906   .73716 1.404 (.299) 4.630 (.595) .332 (.000) .734 (.000) 
Notes: The tests of normality of distribution illustrate that several variables show considerable skewness 
and/or kurtosis. In most cases, many of the skewness values are even more than twice the value of the 
standard error. By a frequent standard error of 0.299 of the skewness, the skewness itself ranges from 
0.122 (“How many disagreements regarding different ideas were there during the one hour discus-
sion?”) up to 5.49 (“How much anger was there among the members of the group?”). In the non-tool 
condition, skewness is even more positive. In addition, some of the variables have quite kurtose distribu-
tions (which ranges from -0.037 for “I shared with my group members all the relevant insights, informa-
tion, experiences that I deemed relevant for the task” to 6.456 for “At every point in time I knew why 
the group was discussing a specific issue.”). Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality 
confirm the fact that variables show a non-normal distribution. Unfortunately, treating the variables 
with a logarithm did not improve the situation significantly. As a general tendency, respondents reported 
quite positively (or uncritically) on their or the groups behavior. One possible explanation for the non-
normality of our distributions is our small sample size (Yourstone & Zimmer, 1992). An additional ex-
planation for the non-normality could also be that students were only poorly motivated to reflect criti-
cally on the questions of the questionnaire after having participated in the relatively long experiment of 
one hour. Furthermore, biases of social desirability (Edwards, 1990) or of acquiescence (Hurd, 1999; 
Paulhaus, 1991) might also be reasons for the non-normal distributions we found. The subjective im-
pressions of the researchers, who attended the experiments as observers and who organized the correct 
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filling out of the questionnaires, found that for constructs, that are quite easily observable like balanced 
participations, the turn taking was not as balanced as respondents reported and that there was a differ-
ence between the respondents’ exposed theories (written or oral self-descriptions of one’s/an organiza-
tion’s behavior, values, beliefs) and the ones in use (those more implicit values, beliefs, and assumptions 
manifested in personal/organizational practice) (Argyris & Schön, 1978). 
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Appendix 13 
Original Scales with Factor Loadings and Cronbach Al-
phas Prior to Scale Adjustments 
Factor Item 
Factor 
Loading  
Eigen- 
value 
% of 
variance 
explained 
Cronbach 
alpha 
Balanced partici-
pation (EP) 
1 There were not one or two people who domi-
nated the discussion 
0.874 
 2. There was an adequate participation from all 
members of the group. 
0.814 
 3. The other members of my group paid atten-
tion to the comments I made. 
0.586 
1.77 0.59 0.65 
Big Picture (BP) 1. The conversation process was very clear 0.806 
 2. We never lost time on discussing irrelevant 
issues 0.724 
 3. We never lost time on too detailed discus-
sions 
0.602 
 4. I always knew how a specific contribution 
related to the more general topic of the dis-
cussion. 
0.603 
 5. At every point in time I knew why the group 
was discussing a specific issue. 
0.774 
 6. I knew at every point in time where we where 
in the discussion 
0.632 
2.90 0.48 0.78 
Common Ground 
(CG) 
1. During the discussion the group created a 
shared and deep understanding of the topic. 
0.829 
 2. During the conversation, the group devel-
oped and shared a common language to deal 
with the task 
0.854 
 3. I could now better adjust my communication 
style to the other members of the group. 
0.492 
1.66 0.55 0.55 
Task Conflict (TC) 1. How many disagreements regarding different 
ideas were there during the one hour discus-
sion? 
0.838 
 2. How many differences about the content of 
decisions did the group have to work 
through? 
0.749 
 3. How many differences of opinion were there 
within the group? 
0.837 
1.96 0.65 0.73 
Relationship 
Conflict (RC) 
1. How much anger was there among the 
members of the group? 
0.854 
 2. How much tension was there in the group 
during the exercise? 
0.898 
 3. How much personal friction was there in the 
group during decisions? 
0.901 
2.35 0.78 0.85 
Decision Com-
mitment(DC) 
1. I feel confident that our group made the right 
decisions 
0.709 
 2. The group was better at making the decision 
than I could have done by myself. 
0.674 
 3. The decisions were unanimous (that is, all 
four of us agreed) before the two managers 
of my group took a decision. 
0.424 
 4. There was a lot of agreement in the group. 0.730 
1.669 41.7 0.48 
Satisfaction with  1. I am satisfied with my group's set of solutions 0.881 
Group 2. I am satisfied with my group's performance 0.735 
Performance 
(SGP) 
3. I am satisfied with my performance on this 
assignment. 
0.650 
1.74 0.58 0.63 
 
Notes: Items reported in grey are the ones we had to drop
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Appendix 14  
Group Comparison of Means between Tool and Non-Tool 
Condition 
Construct Non-Tool Condition  
Mean (S.D.) 
Tool Condition 
Mean (S.D) 
d t2 p 
Balanced participation 0.89 (0.73) 1.19 (0.94) -.30 -1.41 .165 n.s. 
Big Picture 0.99 (0.30) 1.46 (0.67) -.47 -3.53 .001** 
Common Ground 0.84 (0.50) 1.06 (0.61) -.22 -1.58 .120 n.s. 
Task Conflict 2.55 (0.57) 2.63 (0.57) -.07 -.52 .608 n.s. 
Relationship Conflict 3.52 (0.76) 3.71 (0.53) -.19 -1.16 .250 n.s. 
Decision Commitment 0.90 (0.64) 0.94 (0.62) -.03 -.20 .843 n.s. 
 Group Comparison of Means between Tool- and Non-Tool-Condition 
Notes: SD = standard deviation, d = effect size, t2 = t-test, p = p-value  
** Significance at .01 level, * Significance at .05 level 
The means comparison between the tool and non-tool condition shows significant 
means differences only with regard to the “big picture” construct. The mean is sig-
nificantly higher in the tool condition (mean: 1.46 (S.D.: 0.67) than in the unsup-
ported condition (mean: 0.99 (S.D.: 0.30). The individuals in the non-tool groups 
struggled less to gain the big picture and they were more satisfied with their perform-
ance than the individuals interacting with the facilitation of the tool. Although we 
have not expected that the tool has a significant positive impact on the level of the 
means, the significant negative effect for the big picture construct can be explained by 
a low familiarity with the tool and the use of an inexperienced moderator (person us-
ing the tool). Both aspects led to breaks in the communication flow, an exaggerate 
time allocation for the documentation of details, and an unbalanced participation.  
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Appendix 15 
Pearson's Inter-Construct Correlations Controlling for the 
Tool/Non-Tool Condition 
 EP 
non-tool/ 
tool 
BP 
non-tool/ 
tool 
CG 
non-tool/ 
tool 
TC 
non-tool/ 
tool 
RC 
non-tool/ 
tool 
DC 
non-tool/ 
tool 
Balanced participation 
(EP) 
      
Big Picture (BP) .37*/.49**      
Common Ground (CG) .18/.35* .20/.54**     
Task Conflict (TC) -.57**/-.24 -.31/-.10 -.10/.24    
Relationship Conflict 
(RC) 
-.55**/-.33 -.50**/-.47** -.18/-.60** .50**/.05   
Decision Commitment 
(DC) 
.28/.27 .37*/.52** -.10/.31 -.51**/-.22 -.35/-.26  
 
Notes: ** Significance at .01 level, * Significance at .05 level 
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Appendix 16 
Multiple-Sample Analysis between Tool and Non-Tool 
Groups Showing Unstandardized Values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unstandardized Estimates for Tool Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unstandardized Estimates for Non-Tool 
Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge
Integration 
in Decision 
Making
Task
Conflict
Common 
Ground
Big Picture
Balanced
Participation
Decision 
Commitment
.69
Relationship
Conflict
-.74
-1.02
.96
1.02
1.00
.22
Unstandardized Estimates:
chi-square= 16.176 df=16 
p-value=.441
gfi=.923 agfi=.798 aic=68.176
rmsea=.013 pclose=.7600
Knowledge
Integration 
in Decision 
Making
Task
Conflict
Common 
Ground
Big Picture
Balanced
Participation
Decision 
Commitment
.61
Relationship
Conflict
-1.07
-3.64
.26
.33
1.00
.27
